



D5.2 Mainstreaming, Gender and Communication

Hungary country report

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

Executive Summary/Abstract

This report focuses on radicalisation instigated by toxic masculinity, gender discrimination and sexism in Hungary with a special focus on the context that a politically induced polarisation stimulates, while emphasising the unfolding measures of de-radicalisation within the society. To show how the Hungarian political elite promotes toxic masculinity by politics as well as legislation and execution of policy, we have analysed digital media content and media articles from the most recent years. The first part of the report investigates the historical background of sexism, toxic masculinity and anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment within the political arena by reflecting on neo-Turanism in Hungary – a political ideology that rests on mythical interpretations of Hungarian prowess and valour as fighters and state builders, which inevitably indicate masculine superiority. In the second part, through analysing digital media content of de-radicalisation agents, we promote rather unconventional ways of de-radicalisation measures. A content analysis regarding social media platforms presented us with data and user comments about polarisation regarding sexism and toxic masculinity in Hungary. While they showcase the current status of polarisation in Hungary, they have also presented us with inferences as to how social media can mediate the impacts of radicalisation and equally instigate de-radicalisation. By investigating anti- and pro-gender actors, this report serves as a map of politically induced radicalisation and how stakeholders and ordinary citizens in society reacts against stark polarisation over gender issues.

I. Introduction

Toxic masculinity is rampant in Hungary. Right-wing conservative ideology in power, imbued with a state-led radicalisation (Fazekas and Korkut 2021), has instrumentalized mediated hegemonic presentations of gender roles. As our report presents below, these gender roles serve to circulate misogyny, toxic masculinity and anti-LGBTQ ideologies. Some of these representations find their due hosts even in such political leaders as the President of the Republic. In this report, we explore how the Fidesz government adopts and exploits a self-made gender ideology to broaden the appeal of its politics. We note the impact that a mythical Hungarian past constructed with references to irredentist political claims and nomadic life styles - which inevitably also hosts masculinity - has had on the composition of the far-right in Hungary. In this effort, this report explores how radicalisation boosted by mediated hegemonic gender representations has become a tool for the Hungarian government, which we conceive as the main actor of radicalisation in Hungary. In the first part of the report, we showcase the history of the Hungarian far-right movements and how the Fidesz party reached the climax of polarisation and gender-based radicalisation. We demonstrate the government's usurpation of traditional values and its efforts to monopolise the Hungarian political scene with its own interpretations of gender roles that have nonetheless unleashed rampant gender-based radicalisation including misogyny, toxic masculinity and anti-LGBTQ+ ideologies.

The report proposes two case studies on the confluence of the right-wing gender ideology and its instrumentalization through media exploring the ways in which they boost radicalisation. One of them is the campaign period for the election of the new Hungarian President in 2022 and how Novák became the President of Hungary through representing her life-style and her personality as subservient to the classical notions of gender roles that expect women to be multiple child-bearing mothers and home-makers while also working even as a politician.

The second case refers to the making of the anti-LGBTQ+ legislation in Hungary. This has created a certain hostility within the society towards such issues as the visibility of

any LGBTQ+-related content. This content has now been banned by from appearing in school curricula or in any mainstream media. At the face of such hostile environment against LGBTQ+ issues and conservative interpretations of gender roles in legacy media, discussion around these issues and their representation find a host within the boundaries of social media. This sphere is, currently not administered by any political body (even if the Fidesz government had tried to take its hands-on Facebook regulations) and therefore there is a certain freedom provided for users to express their opinions. However, given that it is a deeply polarised nation characterised by past decades of grievance and injustice, the conversation between sides on social media is usually heated.

There are various challenges with doing de-radicalisation related work in Hungary. The current political climate is disadvantageous to pursue de-radicalisation-related research. As we have earlier established, polarisation and radicalisation in Hungary are politically induced and most political actors are themselves eminent radicalisers. This has become the case most manifested in the field of gender issues and legislation. This means that any de-radicalisation work by NGOs and civil actors are often prohibited by politicians as they are themselves stakeholders of radicalisation. This has meant that de-radicalisation, understood as 'prejudice-alleviation' in Hungarian language, programmes are banned in relation to gender-topics, due to a recent change in legislation. However, we came across how social media and particularly TikTok at times served as a medium of deradicalization. Our deradicalization case refers to social media activism within the remit of TikTok as a reaction to this legislation.

Over the coming sections, our report will first present an outline of our methodology. The second section refers to the mediated hegemonic gender presentations and its relationship with radicalisation in Hungary, with special focus on how toxic masculinity and anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments spread within the ranks of three right-wing parties (Fidesz, Jobbik, Our Homeland). After we lay out the background of gender presentation in the media, we turn to the analysis of media contents that are related to radicalisation focusing on two case studies. Then section V. presents the representation of de-radicalisation by collective agents with two case studies. Lastly,

we demonstrate how ordinary users spread de-radicalisation in Hungary with two case studies.

II. Methodology and methods

The issue with undertaking research in the topic of de-radicalisation in Hungary is to do with the fact that the term sounds strange in Hungarian language. The term mostly used for de-radicalisation measures is anti-polarisation or prejudice-alleviation, with the latter unfolding as much bigger underlying societal issues including toxic masculinity and heterosexism become apparent. The content of de-radicalisation in those instances relate to alleviation of prejudice against women in workplaces or against the members of the LGBTQ+ community. That is the reason why most NGOs refer to the term prejudice-alleviation, instead of de-radicalisation, even though the idea behind prejudice is mostly expressions of radicalisation.

Still, our report originates from two cases of radicalisation and one case of deradicalisation. In order to develop an understating of how gender-based polarisation, toxic masculinity and anti-LGBTQ+ views have spiralled in social media, we had undertaken content analyses in various social media platforms. Given the fact that Twitter in Hungary is usually in English, we excluded it from our scope while searching for ordinary users serving as stakeholders of radicalisation. It has become clear that Hungarian Twitter users mostly used the platform to connect with international businesses, people and potential funders. Instead, we looked at YouTube and TikTok since the younger generations tend to use these sites more frequently, as well as Facebook, which still serves as the leading social media platform in Hungary. Using Facebook as a starting point to present polarisation within social media platforms seemed unequivocal, since the Hungarian political elite still uses Facebook as their primary communication channel other than the traditional media. For instance, during the pandemic, Viktor Orbán held many live video statements on Facebook. Hence, we took one of his upload and analysed the comments under it. Secondly, we decided to use a TikTok sound as a base of our research on the platform, as it demonstrates politically induces de-radicalisation measures from average users – often without them knowing it. We watched a hundred of these short videos in order

to look for congruent messages – these findings are presented in Section VI. of the report. Thirdly, we found a YouTube video of Katalin Novák, the President of the Republic of Hungary and analysed the comment section in order to present polarisation and deep misogyny within the society. Our focus on specific actors is based on the premise that their content relates to radicalisation or de-radicalisation and the engagement they are able to create from users. During the analysis, we looked for specific topics that could either incite polarisation regarding to toxic masculinity or anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments or spread de-radicalisation messages.

We often came across Facebook pages of Instagram feeds where comments were extremely one-sided, which made us reflect on whether users deliberately filter their comment section to preserve their authenticity or to look more agreeable with their followers.

III. Mediated hegemonic gender presentations and its relationship to radicalisation in the country

Despite the improvement of gender-related legislation, increasing rights and freedoms as well as correction of historical mistakes that disadvantaged large sections of the society due to their gender and sexuality in the West, the situation in Hungary has reverted back to dark ages with oppression and social exclusion of those that demand gender equality or acceptance. The legislation that relates to the improvement of social politics during the country's EU accession process have either been reverted or at least stalled at the face of the Hungarian conservative right Fidesz gaining political traction and impressive political success with two-thirds majority in four general elections since 2010. In this regard, the first part of our report is set to demonstrate gender issues and how they have been exploited to become instruments of radicalisation with a historical scope in order to contextualise hegemonic or toxic masculinity in both social and political narratives in Hungary. This will form the basis of our composition of mediated hegemonic gender representations and toxic masculinity as its most essential element.

Hegemonic or toxic masculinity in Hungary is often related to the realm of right-wing political parties. Referring to the I-GAP spectrum, earlier D.Rad report on the Cultural Drivers of Radicalisation in Hungary (Fazekas and Korkut, 2022) have already established existing forms of injustice and grievance, caused by the regime change in Hungary. Arguably, the regime change has failed to manifest the redistribution of cultural and political power once socialism has ended (Tamás, 2012). In this turmoil, a big shift in the ideological underpinnings of the Hungarian state has happened and took the country from communism to extreme right radicalism. Rampant expressions of toxic masculinity relate to this political context.

Populism has also made its toll on Hungary over the past twelve years and this has had dire impacts on the making of and resonating societal gender roles. The Fidesz government is the primary authority that disseminates narratives about what 'women's place' should be to serve the conservative future that it has committed itself to build in the country. Its aim to build such conservative futures featured in its attacks on groups such as the LGBTQ+ community or ethnic minorities, which conceivably veer away from the aims of the Fidesz-defined conservative future. An aversion of globalization and multiculturalism and anti-immigrant sentiments, which fuel a desire to recover the lost 'greatness' of a nation in decline, have become essential makers of populist politics (Agius, 2021) as well. There is a further element of such politics that derives from made-up and manipulated myths about the history of Hungarians. We have elaborated on this type of politics and their proponents in our earlier work (Fazekas and Korkut, 2021) showing how over the recent years neo-Turanism has become a generic name for extreme and radical political ideas and movements. While some of these movements and esoteric belief systems found hospitable ground within Jobbik prior to its evolution into a more centrist political party after 2020, the governing party itself has embraced some notable elements of these belief systems and embedded them into the re-making of its foreign policy orientation. As it is, the Fidesz government has exploited the resonance that neo-Turanism has gained traction in Hungarian society with its more eminent dress styles, craft systems, sports and games but also notably its depictions of gender relations. Furthermore, some of these cultural and societal elements have evolved into the making of the Hungarian foreign policy with anti-western tones that rejected modern gender roles and expansive rights and freedoms as if they are merely imposed by the West and hence foreign to Hungarian

historical and cultural traditions. In order to identify the drivers of such misogyny that caters for radicalisation, we therefore need to identify this new political structure that serves for much of the conservative turn in Hungary including a remake of gender roles and identities.

There seems to be many political parties and movements in Hungary that profit from toxic masculinity and a general exploitation of gender issues by politicising them in order to consolidate their voters base. In this report, we reflect on the most notables of such parties as Fidesz, Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk) and Jobbik in relation to the attributes of toxic masculinity and the oppression of racial and sexual minorities. The relationship between the modern far-right and the 'original' far-right right parties is rather evident as both their discourse and activism reek of those of the fascist Arrow Cross Party founded during the Second World War and sculpted to match Germany's Nazi party. Their program also concentrated on having mothers tasked with giving birth to children for the nation (Peto, 2020). This matches the contemporary rhetoric of Fidesz as well as the political programme of Jobbik that neglects women. In contrast, during the Soviet regime in Hungary, women were an active part of the labour force and women's paid labour was understood as essential for their emancipation according to the Marxist–Leninist doctrine (Fodor 2022). However, as the Hungarian far-right ideology in part thrives from the grievance and injustice brought by the Soviet oppression, which essentially demolished traditional Hungary with its class relations and gender functions in economy, their embrace of a fully emancipated and working class of women becomes unimaginable.

The Jobbik party's place in this legacy creation is essential. The upkeep and defence of traditions¹ was a major goal for the Jobbik party at their inception. The party has often defined itself as "a principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian party", whose "fundamental purpose" was the protection of "Hungarian values and interests" (Akçalı and Korkut, 2012). At the time of their successful inception, they thrived from injustice and grievances caused by the failure of the regime change spiralled in the Hungarian society. As Hungary's neighbours have become resurgent as regional actors, this has further dented Hungarian self-confidence. As Jordan (2010, 102) notes "... Slovaks ... to whom Hungarians have long been condescending,

¹ *hagyományőrzés*

have adopted the Euro and are prospering, buying homes in cheap Austrian and Hungarian villages and turning them into Slovak suburbs.” In this respect, Jordan (2010²) called attention to the “... increasing number of Hungarians, stirred by hate speech, [who] are fed up with what they see as a flood of broken promises, corruption and incompetence by their mainstream left and right, [seeing] themselves betrayed by Brussels, the World Bank and the IMF [and] even ... by capitalism and democracy”.

Thereby, neo-Turanism has become fodder for Jobbik to consolidate their voter base around a mythical past where Hungary had been glorious and vindictive. In order to forge a basis for this made-up interpretation of the Hungarian past, Jobbik descended all the way back to Hungarians’ ancient heritage and sought for strength in the long-forgotten masculine, warrior nomadic culture of Hungarian ancestors that migrated from Asia to Europe. As this has been much later picked up the Fidesz party, appending Hungary to its East, despite its also being a much-imagined space, the Hungarian right has become opponents of Western globalism and anti-establishment. Rampant scape-goats such as international organisations and corporations (Jordan 2010, 102) have allegedly sought to corner Hungary. Against that, the preservation of traditional values has become a major tool of defence adopted by the Hungarian right. In time, Fidesz has adopted the narrative that Jobbik has instigated and embedded it at the heart of its political system while it has consolidated itself the leading extreme-right party of the National Assembly.

The conservative- and extreme-right have proposed various cures and modes of defence against the allegedly enfeebling sway of western-defined international systems on Hungary (Hisarlıoğlu, 2022). In time, the rights and freedom demands in effect to gender and sexual issues in Hungary have been also interpreted as an extension of the global liberal ideology and its left-liberal globalist actors in Hungary. To find allies against the globalist and western forces, Fidesz looked for a host for the ways in which it has envisioned Hungarian politics to conform with. This shift was attuned with the ascendance of Turkey, Russia and China in global politics. This association was apparently associated with anti-globalism, anti-equality, anti-genderism, homophobia and xenophobia – literally essentialising the East with a toxic representation of masculinity and anti-gender strands of power. It was initially Jobbik

that pursued to preserve traditional values embedded in their composition of neo-Turanism, which eventually incited also political radicalisation. The association of their para-military groups with the Roma murders of 2009-2010 showed how toxic masculinity and its values can turn into violence.

The Fidesz party picked up from where Jobbik left with political radicalisation and created a space for anti-LGBTQ+ and anti-gender legislation using their parliamentary power. The last twelve years of the Fidesz government had shown curbs of gender equality and human rights in various waves. Fodor (2021) argued that the illiberal, populist Hungarian state is eastward-looking and neo-patriarchal as they have exploited existing homophobia, anti-genderism, transphobia and anti-feminism. Takács (2022) demonstrated how attacks on same-sex marriage, the rejection of the adoption rights for same-sex couples, attacks on rainbow families and non-heteronormative lifestyles, on reproductive rights and on the right to abortion play a central role in far-right politics. We witnessed over the past years how Fidesz strove to demolish any ideology that are not aligned with their heteronormative, binary ideology of sexuality, and challenge their self-ascribed role as the custodians of the Hungarian and Christian values. The Fidesz government's most radical step in this regard was the anti-LGBTQ+ legislation – almost an exact transplantation of the Russian example. While it does not go as far as saying that homosexual people are paedophiles – as its Russian equivalent does (Korkut and Fazekas, 2021) – the Hungarian legislation mixes up these terms in order to create hatred against members of the LGBTQ+ community on a societal level.

As a sign of further toxic masculinity, in 2018, Fidesz banned gender studies at two Hungarian universities that used to offer MA courses in this subject. The overnight revoking of their licence to deliver such courses in two universities created havoc in the academic circles (Peto, 2020). The Fidesz government explained their decision arguing that the courses were cancelled to economise taxpayer's money³ as students with gender studies degrees were struggling in the job market.⁴ The most plausible

³ The program at CEU is not financed by the Hungarian taxpayers as it is a private university. The tuition fee of ELTE for the ten students is 2700 000 Hungarian Forints, less than 8000 euro for a whole academic year. So, one wonders what the real motives are behind this bill. (Peto, 2020)

⁴ It is to be noted though that CEU has 139 graduates from this programme since 2006, and, according to an alumni report, the graduates have landed great jobs from Kyrgyzstan to Iceland and Great Britain in higher education, economy, culture and finance, as this programme mostly admits international students. The first

explanation, however, was that Fidesz has already set their plan to banish Central European University (CEU) from Hungary (based upon their campaign against George Soros) in motion and to discredit the “harmful, Western liberal” courses such as gender studies whilst doing that.

The previous examples hence would showcase the role of Fidesz as a purveyor of polarisation informed by toxic masculinity. However, Fidesz had also faced some issues in relation to maintaining their image as a conservative and Christian Party, whilst spreading homophobia. In 2019, there have been three scandals involving top Fidesz politicians. First, a Fidesz founder and an ex-MEP József Szájer, broke coronavirus lockdown rules by attending a Brussels gay sex party. When police caught Szájer, who had tried escaping via a gutter, they found drugs in his rucksack (Ozsvath, 2021). It was Szájer, who drafted the amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, to state that “a mother is a woman, a father is man” and ironically turned out to be spending his free time at a drug-infused gay-orgy at the same time. However, Fidesz survived this crisis as they quickly disengaged themselves from Szájer and thanks to their control over the media there was no scrutiny. The scandal did not make anyone question their credentials as a collection of conservative, Christian (and straight) men either. To keep up with their toxic masculinity they instead initiated a smear campaign against Gabor Vona, ex-president of Jobbik Party right before the 2018 elections alleging that he was seen in gay bars in Budapest to weaken their biggest rival from the extreme right.

While masculinity itself has been evidently dominating in the past, in the current political arena it has turned into more toxic and hegemonic. Sexism itself found its way into the chamber of the National Assembly as well. In terms of the ratio between men and women M.P.s, Hungary has one of the worst scores in Europe. Currently, only 13% of the Hungarian Parliament is composed of women. This makes the Hungarian idiom that the woman’s place is in the kitchen ever more resonant in politics as well.

The far-right parties in Hungary has evidently been boosting anti-gender-ideology and misogynist discourses. On the one hand, they emphasize heteronormative values and understandings of gender and society while, on the other, they largely espouse

cohort of the program at ELTE was launched in 2017. This cohort will graduate in July 2019 so no data is yet available about their placement (Peto, 2020).

gendered conceptions of Hungarian traditions and feminine bodies that respectively need to be saved from the invasive 'immigrant' (specifically Muslim) others (Agius, 2021). This latter discourse on 'Muslim others' is repeatedly framed as the role that the Hungarian state plays to defend gender equality rather than being anti-gender as the liberal opposition claims. Despite the progressive and transformative view of gender norms that gender equality should play, the way the Hungarian government interprets that has anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim tones often couched in stereotypical views of women as inferior and/or in need of protection.

IV. An analysis of media presence, production, and circulation of collective agents of radicalisation

The D.Rad report 5.1 *The Cultural Drivers of Radicalisation* analysed the Hungarian media landscapes to note a lack of media plurality in Hungary (Fazekas and Korkut 2021). The report concluded that over 90% of mainstream media outlets were either owned by or can be associated with the Fidesz government. The government transformed the media landscape in Hungary into a hegemonic propaganda tool, while opposition and critical voices had been widely marginalised. This turn gave no other option to opposition parties but to expand their social media sites and online outlets such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Even though the Fidesz government intended to regulate the Facebook in Hungary, this failed and currently social media posts of politicians generate considerable engagement with their supporters for both sides. At the face of this, Judit Varga, the Minister of Justice, accused social media platforms of "reducing the visibility of conservative, right-wing views" by saying that "tech giants can decide [the result of] elections" (Ozsvath, 2021). Thus, campaigns for the 2022 national elections partially shifted to Facebook, creating an outbreak of a competition as politicians engaged in a war over who will receive more "likes" on social media (Hanula, 2022).

In this regard, hegemonic or toxic masculinity has become widespread with pro-governmental Facebook groups and influencers. By analysing these posts and focusing on their content and engagement, we demonstrate that in Hungary, toxic

masculinity, misogynist opinions and homophobia is being propagated by pro-governmental agents and far-right politicians. Although the European trends shifted during last decade from Facebook to Instagram in relation to social media consumption, in Hungary, there are still almost 6 million Facebook users, while only 2 million use Instagram (ClusterMedia, 2022). In this part of the report, we analyse both Facebook, Instagram, YouTube posts of various politicians in order to demonstrate their radicalising nature propagating misogyny and toxic masculinity. Puzzlingly, in recent years, women politicians have been a lot more forthcoming to spread toxic masculinity in Hungary.

Our first example is a book entitled *Meseország Mindenkié (Fairy Tale for Everyone)* – an all-inclusive children’s book with 17 stories featuring characters that are gender - diverse and from various ethnic, religious and socio-economic backgrounds and that would usually be underrepresented in children’s stories (Haynes, 2020). It was published in 2020, shortly after the governing Fidesz party started to attack members of the LGBTQ+ community with discriminative laws and conservative campaigns. This resulted in a rise of homophobia within the country and polarised the nation, causing attacks against the LGBTQ+ community (Fazekas, 2021).

Furthermore, the Fidesz campaigns for “family values” have been on the rise ever since the migration topic started to cool down. While Fidesz claims that the Western liberals had an agenda for Hungary to teach gender norms in an aberrate manner to children in schools and kindergartens, only the right-wing Fidesz and its subsidiary media can cure for such deviation with their narrative true to the core of the nation. Their political crusade for the revival of traditional, Christian family values ended in a constitutional amendment stating that in a family, the “mother is a woman, the father is a man”, while also banning gender reassignment surgeries, ending legal recognition for transgendered people and made it impossible for same-sex couples to adopt children.⁵ In this climate, where LGBTQ+ issues are highly politicised, the Fairy Tale for Everyone book went amok within the far-right circles and received wider publicity than expected.

⁵ Also, the Fidesz government started to provide extra financial support for young couples in order to encourage them to establish a family by having children. The more children they have, they receive more financial support and larger tax reduction.

Initially, there has been a petition signed by 85,000 people demanding the book's removal from bookstores. On a radio interview, the PM Viktor Orbán said: "Hungary is a patient, tolerant country as regards [to] homosexuality. But there is a red line that cannot be crossed, and this is how I would sum up my opinion: Leave our children alone." (Haynes, 2020). As Fidesz supporters usually do, their core voter base reacted positively to Orbán's comments. On social media, pseudo-intellectual, fabricated evidences started to circulate without scientific sources producing huge amounts of engagement. Under one Facebook post with a link to Orbán's radio interview, someone commented: "LGBT activism and heteronormativity-destroying know-how come from the West. [...] Don't be fooled: These activists are very serious about targeting our children." (Mediaklikk.hu, 2022). Hence, "they are targeting our children" became the next slogan of homophobia in Hungary and the Fidesz media conglomerate circulated more and more content on the dangers of the Western-liberal LGBTQ+ activism. This ended up in a legislation that (among washing together paedophilia and homosexuality) banned LGBTQ+ topics from appearing on TV (unless it is PG 18) as well as banning LGBTQ+ topics from being discussed in schools by either teachers or NGOs - all in line with Orbán's words "Leave our children alone!".

However, it was not only Fidesz that rode along with the twisted popularity of this book and another far-right party, *Mi Hazánk Mozgalom* (Our Homeland Movement) has also campaigned for similar conservative and Christian values as Fidesz did. Dóra Dúró, a member of the party and the Hungarian Parliament, has gained a spotlight when she shredded the book as a political performance. This performance was live on social media during her press conference. She stated that "aberrate, deviate homosexual princes will never be part of the Hungarian canon". Her staged performance received world-wide attention and controversy nationwide. The move was swiftly condemned by human rights activists and the Hungarian Publishers' and Booksellers Association, who called the performance reminiscent of Nazi book-burners and Communist book shredders (Haynes, 2021). Her actions also became memes on social media and received attacks from feminist and LGBTQ+ groups. The book itself hit the top of the charts in sales after the media attention, been reprinted in 15,000 copies (after the initial 1,500) and since then has been published in the UK with a recommendation written by Sir Ian McKellen. This goes to how an ordinary book and its publication can

turn into polarisation as it has been exploited by far-right politicians looking for audience for their anti-LGBTQ+ politics.

Our Homeland PM Dóra Dúró's performance and Orbán's reaction shed light on the deep polarisation within the Hungarian nation and Parliament as well. While the Fidesz enacted numerous legislations against members of the LGBTQ+ community, the country has experienced some controversies from within their own circles. An acute example involved criminal charges against Gábor Kaleta, a former Hungarian ambassador for Peru, who was found in possession of 19,000 pictures of child pornography with the intention of selling the illegal contents. As he was appointed by the Fidesz government and has earlier been employed at the Ministry of Justice, people associated him with Orbán's party. This connection also derived from the fact that the former ambassador was charged with a mere sum of 1,360 Euros and suspended prison sentence (Spike, 2020). Later, the Fidesz government referred to the Kaleta-case when they reworked the criminal code regarding the prosecution of paedophilia, which resulted in the scandalous and oppressive legislation that constituted another attack targeting the LGBTQ community by washing homosexuality and paedophilia together.

The case of the Fairy Tale for Everyone unleashed further injustice as the National Assembly in Hungary adopted an anti-LBGTQ+ legislation conflating the story around a children's book and with a law drafted by Szájer – the very politician who frequented drug-infested gay-sex parties in Brussels during the pandemic. The current level of politically derived and incited homophobia and polarisation within the nation allowed the far-right politicians the spotlight that a de-stigmatising book gained to however disseminate their radicalising and oppressive views.

The President of the Republic of Hungary is a ceremonial role as the head of state. They are meant to express the unity of the nation and guard the democratic functions of the state. The office holder is also the Commander of the Hungarian Defence Forces and the highest dignitary of the state. The role was introduced with the regime change of 1989 and the President of the Republic role has since been filled by a man. Since 2012, the Presidents have come from the Fidesz. While the President should remain politically neutral in order to efficiently oversee checks and balances, the current Fidesz government have elected ex-Fidesz politicians to office and hence indirectly

politicised this office. On the 21st of December 2021, Viktor Orban nominated Katalin Novak, the then Minister for Family and Youth Affairs at the Ministry of Human Capacities and the vice-president of the Fidesz party. After the nomination and election of Novak, the Fidesz also won the general elections of 2022 with two-third majority of the National Assembly. In the new parliamentary cycle, the current state has 28 female MPs (14.07 percent, 12.56 percent in the previous cycle), which is only three more than the previous cycle (Nótin, 2022). Amidst such gender imbalance, the nomination of a woman was in itself surprising and could have been considered as progressive. However, due to her former statements on gender issues, Katalin Novak appeared as a controversial figure in Hungary.

Ensuing the nomination of Novak, the Budapest Pride called Novak “a minister of homophobia” with international far-right relations, whose election as the head of state would mean trampling on human rights. The Budapest Pride indicated that her election to office would pose a serious threat to Hungarian women, LGBTQ rights, freedom of expression and Hungarian democracy. Eventually, they considered Novak the most radical, homophobic and transphobic member of the Fidesz government (Budapest Pride, 2022).

While toxic masculinity or even misogyny do not usually derive from women (Harrington, 2021), Katalin Novák is our second case study to show toxic masculinity following her media presence and performance. This section analyses one of her videos on YouTube as well as her Facebook posts. In all analysed content, she propagates toxic masculinity in line with the Fidesz rhetoric giving us substance to establish her figure as a stakeholder of radicalisation.

In her YouTube video, analysed in this report, she portrays herself as a confident woman and sends a message to all other Hungarian women saying that there is no need to compare themselves to men. Women can ‘feel complete’ even though they earn less than men. Women “have the ability to live their femininity to the fullest by bearing children”. In the video, she appears as a mother, who is standing in her kitchen and following a recipe “for life”. As Katalin Novák has a career in politics and has been elected as the first woman to the role of President of the Republic, her message reads rather hypocritically. She pushes women to accept their roles in a patriarchal society, thus supporting traditional gender roles against which women have been fighting

continuously since the past century. Novák is said to fear that the country will be taken over by non-White, non-Christian, non-Hungarians (Lazar, 2018). The Hungarian government rejects immigration and Novák says that it was young white Christian Hungarian women's duty to have more babies to avoid a demographic decline. This follows an earlier line from the Prime Minister Orbán as he talked about a "contract" between women of childbearing age and the government to ensure the required number of babies to fight the Hungarian demographic decline.

However, the comment sections under this YouTube video showed clear discontentment of the users regarding the misogynistic message in Novák's words. The Gender pay-gap was one of the core topics of the most visible comments. One user simply said: equal pay for equal work = respect". As a response to this, another one stated that the [Hungarians] shouldn't treat [women] who spend 8 hours at work while doing nothing" implying that women do nothing at work. Other users emphasised that "what if women cannot bear children for medical reasons? Should we disqualify them as women if they can't fulfil their so-called duty [to fight against the demographic decline]?" The discussion portrays deepened alienation among viewers and also contributes to the I-GAP spectrum as political contents such as the President's YouTube video enhances polarisation.

Novak's message in this video sits well with the general idea of women's role foregrounded by the nationalist right-wing governments. As Agius (2020) noted that right-wing and far-right movements and leaders contrast and reimagine memories of the past, when patriarchy was considered the only way. Manifestations of this dichotomous order are often visible in the idea of 'the people' versus 'the feminist elite', and in the far right's opposition to 'gender ideology'. Focusing on Brazil, Poland and Hungary, Mudde (2019) notes that the far right constitutes 'gender ideology' as a major threat alleging that it is a part of a left-wing conspiracy designed to weaken the traditional nuclear family structure and women's role in it as figurative mothers of the nation-state.

Strikingly, this also collided with Orbán's annual speech at the Tusványos Summer University and the student camp – a traditional gathering of Fidesz activists with the high Fidesz elite – in Transylvania, Romania. In his 2022 speech, Orbán called gender-ideology "Western gender-craziness" and emphasised the importance of

national identity and Hungarian values rooted in the traditional family model. He also insisted that the Hungarians were “not a mixed race”. The whole speech was shared live on Facebook, with thousands of comments. For the rest of this report, we are discussing the content of some 5,000 of these comments that we take to represent the current political polarisation in Hungary. Amongst these comments, there were many supporting Orbán and many criticising him referring to the most recent financial cuts and law-amendments that were pushed through in the last days before the National Assembly shut down. Analysing the comment section on Facebook under the post Orbán’s speech, we found that most commenters expressed their opinions based on different ideologies and not on facts. For example, one user wrote that: “Orbán is a genius and thank God, the people know this and have voted for him”, the other one in contrast stated that: “Orbán should remain in Romania, we don’t need him here in Hungary. [Politicians are] all liars.” The majority of the comments are typically either supportive or against the Fidesz government, although it is rare for users to point out explicit facts or data in their arguments. This shows high level of polarisation based on political and ideological views within the nation, as the two camps (pro- and anti-Orbán) reject engaging with each other on equal terms and by referring to shared facts and values but instead endorse their own facts and values at the cost of demoting those the other.

The outcome of this recent speech had unforeseen consequences for the Fidesz party. After Orbán said: “we are willing to mix with each other, but we don't want to become a mixed race.” (Facebook, 2022). Opposition leaders called his remarks “straight Nazism” (Németh, 2022) and his words led to the resignation of Orbán’s long-trusted ally, the Commissioner Zsuzsanna Hegedüs, who commented the speech as one that “even the most bloodthirsty racists would have liked” (HVG.hu, 2022). This further demonstrates how the Fidesz government serves as a leading stakeholder in far-right radicalisation in Hungary.

V. An analysis of media presence, production, and circulation of stakeholders of de-radicalisation

As it was demonstrated in previous parts of this report, misogyny, toxic masculinity and anti-LGBTQ narratives are indispensable parts of the Hungarian political scene. In response to that, the current section of the report focuses on stakeholders of de-radicalisation regarding toxic masculinity, sexism and anti-LGBTQ+ voices. The analysis of these stakeholders' online and visual narratives is essential given the rise in online radicalisation and de-radicalisation activities. Studying these narratives can provide insight into the ways in which radicalization and de-radicalisation have taken hold online, allowing us to better understand these complex dynamics. We chose mostly female opposition politicians to introduce the long-lasting sexist culture within the Hungarian Parliament and a media article to showcase how it affects their work. Secondly, we discuss the legislation aspects of how anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments are radicalising the nation and how sexual and domestic violence against women is portrayed in the country and the media.

Only a very small minority of politicians are female in the Hungarian National Assembly, even less within the branches of the opposition. Women politicians recently shared their stories regarding sexual references that they are exposed to during work men colleagues. According to the interviews carried out with the female opposition MPs by online journal Telex, they have all experienced some kind of sexism within the Hungarian Parliament. Given the deep level of misogyny within the society, it is no surprise that there is an overlap between the wider society and the Hungarian Parliament in terms of how women find themselves treated in a degrading manner at their workplace including the Parliament. A female MP stated that “unfortunately, sexist remarks are present in the Parliament, on Facebook, everywhere. In my experience, Fidesz politicians and propagandists are at the forefront. The government always sets the tone. I'm sorry the government don't feel the weight of it” (Telex, 2022), referring to the Fidesz' involvement in misogynist narratives.

The right-wing majority dominated Hungarian Parliament has been a scene of toxic masculinity in the past decade. While many female politicians noted that the Fidesz government nominated and elected the first female President of the Republic, their common hope was that Katalin Novák could potentially have had the power to challenge the misogynistic attitude within the nation and the Hungarian Parliament. This was despite her earlier remarks on the primary role of women being child bearing

months serving to strengthen the toxic masculinity and a general anti-LGBTQ+ atmosphere. Her incapacity to challenge toxic masculinity and to fight sexism in the political and public arena overall, makes women pessimistic about the future. The Telex article, noted above, also discussed the abortion-issue as an element of toxic masculinity as well. Most female politicians stated that they would not change the current legislation, which keeps abortion legal in Hungary. Upon the release of this article on the Facebook page of Telex, many commenters had stated their opinions in rather disturbing tones (Telex, 2022). While many of the commenters supported the female politicians' opinion on abortion, one of them said: "As a father, I will not allow my child to be killed by a woman unworthy of motherhood! THAT'S IT!". Another male commenter stated that "it certainly deserves respect that these two tables were exceptionally produced without spelling errors.", referring to the tables shown on Image III. Both two highlighted comments demonstrate a deep level of toxic masculinity.

Another aspect of toxic masculinity as we noted above was the anti-LGBTQ+ legislation. As a reaction to the anti-LGBTQ+ law of the Fidesz government to control the education process of children by vetting organisations that can hold sexual education classes in schools, many civil societies and NGOs took the initiative to fight against their being banned from school grounds based on discriminatory measures. Civil society organisations such as NANE and Patent instead organised a summer camp for girls, who were mostly left out of sexual education, in order to undo for the adverse effects of this law. The topics of the summer camp were about reproductive health, self-respect, signs of domestic violence, bullying, and healthy relationships. However, the Fidesz media conglomerate also attacked this initiative with newspapers writing articles with such titles as "Easy summer brainwashing for teenage girls" (Bácskai, 2021) and "George Soros's radical left-wing feminists also welcome "rebellious" 13-year-old girls to their summer camp" (Origó.hu, 2021). These articles described the existence of the camps as deliberate provocation against traditional values and insinuated that the organisers were providing disinformation about abortion for children. Still, there were many supportive comments for this on the organisers' Facebook page, although many decided to share their opposing thoughts.

There was a reaction from most civil societies against the Fidesz government's plans to allegedly "protect our children" with its anti-LGBTQ+ legislation. Several NGOs have approached the Constitutional Court to interfere and prevent a referendum on "sex reassignment surgeries for minors". However, they did not succeed and the referendum was held on the same day as the national elections. The referendum included such ludicrous questions as "Do you support holding classes on sexual orientation for minor children in public educational institutions without the consent of the parents?"; "Do you support the promotion of gender reassignment treatments for minors?" and "Do you support the unrestricted presentation of sexual media content to minors that affects their development?". Even though a question was included in the referendum, gender reassignment surgeries had been banned months before and it has never been available for minors making the question redundant. The referendum eventually was deemed invalid as the turnout was below 50% and 1.7 million people casted void votes showing their displeasure with the referendum. The referendum itself was unique since the questions were already incorporated into domestic law months before. Therefore, the nation was asked to state its opinion on an already decided topic. Despite the insufficient number of votes, the Fidesz media declared the referendum a huge success in relation to the government's children-protection initiative (Harangozó, 2022).

Misogyny and the protection of women's rights can be correlated. In Hungary, however, protection is usually victim blaming when it comes to domestic violence or sexual abuse. Many civil society organisations have urged the Hungarian government to ratify the Istanbul Convention and incorporate its measures into domestic law in order to provide women the necessary protection. Even if Hungary was a signatory for the Convention, it has never ratified it. The ratification of the Istanbul Convention is an ongoing political issue in Hungary. Already in 2017, the Hungarian Parliament Justice Committee proposed the ratification of the Convention and some civil society organisations extended their decades long experience to incorporate women's protection measures into domestic law. However, none of them received an invitation for a discussion. Instead, the Justice Committee cancelled its proposal for ratification, solely based on an opinion piece published by a pseudo-academic Facebook-site 'Centre for Human Dignity' with around 200 likes on their page (Nokert.hu, 2017). This opinion piece was shared by different pro-governmental Facebook sites, which

eventually resulted in the Committee's examination and conclusion that the "many studies and people have shown" that the Convention was "not actually about women's rights" (Nokert.hu, 2017). The fact that the government neglected facts in order to keep up with their anti-liberal agenda can sow the feeling of injustice and grievance within the society. This can be taken as an element of the I-GAP spectrum. Furthermore, the Hungarian legal system does not recognise femicide and its perpetrators may be liable for homicide or involuntary manslaughter. Data from the European Institute of Gender Equality reveals that, in 2018, the rate of female victims of homicide in Hungary was 0.84 per 100 000 inhabitants, the 10th highest rate among the 24 Member States, and Hungary has the fifth highest rate (0.22) of female victims of intentional homicide perpetrated by intimate partners (out of 15 jurisdictions) (EIGE, 2021).

According to studies from 2018, more than 250.000 women in Hungary lived with a violent partner and experienced physical or verbal abuse (Tóth, 2018). This data shows that femicides shall not be taken lightly. Currently, there is no communication from the government about the ratification of the Convention or whether different steps were to be taken in order to provide a legal safety net for women in abusive relationships. On rare occasions, when the Convention is mentioned within pro-governmental circles, it is often called as a left-wing radical, feminist propaganda or a dangerous liberal agenda.

VI. An analysis of media presence, production, and circulation of ordinary users against radicalisation

The DRad project deems it important to trace informal processes and routes of deradicalization. We argue that deradicalization can happen in everyday contexts alongside deradicalization policies. Moreover, if deradicalization policies are largely missing, as it is in the case of Hungary, this does not mean that de-radicalisation does not happen at all. In fact, ordinary citizens grasp deradicalization through their activism. In our case, we came across social media as an informal site for deradicalization in Hungary. In order to locate the social media presence of ordinary users against radicalisation, we turned to TikTok. The social media platform is the

fastest-growing application today, attracting a huge audience of 1.5 billion active users, mostly children and teenagers (Weimann and Masri, 2020). As the social media app has an increasing popularity amongst young people in Hungary, it avails content relating to extremism, radicalisation and misogyny topics. We found that ordinary users inadvertently put forward de-radicalisation on TikTok, even though it is most likely not their purpose.

To ride the popular waves, users make videos on TikTok using similar sounds. One of these ludicrous sounds in Hungary turned into a pointer for us to search for answers for how and why ordinary users of social media react to radicalisation and implicitly instrumentalise TikTok for de-radicalisation. One evidently recognisable sound that nonetheless derived from a song produced by a Hungarian rap-musician Krúbi became quite popular among users. At the time of writing, there were more than 400 videos made using the same sound. The song contains strong language regarding Fidesz and Dóra Dúró, a female MP of Our Homeland party, who has already been discussed above as an agent of political polarisation and radicalisation in Hungary above. The lyrics of the song goes as follows:

I call over Dorka Dúró

I fuck her neck hard

I thought that'd be an issue

But the nation stands and applauds.⁶

Most of the TikTok videos with this sound and lyrics have later been produced by young women (see Image IV), although we came across some men within the analysed content as well. It is hard to say how many of the videos were directly related to the topic of de-radicalisation or the I-GAP spectrum although we found this a positive turn. Even though most ordinary users seemingly ignore the meaning of the song, some are using hashtags such as “discrimination”, “end homophobia” etc in order to make their political position evident. As it has gained popularity, this song

⁶ Lyrics from Krúbi: KUTYA (translates to *dog*)
“Áthívom a Dúró Dorkát
Telibe kúrom a torkát
Azt hittem para lesz belőle
Erre állva tapsol az ország”

depicted the deepest issue of polarisation in Hungary by calling out at Dóra Dúró, a far-right MP and a stakeholder of radicalisation. The TikTok users sing “fuck Dóra Dúró” to show how the nation was fed up with the politically-incited homophobia and say “enough to the anti-LGBTQ campaigns”.

While no TikTok videos with this sound have gone viral, we argue that these types of unintentional de-radicalisation measures from ordinary users of social media could offer an informal type of deradicalisation. Realising that the times of academics and NGOs making real change in this field might be over, turning to TikTok or any type of social media frequently used by the youth can make a real difference. Since lectures, round-tables, journal articles in this topic can be considered ‘uncool’ for the young, they unintentionally created their own way of dealing with the similar issues. This idea is supported by the sheer numbers on TikTok. While the Krúbi-sound has hundreds of videos and several thousand likes, most NGOs’ TikTok pages lack any visibility by the younger generations (Image V).

Our second case study of how ordinary users turned to social media to show their resentment against radicalisation was their defence of Marci Pál. We take Marci Pál as an agent of de-radicalisation due to his relentless work that appeared in legacy and media and social media to contribute to the acceptance of LGBTQ+ members within the society. In this regard, we came across a video of him delivering a speech at the opening of Budapest Pride, which was also uploaded to TikTok by the Budapest Pride (Image VI). When the Hungarian government abruptly banned same-sex couples from adopting children and re-worked the Fundamental Law of Hungary to insert Christian-conservative values of traditional family model, thus attacking the LGBTQ community, Marci and his husband gained visibility including in the legacy media. They adopted a child right before the new law and used their growing social media accounts to – essentially – de-radicalise people from attacking same-sex couples with children and to emphasise that the most important thing for a child is to grow up in a loving environment, that is a family, even if the constitution regards families formed only by a ‘matrimony of a man and a woman’. A movement started to form around ‘rainbow’ families, and one of Hungary’s largest, politically neutral media channel, RTL Klub started a campaign called Family is Family⁷, broadcasting an informative video in ad

⁷ A Család az Család movement, see: <https://www.acsaladazcsalad.hu>

blocks, which was later taken on by other channels. The movement gained popularity in a climate when the Fidesz party started a witch-hunt against the LGBTQ+ community. In the so-called paedophile law, advertisements for social purposes in which homosexuality appears were banned. Based on the text of the law, an ad that "depicts" homosexuality "cannot be classified as" an advertisement with a social purpose, therefore it is not possible to broadcast or publish an ad with a social purpose in which, for example, attention is drawn to the legal disadvantages affecting Hungarian LGBTQ people or rainbow families. This led to the campaign to briefly stop in the legacy media, as the Media Council decided that the ad was illegal, but the decision was overturned in April 2022.

The TikTok video that we have studied was circulated in the traditional media and can be linked to Marci Pál, who also appeared in the Family is Family movement. In the video, we see him on a stage giving a speech about his two boat rides with the same captain. He talks about how he and his husband went on this ride, while the captain asked them where they live. When they responded they live together at the same address, Marci says it was silence for a while. They told him that they will return with their son the next day. When Marci talks about his son during the video, he struggles to hold his tears in – for which he receives applause from the audience. The story continues with the second day of the trip, this time the whole family goes on the boat with the same captain. As the day passes by, the captain says to Marci and his husband that he had to get really drunk (presumably on the previous day) so that he would be able to bear through this day. Yet, seeing them together with their son, he later said how he understood once he saw the child really happy and how they looked like a 'normal' family – something that he never thought would be possible.

There are more than 200 comments under this video with some of them very supportive and others expressing hostility. One user said "a child needs a mother and a father. A woman and a man. I don't care what you say." Even though some other users tried to defend the idea of same-sex couples adopting children, most anti-LGBTQ+ commenters do not react to any reasoning and blindly follow their own arguments. There were also instances of hate speech with some users saying "Death to them" or "I don't understand why you have to provoke normal people with your absurdity". Most derogatory comments can be linked to the Fidesz government's

provocative and oppressive messages making us conclude that the attacks against the LGBTQ+ community as another tool of inciting political polarisation and radicalisation.

VII. Discussion and conclusion

This report demonstrated that misogyny, sexism, gender-inequality and anti-LBGTQ+ sentiments are part of both the political narratives and discourse in Hungary. Radicalisation regarding gender and sexuality is indeed a residual aspect of Hungarian politics. Yet, it remains a politically-fuelled topic. By showcasing the analysis of the media presence, production, and circulation of collective agents of radicalisation, we have portrayed the political side of toxic masculinity in everyday life. As discussed, polarisation and radicalisation agents are mostly politicians in Hungary. In order to portray agents of de-radicalisation within the topic of toxic masculinity, we had to look for it in unconventional places. Thus, the reports main findings are the following.

First, due to the political nature of radicalisation, de-radicalisation programmes are limited and mostly obstructed by the lawmakers. While some 'rebellious' NGOs still fight against the most recent legislation that prohibits gender and sexuality to be discussed freely by anyone in schools, due to the strong grip of the government these kinds of initiatives are numbered as lack of funding is disabling the future work of some organisations. In order for the next generations to receive proper and unbiased education, we recommend the Hungarian government to enable civil organisations to contribute to the national curriculum. This should be imperative in order to stop the spread of toxic masculinity, anti-LBGTQ+ sentiments and sexism within the nation and the future generation.

Secondly, due to the lack of ordinary de-radicalisation agents in Hungary, we turned to TikTok in order to collect relevant data. While we came across some users that consciously took part in de-radicalisation, we realised that most anti-polarisation and

de-radicalisation activities were carried out by minors or young adults that used TikTok as one of the most trending social media apps. We came across hundreds of users that acted as de-radicalisation agents without even knowing it by simply creating videos using a popular Hungarian rap song including some explicit language that aims at a far-right politician. These videos gained popularity among children and young people, which we identified as a whole de-radicalisation movement resulting in a breakthrough theory.

While de-radicalisation among the youth became a popular research topic, in countries where radicalisation is not taken seriously by the government and measures aiming to de-polarise the society is even hindered by the state, academics, NGOs or other stakeholders in de-radicalisation have low amount of chance to reach those who are prone to radicalisation and extremism. In Hungary, this societal process resulted in a most unconventional way of de-radicalisation, which is young adults mimicking rap songs on a social media platform with enormous potential to reach those levels of the society who could potentially be radicalised. We take this as an important way to tackle radicalisation.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Media objects



252 kedvelés

duro_dora_hivatalos_oldal ! Nem tűri a Mi Hazánk, hogy a gyerekeket kitegyék a homoszexuális propagandának már azzal is, hogy a mesekönyvekbe csempészik be az abnormális életformát, ami így hazugság, hiszen a magyar kultúrának nem részei a homoszexuális királyfik. Mai sajtótájékoztatómon megsemmisítettem a homoszexualizmus propagandakönyvét, ami a gyerekek egészséges

Image I

Instagram post of MP Dóra Dúró of her press conference, when she publicly shredded the book *Fairy Tale for Everyone*



Image II

The President of the Republic, Katalin Novák features in a YouTube video giving advice to women on how to live fully as a housewife and “not to pursue career like men do”.



Image III

Female MPs in the Hungarian Parliament hold demonstrates against toxic masculinity. One translates: In a moral and mental sense, one cannot be classified as a women, if she does not fulfil the female principium. The other one was a question from a male Fidesz politician to a female opposition MP: Why do you even talk, woman?




Image IV

TikTok videos of young women with the same sound




Image V

Society for Women NGO's TikTok video on abortion with 0 likes and 0 shares




Image VI

TikTok video uploaded by Budapest Pride

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