



7.1 Country Brief: A social psychological perspective on trends of extremism in Israel

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and broader social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) to move towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. We intend to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, including a sense of being victimised, being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts, including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation-states adapt to new security challenges. Mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts is crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that radicalisation processes often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national justice frameworks. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation is central to the project’s aims.

Executive Summary

This country brief summarises the survey findings for Israel. It then embeds the survey findings within a national and cultural context for each country. The aim of these summaries is to situate the findings within their respective sociopolitical and sociocultural contexts. The literature review and rationale for the proposed model, analysis of the full dataset, and discussion can be found in the full 7.1 report, which also contains the country briefs.

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1. Results

Only 3.07% of participants in Israel did not know their political attitudes. These participants were removed, the variable retained, and the final sample was $n = 315$.

Descriptives

Breakdown by age and sex.

Mean age (SD)	Sex					
	Male		Female		Other	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
24.40 (4.95)	155	47.69	169	52.00	1	0.31

Breakdown by religious affiliation.

	n	%
Jewish	259	79.69
Christian	23	7.08
Muslim	21	6.46
Agnostic/Atheist	18	5.54
Other	3	0.92
Bahá'í	1	0.31
Buddhist	0	0.00
Hindu	0	0.00
Sikh	0	0.00

Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?

	n	%
Yes	88	27.08
No	196	60.31
Don't know	41	12.62

Breakdown of belonging to a group that is discriminated against On what grounds is your group discriminated against?

	n	%
Religion	46	52.27
Gender	15	17.05
Nationality	13	14.77
Language	13	14.77
Ethnic group	12	13.64

Colour or race	10	11.36
Disability	9	10.23
Other	7	7.95
Age	6	6.82
Sexuality	5	5.68

Note: participants were allowed to select multiple groups. As such, proportions will not necessarily add to 100%

Breakdown of different organizations participants reported being members of (active or inactive) or not.

	Active		Inactive		Not a member	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Church or religious organization	115	35.38	103	31.69	107	32.92
Sport or recreational organization	108	33.23	116	35.69	101	31.08
Art, music or educational organization	85	26.15	116	35.69	124	38.15
Labour union	84	25.85	120	36.92	121	37.23
Political party	43	13.23	149	45.85	133	40.92
Environmental organization	59	18.15	136	41.85	130	40.00
Professional association	74	22.77	123	37.85	128	39.38
Humanitarian or charitable organization	66	20.31	125	38.46	134	41.23
Consumer organization	63	19.38	116	35.69	146	44.92
Self-help group or mutual help group	67	20.62	134	41.23	124	38.15
Women's group	65	20.00	124	38.15	136	41.85
Other organization	46	14.15	108	33.23	171	52.62

Breakdown of different political actions participants reported taking in the last 12 months.

	Yes		No		Missing value	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Contacted a politician or government official	73	22.46	232	71.38	20	6.15
Worked in a political party or action group	51	15.69	261	80.31	13	4.00
Worked in another ideological organization	48	14.77	253	77.85	24	7.38
Displayed a campaign badge/sticker	75	23.08	232	71.38	18	5.54
Signed a petition	129	39.69	173	53.23	23	7.08
Took part in a lawful public demonstration	76	23.38	228	70.15	21	6.46
Boycotted certain products	122	37.54	180	55.38	23	7.08
Posted or shared anything about politics online	114	35.08	200	61.54	11	3.38

Predictors of realistic threat

Holding stronger beliefs about inherent group hierarchies (social dominance orientation) was associated with greater perceptions of threat to one's national ingroup from migrants. Feelings of anomie were also associated with greater perceived threat. Although we did not have predictions about vulnerability and perceptions of realistic threat, experiencing social alienation was linked with lower perceptions of threat from migrants.

Direct predictors of extremism

Holding stronger beliefs about inherent group hierarchies (social dominance orientation) was also linked directly with increased support for extremist attitudes. A stronger online group identity was also directly associated with greater support for extremist attitudes. Perceiving that one's ingroup was superior to other social groups was linked with greater support for extremism. Additionally, perceiving that one's national ingroup was more economically deprived relative to migrants was also linked with greater support for extremism. Regarding political ideology, populism was associated with greater support for extremism. In terms of vulnerability, feeling more socially alienated was linked with increased endorsement of extremism.

Indirect predictors on extremism

Increased social dominance orientation had an indirect effect on increased support for extremist attitudes via increased group relative deprivation. However, it also indirectly affected lower support for extremism via decreased populism. The total indirect effect of social dominance orientation was not significant.

A stronger online group identity had indirect effects on increased support for extremist attitudes via increased social alienation, increased populism, and increased collective narcissism. The total indirect effect was not statistically significant.

Predictors of attitudes towards Russian culture, Russian and Ukrainian migrants

Holding stronger beliefs about group hierarchies (social dominance orientation) and endorsing more extremist attitudes were both separately associated with more negative attitudes towards Russia. Additionally, perceiving migrants in general as a threat to Israel and its resources was linked with more negative attitudes towards Russia. Conversely, experiencing greater anomie was associated with more positive attitudes towards Russia.

Perceiving that one's individual economic situation was more deprived relative to migrants in general and that migrants are a threat to Israel and its resources were both separately associated with worsened attitudes towards Russian and Ukrainian migrants. Additionally, holding more populist beliefs was linked with worsened attitudes towards Russian migrants in the past twelve months.

Figure 10. Respecified model for Israel.



2. Situating the findings within the Israeli context

This report seeks to explain the survey results through the socio-political complexity of Israeli society. Several processes have been taking place in recent years, which have raised significant concerns about the relationship between the democratic regime and the citizens. After a short introduction (2.1), the first part (2.2) deals with the processes that undermined the trust between the citizens and the government while referring to the activity of civil society and the recent protests against the current government. In the case of Israel, political instability and multiple election systems led to deep polarisation between political camps and different social groups.

The second part (2.3) deals with the various practices used by the various political forces, such as online personalisation and populism, as tactics of separation between "us" and "them" and their possible effect on extremist tendencies. As found in the survey, a more robust online group identity predicted greater collective narcissism, stronger feelings of social cohesion in one's neighbourhood and community, stronger feelings of social alienation, and decreased populism. This part of the report includes attention to the role of the online space and political processes. It shows that the leaders' personalities have become central in the eyes of the Israeli voting public while politicians are expressing extreme positions online. As such, social networks also significantly influence trends of radicalisation. Therefore, the survey results might reflect the tendency to "normalise" discriminatory posts, thus creating feelings of discrimination and inequality in addition to the existing polarisation.

Section 2.4 offers some background to the dominance of women shown in the results. The current fear of reducing women's rights, which is reflected ambiguously, goes in parallel to the fact that they constitute a majority in Israeli society (51%). It forms the feeling of dominance

among women, who respond through civil society to what they perceive as an attempt to reduce their rights and the female space in light of the collaboration of far-right parties in the coalition. This is also part of a process of regression that has been occurring since 2015 concerning gender equality in society.

The following section (2.5) refers to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its outcomes, in context to the vast Jewish population still living there, others who immigrated to Israel during the war, and the Russian-Ukrain Jewish population who came to Israel in the 90s. Contrary to expectations, greater collective narcissism did not predict greater perceptions of migrants as realistic threats. Instead, increased collective narcissism directly predicted more significant support for extremist attitudes without having to pass through perceptions of migrants as threats. Increased feelings of social alienation predicted a *decreased* perception of migrants being a realistic threat but *increased* support for extremist attitudes.

Section 2.6 attends to the fact that Political attitudes had no relationship (either direct or indirect) to support extremist attitudes. It might suggest that societal polarisation holds grave importance for the public and is not necessarily dependent on political affiliation. We relate it to the cost of living and the economic situation following the Corona crisis, raising the tendency towards extreme positions unaffected by political partisanship. The division of the geographic periphery is reflected in the absence of voting in areas with low socio-economic classification, which continues a trend of mistrust in the political system over the years. In addition, it shows that right-wing representation is more common in peri-urban environments, which some consider part of the lower socio-economic clusters.

Finally, the report offers concluding remarks, emphasising that the connection between online activity and extremism can be related to the rise of online political personalisation and progressing populist practices, leading to further radicalisation.

2.1. Introduction

The proportion of those who believe that 'Israeli democracy is in grave danger' is just over half, according to the Israel Democracy Institute 2022 survey. It is a factor in increased domestic polarisation. Over a third of the interviewees (35.5%) reported having experienced sharp disagreements with family members or co-workers regarding the latest legislative changes and the 'judicial overhaul' protests. It turns out that the differences of opinion permeate the daily lives of Israel's citizens to a significant extent. This experience is not the property of only one political camp among the Jewish majority; the political left, centre, and right share it. The IDI survey has also reflected concerns regarding translating this polarising conflict into a violent clash between citizens. Accordingly, only a minority predicts a high probability of a violent civil war in the future (Jews 39.5%, Arabs 45%). Segmentation by political camps (Jews) shows that fear is the highest on the left and the lowest on the right (Herman and Anavi, 2023).

This report offers an explanatory analysis of D.Rad survey results. The empirical information obtained from the study was cross-referenced with theories and other empirical findings to draw appropriate insights in light of the latest developments in Israeli society. The materials used for this analysis include academic studies on Israeli society, surveys conducted by

research institutes and government institutions on socio-economic, gender and relations between the government and citizens, and reports from reliable media.

The following sections will provide possible explanations for the survey findings, considering the social structure, cultural texture and political conflicts that characterise Israeli society in recent years. Section 2.2 pays particular attention to political participation issues and the democratic framework. Section 2.3 examines the issue of extremism through practices of populism and online personalisation, taking into account the effect of social media on both. Section 2.4 discusses some reflections regarding the results showing gender-based differences between the participants' political agendas.

Section 2.5 concerns the answers given in the survey regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine while examining the local context of immigration. Section 2.6 briefly explains the connection between voting patterns and socio-economic clusters in Israeli society, which might indicate political tendencies. We conclude with a summary of the explanatory analysis of the survey and conclusive remarks.

2.2. Explanatory analysis: Political participation and the democratic discourse

According to our survey, only 13% of the participants identified themselves as "active members" of a political party, and 45.85% were inactive. 39.69% of the participants said they had signed a petition, while 23.38% participated in a public protest. 35.08% have posted a publication that involves political content. This data can be explained by civic society tendencies, characterised by widespread involvement in everyday life.

The "cost of living" national protest of 2011 is considered a landmark in the political history of Israeli society. It has changed the population's political involvement since it has increased the activity of civil society and reflected the decrease in trust in political entities. It has expressed a crisis of representation of the modern political system against the failure of the postmodern political culture to communicate inequality in the socio-economic field (Ram and Filc, 2017). The protest has shown that hundreds of thousands sought representation outside the political system. It illustrated that the parties lost their central role as mediators between the citizens and the state, leaving the political arena open to competition (Ibid, 75-78).

The lack of trust was connected to the political protests in 2020, named "the Balfour demonstrations" against the prime Minister's indictment on three criminal charges (Gorali, 2020). The 2022 elections, fifth in number since 2019, established a full-right-wing coalition that holds the majority of the public's votes. The expectation was that Israeli society would drift away from the intense political polarisation it has been experiencing for quite a while. However, the coalition includes the electorates of three extremist parties, holding an ethno-religious, nationalist, far-right agenda, endangering the hopes for social solidarity: "Jewish Power" party (Otzma Yehudit) led by the Minister of national security, Itamar Ben Gvir; Religious Zionist party (Ha'Zionot Ha'Datit) led by the Minister of Treasury Betzalel Smotrich; and "Noam" party, characterised as 'messianic', anti-LGBTQ+ communities, and Ultra-ethnocentric led by Knesset Member Avi Maoz (Vertman and Elran, 2022; see also: D3.2).

Political stability is questionable, given the social influences of the extreme-religious parties on the public atmosphere. Decisions on sensitive issues such as security, minority rights and

equality seriously affect existing conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian shareholder on holy places in Jerusalem and issues in the West Bank. The 2022 election results and voting rates can explain the need for more trust in political parties. It reflects on the voices that were **not** heard and did not come into representation, such as the liberal party of "Meretz", which failed to pass the electorate threshold for the first time in its history (Ben Chaim and Keynan, 2022). Meretz's agenda is to advance human rights, equality, and conflict solutions through peace.

The fact that the rate of electorates was low compared to earlier years and held 70.6% out of eligible votes shows the weakness of leftist parties, which were considered the parliamentary response to the extremist ones from the right wing. In the Arab sector, the voting rate was only 53.2%. In parallel to extreme parties, the Ultra-orthodox parties have also increased their number of electorates. Still, the far-right religious Zionist parties, which have joined forces into one joint list, increased their power by more than 10%. (Vertman and Elran, 2022, 2). Meretz had the chance to follow the same path of a shared list but was rejected by the Labour Party (Azoulay, 2023).

Vertman and Elran (2022) explain the increased power of the far right as caused by the diffusion of the religious Zionist mainstream parties and other sectorial parties over the years. The leftist bloc of parties has decreased its power to 38.3% compared to the right-wing bloc led by Benjamin Netanyahu, with 49.6% of the party electorates. The two mentioned that the complex of far-right religious parties could result in a critical main challenge, emphasised in two fields. Firstly, the relations between Jews and Arabs inside the state also show benefits to the West Bank settlers rather than cultivating ties with the Palestinians. The second concerns the USA officials and the American-Jewish community's reactions to these potentials, seeing radical agendas as a significant part of the Israeli government coalition. It can affect Israel's identity as both Jewish and democratic (Ibid, p. 3).

The last IDI annual report shows that public trust in state institutions decreased, while parliament and the political parties suffered the lowest trust rate of 10% (Israeli Democracy Index, 2022, 5). On the topic of "The strongest tension in Israeli society today", 34% showed that they see it coming from the far-right threat, while 61% said it is the tension between Jews and Arabs (Ibid, 6). When asked about the state and religion ratio, 51% of the seculars supported the dominancy of the democratic component, while 58.5% of the conservative religious participants supported the Jewish one (Ibid, 8). Compared to the global index that measures democratic characteristics, Israel is high in political participation (95-100 per cent from the OECD average), and most parameters have remained stable (Ibid, 11).

At the beginning of 2023, hundreds of thousands from the Israeli public joined the growing weekly mass protests, which originated at the Kaplan junction in the centre of Tel Aviv and spread across 150 locations in the country. The Israelis participating in the demonstrations come from different sectors, political parties and classes. Their main claim is that democracy is at risk due to the "judicial overhaul", meaning the coalition's attempts to pass judicial laws aim to weaken the judicial system, enabling the government more power. Dozens of civic and private organisations joined forces following this primary claim: *"If the reform gets underway, there is only one authority left: the government [...] this is how Israel will change the form of the regime from democracy to dictatorship."*(Restart-Israel, 2023). The continued protests demand to stop the legislation as it shatters the traditional construction of Israel as a democracy.

2.3. Populism, personalisation, and extremism

As a fundamental premise, the dominance of the Jewish majority in Israel was well reflected in the identity of our survey participants. 79.69% were identified as Jews (by religion), while only 13% were Christians and Muslims. According to our survey results, an online group identity significantly indirectly affected extremist attitudes via collective narcissism, social alienation and populism. However, as with SDO, the total indirect effect was not significant. As with SDO, the full impact and direct effects were significant. A more robust online group identity predicted increased collective narcissism, increased feelings of societal alienation, and populism. In turn, an increase in these variables predicted a rise in support for extremist attitudes. SDO had a significant indirect effect on extremist attitudes via populism and group relative deprivation, although the combined indirect effects were insignificant. The total effect (i.e., the sum of indirect and direct effects) was significant: greater SDO predicted more substantial support for extremist attitudes. However, the relationship seems mainly driven by the immediate effect, independent of the influence through other variables.

During the years of the Netanyahu regime, the 'exclusionary' path has been central in fulfilling polarised politics, which extremists have adopted (Hoffstein, 2023). The rise of populist practices can explain it. Populism sees "the people" as the source of good and truth. Populist movements tend to explain and understand society as priorly polarised, divided into 'them' and 'us'. 'They' are mainly "the elites", seen as disconnected from "the people". The anti-elitism approach often goes hand in hand with xenophobia, nationalism and other exclusive paths. The democratic concept of the populist movements emphasises that democracy is, first and foremost, people's sovereignty by governing themselves (Mudde, 2017). The division of "us" (the people) and "them" (the others) is leaning either on an inclusive approach or an exclusive one through three dimensions: symbolic, material, and political. Exclusionary populism symbolises "them" as those who are not part of the people and should be cast out from material rights by political delegitimation (Filc, 2006).

In Israel, political populism divides Jews and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians, Right and Left, religious and seculars, women and men, and more. What assists it is that a large portion of the political activity has been transferred to the online arena, amplifying the ability to reach vast crowds exposed to intense content (Zamir and Rahat, 2019). The online populist practice undermines liberal values such as tolerance, affecting democracies globally (ISOC-IL, 2020, pp. 20-21). In 2014, the Knesset passed a law in which the blocking percentage was increased from 2% to 3.25% to prevent extremist parties from taking control and entering the parliament. It created the opposite effect of the growth of extremism since it did not prevent the global rise of populism and its influence on radicalisation (Retig-Gour, 2022).

Our survey showed that online group identity significantly indirectly affected extremist attitudes via collective narcissism, social alienation and populism. However, as with SDO, the total indirect effect was not significant. As with SDO, the total effect and direct effects were significant. A stronger online group identity predicted stronger support for extremist attitudes. However, the relationship is mainly driven by the direct effect (70% of the total effect) and not by the indirect influence of online group identity on other variables (30% of the total effect). Political attitudes had no relationship (either direct or indirect) to support for extremist attitudes.

Patterns of political personalisation can also be pinpointed as a process in which the political weight of the only player, such as the party leader, rises. At the same time, the importance of the group goes down (Zamir and Rahat, 2019, p. 7). A study of online political habits showed that Israeli surfers' consumption of social networks presents a preference to follow the politicians' Facebook pages and Twitter accounts, especially of their leaders and parties. Israel is a case-in-point of extreme personalisation compared to other countries (Ibid 8-9). The relationship between the parties and the citizens experiencing a weakening manifests itself in a decrease in loyalty to parties, membership in parties, trust in the parties and even in the participation rates in the elections. This space is filled with Politicians as individuals and mainly, but not only, the parties' leaders. It is part of the phenomena of the "individualisation" of politics (Ibid, 13-14). Personalisation progresses populist leaders whose discourse may weaken the gatekeepers of democracy (Ibid, 15-16). Social media and digital online networks encourage personalisation, providing opportunities for politicians to stand out more than their parties due to direct interaction with civilians (Ibid, 23).

An additional aspect of online development is the ability to spread "fake news" and propagate populism and other agendas more easily and quickly, thus enabling the spread of extremist views. Fake news can bring the sinking of the concept of truth, creating a crisis of decreased trust in democratic institutions (Karniel and Lavie-Dinor, 2022). Fake news enables doubts and facts, leaning on a blurring line between legal-scientific and spiritual-subjective truth. Alternative facts are created, supporting "conspiracy" theories (e.g., COVID-19) (Ibid, 116-118, 120-123). Social networks enhance the perception of trust as a question of faith, asking those who represent "my truth" (124-126).

Our survey also explained 38.60% of the variability in extremism scores (i.e., 38.60% of the variability in participants' extremist attitudes can be explained by our model). SDO had a significant indirect effect on extremist attitudes via populism and group relative deprivation, although the combined indirect effects were insignificant. Beyond any indirect effects, greater SDO directly affected more significant support for extremist attitudes. The total impact (i.e., the sum of indirect and direct effects) was significant: greater SDO predicted stronger support for extremist attitudes.

The fact that only 35% of the respondents to our survey said they had an affiliation to a religious organisation like a church, mosque or synagogue means that most religious discriminated participants had no affiliation to such institution and that the impression of inequality was not necessarily attached to a specific practice. According to the above, the perception of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) was higher among those who did not come from discriminated groups. Participants who identified as discriminated against had stronger online identities than those who were not, alongside lower collective narcissism. Those who do not belong to a discriminated-against group showed higher individual relative deprivation than those who felt discriminated.

The above can be explained by the contemporary political atmosphere. As recently noted by USA President Joe Biden: *"Netanyahu has some of the most extreme government members I have ever seen, and I go back in time to Golda Meir. Smotrich and Ben Gvir are part of the problem in the West Bank."* (cited in Bar, 2023). In the Arab public, the large majority opposes Minister Smotrich's statement that "There are no Palestinian people". The Jewish public is divided on this matter while on the left, the majority contends; in the centre, slightly more than

half; on the right, only a tiny minority disagrees with the Minister's statement (Herman and Anavi, 2023).

2.4. Gender

Our survey reflected that women reported a stronger social dominance orientation (SDO) compared to men, as 39.31% expressed it against 36.59% among men. This is particularly interesting for Israel as research has consistently found that men typically score higher on SDO across cultures than women. Women also expressed stronger online identity (17.41%) than men (14.63%). Women had greater political trust (47.25%) than men (45.35%).

This can be explained by the simple fact that Women make up 51% of the total population in Israel compared to 49% of men (Carmel, 2023). and still. Inequality characterises the socio-gender relations in Israeli society. According to Chazan (2018), Israel has always been a gendered society. Gender gaps have taken on different forms over time. "With all the considerable progress gained by women in education, health, the workplace, and recently even in the political realm, women, however, empowered, still do not enjoy substantial power." (Chazan, 2018, 141).

Since 2015, Israeli politics and society have experienced regression in equality under the leadership of the right-wing parties: "ushered in a right-wing government that is bent on changing the rules of the game by defying Israel's commitment not only to coexistence with its neighbours, but also to basic notions of religious pluralism, social equity, and solidarity. It has promoted a monolithic, ethnocentric interpretation of the country's identity and aspirations, fueling social divisions and exacerbating internal friction. [...] This toxic mixture of intolerance, authoritarianism, and populism emanating from the top" affects gender relations (e.g., excluding women from public events). (Chazan, 2018, 149).

The feminist struggle in Israel has re-awaken in the past year; some would say it is due to a lack of representation. According to the Knesset research division, in the 2022 elections, only 29 female Knesset members were elected, which is 24% of all elected Knesset members. The number of elected representatives has remained unchanged since 2015 (Avgar, 2022). Various feminist organisations have joined the anti-judicial overhaul protests, captured as an authoritarian coup that will harm women's rights by narrowing the judicial system's authority. The judicial overhaul reflects it. Among the Jewish population, women reported higher rates of sharp disagreements in their immediate environment than men (respectively 45% vs. 33%). Among the voters of the Arab parties, only a minority experienced such differences of opinion (Herman and Anavi, 2023).

A central initiative presents a weekly march of the women in red inspired by "The Handmaid's Tale" TV show, based on Margaret Atwood's novel. The affiliation is based on the idea that under the leadership of extremists, the USA is becoming an extreme and class-based halachic state where women lose their achievements (Yael, 2023). Atwood herself wrote on her Twitter account how astonishing and overwhelming the protests are (Walla, 2023). The March is organised by the "Building an Alternative" foundation, which brings together women from all sectors: secular, religious, traditional, Haredi, Arab, Muslim, Christian, Druze, and Jewish. Its main claim is that gender equality is going through an opposite process of declining women's rights. The foundation sees it as a fight that includes the women of the State of Israel 2023,

which "grew up free, with almost equal rights, served in the army, developed professionally, sat in the Knesset, served, headed a party and even had a prime minister." (Yael, 2023)

2.5. Immigration

Our survey examined reflections regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. Participants reported that their attitudes towards Russian migrants in the last 12 months had not changed significantly. However, participants reported their attitudes towards Ukrainian migrants in the previous 12 months to have improved slightly. Increased SDO, individual relative deprivation, and support for extremist attitudes significantly predicted worsened attitudes against Russia (e.g., "We should break all cooperation with Russian academics, artists, and athletes."). According to the survey, contrary to expectations, greater collective narcissism did not predict greater perceptions of migrants as realistic threats. Instead, increased collective narcissism directly predicted more significant support for extremist attitudes without having to pass through perceptions of migrants as threats. Increased feelings of social alienation predicted a *decreased* perception of migrants being a realistic threat but *increased* support for extremist attitudes.

Immigration from the former Soviet Union should be considered under context. In Ukraine and Russia, Jewish communities handle ties with families and friends who immigrated to Israel after the fall of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the '90s. According to Shumsky (2001), hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Russian communities had to adjust to Israeli culture. They were seen as "others" many times until they developed, among others, political strength. The Jewish ethnicity was less critical than the ability to connect to the Israeli Zionist nationality and be part of its secular formation.

The Russia-Ukraine war has raised the number of immigrants to Israel, which holds a tight immigration policy that benefits Jews. According to the Knesset research division, immigration to Israel in 2022 from Ukraine and Russia was greatly affected by the war between the two countries. The Russian invasion resulted in an extraordinary wave of migration of Ukrainian citizens, especially women and children, who fled to other countries in Europe and different regions. The war in Ukraine led to a significant increase in the number of people interested in immigrating to Israel from Ukraine and Russia, in the number of actual immigrants, and in the number of citizens who sought to change their status in Israel to immigrants (Eliyahu, 2022). The only criterion for checking eligibility for immigration is full compliance with the Law of Return. According to the "Law of Return, 1950": "A Jew is one who was born to a Jewish mother or who converted and is not a member of another religion" (Eliyahu, 2022, 3). Before and during the actual fighting (January-October 2022), 38,047 requests for immigration were received in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. This number is more than twice the number of applications received in 2021. From March to October 2022, about 44,000 immigrants from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus immigrated to Israel - 29,133 from Russia, 13,570 from Ukraine and 1,580 from Belarus. The Ministry of Welfare assisted 12,877 citizens of Ukraine who were not entitled to immigrate to Israel during the war (Ibid, 6-8).

2.6. Urban/ Peri-urban

Radicalisation does not necessarily reflect a political preference since some perpetrators and extremists do not believe in political parties (see D3.2). However, voter trends in Israel

differentiate between the low-class population, who usually live in peripheral areas, and the high classes, who typically vote for centre leftist parties. The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBOS) uses the socio-economic rate to produce data that can be of value to social development. The rate is determined by several measures, in which each municipality is ranked averagely by clusters, in which "1" is the lowest, and "10" is the highest (Agmon, 2016)

The elections of 2019, for example, showed that the bigger parties get the majority of the votes, as the highest support rate for the Likud party was also recorded in the last elections in localities and regions with a socio-economic rating of 6-4. The highest support rate for the Blue-White party was also recorded, this time in localities and areas with a rating of 8-10 (Hoffman-Dishon, 2019). The general votes for right-wing parties were among clusters 4-7, while some Jewish-zionists were also in clusters 8-10.

The 2022 elections showed a similar notion, in which voting tendencies in Israel are attached to socio-economic class divisions, which are accumulated in the living area. Within the middle class (clusters 4-7), it was found that every third voter supports the right-wing "Likud" party, almost double that of the second largest centre party, "Yesh Atid". In addition, most religious Zionist parties come from the same clusters, as the party of Smotrich and Ben Gvir are third in size with the support of 13.5% of the votes. Among areas which compare clusters 1-3, the vote rate is generally the lowest. The clusters contain religious and Arab municipalities, in which most of the votes were given to sectorial parties, and only 10% voted for the Likud party.

The political processes in Israeli society, directly and indirectly, reflect the survey results, although no direct influence of the participants' political or ideological positions was found. From the analysis of the voter turnout according to clusters, the wealthy localities vote more than the average turnout. There is a correlation between the economic cluster of the locality and the decrease in the turnout, except in the lower group, where the turnout is 1% higher than the average. At the same time, only 112,000 votes came from Cluster 1, against almost 404,000 from Cluster 9 (Racover and Kaspin, 2022). If anything, even if it can be said that radicalisation might derive from peri-urban areas, the data above indicate that it does not necessarily verify one's affiliation to political power. Here, it shows that not voting is a more common trend in peripheral areas among lower economic classes.

The survey proposes some correlations between the socio-political tensions of Israeli society and its polarised views affected by populism and political personalisation. The connection between online activity and extremism can be related to the rise of online political personalisation and progressing populist practices, leading to further radicalisation.

The survey results showed a connection between online activity and a tendency towards extreme positions. The political extremism present in Israel also reflects the use of different practices (e.g., populism) in ambivalency to the extensive civil society activity against the current administration, which it claims promotes extremism. For example, the data showed a female predominance among the survey respondents. At the same time, socio-political events indicate a regression in granting rights to women and a fear of the reduction of equality between women and men in light of the political administration that changed in 2022.

The results of the survey testify to the deep polarisation that exists in Israeli society through the tendency to go in radical directions, probably under the influence of the political instability

in Israel, the multitude of election systems, and security and economic instability, respectively, which started even after the outbreak of the Corona epidemic. A significant percentage felt that they were discriminated against, which links to trends of polarisation and violence and a feeling of institutionalised discrimination.

Above all, it can be said that the lack of trust in the political systems in Israel, which characterises the last decade through struggles of the cost of living and socio-economic differentiation between the periphery and the centre, can explain the tendency towards extremism and populism that centres on the concept of "the people" and its welfare. Cross-checking the data with the abstention from voting in areas geographically distant from the central and more affluent regions showed that despite political personalisation by parties, a significant part of the public did not go to vote at all. This point is also coherent with the finding that political attitudes had no relationship (either direct or indirect) to support extremist attitudes.

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