



# Visual Drivers of Radicalisation

Finland / Country Report 5.1

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>BBM</b>	Blue-Black Movement ( <i>Sinimusta Liike</i> )
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FP</b>	Finns Party
<b>MP</b>	Member of Parliament
<b>NRM</b>	Nordic Resistance Movement
<b>SOO</b>	Soldiers of Odin
<b>SMP</b>	Finnish Rural Party
<b>VKK</b>	<i>Valta Kuuluu Kansalle</i> (Power Belongs to the People)

## About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

## Executive Summary/Abstract

The aim with this country report is to address the role of the media in transmitting, mainstreaming, and legitimising radical ideas. We focus on representation, circulation, and consumption through analysis of YouTube videos and their comment spheres that represent far-right radicalisation in Finland. In understanding radicalism, we focus on particular feelings of injustice that result from grievances, alienation and polarisation in the I-GAP framework as conceptualised in the D.Rad project.

The data consists of two YouTube videos and their comments, the first one being the election video of the radical right-wing Finns Party, published in March 2019, and the second one the introductory video of a new political organisation and a registration-aspiring party, the Blue-Black Movement (*Sinimusta liike*), published in January 2021. Originally, the Finns Party is not a far-right actor, but after the party split in 2017, the more radical nativist wing, led by Jussi Halla-aho, has brought questions related to migration and national consciousness to the front. The Blue-Black Movement is an ethnonationalist party which started to become an officially registered party in April 2021. During the time of writing this report, the campaign progressed steadily, and registered supporters piled up slowly until June 2022 when BBM became a registered party. The party manifesto of the initiative is strongly exclusivist, ethno-nationalist and includes typical tropes of fascist ideology and mobilisation.

Our analysis of the YouTube videos and their commentary showed that the violence expressed is not direct but instead the videos create antagonism between “us” and “them”, the outgroup consisting of immigrants, and the political elite. These antagonisms stir feelings such as fear, hate, and distress that can feed into radicalisation. While we focus on particular feelings of injustice that result from grievances, alienation and polarisation (I-GAP), we found feelings of being unrepresented, fear of foreigners and economic injustice towards the in-group. The videos also stress an urgency for action to change the current situation. Both videos and their comments seek to generate a bipolar worldview.

This similar bipolar worldview is repeated in other communication by the organisations, they articulate a hegemonic confrontation and build on readiness for violence, even if violence is not explicitly encouraged. The heroic role of the far right defending the people from the terrifying realities or futures has resonance with earlier discussions and aesthetics related to the far right transnationally. Further analysis is needed on the use of social media, the study of hegemonic confrontation through different media and genres, as well as the spread of implicitly violent content.

# 1. Introduction

The aim of this country report is to provide a conceptual account of how media function as drivers of radicalisation (see e.g., Hoskins et al, 2011). The report addresses the media's roles in transmitting and legitimising radical ideas and radicalised political action, particularly considering representation, circulation and consumption. Our report compares an established and an aspiring political party, now both in the party register, through YouTube videos in the Finnish media landscape. It outlines the us-building of right-wing radical, nationalist movements in a political and cultural context. We inquire how a particular audio-visual media text not only represents the radicalised ideas but also reaches and constructs audiences and how audiences process them through emotional commentary.

The exit project consists of three focus areas: education of stakeholders, creation of operating model and client work. The aim of education is to spread knowledge and understanding the importance and substance of exit work. The model creation refers to building permanent practice, which is shaped by co-learning with other EU member states. The client work offers mentoring for voluntary, violently radicalised people or ones at the risk of violent radicalisation.

The level of (violent) radicalisation is relatively low in Finland. Finland has been a consensus-driven country after polarisation during the civil war, in 1918, and the period after-WWII, with structures of Nordic welfare society. This is also visible in the media culture. The far right is seen as the most prominent threat by the national security authority and its activity grew especially during and after so-called refugee crisis in 2015 (SUPO, 2021; Horsmanheimo et al., 2021), although a lot of the de-radicalisation support measures are for radical Islamist actors. In December 2021, an extreme right group was under investigation for the potential planning of terror action for the first time in Finland (Yle news, 2021). The injustice claims on the far right are related to migrants and refugees receiving more than the Finland-born Finns from the state, feelings of unsafeness and being threatened with violence, and increased crime rates (Lounela et al., 2021). At stake is a constitutive performance of 'us' (c.f., Palonen, 2021a).

After the migration-intensive period 2015-2016, far-right mobilisation on the streets has toned down. A newer phenomenon is the formation and transformation of political parties interest the far right. One of the major parties in Finland, the radical-right Finns Party (FP) has adopted a strong anti-immigration focus (Palonen, 2021b). In 2021-2022, new splinter or spin-off parties of the Finns Party have been gathering support for official registration; one of them being a new political organisation, the Blue-Black Movement (BMM). We use here the concept of far right (e.g., Mudde, 2019), which is a heading for both the radical right, represented by the Finns Party, and extreme right, represented by the BBM. Many of the new parties are anti-vax, covid-policy critical and Putinist. Although, the BBM wants to establish itself as a party, it claims to contest the whole political system (Sinimusta 2021a). Contesting mainstream media and forming counter media are central in Finnish far-right activity (Horsmanheimo et al., 2021; Saresma & Palonen 2022).

In Finland, most media outlets are not politically aligned; they thrive on impartiality and fact-based news, which does not provide fertile soil for polarised media discourses or alternative voices. However, Yle, Finnish public broadcasting company, is obligated to secure diverse content and media services in minority languages (Ala-Fossi, 2015). The self-regulated media with mostly highly educated professional journalists seek balanced and multi-voiced reporting as an ideal – critically described as naïve pluralism (Karppinen, 2007). The Finnish far-right movements distrust the mainstream media and have established their own media channels and use their own platforms while also engaging on general platforms (Pyrhönen, 2015; Ylä-Anttila, 2017; Hatakka, 2019). Particularly, Yle has become a campaign target for the far right. In a country where professional journalism is self-regulated, the emergence of alternative media that does not follow journalistic conventions, is in striking contrast with the mainstream media outlets. Feeling of injustice in terms of communication is often voiced in the critical comments in Finland: 'wrong' people and topics are heard in the news outlets.

The far right's online communication revolves around forming the in-group and strengthening its solidarity through mediating collective experiences of violence and hate, but also cohesion and friendship (Ekman, 2014). The campaign videos we analyse spread the far-right message beyond the usual target groups. Related videos emphasise counterhegemonic organising methods and suggest mobilising in both online and offline environments. We understand political polarisation as an attempt to generate a counterhegemonic perspective through a binary logic in which the 'us' presents a counterpart to all others projected as pejorative and fostered by a culture war that generates a basis for all identification (Adorno, 2020; Palonen, 2009). One-dimensional speech can be a conscious choice that leads like-minded people to even more extreme opinions (Tuomola, 2018, p. 186).

In this report we chose to study YouTube, which has a wide demographic spread and is the main platform for videos in Finland especially for the youth (Tilastokeskus, 2021). YouTube is an interactive platform as it is possible to leave comments and like or dislike videos, and the videos can be shared to multiple platforms and other social media which can make them circulate even further. Laaksonen, Pantti, and Titley (2020) have researched anti-immigration movements' activism during and after the 'refugee crisis' there. They suggest that Finnish anti-immigration actors know YouTube's capability of generating movements transnationally. Analysing the videos and their comments enable us to perceive the in-group building and polarisation in social media through visual representation and emotional reactions. It is vital to study how the far right uses YouTube videos to spread radicalised ideas and gain support, since YouTube enables reaching people by developing the brand and the channel, and it also reaches people with a relationship with the established media that is not strong (Laaksonen, Pantti & Titley, 2020, p. 187). Digital media has provided radical right-wing movements new ways to interact and consume racist content with each other despite their physical location (Ekman, 2017, p. 350).

This report is structured as follows: first we introduce our methodological and theoretical framework and data, then we describe the Finnish media landscape, and cultural and political context of radicalisation. After that, we introduce, compare and analyse the videos and their comment spheres. Finally, we provide the conclusions to the report. Our data consists of two YouTube videos, the first one being the election video of the Finns Party, published in March 2019, and the second one the introductory video of the BBM, published in January 2021. We have chosen two YouTube campaign videos of far-right actors as our data to see what the main claims are and how these media products resonate and spread violent ideology in contemporary Finnish society. To present the scale of far right in Finland, we chose one video which represents the mainstream (i.e., the FP) and another which represents the fringe (i.e., the BBM).

## 2. Methodology

The report follows the media ecology approach to demonstrate the cultural drivers of radicalisation and mediated patterns of othering and marginalisation. According to Mattoni (2017), media ecology as an approach focuses on media technologies in the context of multi-layered media ecologies. To analyse YouTube data, we used a practice-based media research methodology (Couldry, 2004), concentrating on observing communicative dimensions from an empirical viewpoint at a micro-level. Both approaches emphasise the multiple form of technologies, channels and contents through which people interact. (Mattoni, 2017.) The media ecology approach sees media as forming environments that affect and surround people who use them. Media then can be understood as "species" living in an ecosystem in relation to each other (Scolari, 2012, p. 209). Hybrid media ecologies combine the analysis of the digital and the non-digital, the online and the offline, the mainstream and the alternative (Treré, 2018). The Finnish far-right scene online is active, interconnected and well-studied. Our report points to how it seeks to bridge the gap between online communication and political action. The way people use media can affect the way they show their political stands or participate politically (Mattoni, 2017, p. 501), which is highly relevant in our cases that represent political parties.



To develop the contextual understanding, the report follows the cultural circulation model of Stuart Hall (1980; 1997). In cultural theory, politics of representation emphasise how signifiers are negotiated, contested, and agreed upon (Hall, 1997; Laclau & Mouffe, 1987). Representations enable perceiving and understanding what other people communicate to each other; thoughts, things and culture become common and shared (Seppänen & Väliaverronen, 2014, pp. 95-96). To perceive radicalism, we used the constructivist I-GAP framework that allows the motives driving radicalisation to be traced in representations of particular feelings of *injustice* that result from experiences of *grievances, alienation and polarisation* through (see report WP3.2, Lounela et al., 2021).

The first piece of data, *V niin kuin Ketutus* (2019), is an election campaign video of the FP, a populist radical-right party (Palonen, 2021b), one of the largest parties in the Finnish parliament. The second video, *Sinimusta Liike* (2021), was made by an aspiring political party known as the BBM, which released the video to boost its campaign for the 5000 supporters it needed to register as a party. Both videos express radical ideas that can be prone to violence. At the time of analysis, BBM's video had been viewed 12 368 times, and received 666 likes<sup>1</sup> and 474 dislikes. FP's video had 508 851 viewings<sup>2</sup>, with 13 655 likes and 5095 dislikes. The numbers reflect the prominence of the two political actors in Finland. However, the exceptionally large number of viewings in FP's video is due to the media publicity it received and at the time it had 10 times more viewings than the election-winner Social Democrats' election video<sup>3</sup> (Sakki & Martikainen, 2020, p. 615). The FP has an English version of their video which spread abroad and made people leave election greetings internationally also to the Finnish version.

In the videos we searched for visual and rhetorical elements that resonate with I-GAP and compared the themes and factors which link or separate these videos and actors together. We read through the collected comments and noted recurring topics related to violence or extremism and the ones that are identified in I-GAP framework. The YouTube comments were collected on the 12th of August 2021 by using YouTube API through YouTube Data Tools software. We content analysed the first 800 comments from both videos, because their lifetime online varies greatly. The qualitative content analysis includes quantitative characters. We compared the comments of the two videos and rated the most active commentators to see how many times they had commented, and whether they were arguing for or against the messages in the videos. The English version of the FP's video is referenced in this report, but comments were collected from the Finnish one.

### 3. Media landscape, cultural and political context of radicalisation in the national setting

In this chapter, we first provide an overview of the Finnish media landscape in a hybrid media context, which includes relationships between mainstream media and counter media outlets. In the second half of the chapter, we examine how far-right actors are situated in the Finnish political sphere.

#### 3.1 Finnish media landscape

According to Hallin and Mancini's (2004) comparative study, the Finnish media landscape model is democratic corporatist. In common with many other western countries, Finland has been transforming towards a liberal model (Karppinen, 2015, pp. 94-95), moving from a strongly state-owned and regulated model towards more commercial and decentralised media ownership since the 1980s. Despite this, the media market is quite concentrated in Finland internationally compared, with a few companies dominating the field (Karppinen, 2015, p. 51). The national broadcaster, Yle, is

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<sup>1</sup> In January 2022, the BBM's video had 13 877 viewings and 727 likes.

<sup>2</sup> In January 2022, the FP's election video had 512 881 viewings.

<sup>3</sup> In January 2022, Social Democrats' video had approximately 60 500 viewings, National Coalition 36 000 viewings, Centre just under 26 000, Green League 14 000, and Left Alliance 7500 viewings.

under parliamentary control and plays an integral part in the media field with an even stronger role after its funding model was changed from a fee-based to a tax-based one (Herzog & Karppinen, 2014).

Finnish journalists are mainly educated professionals, trust in professional media is high and nationwide media service circulate broadly in this country where “party newspapers are a curiosity” (Medialandscapes, 2015). In a country of 5.5 million inhabitants, there are 250 newspapers from the local to national levels. Subscriptions to newspapers home-delivered daily are at a record high although digital subscriptions are increasingly starting to replace home delivery; the industry estimates the total reach of newspapers (digital or paper copies) as 95 percent of the population (Uutismediat, 2020). Newspapers and magazines claim one-third of the total marketing expenses in Finland, while TV and Radio a quarter, social media 13 percent, classified online media 13 percent and other online media 1 percent (Uutismediat, 2020). This indicates a clear prominence of traditional forms of media, and particularly the reach of print media. This could also pose a challenge to the emergence of radical views.

Until the 1980s Yle was the official broadcaster with a cultural and informative role as a part of democracy and welfare policy of the public authorities. As the regulation channels were liberalised, media politics started to be less connected to party politics. While major reforms in the media landscape have been state-led and communication policy is strongly hierarchical-corporatist and elite-led, the participation of stakeholders has increased (Jääsaari, 2015, pp. 72-73, 85). Since 2013, Yle has been financed through the controversial ‘Yle tax’ that replaced TV licensing (Nieminen, 2015, pp. 16-17; Herzog & Karppinen, 2014). Yle produces content in several languages, and it is supposed to nurture diversity and multiculturalism when distributing news, information, and entertainment. The tax model has been opposed by the FP, who suggest that Yle’s television broadcasting should be financed by users rather than a universally available state-funded service. The FP also claims that Yle is declaring its own ‘truths’ instead of facts (Perussuomalaiset, 2020, p. 4).

Nieminen (2015) claims that alternative options have often been eliminated and only harmonised interpretations are present in Finnish media reporting, which weakens audience’s critical competence to weigh between conflicting perspectives. Ikäheimo and Seuri (2020) provided an example of this by presenting journalism on EU celebration days as consensual and elite compliant in Finland. The alternative model has been to establish two conflicting sides, but this approach, although popular in talk shows, has received criticism. The traditional media has given prominence to elite-challenging discussions and personalities, for instance mainstreaming the FP prior and after their landslide for becoming one of the largest parties in the 2011 parliamentary elections (Palonen & Saresma, 2017).

Despite traditionally consensual reporting, according to violent radicalism researchers, extremism as a theme, particularly far right and jihadism, has been discussed intensively and mostly negatively in the Finnish hybrid media space. Media focus is mostly on reactive news coverage (reporting of attacks, law cases etc.), while extreme ideologies and ideas (especially jihadist) get little media attention. Connections between the Finnish extreme right and the FP, and their worldviews have been discussed in traditional media in the past few years (see e.g., Lehtonen 2020). While the Finnish news media has mostly acted in a proportionate and responsible manner when writing about issues related to extremism, drawing attention to topics such as al-Hol camps and the Christchurch terrorist attack, and unclear agendas of editorials on terrorist violence might have caused mainstreaming of violent radicalism (Malkki et al., 2021, pp. 72, 79, 97-100).

The counter media scene is a part of the Finnish culture, despite the strong tradition of professional journalism reducing the space from other media producers and platforms (Toivanen et al., 2021). The ‘refugee crisis’ caused the evolution of counter media platforms to speed up as they offered a means to criticise the mainstream media content (Ylä-Anttila, 2017). Far right plays a key role in the counter media field. There are some online outlets including *MV-media* (the most discussed far-right medium), *Sarastus*, and *Oikea media* (see WP3.1, Horsmanheimo et al., 2021; Sallamaa, 2018).

Counter-media platform *Partisaani* was founded on 3 May 2020, the World Press Freedom Day (Partisaani, 2021a). It mimics the NRM's previous website with its topics and visuals and is connected to the banned organisation (Kotonen, 2021). The radical left and anarchists also have their own (online) publications and platforms, e.g., *Varisverkosto* and *Takku*. Open radical Islamist media platforms hardly exist, and communication happens through private or international platforms (Malkki et al., 2021). Toivanen, Nelimarkka and Valaskivi (2021) argue that the Finnish counter media remediate the content of the mainstream media, mostly by reframing it, rather than just working as a producer of 'fake news' or 'misinformation'.

Social media has been an important factor in the emergence and mainstreaming of the far right in Finland (Horsti & Saresma, 2021). Internet usage is at a high level in Finland, which is one of the leading countries in communication technological issues: over 80% of 16–89-year-old Finns use the internet daily (Tilastokeskus, 2020) even if during the transformation from traditional to hybrid media era, there was a concern about how to secure equal access to media and to avoid regional inequality (Karppinen et al., 2015). This has resulted in an active culture of online discussion boards and platforms, such as Suomi24, that include a wide range of topics and where issues such as asylum seekers are emotionally discussed (Pantti, 2016). Some of these discussions take place on the websites of the traditional media outlets. Terrorism experts note that conversations glorifying violence and dehumanising others happen across a wider range of more general arenas, beyond the few open websites or platforms that comprise the extremism in the Finnish internet environment (Malkki et al., 2021). Of discussion boards, *hommafoorumi.fi* is closest to the FP. It provided a support-base to Jussi Halla-aho (party leader in 2017-21), whose blog writing generated a following for the FP and alt-right mobilisation in Finland in general with undertones of racism and misogyny (Horsti & Nikunen, 2013; Hatakka, 2017; Ylä-Anttila, 2020; Saresma, Karkulehto & Varis, 2020).

The Finnish far right can now be seen as more of a social media phenomenon (Kotonen, 2020, p 64). The most popular image-based board, which provides a platform for far-right conversations and discussions on misogynistic incel topics and school shootings, is called *Ylilauta* (Malkki et al., 2021, p. 14), although from wide range of content and topics on forum the seriously radical discussions are but a section. According to Vainikka and Harju's study (2019), users of this kind of platform, including those who have been marginalised from society, feel that the mainstream media does not give space to alternative voices. According to Malkki et al (2021), from the spectrum of extremist movements in Finland, violence glorification and dehumanising others are more common in far-right and anti-immigration conversations. Moderation still takes place on board platforms, and even the loosely moderated *Ylilauta* removes posts glorifying violence. Anti-radicalisation responses on the streets and the media have included the humorous Loldiers of Odin (Laaksonen, Koivukoski & Porttikivi, 2021). In the media sphere, strategies such as ridiculing, debunking and protesting are used but may backfire (Hatakka, 2020). For example, in January 2022, Supreme Court dismissed journalist Johanna Vehkoo's conviction for calling a city councillor a 'racist' and 'Nazi clown' to a private audience on Facebook, presented as a victory for journalists' freedom of speech in Finland (Yle News, 2022a). Also, ex-interior Minister Päivi Räsänen's incitement against sexual minorities trial has begun in Helsinki, and it is the first case where court will decide on whether quoting the Bible can be considered a crime (Yle News, 2022b).

### 3.2 The far right in Finnish political context

The Finnish far right consists of a range of ideologies, but most commonly it positions itself against Islam, immigration, multiculturalism, the EU, the political elite, and/or globalism (Sallamaa, 2018, p. 5). The main far-right grievances in Finland address freedom of speech and media control, and the maintenance of ethnic homogeneity, cultural purity, and economic prosperity (c.f., Sallamaa, 2018; Malkki et al., 2021). The signifiers of patriotism (*isänmaallisuus*) and national consciousness (*kansallismielisyys*) are reflected in the speeches and symbols of far-right actors and evoked in historical references particularly to the independence and its maintenance through military means (Sallamaa 2018). Their economic claims are that the Finnish welfare society is doomed and that too much of tax revenue is spent on immigration rather than on welfare services for the Finnish people

which leads to criticism of taxation (Nordensvard & Ketola, 2014). As Sakki and Petterson (2016) have found in their study, this is due to a corrupt elite that far-right actors associate with the highly educated red-green block. Also, far-right actors feel as though their way of life is deemed to be 'wrong' by the elite and media, for instance, the use of fossil fuels in cars or factories.

Currently, important actors are the street patrolling group Soldiers of Odin (SOO), with connections to the BBM, and anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism organisation *Suomen Sisu* particularly connected to FP members while former members of *Sisu* have been MPs for the party (Horsmanheimo et al., 2021). Far-right demonstrations and events bring together actors from different far-right movements and can connect more radicalised people with less radicalised ones which might lead to wider groups getting more radical ideas. Previously, the most violently threatening group the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) was banned in 2020, but their supporters will most likely continue their activities through other organisations (Kotonen, 2021; Sallamaa & Kotonen, 2020; Lounela et al., 2021). Importantly, the NRM had connections to the SOO as well. For this report we chose to study the FP and the BBM that are seeking influence through the Finnish parliament but have connections with the far right.

Originally the Finns Party is not a far-right actor. Its predecessor, the Finnish Rural Party (SMP), was a centrist-agrarian movement committed to anti-communism and challenging the hegemony of Finlandisation in Centre Party-led Finland (Palonen & Sunnercranz, 2021). The SMP was established in the 1950s. Its leader Veikko Vennamo was famous for slogans such as 'the people know' and a colourful way of speaking presenting a traditional populist style. He gained support from the people at the margins of Finnish society. Some of these were refugees from Eastern Karelia lost to the Soviet Union in the Second World War. The FP was established in 1995, on the ruins of this finally bankrupt small-holder party in the recession years of 1990s.

Racism was one of the undertones in the FP but never its core, when migration to Finland increased in the early 1990s as Finland received Somali refugees. The (sub)urban-rural divide and anti-elitism were important currents, alongside criticism of European integration. The charismatic leader Timo Soini led the party from its early years until June 2017. After the landslide in 2011, the FP has remained one of the major parties in the Finnish parliament. Under Soini's leadership, FP joined the Sipilä Centre-Right government in 2015. The supporters criticised a perceived inability to fully close the borders from migration and the joining of the elites. The radical nativist wing established its power in the party congress in 2017, which elected Jussi Halla-aho as a new leader. Halla-aho came from the *Suomen Sisu* organisation which established itself in the FP. Halla-aho stepped down in 2021 but his nativist line has continued: the new leader Riiikka Purra emphasises the signifiers of patriotism and national consciousness and migration as the key problem, alongside media and the wrong elites in power (Palonen, 2021b).

The BBM is an ethnonationalist party, which started to collect signatures from the supporter to become a registered party on 12 of May 2021 (The Finnish Identity Day) to attend the parliamentary elections for the first time in spring 2023. The reasoning behind establishing a new party came from the idea that for a system change, mobilisation should move beyond the online environment, and that the existing parliamentary parties cannot secure a good enough future for the Finnish nation. Partisaani supports the BMM by sharing their political standpoints (Partisaani 2022b), YouTube videos (Partisaani 2022c), interviews (Partisaani 2021b), and encourages signing the supporter card for the BBM to become an official party (Partisaani 2022a). Additionally, the BBM received a donation from a bookstore *Kielletyt Kirjat* (Forbidden Books) (Sinimusta Liike 2022) which is another organisation connected to the already banned NRM (Kotonen 2021).

BBM's campaign progressed steadily, but registration of supporters was slow, in comparison to another splinter from the FP, namely MP Ano Turtiainen's *Valta kuuluu kansalle* (VKK, in English: Power belongs to the People) that gathered the required number of supporters in a day (Liukkonen & Krogerus, 2021). VKK is a predominantly anti-elitist party that mobilises anti-EU and anti-vaccination sentiments, and Putinist undertones and connections to such support. In spring 2022

further parties with similar credentials but no MPs were registered after quickly receiving the necessary support.

The BMM can be called a splinter of the FP as the active members of organisation have had connections to the party, and some of them are former FP members, even too radical in terms of hate speech. BBM also has connections to other extra-parliamentary far-right movements. Terhi Kiemunki was a councillor in Tampere, and she was ousted from the FP's party group in July 2019 for engagement with the extreme right at a summer camp and from the party where she had worked as an aid to an FP member of *Eduskunta, the Finnish parliament*. Inspired by Jussi Halla-aho's blog in his teenage years, Tuukka Kuru has been an activist in the extreme right *Suomen Sisu* and has led its northern most section, Lapland. In an interview in 2016, he suggested two reasons for joining *Sisu*: first, alleged dismissal of everything non-left as fascism, and then, a personal experience of differences between people in Turkey (Jaakola, 2016; largely quoted in a profile article in *UMV-lehti*, 2016). The universalist argument 'patriotism belongs to all', presented as the title of the original article, is echoed in *Sinimusta*.

Symbolism and ideology of the BBM is inspired by the interwar Lapua Movement (*Lapuan liike*), an anti-Communist, Fascist movement in the 1930s Finland (STT, 2021; Koskelainen & Hjelm, 2016 for Lapua Movement). This period was a turbulent time of confrontation between the Communists and the anti-internationalist, nativist, peasant-populist movements in Central and Eastern Europe. Historical contacts with Germany were also maintained in the name of anti-communism. BBM's party manifesto states that immigration to Finland should be stopped, that Finnish people are ethnically united, and that the party seeks to constrain contraception and abortion and to promote the perceived traditional idea of nuclear family. The party manifesto is strongly exclusivist, ethno-nationalist and includes typical tropes of fascist ideology and mobilisation. (Sinimusta Liike, 2021a).

The party manifesto has similarities with the NRM introduced in our previous reports (Horsmanheimo et al., 2021; Lounela et al., 2021), such as 'the importance of soul and blood in the birth of national identity', references to the idea of *Volksgemeinschaft*, and economic third positionism (Kotonen 2021, 190). In contrast to the NRM the BBM in their election manifesto is Fenno-centric, seeking to cut ties to Europe, except for Fenno-Ugric connections with Estonia and Hungary (Sinimusta Liike, no date). There are no NRM members in leading positions in the BBM, although some of them have taken an interest in the party project by promoting them.

Both FP and BBM present themselves as alternatives to the current parliamentary parties. FP has created distance to its former leader Timo Soini, while the BBM compares itself to the FP as they make a claim of being the only party with the courage to oppose 'liberal hegemony at the systemic level' (Sinimusta Liike, 2021b). The distinction between the people and the elite is made evident, as the current politicians are depicted as the ones making immoral choices or only looking to benefit themselves. Additionally, this notion shows the political claim of being unrepresented. In the next section, we analyse the representations of the FP and the BMM to see how they communicate about the claims of far right and their need to renew the political system.

## 4. An analysis of the representation, circulation, and consumption context of the media object

This chapter is structured as follows: In sections 4.1 and 4.2, we introduce the contents and the contexts of the videos. After that, in section 4.3, we compare and analyse the videos in the I-GAP framework (Injustice-Grievance-Alienation-Polarisation). Lastly, in section 4.4, we analyse the comment spheres of the videos.

### 4.1 *Ketutus* – the Finns Party election video in context



The FP's election video is titled like a story '*V niin kuin ketutus*', and its English version title is 'KETUTUS - A story of being seriously pissed off' (Suomen Uutiset – Perussuomalaiset, 2019). Here we have referred to it as *Ketutus*. The video is rather long for an election video format (6:40 minutes). The video was filmed by using real footage but also cartoons. It begins in the Finnish national library where an unknown person (who is revealed as the chairperson of FP at the end of the video) starts reading a story from a comic book. The fairy tale style of story opens by explaining about the small and content nation of Finland that has sacrificed a lot for its independence in the past. One day, the political elite starts acting selfishly which makes them disregard Finnish values and traditions, compromising the wellbeing of the people through increasing taxation and loosening immigration policies. Following this, a monster is born from the anger of the people. It catches the corrupt politicians partying in a limousine and threatens them with violence, which makes the politicians agree to change their habits, resulting in a happy ending. However, after the close of the comic book story, the chairperson of the FP, Jussi Halla-aho, states: "As you know, there is no monster to come and save everyone. The old parties are not going to change their objectives. If you want change, you have to vote for change" (*Ketutus*, 6:18–31).

Sakki and Martikainen (2020; 2021) have studied the video and its comments through multimodal analysis to explain better how populism's persuasiveness works, and how the video uses ancient myths, Bible stories, and romantic visual imagery in their populist communication. According to them, *Ketutus* is based on a palingenetic myth that tells a story of a reincarnation after a catastrophe. According to Sakki and Martikainen (2021, p. 617), the cartoon form makes it possible to express xenophobic views because it makes the video clearly fictive, which can be used as a defence against accusations of racism. In the video, refugees are connected to violence, terror, poverty, and unemployment that put the nation in danger (Sakki & Martikainen, 2021; See Figure 5).

In terms of funding, the large budget that was required was available to the party due to the party split in 2017. The remaining parliamentary group retained party support funding from the state for all the seats they initially received in 2015 due to a recent law change: the so-called Lex Soini, backfired on the former FP leader who himself left the party with his splinter faction (Husu, 2018). The video can be seen as reflecting some of the personal preferences of Jussi Halla-aho, the Finns Party leader in 2017-21. According to the unofficial biography, he is a cartoon and heavy metal music fan (Nurmi, 2020), these narrative and aesthetical preferences could have influenced the video.

## 4.2 *Sinimusta* – The Blue-Black Movement's campaign video in context

The BBM's campaign video *Sinimusta Liike* (Blue-Black Movement, hereafter *Sinimusta*) is a lot shorter (2:42 minutes) than *Ketutus* and was clearly made with a smaller budget (*Sinimusta Liike*, 2021b). The video, shot in Tampere, presents the main goals and principles of the BBM in the voice of the four leading figures of the movement. It starts with a claim on a limitedness of the range of themes that can be discussed in Finnish politics, apparent in the future visions of the politicians. According to the speakers, BMM rejects concentrating only on social classes and individual needs and promotes Finnish 'blood heritage' (*verenperintö*), with the vision is for a 'Finnish Finland in a European Europe' (*Sinimusta*, 0:29–36). The video argues about the problematic of the use of English language in workplaces, the loss of jobs of Finns, and global mass culture, in which the Finns would be just a fraction of all consumers. BBM members claim that 'The BBM is the only party in Finnish politics which dares to challenge liberal hegemony at a systemic level and defend the rights of the Finnish people to have their own life environment (original reference to *elinpiiri* implies the German *Lebensraum*) now and in future, and to protect Finnish nature and animals from short-sighted profit making'. Nationalism is an important undercurrent in the organisation that claims to be 'proud of their roots', while it is worried about 'national home country' turning into a 'global shopping mall'. At the end, the chairperson states that 'Finnish Finland will need the help of every friend of the patria: It is time for action'. (*Sinimusta*, 1:23–47, 2:02, 2:26–31).

The video depicts a threatening future for Finland and Finnish people as they speak about multiculturalism and globalisation. So far, research on the movement has been limited, although research on the Finnish far right includes references to the key personalities involved (e.g.,

Pyrhönen, Bauvois & Rosensström, 2021; Kotonen, 2019). After the campaign video analysed in this report was launched in January, the BBM has actively published new videos on their YouTube channel. They repeat the same themes and ideas, including the threat of violence against the constructed 'us' group and the urgency of strong action. One of the videos is a shot in Turku where the only radical-Islamist terrorist attack in Finland happened in 2017, and it pictures the BBM and other far-right activists holding a memorial for the victims.

### 4.3 Comparison and analysis

In this section, we analyse and compare the videos to identify factors that can lead to violent radicalisation; feelings of injustices emerged from grievances, alienation, and polarisation. These include a sense of being victimised, of lacking agency in established political, legal, and economic structures, and the construction of polarised identities between 'us' and 'them'.

The far-right actors use aesthetic elements in YouTube videos to access experiences and emotions of the audience (Ekman, 2017). *Ketutus* uses aesthetic elements, lights, sound, different camera angles and atmospheres with wider variance, and *Sinimusta* is audio-visually more stable. Both videos start with a tense atmosphere with dark scene intense music and graphics. *Ketutus* opens with zooming to a row of books in a library and zooms into an unrecognisable person who starts to read an action hero style of comic book. In *Sinimusta*, the tense and threatening feeling goes on until the movement presents itself as the alternative to change the way things are now inevitably headed towards.

Both videos use the Finnish scenery as background creating symbolic connotations to shared past and culture. *Sinimusta* uses a recognisable city centre of Tampere, a Finnish factory town and one of the key sites of the workers movement in Finland, and a soldiers' graveyard. *Ketutus* has impressive sights from the capital Helsinki and the library scene is from the National Library. (See Figure 1). *Ketutus*, the election video of a party with agrarian roots and presence in the suburbs uses only city landscapes. Both make a visual reference to the Evangelic-Lutheran Christian religion, which is the overwhelmingly dominant orientation in secular Finland.




Figure 1. Soldiers' graveyard in Tampere and Helsinki with the tower of the Main Cathedral. (Source: *Sinimusta liike*, 2021b, 0:24 & *Suomen Uutiset – Perussuomalaiset*, 2019, 0:43)

Both videos include Finnish war history in their visual elements; one BBM member is standing in front of a soldier's graveyard while talking about 'a Finnish Finland' (Figure 1), and in *Ketutus*, Second World War veterans are depicted as being sad, even in tears, about the current state and development in the country after having been one of who re-built Finland. In this way, they both use the myth of war history (especially the Second World War and the preservation of the independence) and create a feeling of nostalgia in these videos, which constructs and represents an idealised Finland that is now lost, and Finnish traditions being destroyed by globalisation.

The criticism of mainstream media is very apparent and has an important role in both videos. According to the videos, the mainstream media does not allow free speech, nor does it tell the truth. In the *Ketutus* storyline, the mainstream media has been harnessed to serve the elite and the main national daily *Helsingin Sanomat* is presented as spreading corrupt content and promoting immigration. *Ketutus* shows people who are demonstrating against rapists, implying that sexual violence is connected to immigration, being labelled as racists. This represents the liberal elite ignoring the people's justified concerns as immoral and condemnable. In *Sinimusta*, a member of the organisation asks the audience whether they have noticed how only a limited number of topics can be discussed in Finnish politics. Key grievance in both videos is the lack of freedom of speech and not having the right to voice one's opinions. This portrayal of the mainstream media represents



political claims of the 'us' group being unrepresented and can explain why these political camps feel the need to use counter media.

What is striking is the juxtaposition between globalism and nationalism. This is one of the main discourses of *Sinimusta*: National has been subjugated to global which in their argument can be seen in that most of the products Finns consume are produced abroad (0:50–55). In *Ketutus*, the narrator states that 'they [the politicians] scorned the Finnish Independence with their actions' while the video shows the EU flag (1:08–1:14). Instead of globalism, *Sinimusta* argues for protectionist economy and against foreign labour, portraying a Finnish factory in the background of the video. *Ketutus* presents more of a white-collar worker (depicted in the video as having been fired), when in *Sinimusta* there is a factory worker (Figure 2). Finnish people losing work due to globalisation is presented as an injustice. According to the BBM's chairperson in the video, globalisation is the reason 'nothing has value anymore, only a price' (*Sinimusta*, 2:06–2:10) which portrays feelings of alienation and lack of agency.




Figure 2. The fired white-collar worker of the FP and the factory worker of the BBM. (Source: Suomen Uutiset – Perussuomalaiset, 2019, 3:19 & *Sinimusta liike*, 2021b, 0:56)

Globalisation is presented as not only bad for the economy, but also for the Finnish culture: International influences through foreign cultural and entertainment products are deemed to be damaging to Finnish national culture. This is especially prominent in *Sinimusta*, which stresses a

worry because Finns consume foreign mass-produced TV series and movies. In addition, the BBM states it wants to protect the Finnish landscape and nature from the global forces looking to exploit it. In *Ketutus*, the narrator states that the corrupt elite is abandoning Finnish traditions and values, while the video shows a family decorating a Christmas tree, connecting Finnish values to Christianity. The corrupt elites are depicted as gangsters in the cartoon which contrasts with the Finnish case and self-understanding of Finnish politicians. After all, the FP originally made their leap in the 2011 challenging systemic corruption related to the election funding in the 2007 elections.

Finnishness is the ultimate concept that needs to be defined when defining 'us' in the videos. Both the FP and the BBM are nationalist, but the BBM's 'Finn' is defined through ethnicity more directly in *Sinimusta*. In their video, while standing before the soldier's grave they talk about 'the heritage of blood' that combines Finns instead of 'societal classes or individual interests' (0:28–0:32), and how this 'ethnic composition' (1:48–1:57) will change through immigration (Figure 1). Longing for more communality is important in the BBM's rhetoric. The FP only talks about the people in general in *Ketutus*, but their representations of Finns in the video are white, while immigrants are all depicted as dark skinned (see e.g., Figure 3). In this way, FP's definition of Finnishness is more hidden, as these ideas are not stated verbally, only portrayed visually.

*Ketutus* becomes more dramatic when the out-group of refugees is represented. This is achieved with sound and fast shot changes that can be associated with violence and disorder (Sakki & Martikainen, 2020, p. 618). In *Ketutus*, refugees are depicted only as cartoon characters while the other out-group, the corrupt political elite, is portrayed by real actors (Figure 3). In *Sinimusta*, the out-group is built the same way: the government and political elite on the one hand, and foreigners on the other. They speak about 'harmful foreign cheap labour' (1:03) which represents foreigners as a non-humane mass of workers instead of individuals, and claim that they do not want the 'ethnic composition' of Finnish people to change, othering and marginalising the out-group with a xenophobic statement.



Figure 3. The corrupt politicians played by real actors and a politician and refugees as cartoons. (Source: Suomen Uutiset – Perussuomalaiset, 2019, 0:51 & 1:39)

The clearest instance of violence in the videos happens in *Ketutus* when the monster appears (Figure 4). The monster is the 'embodiment of pure irritation' (*Ketutus*, 4:09–14) the clustered people's anger that emerged from the earth. It started to threaten the corrupt political elite with violence to force them to change their habits since 'it was impossible to escape the anger of the people' (*Ketutus*, 5:37–42). The monster is a metaphor for the FP that will save the nation (Sakki & Martikainen, 2021). Overall, *Ketutus* shows more violence (the monster using violence towards the political elite) than *Sinimusta* which paints threatening pictures of the world's state by mere speech. Neither video speaks directly about violence or the need for violent acts. Instead, violence is depicted as coming from the outside as a threat, evoking a sense of 'us' being victimised.





Figure 4. *The monster appears.* (Source: *Suomen Utiset – Perussuomalaiset*, 2019, 4:11 & 4:14)

The far-right often use violence against women to justify their own agenda; for instance, depicting (non-white) immigrants as threatening (white or Finnish) women and children (Ekman, 2017). Finnish far-right women have typically reproduced the gender hierarchy (Pettersson, 2017). Also here, women and children are depicted needing protection by the FP actives. This can be seen in *Ketutus* in the most dramatic scene: The city and the streets are on fire, and a woman holding a child's hand as a traditionally portrayed caring mother, walks through the flames, while the narrator's voice states that the streets are not safe for women and children anymore. The representations of women consist also of an internationally stereotypical, sweet, innocent schoolgirl walking alone on the street getting kidnapped by immigrants pictured as ski-masked, brown-skinned people in a van. The girl's outfit while not something typical of Finland, includes features of teen pornography where reportedly 'they wore schoolgirl uniforms or had their hair in pigtails' (Peters et al., 2013). Thirdly, women are depicted in short dresses and with tattoos in a limousine with the politicians. (Figure 5). In short, women are showed as victims of male dominance, and do not receive more active roles and their representations are sexualised. Feminist activists criticised the imagery of women in the video right after it was published (Laakso et al., 2019). Gender or violence against women is not an explicitly visible theme in *Sinimusta*. The four of the five speakers in the video are male.

Incidentally, the transnational figure of the schoolgirl in uniform is far from non-uniformed Finnish school kids, in an environment where children typically walk to school from early age without fear.

The homeless man is represented sleeping on a street, more suitable for American imaginary than Finnish one. It raises questions about the location of production and planned audience of the video, which is not indicated. The accent in English in the spoken version is American. Together with these aspects, questions of finance and audience come to fore, but this is an issue that falls outside the scope of this study.





*Figure 5: A child and a woman walking while streets are burning, a schoolgirl getting kidnapped, and women in a limousine and a politician giving money to one of them. (Source: Suomen Uutiset – Perussuomalaiset, 2019, 2:51, 1:53, 4:34 & 4:41)*

Political satire can act as a disguise for hate speech, spread extreme right's political agenda in general, and attract new audiences for the extreme right (Schwarzenegger & Wagner, 2018). While *Sininimusta* is completely serious, *Ketutus* uses satire in their video, and the FP has continued to use this tactic in their more recent video productions as well. Sakki and Martikainen (2020, p. 629) conclude that *Ketutus'* depiction of threats and call for violent actions, together with its humour, normalises and mainstreams hostility towards the out-groups, increases collective hatred and polarises the public sphere.

The scenery in *Sininimusta* is realistic, in comparison to *Ketutus*, and the urgency of need for action is called upon by ordinary people in everyday surroundings. Instead of limousines, it features busses (Figure 6). While *Ketutus* portrays the then leader of the FP Jussi Halla-aho, the BBM has several active member faces. Picturing Halla-aho as the main character of his party, this election video being his first as the party leader, is in line with his position as the most supported party member on his leadership period. His voters call him a Master (*Mestari*). Halla-aho reassures his supporters from the comfort of the Finnish National Library, while the BBM video contains shots in Tampere with living cityscape and public transport noise as settings for the concerned looking party actives who explain their grievances.





Figure 6: The BBM is presented by its leadership, Tuukka Kuru and Terhi Kiemunki who each take the stage in Tampere, in everyday surroundings in everyday clothing in *Sinimusta*. (*Sinimusta liike*, 2021b, 0:10 & 1:33).

The two videos are set in differing genres, but our analysis shows how they also include important dimensions in the far-right discourse. The narration through the fictional comic book is of course quite different from the political activist talking to the video. Both make clear the problems in the Finnish society in their views, but they give little insights to the policies that would be implemented. Next, we will look at their reception in through comments on YouTube.

#### 4.4 Analysis of the comment spheres

We found comments both in support and against the messages in the videos: 806 comments about *Sinimusta* and 2213 comments about *Ketutus* and we picked up a portion of these. In the comment section, discussion often goes back and forth between certain users as they have commented multiple times: *Sinimusta* has 25 users who have commented 10 times or more, and *Ketutus* 26 users. Under each video, the most active user has sent multiple comments, for *Sinimusta* 70 different comments and for *Ketutus* 86 comments.

Comments under *Ketutus* consist of antagonisms between the FP and the leftist and green parties, whose supporters are called 'toletard', which is a mocking nickname combining words tolerate and retard (in Finnish *suvakki*, c.f., Ylä-Anttila, Bauvois & Pyrhönen, 2019), in a pejorative manner. There are a few comments stating that people who have pressed the 'dislike button' are a part of a group of 'nation-destroying lefties'. Many comments argue against the FP and its supporters, calling them contemptuously criminals and the unemployed ones. Commentators of *Sinimusta* criticise not only leftist and green parties but also the FP which is seen as part of the predominant system. The discussion in the comment sphere of *Sinimusta* is antagonistic with mutually-criticising argumentation that flows from one topic to another without making progress. The main target of the BBM supporters is to oppose everything but their own group even if their internal argumentation is not coherent and they come from various backgrounds. However, they share a target to oppose (see also Laclau, 2005). The main topics are the economy, the definition of a 'Finn', and whether pornography should be banned. This shows the video gathered comments on topics that were not addressing in it offering a platform for people to argue their own ideas.

In addition, there is a considerable amount of praise for the former FP party leader Jussi Halla-aho written under *Ketutus*. In many comments, he is called 'Master', highlighting the personality cult formed around him already on the online discussion platform *hommaforumi.fi* from the early 2000s (Saresma, Karkulehto & Varis, 2021). In populism theory that draws on psychoanalytical thinking (see e.g., Laclau, 2005) this form of affective leadership is crucial. In the comments he is praised for the impressive style of speaking assertively on other occasions and contexts. *Ketutus* also got international attention: there are multiple greetings from several countries that congratulate and encourage the work the FP has done in Finland.

The distrust of the mainstream media can be seen in the comments. For instance, one commenter about *Ketutus* laments the way the mainstream media is covering the pandemic, and another one says that people should be allowed to speak the truth openly. One commentator states that the mainstream media is in the hands of liberals, which means they decide what is researched and communicated. Some commentators of *Sinimusta* claim that YouTube is part of the problem of restricting the freedom of expression: Comments are said to be censored because of for example racist content. Also, other commentators and leftist-green government are accused of judging others for hate speech too easily.

Resonating with the videos, immigrants are presented as the out-group in the comments. For instance, under *Ketutus*, one commenter states that 'harmful immigration negatively impacts Finland's economy. We cannot be a social security office for the whole world'. In addition, feminists and people stressing LGBTQ rights are represented for example as 'destroying Finland in addition to Islam of course' by the commentators of *Ketutus*. Some predict a civil war if things will not change for the better. In the comment section of *Sinimusta*, there are references to the threat of violence from the radical left towards the BMM supporters and like-minded.

Sakki and Martikainen (2020, p. 623) found that there were many comments that approved or even celebrated violence against out-groups, or at least downplayed their importance. For instance, one commentator wonders why 'tolerant people' think that *Ketutus* incites violence when it is 'an edited video where someone gets punched, while immigrants are raping women in real life'. Some people comment on this: 'How is this a violent video? The fake news is full of it' or 'The only violent thing about this is the sabre of humour ... maybe for some even a word is some sort of weapon of mass destruction on Judgment Day?'.

Defending women from violent immigrants is also a prevalent theme in the comments. In *Ketutus*, a long comment states how women's security and Finnish national traditions will rise to be the main topics in the 2019 elections. The commenter states that as a white man there is no reason to feel personal fear, but he wants to protect his younger sister whom Finnish men 'swore to protect in their military oath'. Another commenter states they 'do not want to see a day when they must tell their daughters that they have no rights just because they are girls, and that dad did not act when he could have'.



*Sinimusta* has comments that glorify tribalism (*heimoaate*), such as 'Humans are tribal animals -- discrimination based on race is part of tribal behaviour.' Commentators connect the BBM to the 1930s Lapua Movement and IKL (Patriotic People's Movement) as well as to NSDAP and Nazis - in both accusatory and praising manners. Some defenders of the BBM want to deny the allegations of Nazism. Violent ideas and ideologies are discussed also in a humorous way, for example in a comment imitating a phone call to the BMM and asking 'Hello, is this the transportation service of Lapua?', referring to political violence of Lapua Movement (See Section 3).

In sum, the discussion does not lead to any conclusions, instead the commenters demand that each other show sources to back up their statements and accuse each other of lying. The comments repeat the same kind of rhetoric present in the videos, but also use more violent language.

## 5. Conclusions

The Finnish far right, which is composed of several interconnected but also competing groups, mobilises through various online platforms and services. The media discussions and media landscape in Finland have been polarised over the recent years. Far-right actions are discussed in the traditional media and well-researched in the academia. In this report we sought to outline the field of Finnish self-regulated and professional journalism, which is dominated by the public service media and a few commercial actors, but where alternative news sources are seeking to become a counterpart to the established framework. At the same time, the Finnish far right is seeking to work through political parties. Instead of mere online presence, they both mobilise on the streets and offer themselves as an alternative among the established political actors. These initiatives include the party transformation in the FP and establish new parties such as the BBM. In this process the violent, radical nativist underpinnings are presented as a new ideological basis that sets an alternative to the 'ideological' counterparts particularly in the Green and Left politics.

The media helps extreme views become more mainstream. The attention to the far right, and its scandalous claims, increases visibility and legitimacy of that (Mondon & Winter, 2020) and erodes trust in news media. The audience has a role as well since it does not only circulate the contents but expands and reinforces it by adding content and commenting on the posts. This can be harmful if a culture of hatred is established in some social media platforms (Schwarzenegger & Wagner, 2018, pp. 479-493). Social media platforms add another layer to this and is cross-referential with traditional forms of media – with accusations of the elitist or otherwise wrong content. This is also observable in the two videos and the comments we analysed. One of the comments on *Ketutus* voices an important dimension in far-right communication strategy: 'The [mainstream] media and other parties gave the visibility - at least 150k - to this [video] when it came to the scandal that it's violent and improper. [The video] makes legit claims, can't deny it'.

Our analysis of the YouTube videos and their commentary showed that the violence is not direct but instead the videos create antagonism between 'us' and 'them', the outgroup consisting of immigrants on one hand, and the political elite on the other. These antagonisms stir feelings such as fear, hate, and distress that can feed into radicalisation. When we focus on particular feelings of injustice that result from experienced grievances, alienation and polarisation (I-GAP), we found feelings of being unrepresented, fear of foreigners and economic injustice towards the in-group. Both videos and their comments seek to generate a bipolar worldview. The videos also stress an urgency for action.

*Ketutus* focuses on a fictional account of what is going wrong in Finland. Instead, it could have focused on a more realistic account of the types of policy the party, currently in opposition, would like to carry out in power. *Sinimusta* also plays with scenario of liberal hegemony being a catastrophe for Finland, but they also have proposals for the future. This similar bipolar worldview is repeated in the other communication by the organisations. They articulate a hegemonic confrontation and build on readiness for violence, even if violence itself is not explicitly encouraged. It is also noteworthy that the parties here, focus mainly on the political other not the substance of politics.

Further analysis is needed on the use of social media, the study of hegemonic confrontation through different media and genres, as well as the spread of implicitly violent content. The heroic role of the far right defending the people from the terrifying realities (*Ketutus*) or futures (*Sinimusta*) has resonance with earlier discussions and aesthetics related to the far right transnationally. The videos in their different styles speak to contemporary audiences with old messages. More detailed analysis would be needed on the transforming hegemonic struggles, transnational flows of radicalised content and the new technologies that carry them to the wider audiences.

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