



Trends of Radicalisation

D3.4 Synthesis Report

September 2021

Stephen W. Sawyer, Roman Zinigrad – The American University of Paris, Center for Critical Democracy Studies



Table of Contents

<i>About the Project</i>	3
<i>Introduction</i>	4
<i>Method</i>	5
<i>Overview of trends</i>	7
<i>Degrees of violence</i>	8
<i>Violence and Political Motives</i>	11
<i>“Lone Wolves”</i>	11
<i>Radicalisation Online</i>	13
<i>Circumstance Analysis and Motivational Factors</i>	16
<i>Conclusion</i>	19
<i>Annex I: I-GAP Coding</i>	22
<i>Annex II: Mapping Radicalisation</i>	27

About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and broader social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) to move towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts, including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation-states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

Introduction

The collection of country reports traces the main trends of radicalisation in all seventeen focus countries of the D.Rad project by identifying specific historical “hotspots”. These hotspots, which speak to the specificities of political, economic and cultural development and tensions present in each analysed region, represent a culmination of general radicalisation trends and provide meaningful insights into their rise and expansion.

This work package is the second part of the project’s Work Package 3 (WP3). WP3.2 aims to map key meso-level stakeholders and identify situations of radicalisation to provide a foundation for situational analysis among all the partners of the D.Rad project, elaborating the links between individuals at the micro-level across the I-GAP (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) spectrum, and meso-levels of radicalisation. It is a follow up to the previous deliverable, WP3.1 that mapped the structures of radicalisation, the main agents of violence and the main stakeholders of de-radicalisation in each country.

This synthesis report provides preliminary insights on the current trends of radicalisation in Europe and beyond. The report begins with the method devised for WP3.2 by its coordinators, Stephen W. Sawyer and Roman Zinigrad. It moves on to provide an overview of the detected trends, asserts that eminent trends of radicalisation do not always culminate in violence, and argues that the degree of exercised violence does not correlate with the type of political motives that drive it. In the next sections, the synthesis report touches upon two themes central to most contemporary trends of radicalisation: the “lone-wolf” strategy and the nature of online extremist networks. It then offers a synopsis of the main micro, meso, and macro factors that were found to instigate radicalisation, addresses the motivational factors that triggered the violence in the actors’ own perceptions, and emphasises the tension between these two categories. The report includes the coded information on the motivational factors of all hotspots analysed in WP3.2.

Finally, the conclusion offers some interpretive and conceptual analyses of the findings addressing four major points: 1) the distinction between radical ideology and radical violent action; 2) numbers of victims or attacks and the relative physical or material harm caused by attacks as opposed to their symbolic power; 3) the relationship between jihadist violence and religious violence more broadly; 4) how a “hotspots” approach reconsiders the relationship between civil society actors or stakeholders and state action or programmes.

Method

WP3.2 examines the most vivid and consequential manifestations of extremist violence. Its method is designed to complement the approach in WP3.1, which embedded stakeholders of radicalisation in social and political networks. WP3.2 reverses this perspective, working backwards from “hotspots” to understand how specific instances of radical violence in the past may shed light on emerging trends of radicalisation.

Identifying hotspots. Instances of radicalisation qualify as “hotspots” for the purpose of WP3.2 when they are (1) premeditated and potentially scalable acts of (2) extremist violence (3) with significant duration that are (4) committed by radicalised individuals (5) linked to a radicalised milieu. The analysis of trends of radicalisation as they are reflected in the chosen case-studies consists of four principal stages.

First, country reports identified “hotspots” of radicalisation central to the history of extremist violence in each region and emblematic of their environment. The choice of hotspots was not designed necessarily to choose the most emblematic of all types of possible radicalisation. Thus, it is not possible to use the list of hotspots as representative of the diversity of forms of radicalisation happening across the case studies discussed. Rather, research teams in each country were given full discretion to choose hotspots. While this method may remain subject to selection bias, teams were encouraged to choose the hotspots most relevant for future trends, based on the stakeholders explored in WP3.1 and their expertise on local, historical, and social context.

Second, the reports provided a multi-level analysis of the forces of radicalisation that are most intimately linked to the chosen hotspots. This part identified micro, meso, and macro factors that drive radicalisation. Micro factors cover the personal background of the individuals responsible for planning, organizing, and carrying out the violent acts, meso factors point to the wider radical milieu – the supportive or even complicit social surroundings – which serves as a rallying point and may be the “missing link” with wider radicalised networks, and macro factors provide the context that identifies the role of the at-home and abroad governments and societies in processes of radicalisation.

Third, the reports addressed the hotspots’ facilitating factors that make violent acts possible or attractive.

Fourth, the reports identified the motivational causes for each of the hotspots and quantified their impact by coding them on the I-GAP scale. The coding is a constructivist method of multifaceted assessment, developed especially for WP3.2, which allows the tracing of motives driving radicalisation. The motives are observed from the point of view of the individuals involved in the hotspot and reflect their own sentiment and impressions rather than external or “neutral” perspectives.

For each identified hotspot, country reports examined four aspects of radicalisation that motivate individuals to engage in violent extremism. Country reports grounded the chosen hotspots in perceptions of *injustice*, which lead to *grievance*, *alienation* and *polarisation* (I-GAP), and finally culminate in the violent act. I-GAP coding provides a spectrum that allows for quantification of these sentiments. The data obtained from the coding allows for some

measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programs. The quantification of the four components for each chosen hotspot was achieved with the help of five scaled-response questions. The answers range from 1 to 5. Low and high scores indicate lower and higher degree of radicalisation, respectively.

Overview of trends

WP3.2 encompasses seventeen country reports that analyse forty-six hotspots. Most studies identify two or three hotspots representative of the trends of radicalisation in the respective country, with some reports focusing only on extreme right or only on radical religious violence. However, there are variations in the structure and nature of radicalisation within a political category of a given country.

All three hotspots in the German report focus on extreme-right political violence but each highlights a different manifestation of its organisation. The cases range from “traditional pattern of long-term development based on personal networks” to those “representing recent trends of ‘turbo radicalisation’ that [...] are enabled by massive social mobilisation against the government’s migration policy”, and to those focusing “on online communities as hotspots of radicalisation”. Similarly, while the study of radicalisation trends in Hungary is limited to the extreme right, it addresses distinct attacks of Roma, migrants, and sexual minorities. The reports on Poland and the UK also feature only radical right events whereas the Kosovo and Jordan reports identify only nationalist and jihadist radicalisation, respectively, as the most urgent trend of political violence. Both hotspots identified in Jordan point to organised jihadist violence – primarily Al-Qaeda and ISIS – as the main threat in the country. Finally, the Georgian report mentions only violent attacks or protests against sexual minorities that were organised by the alt-right and Christian-Orthodox fundamentalists with the active support of Georgian Orthodox church clergy. The choice made by the research teams in these countries to focus only on one type of hotspots implies that the trends requiring most attention and bearing the most destructive potential are to be found primarily in that specific category of radicalisation.

Accordingly, the reports addressing a diverse range of political motives for radicalisation indicate that political violence emanates from a variety of political networks and organisations that are often both mutually hostile and enhancing each other’s inflammatory violent discourse. For instance, the 2002 attempted assassination of President Jacques Chirac studied in the French report is representative of the reorganisation of neo-Nazi and ultranationalist groups in the country. The rising popularity of the French extreme right is linked to their success in constructing their activity as the only effective instrument against jihadist violence, such as the 2020 murder of a schoolteacher by a Chechen national also addressed in the report on France. Ultra-left radicalisation and violence in France, such as attacks against the police of the sort described in the French report, are partially a backlash against the increasing presence of radical right and fascist activists in the military and police ranks.

Israel presents another example of intertwined trends of radicalisation. The jihadist hotspot described in the report, namely the 2014 abduction and murder of three Jewish youths from a settlement in the West Bank, “was used as a major incentive” for a reprisal operation by other settlers “who geographically shared a high exposure to constant discursive and de-facto violence, sociably supported one another in performing a murder of another youth, and personally identified with self-actions in the spirit of a [vengeful] agenda”. The reprisal developed into a Jewish terrorism hotspot as later that year a group of Jewish settlers driven

by revenge sentiments burned a 16-year-old Israeli Arab who was not involved in the previous incident or any other jihadist activity.

Other hotspots rooted in different radical ideology are not interrelated but do highlight the various trends of extremist violence in each of the surveyed countries. The hotspots identified by the Austrian research team – a jihadist terror attack in Vienna and the interruption of a theatre play with refugee actors by members of an extreme right-wing group – are both “exemplary of the two most dominant strands of radicalisation in recent years”. Similarly, in the case of Finland, a school-shooting hotspot from 2007 plays a significant role “in inspiring similar attacks and threats in schools” and offers an “interesting political violence perspective to the Finnish radicalisation and terrorism discourse”; a lethal assault of an onlooker by a neo-Nazi represents “the most alarming threat of radicalisation in the recent decades in Finland”, which developed in the country “after the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015”; and the 2017 jihadist hotspot in Finland is “the first and only crime for which someone has been convicted for terrorism in Finland in the 21st century” but is “in many ways [...] compatible with other radical Islamic terrorist attacks committed in the name of ISIL in Europe”.

The range of radicalisation trends is shown also in the case of Italy, where the right-wing hotspot, the killing of two Senegalese market traders in Florence in 2011, “exemplifies the exponential growth of racially- and xenophobically- motivated violent crimes in the last decades”. The left-wing incident involving the killing of a consultant to the Minister of Labour in 2002 “reflects the extreme left’s opposition to reforms of the labour market, [and] exemplifies the failure of the Italian state to protect its consultants”. The jihadist hotspot is emblematic of the “fluent and unstructured Jihadist landscape in which recent radicalisation largely operates outside established mosques”. Finally, the violent events of separatists in South Tyrol in 1961 shows “the connection between past events and traditions with current ethnic, social and political divides”. Likewise, three most rising trends of radicalisation were identified in Iraq: separatist activity in Kirkuk, extremist political violence in Anbar, and violent persecution of religious minorities in the Nineveh Plain.

Finally, the Slovenian report identified only one hotspot of radicalisation in the country, an attack by far-right extremists on a gay-friendly café that was hosting an LGBTQ+ poetry event. The lack of hotspots is due “to the almost non-existent terrorist attacks, the very small number of organized extreme violent attacks and the lack of in-depth analyses of radicalized groups”.

Degrees of violence

WP3.2 reports confirm the claim that the study of political extremism must not be fixated on the most violent expressions of radical behaviour such as terrorism or other types of violent attacks. The framework set up in the 3.2 guidelines for gathering information, choosing the most emblematic representations of political violence, and analysis of the motivational factors driving the hotspots facilitates better detection of radicalisation trends early on, before violence is legitimised by the perpetrators’ community of reference. Second, the reports indicates that the scale of violence considered justified by the perpetrators does not depend on the type of their political (or religious) convictions.

In their choice of hotspots for each of the case studies, the D.Rad research teams were asked to detect events “that represent a culmination of general radicalization trends and provide meaningful insights into their rise and expansion”. The obtained results corroborate the premise that extremist violence is neither the best nor the most telling manifestation of trends of radicalisation. Almost one third of the hotspots (fourteen out of forty-six) analysed in the seventeen submitted reports, which were chosen for their representative role in the evolution of political extremism, did not involve violent, premeditated attacks but manifestations, gatherings or protests that evolve into spontaneous violence.

For some case studies, the choice of these events indicates that the general levels of radicalisation in the respective country have simply not reached the point of targeted violence. Other reports show that hotspots limited to a public expression of extremist ideology not involving physical and/or lethal violence are better indicators of trends of radicalisation than violent events. Analysing the identity of the actors in the detected hotspots, their political affiliation, relationship with the government, networks, socio-economic background, and other factors is more constructive for the understanding of the patterns of the evolution of political extremism than the scale of the outcome of their actions.

Hotspots that did not involve premeditated attacks were identified as the most representative expressions of radicalisation even in Western Europe where political and public attention is often captured by the mediatisation of emblematic, violent incidents. Consider for instance the hotspot of right-wing extremism in Austria, committed by the Identitarian Movement in 2016 at the University of Vienna, where activists “interrupted a play that was performed together with refugees at the main auditorium of the university and stormed the stage to unroll a banner while spilling fake blood onto the stage”. This event was “exemplary for the activities and actions of the group: It included the element of direct confrontation, triggered public outrage, and reproduces key narratives of the group”.

A similar pattern was identified as most characteristic of radicalisation trends in the United Kingdom. All three hotspots chosen by the UK research team concerned right-wing extremism, which is telling of its predominance on the map political violence in the country vis-à-vis jihadist, ultra-left and other types of extremism, but two of them did not involve a violent, targeted attack. One hotspot referred to a series of “violent far-right protests” in the town of Dover in 2016 and 2020 that were related to “the rising anti-immigrant and anti-refugee movements in the UK”. However, the violence was secondary to the protests and did not amount to planned attacks. On one occasion, the protests involved “a variety of members of far-right organisations [...] with most visible anti-refugee banners such as ‘refugees not welcome’, chanting ‘no more refugees’ and wearing ‘f*ck ISIS’ t-shirts”, and on another, “banners reading ‘How many illegal immigrants are terrorists’ and ‘4200 homeless veterans abandoned’”. The protests evolved into clashes with the police, which led to arrests, but were not organised with the purpose of inflicting physical harm or damage to property. Another UK hotspot was a “right-wing anti-BLM march” in June 2020 that “served as an outlet for the increasingly dominant ideology that British culture, and specifically, white British culture, was at threat from external and internal sources”. Some of the marchers expressed violent intentions “to ‘come for a fight’”, had fireworks “thrown across the crowds”, leading to the injury of “23 officers”, and were arrested for possession of offensive weapon, assault, or violent disorder, but did not involve violent attacks.

The Polish case-study is another example of radicalisation trends that cannot be detected and properly understood if measured only on the scale of violent extremism. Both hotspots identified in the Polish report concern right-wing extremism but neither involves an attack. One of them is a sequence of “Independence Marches”, events “annually held to commemorate gaining independence by Poland in 1918 [and] attended by nationalist organizations and football fans” who use banners, such as “‘White Europe’, ‘Europe white or deserted’, ‘Clean blood, sober mind’” or “‘There is never enough racism and fascism in Trójmiasto’”. The second is a commemoration “of Adolf Hitler’s birthday in 2017 by eight members of a nationalist organization ‘Pride & Modernity’ (‘Duma i Nowoczesność’)”, during which “participants wore Wehrmacht and SS uniforms, burned a swastika, and praised Hitler’s government”.

Significant radicalised events in Bosnia, Georgia, and Italy, likewise, included no violent, premeditated attacks against individuals. The extreme ultra-nationalist hotspot identified in Bosnia was an annual meeting of the Serb Chetnik movement in Višegrad, commemorating its past leader during WWII. The event was meant to reference the “traumatic events of 1992 of Bosnian returnees in Višegrad” and to promote “the Serbian ethno-nationalistic ideology”. One of the two hotspots of Christian-Orthodox fundamentalist radicalisation in Georgia was a violent attempt “to storm into a movie theatre and stop the screening of a movie about a gay folk dancer”. While not intending to attack the visitors at the theatre, the hotspot was selected “due to the importance of orthodox Christianity and its impact on youth radicalization, and especially as it is the key driving ideology behind the violent mob attacks and network of actors and groups organizing such incidents”. The jihadist hotspot in Italy further demonstrates the need to study early expressions of radicalised behaviour. The Italian event refers to a process of radicalisation of an individual who was arrested during her attempt to contact ISIS without having committed an act of terrorism or other types of violence. This hotspot “is emblematic of Italy’s fluent and unstructured Jihadist landscape in which recent radicalisation largely operates outside established mosques. The case exemplifies its reliance on the web and social media platforms as a main operational hub encouraging radicalisation processes, contact between members and offering ‘citizenship’ of a virtual Caliphate”.

Processes of radicalisation tend to attract political and media attention only when they culminate in large scale attacks or symbolic acts of terrorism. But empirical research and analysis of radicalisation trends are also affected by the inflated interest in tangible and quantifiable violence. Manifestations, gatherings, loose online networks and even violent protests receive little to no attention in documents such as the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports published by Europol because they are not easy to interpret and difficult to conceptually differentiate from acts of legitimate political action. Measurable data like the number of casualties or extent of destruction to property is insufficient for the detection and analysis of the evolution of radicalisation both because it becomes available when violence is already taking place and because not all extremist opinions lead to extremist action. The qualitative analysis of the hotspots in WP3.2 contributes to the detection of radicalisation trends in the D.Rad case studies by highlighting not only their visible manifestations but also the early or lower key signs of these processes. This approach allows for subtler and multifaceted analysis in the development of preventive and deradicalisation policies.

Violence and Political Motives

The wide range of analysed hotspots also suggests that the degree of exercised violence does not correlate with the type of political motives that drive it. Extreme right, jihadist and ultra-left radicalisation all found their expression in both highly lethal assaults and events involving little to no violence, sometimes within the same country.

Extreme right hotspots include deadly attacks in a synagogue in Germany or a passer-by in Finland, murders of Roma in Hungary, the murder of an Arab teenager in Israel or the attempted assassination of the French President, but also symbolic protests and street manifestations. Consider the only right-wing hotspot in Austria, which involved an interruption of a play addressing “the topic of refugees looking for shelter in Europe and illustrates human rights violations and xenophobic discourses” by 30 to 40 activists who “entered the main auditorium of [a university,] stormed the stage to unroll a banner which read, ‘You hypocrites’ [...] while spilling fake blood on the banner and the stage” and distributed “leaflets in the auditorium that read, ‘multi-culturalism kills’.

The ultra-left hotspot in Serbia concerned environmentalist activism in 2020 that included sabotaging a pipeline to prevent the construction of a micro hydropower plant; the ultra-left hotspot in France, in 2016, involved a more violent incident of incinerating a police car and attacking the policemen trapped inside, which potentially leading to their death; whereas the 2002 ultra-left incident in Italy ended resulted in the murder of a professor who was a consultant to the Labour Ministry and a co-author of a study on labour market reform.

Trends of jihadist extremism are similarly not uniform in their level and motives of violence. Armed and premeditated attacks were identified as representative of the patterns of jihadist radicalisation in Turkey (massacre of members of the Alevi minority in Sivas in 1993), France (murder of a schoolteacher in 2020), Austria (shooting at restaurants and cafés in Vienna in 2020), Israel (murder of three youths in 2014), Jordan (e.g., bombing of hotels in Amman in 2005), and in Bosnia (attack on the United States Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011). Yet, the jihadist hotspot in Italy did not result in an act of violence and only concerned a woman who “radicalised online and left with her Albanian husband for Syria to join ISIS in 2014, where she received training on firearms and expressed her desire to die as a martyr” and later “managed to convert and recruit her whole family”. This incident was found to be characteristic of jihadist radicalisation in Italy where no “jihadist attacks with fatal casualties” were recorded, but in which “several Italian nationals, citizens with migration background and converts engaged in militant activities”.

The data obtained in WP3.2 shows therefore that the methods and “ceiling” of permissible violence deemed justified by the various radical ideological camps depend less on their political causes than on the meso and macro circumstances in which they operate.

“Lone Wolves”

WP3.2 has devoted special attention to the concept of a “lone-wolf” perpetrator who is neither recruited nor trained or sent to their mission by an organised extremist group, and who has

only loose, mainly online links to other radicalised actors. The Guidelines for 3.2 reports asked the project's research teams to exclude from their studies cases of "isolated acts of violent extremism" that are not driven by a political or religious agenda and so do not epitomise trends of radicalisation. Yet, hotspots involving individual action that is not apparently linked to or directed by an extremist organisation were detected in most countries examined in the D.Rad project. The analysis of these hotspots provided in WP3.2 contributes to the understanding of the "lone-wolf" patterns of radicalisation and reconceptualization of the meaning of a "network" in the context of extremist violence. All reports discussing "lone-wolf" hotspots agree that radicalisation occurs within an already radicalised milieu and is not a solitary process, and that it does not culminate in violent action without encouragement or support from more experienced extremist actors.

The German report argues, for instance, that the 2019 case of a synagogue shooting, "refutes the myth of isolated right-wing terrorism by so-called lone wolves and demonstrates that even supposedly individually acting perpetrators are embedded in (online-)networks and intentionally spread hate and fear with support obtained from digital spaces". The 2016 shooting and stabbing of MP Jo Cox in Britain, initially described by many as a "lone-wolf" action, is shown by the authors of the UK report to have been committed by a person who "was involved with far-right extremist groups, [...] had made several purchases from [a] US-based Neo-Nazi group", and was affected by the "physical and social setting of his West Yorkshire home". In the same vein, while the failed assassination of President Chirac in 2002 may "appear to be almost an ideal type of 'lone-wolf' radicalisation" it is used in the French report to demonstrate "that even the most solitary extremists rarely operate in political vacuum. They are nurtured, educated, and radicalised with the support of online and offline actors that provide them with both ideological training and a sense of belonging that might culminate in violence".

Central to the understanding of "lone-wolf" strategy is the 2014 abduction and killing of three Jewish teenagers in Israel. The Israel report shows how this jihadist hotspot "changed the paradigm of what were considered until then 'lone-wolf' phenomena, proving them to be deeply rooted in the agenda of bigger organizations". According to the report:

After "IDF found the attackers that were assumed to be lone-wolves, investigations by the police and special security authorities showed that [one of the perpetrators] planned the attack with the help of others. The investigation revealed that the kidnap was planned prior to the event and relied on funds that came directly from the Gaza Strip. [...] Since the beginning of the 1990s, Palestinian terror organizations have been using lone-wolf perpetrators as part of a wider strategy in order to attack civilian targets. These actions have a few goals, as explained by the perpetrators, such as showing solidarity and performing actions that constitute revenge for an enemy's crimes. These elements led other perpetrators during 2014–

2015 to carry out more allegedly lone-wolf actions, when in fact in most cases they were supported by Hamas”.¹

Several reports put a special emphasis on the role of community in the process of radicalisation. The Italian report demonstrates that the shooting of street market vendors of African origins in Florence in 2011 by an apparent “lone-wolf” was in fact an act committed by “a sympathiser of the right-wing movement Casa Pound Italia (CPI), and this partial embeddedness provided him with crucial validation for his beliefs and feelings”. This “action is emblematic of an emerging trend of ‘lone wolf’ attacks by individuals partially embedded in Italy’s extreme right-wing organisations [...] and inspired by Italy’s right-wing milieu”. Likewise, the 2011 lone attacker of the United States Embassy in Bosnia “was a member of Salafi community and had strong ties to Salafi community in [...] North-East Bosnia and Herzegovina”. In Finland, “Although the [2017 jihadist] stabber and the [2011] school shooter can both be interpreted as lone actors in the sense that they did not have a clear background organisation, [...] they did not act completely on their own. Even when the individual is radicalised not through active recruitment or by participation in an organisation in a traditional sense, but through consuming (mostly online) extremist material, it is important to note that they are not alone; they are very much part of communities online”.

Radicalisation Online

Online extremist propaganda, influence and coordination of radicalised activities are identified as an important, and in most cases inherent, part of contemporary radicalisation trends. Internet publications and social media are shown to have contributed to the radicalisation of perpetrators identified in several hotspots. Yet, as argued in some of the WP3.2 reports, online presence and even interaction alone are almost never sufficient to complete a radicalisation process. The reports also show that social media may play a central role in detecting early signs of radicalisation.

Thus, the UK report underscores that the murderer of a British MP in 2016 “had spent significant time online researching methods of violence, right-wing and fascist groups and ideologies, and subscribing to a number of far-right groups”. The German study argues more broadly, that “the online medium has become the most important radicalisation hotspot, as it featured heavily both in the arson attacks of the mid-2010s, as well as in a series of armed, ‘lone wolf’-type attacks committed by individual perpetrators in Munich (2016), Halle (2019), Wolfhagen (near Kassel, 2019), and Hanau (2020), killing twenty-one people, including Kassel district president Walter Lübcke”. The synagogue shooting in Germany is also shown to have been committed by actors who were “embedded in (online-)networks and intentionally spread hate and fear with support obtained from digital spaces”. Furthermore,

The shooter relied on and received support by a global online community, which was essential to the arrangement and execution of the terrorist attack.

¹ Citations omitted.

He not only radicalised on online forums, but also learned how to build weapons and obtained necessary equipment, such as a rifle from the website American Civil War and a 3D Printer, with which he manufactured his own. Moreover, in order to address a global community from which he expected recognition for his deeds, the perpetrator joined the online platform Twitch, which he chose over Facebook because of suspicions that Facebook would take down the livestream more quickly, as cautioned by the case of the Christchurch shooter. Investigations also revealed that the attack was announced beforehand on the Image Board Meguca, together with written explanations of his motives for the crime as well as notes and instructions on the weapons he had built himself for that day (Frontal 21, 2019). Afterwards, the live stream of the shooting was quickly spread through Telegram. Within less than 30 minutes an audience of 15,625 accounts received the video (Megan Squire, 2019). Moreover, on image boards such as Kohlchan or 4chan the live stream was quickly spread and heavily commented by an online community. These online reactions to the crime show that the Halle perpetrator was not a “lone wolf”. Although he acted alone, he very deliberately appealed to a certain milieu on the net, users of which acted as multipliers by sharing and spreading the pictures of his deeds. In this way, the attack resembles the Christchurch attack in March 2019, which served as inspiration for the Halle assassin. Such live streams are a typical mean of global far-right terrorism and contributes to a glorification of violence, which facilitates radicalisation and potentially motivates other members of the community to commit terrorist attacks in future.²

Online activity has also played a crucial role in the jihadist, and to some extent also in the extreme-right, hotspots in France. The murderer of the French schoolteacher in 2020 was highly active on social media for months before he acted showing clear signs of rapid and extreme radicalisation. According to a source cited in the report, his “digital activity was almost exclusively devoted to his obsession with jihad [a]nd to the promotion [...] of Russian-speaking fighters – Chechens, Tajiks, Uzbeks – who died as ‘martyrs’ in the Caucasus, Syria or Afghanistan”. His other online activities were even more apparent:

Two of the five Snapchat groups that he joined were named “soldiers of Allah” and “Hunters of idolaters”, and on June 8, 2020 [the perpetrator] opened a Twitter account [...] and was followed by users whose names included violent references, such as “AminAttaque” or “MartyrFassi”. Some of his tweets on the now-suspended account indicated frustration with the lack of adherence to fundamentalist Islam. E.g., On September 13, Anzorov reproached the Saudi government for assisting “in the founding of idols worshiped outside of Allah [such as] the UN, UNESCO, the WTO, the

² Citations omitted.

Council of Gulf States, the Arab World League”, for aligning “with the crusaders disbelievers against the Taliban” and for being traitors and “traitor and hypocrite towards Islam”³. On September 30, he criticized the “disbelief of the Saudi state [...] and all those who support them”, posting a photo of the Saudi King in a meeting with Queen Elisabeth II with the Queen’s face and hands blurred out. On the same day he tweeted that “Almost all Netflix series are haram, [...] I know you I’m sure you won’t watch any of those series that Allah has ordered us not to watch”⁴. [...]

In another message, he protested against what he perceived as media hypocrisy in the coverage of jihadist violence [and] also posted a religious hymn associated with the Islamic State.

Most symbolically in retrospect, [he] posted (and then quickly deleted) an image [of] a man being beheaded with a long knife. [...]

Two weeks before [the murder, he] deleted the approximately 700 tweets on his account, leaving only the Islamic State hymn and a message approving that “Chechnya [is] free”. Finally, a few minutes after the murder [he] posted a photo of [the teacher’s] decapitated head followed by the comment: “From Abdullah, the servant of Allah, to [President Emmanuel] Marcon [sic], the leader of the infidels, I executed one of your hellhounds who dared to belittle Muhammad, calm his fellows before you get a harsh retribution...”⁵.

Alarmingly, the perpetrator’s online activity drew attention prior to the murder and was reported to government agencies responsible for prevention of online radicalisation:

[His] violent and hateful messages on Twitter were spotted by several concerned users (including by LICRA, the International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism). Some of his tweets were reported to PHAROS (Platform for Harmonization, Analysis, Cross-referencing and Referral of Reports), a government mechanism for reporting illegal online content, and subsequently deleted. Yet, [he] was not known to the intelligence services, was not under surveillance and was not even classified ‘Fiché S’ (a French system of flagging individuals considered to be posing a threat to national security or undergoing a process of radicalisation).

³ Ismaeel Naar, ‘Paris Attack: Chechen Who Beheaded Teacher Samuel Paty Tweeted against Saudi Arabia’, *Al Arabiya English* (19 October 2020) <<https://english.alarabiya.net/features/2020/10/19/Paris-attack-Chechen-who-beheaded-teacher-Samuel-Paty-tweeted-against-Saudi-Arabia>> accessed 25 July 2021.

⁴ *ibid*; Matthieu Suc, ‘Chronique d’un terroriste annoncé’, *Mediapart* (19 October 2020) <<https://www-mediapart-fr.acces-distant.sciencespo.fr/journal/france/191020/chronique-d-un-terroriste-annonce>> accessed 29 June 2021.

⁵ Suc (n 4).

The report continues to conclude that this jihadist attack “significantly contributes to the understanding of the precise ways in which contemporary online networks are instrumentalised, mobilised and configured around a specific event”.

Online signs of radicalisation were also evident in the jihadist hotspot and in the schools shooting case in Finland. The person who stabbed to death and injured people in a market in Turku, “had written two manifestos in which he justified his actions with Jihadist ideology and aims, and he stated that his wish was to become a martyr. The manifesto was videotaped and published in a closed online communication group via Telegram” prior to the act. Similarly, the Finnish school shooter in Jokela “acted alone but was connected to national and global online communities of people deeply interested in school shootings”. The shooter “acted alone but was connected to national and global online communities of people deeply interested in school shootings”, and “wrote manifestos in both English and Finnish and posted them online before the shooting”. According to the Finnish report, “[p]articipating in online communities built around school shootings enabled [the shooter] to adopt an aggressive, violent and misogynistic male role online and to live out possibly pre-existing narcissistic traits”.

Circumstance Analysis and Motivational Factors

WP3.2 put the I-GAP spectrum to several uses that assist in the detection of radicalisation trends based on the hotspots identified by the research teams. First, the I-GAP method offers a valuable vocabulary that facilitates the conceptualisation of radicalisation phenomena. The Austrian hotspots, in which “polarisation and grievance play similar roles [...] while the elements of injustice and alienation differ”, are a case in point:

Polarisation is closely tied to the ideological superstructure of both forms of extremism and to macro factors as well as societal fissures. The high amount of grievance and discontent seems to have been a driving force in the process of becoming active and finding relief through the staging of an act of extremist violence in both hotspots. The element of injustice however was interpreted quite differently: While the [jihadist] attack may have been embedded in larger structures of injustice and the perceived lack of recognition by the own ideology, the [extreme right] hotspot is embedded in a frame of premature condemnation and false accusations. Here, the labels “extremism” and “extremist violence” as such are perceived as unjust and are being questioned. Regarding alienation, it becomes evident that this element of the I-GAP spectrum is not significant for members of the [extreme right case] but highly relevant in radicalising the perpetrator of the Vienna [jihadist] attack.

Second, the I-GAP coding of motivational factors detected the psychological, subjective factors of violent extremism that inform deradicalisation strategies. Consider the case of Italy, where “perceived injustices emerge as a crucial motivating factor for all perpetrators examined” in the report: “In some cases, these are informed by rigid ideological positions, in others they emerge from individual experiences of discrimination and

marginalisation". The Italian study also pointed to networks as providing "a sense of community and vindication for their beliefs is crucial to the motivations of all perpetrators".

The Turkish report is another instructive example of a use of the I-GAP terminology. It found that the actors in both the nationalist and jihadist hotspots "were motivated by feelings that the foundational characteristics of the social fabric were threatened by the minorities and the state institutions did not take any measures to eliminate the threats. These feelings appear to have motivated a heightened sense of polarization, engulfing the divide between 'us' and 'them'; and resorting to violence to eliminate the others". The I-GAP coding of Turkish hotspots has revealed that "personal feelings of moral outrage and revenge play a role within the wider radical milieu endorsed by vilifying media discourses, racial public opinion and an absence of state policies which recognize the different ethnic and religious identities explicitly and adopt policies of deradicalization." It also indicated that "abstract feelings of injustice based on perceived threats to their values rather than personal safety nourished similarly abstract grievances and feelings of alienation".

In Hungary, the actors' own perceptions were shown to be representative of the intolerance levels in the general population: "The feeling of grievance, injustice and, paradoxically, alienation were arguably not only shared by the perpetrators of the Roma Murders, but also by a significant proportion of the society at that time. Similarly, there is a growing consensus among the majority of the Hungarians that migrants and LGBTQI people are *Others* who do not belong to the ingroup and / or should have limited access to its resources and privileges". In contrast with the Hungarian case, the drivers behind the Finnish hotspots are not shared by the general public: "Each perpetrator of violent attacks analysed in [the Finland] report were young men, and violent masculinity and misogyny played a central part in their ideology or motivation".

Similar motivations were identified in the hotspots in Poland. The perpetrators in the studies cases "felt socially excluded" and "found an outlet of their frustration and anger in the form of engaging in totalitarian ideologies and hatred". The Polish report suggests that effective deradicalisation in these cases must involve policies that would allow "young people experience equal opportunities, regardless of their background or where they come from. There is a need for education towards openness and social skills trainings, in particular in vulnerable for radicalization areas of Poland".

Third, the D.Rad research teams found the motivational factors to be useful also in identifying commonalities among different types of violent extremism. For example, the Bosnian report found that the "process of group homogenization" in both jihadist and extreme right forms of radicalisation, was carried out "under same values, ideology and culture of violence".

In addition, the analysis of micro, meso, and macro factors of each hotspot sets up the context of radicalisation trends in each of the studied countries. This context assists in detecting the principal stakeholders responsible for the propagation of violent extremism and the central institutions that fail to prevent this process. In the case of Turkey, the lack of prevention is linked to the state's reluctance to acknowledge violence against minorities. The Turkish hotspots were shown to have been "facilitated through the public officers' playing down the attacks on the minorities on various occasions; and failure to investigate into the neglect

and misconduct of the public officers in due process”. Macro factors were found to play a central role in all three hotspots analysed in the Israeli case. The political climate in Israel “allows radical opinions to be expressed” and enables a “heated discourse’ of ‘us vs. them’ on religious, political and ethnic issues within Israeli society”. Similarly, “the spread of the phenomenon of extremism and terrorism in Iraq” was attributed “to the failure of political forces in running the state after the American occupation of Iraq in 2003”.

The contextual analysis of the UK extreme right trends of radicalisation reveals “how geographic locations of West Yorkshire, Dover, and London have functioned as anchors for idealised British identities, values and histories, which have been co-opted by the far-right organisations and individuals in their mobilisation towards political violence”:

While far-right organisations and groups encompass many different ideologies today, the hotspots in the UK show the unifying trends, ideologies, and pathways of far-right radicalisation in the UK. Neoliberal ideology since Thatcher’s era including privatisation and de-industrialisation and the rise of neo-colonial policies and tendencies such as “British jobs for the British” have created and bolstered the far-right hotspots of radicalisation – from murder of those that are perceived to be traitors to the UK, to protests centring on borders and perceived threats to resources, to organised violent marches against perceived threats to values and narratives of a lack of support from institutions. The report has covered rural-urban, North-South, economically thriving-stagnating, and interior-liminal dimensions to illustrate the ways far-right ideologies facilitate the creation of group identities and divisions in current British society, which facilitate extremist demonstrations and violent attacks on streets

The issue of borders and migration played an important role also in the right-wing hotspot in Serbia. The Serbian report warned that “the refugee crisis and most prominently, the questions of Kosovo’s independence” may lead to violence “on a far more considerable scale”.

In the case of Hungary, passive state support of violence against minorities was reinforced by enflaming social and political discourses: “the level of intolerance in the Hungarian society towards the Roma, migrants and LGBTQI people, the proliferation of far-right movements, the dominant political discourse in tandem with the incompetence and/or ignorance of the authorities have, arguably, significantly contributed to the” current radicalisation trends. “In other words, public sentiments and political narratives are mutually reinforcing, and that, coupled with the attitude of the police as quasi-bystanders, have potentially served as justification, if not motivation, for the actors of the hotspots”. In Germany, it is “right-wing extremist ideology, especially hatred against minorities” together with feelings “of extreme marginalization and lack of representation by politics” that serve as the primary motivational factors for violence.

The French report claims that the dissonance “between the motivational factors of extremist perpetrators and the micro-meso-macro context of their violent acts suggest a potential path to deradicalisation and prevention of violence. Closing these gaps in the

perpetrators' own perceptions may be a step in this direction". Lessons from the tension between the contextual and motivational factors are drawn also in the report on Kosovo. The report shows that some "of the macro-level factors are not directly identified through the personal perspectives of the actors of radicalization. For example, issues of enforcing rule of law or perceived weak institutions are not mentioned by the actors explicitly and neither inferred by the researcher, rather their motivations are expressed as a set of legitimate grievances that 'justify' their involvement in violent extremism".

The macro factors that have been contributing to radicalisation processes in Georgia "include the collapse of the USSR, the Rose Revolution, high income inequality, and the victory of Donald Trump in the American presidential race in 2016", and the micro and meso factors are "the dominant role of Orthodox Christianity in national identity discourses and the role of the Georgian Orthodox Church, along with that of alt-right groups in positioning themselves as the 'defender of traditional values'". To an extent, these elements correlate with the motivational factors detected in the chosen hotspots, namely "believing that traditional family values are under threat, that there is 'gay propaganda' going on and the distrust of the 'deep state'". Yet, the Georgian report also found a "visible dissonance between the micro-meso-macro level factors and the motivational factors" in two out of the three studied hotspots: although the perpetrators of the acts were not prosecuted, "the discourse outlined their key justification for violent actions as being that the political elite is 'corrupted' and allegedly 'serves the interests' of some 'globalist forces'".

Conclusion

The choice and analysis of hotspots raises important questions for understanding trends of radicalization and sheds light on future directions for deradicalisation programs.

First, a hotspots approach offers insights into the basic distinction in radicalisation literature between radical ideology and radical violent action (or Hotspots proper).⁶ Obviously, there are far more instances of radical ideology than there are crystallisations into actual hotspots. However, all of the hotspots identified were grounded in some form of radical ideology. This discrepancy suggests that ideology and action have 1) distinct temporal horizons. That is, while actual modes of radical violence tend to crystallise into events, the radical ideologies that nourish them can develop over a variety of time scales. It is possible to identify long time scales (multiple years), such as the decade-long activity of the National Socialist Underground (NSU), Germany's best-known far-right terror cell, the stabbing case of a participant in a LGBTQ parade in Jerusalem, Israel, or the activities of the "Odbranimo reke Stare planine" (Defend the Rivers of Stara Planina) movement in Serbia opposing the construction of microhydro plants, or the jihadist radicalisation process of Maria Giulia Sergio

⁶ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, 'Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model' (2017) 72 *American Psychologist* 205; Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement* (Routledge 2009); Fathali M Moghaddam, 'The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration' (2005) 60 *Am Psychol* 161.

in Italy; and medium time scales (6 months to a year) such as the case of a schoolteacher in France or the Jokela school-shooting case in Finland. Though the WP3.2 analysis was not focused on post-hotspot deradicalisation, this analysis suggests that radical ideologies may have different “half-lives,” that is distinct temporal horizons of decomposition. This temporal variability should no doubt be taken into consideration as deradicalisation programmes are put into place once hotspots have brought attention to a specific area of radicalisation.

Second, since choices of hotspots were made in effort to shed light on emergent trends, in some cases, high profile attacks were not chosen in favour of hotspots that either actually or potentially could reach the largest number of victims, were judged to have the greatest potential for future development or had potentially contagious symbolic significance. This suggests that any “event” approach to deradicalisation should make a distinction between the actual “impact” (in terms of number of victims, number of individuals involved, extent of social and political backlash or government response) and the symbolic power of a given hotspot. The symbolic power of a given act is rooted in history as well as in national and geopolitical context. Symbolic power can have a galvanising impact, that is rallying new members to a given radicalisation movement (as in the case of...) or in some cases have a “puncturing” or “release” impact in which a given process of radicalisation comes to an end following an attack (as was the case with the assassination attempt on Jacques Chirac). Hence a given hotspot has a differential impact on potential processes of deradicalisation.

Third, for the purposes of trans-European comparison in dialogue with Caucasus (Georgia) and the Middle East (Israel, Jordan and Iraq), it may be more meaningful to couch jihadist violence within a larger category of religious violence more broadly. Though “religious” violence is more difficult to define in all contexts, it is possible to identify some structural trends. Seen from this perspective, targets of religious violence vary according to multiple criteria. For example, when there is more or less formal alignment between the state and a given religion, the radical religious violence looks increasingly like right-wing violence. For example, in Georgia: the orthodox church operates on behalf of the state and thus targeted LGBT. Similarly, in Israel there is strong religious alignment between the state and religion and the target of the hotspot was LGBT. In countries with starker separation between religion and state (on a spectrum not in absolute or normative terms), religious violence tends to have more random civic targets, which are more spatially or symbolically determined than sociologically (Consider for example, the attack on schoolteacher in France or the stabbing Turku attack in Finland).

Finally, in dialogue with some of the important conclusions drawn from WP3.1 regarding the necessity of embedding stakeholders of radicalisation in social networks (as per references to literature on contentious politics), the hotspots approach pushes us to offer a complementary perspective on the relationship between civil society and state action. Hotspots are crystallisations or highpoints of opposition between radicalising individuals or groups and other members of civil society or public authorities. As forms of opposition, trends of radicalisation tend to reify their opposition, be they civil society or state actors with clearly defined interests and or autonomy, often in the service of majority or global interests against their own radicalising grassroots movements. For example, in the case of far right, a question of state having been captured by global or foreign interests against a grass-roots popular movement or in the case of jihadism, crystalising Western, anti-Muslim forces as the core of

public or social action. But while these radicalisation movements tend to harden distinctions between their own social action and other civil society groups and public authorities, the process of deradicalisation following a given hotspot will depend on infrastructural capacity of state, that is, the ability to operate through civil society. As such, an essential aim of deradicalisation following a given hotspot is to deconstruct the distinctions and hardening of boundaries between their own movements, other civil society actors and the state.

Annex I: I-GAP Coding

The motivational factors of all forty-six hotspots analysed in WP3.2 were quantified with the help of a coding system that included five scaled-response questions for each of the four I-GAP categories. The analysis of the codified responses exceeds the framework of the present report. However, the codifying questions as well as all codified responses obtained from the seventeen reports of WP3.2 are brought below.

Codifying Questions

- | | |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Injustice 1. | To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice? |
| Injustice 2. | To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment? |
| Injustice 3. | To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution? |
| Injustice 4. | To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition? |
| Injustice 5. | To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation? |
| Grievance 1. | How specific is the experienced grievance? |
| Grievance 2. | How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances? |
| Grievance 3. | How personal is the grievance? |
| Grievance 4. | How formalized is the demand to address the grievance? |
| Grievance 5. | How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance? |
| Alienation 1. | How specific and central is the sense of alienation? |
| Alienation 2. | How voluntary is the process of alienation? |
| Alienation 3. | How complete is the alienation? |
| Alienation 4. | How entrenched is the alienation? |
| Alienation 5. | How reversible is the sense of alienation? |
| Polarisation 1. | To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized? |
| Polarisation 2. | How high is the perceived level of the polarization? |
| Polarisation 3. | To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place? |
| Polarisation 4. | To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere? |
| Polarisation 5. | Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot? |

Codified Responses: Motivational Factors

	Austria		Bosnia		Finland			France			Georgia		
Political/religious motives	Jihadist	Right wing	Jihadist	Right wing	School Shooting	Right wing	Jihadist	Jihadist	Right wing	Left wing	Christian fundamentalist	Christian fundamentalist	Christian fundamentalist
Type of hotspot	Attack	Protest	Attack	Meeting	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Violent protest
Group/Individual	Individual	Group	Individual	Group	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Group	Group	Group
Actors											Actor 1	Actor 2	
Victims	Passers-by	Refugees	US Embassy	-	School Shooting	Passer-by	Refugee	Teacher	President	Police	LGBTQI	LGBTQI	LGBTQI
Injustice 1	2	2	2	2	5	1	4	1	1	5	2	1	1
Injustice 2	5	2	4	4	5	2	4	5	1	5	2	2	2
Injustice 3	1	4	1	4	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1
Injustice 4	5	4	5	5	5	2	4	5	5	1	1	2	4
Injustice 5	3	2	4	2	3	1	4	1	1	5	4	4	5
Grievance 1	1	1	4	4	1	1	1	5	2	2	2	1	3
Grievance 2	4	3	4	3	5	1	1	2	3	4	3	3	4
Grievance 3	1	4	4	4	5	2	5	3	1	3	3	4	4
Grievance 4	5	4	1	2	5	2	5	4	5	5	1	3	2
Grievance 5		4	4	4	5	5	5	5		3	3	4	
Alienation 1	5	3	2	4	1	1	4	5	1	4	5	4	1
Alienation 2	4	3	2	5	1	1	2	1	5	4		3	1
Alienation 3	5	1	2	4	4		5	5	5	3	4	1	3
Alienation 4	4	4	2	4	2	4	1	1	5	5	2	1	2
Alienation 5	4	4	2	4	1	1	2	5	5	4	2	2	2
Polarisation 1	2	2	3	1	1	4	3	1	3	5	4	5	4
Polarisation 2	5	4	2	1	5	4	5	5	2	4	4	4	5
Polarisation 3	5	2	4	3	5	4	5	5	4	5	3	4	3
Polarisation 4	4	4	3	5	1	3	1	2	2	1	2	2	2
Polarisation 5	1	4	1	5	1	4	1	1	5	1	2	1	4


	Germany			Hungary				Iraq			Israel			
Political/religious motives	Right wing	Right wing	Right wing	Right wing		Right wing	Right wing	Separatist	Political extremism	Political extremism	Jihadist	Right-wing/Religious-Jewish	Religious-Jewish	
Type of hotspot	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack		Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	
Group/Individual	Group	Group	Individual	Group		Group	Group	Group	Group	Group	Group	Group	Individual	
Actors				Actor 1	Actor 2	Actor 3								
Victims	Immigrants/Police	Refugees	Jews (Synagogue)	Roma		Migrants	LGBTQI	Government	Government	Government	Settlers	Palestinians	LGBTQI	
Injustice 1	5	5	5	5	5	5	3	1	4	4	1	1	5	1
Injustice 2	5	5	5	5	5	4	1	1	5	5	5	5	4	5
Injustice 3	2	4	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	1
Injustice 4	5	5	5	-	-	-	1	1	5	3	4	5	2	1
Injustice 5	5	5	5	5	5	-	1	1	1	4	1	2	2	4
Grievance 1	1	1	1	5	5	5	1	1	2	5	1	5	2	5
Grievance 2	1	1	3	5	5	-	1	1	5	5	4	5	1	1
Grievance 3	5	5	5	3	5	1	1	1	5	5	5	1	3	1
Grievance 4	5	3	5	1	1	1	1	1	2	4	3	3	5	1
Grievance 5	5	2	5	3	5	1	1	1	3	3	5	3	5	5
Alienation 1	5	4	5	1	5	-	1	1	4	5	3	5	4	5
Alienation 2	1	1	1	5	2	-	1	1	2	5	5	3	3	1
Alienation 3	5	3	5	-	-	-	1	1	4	5	3	3	3	5
Alienation 4	4	2	3	2	5	2	1	1	4	3	3	4	2	3
Alienation 5	5	5	5	-	-	-	1	1	4	2	2	5	3	5
Polarisation 1	1	1	1	1	1		5	5	5	5	5	3	5	5
Polarisation 2	5	5	5	-	-	-	5	5	5	3	3	5	5	5
Polarisation 3	5	5	5	5	5	-	1	1	5	3	3	3	1	5
Polarisation 4	1	1	1	-	-	-	5	5	5	2	5	2	3	1
Polarisation 5	1	4	1	-	3	-	5	5	4	3	4	5	5	5

	Italy				Jordan		Kosovo					Poland	
Political/religious motives	Right wing	Left wing	Jihadist	Separatist	Jihadist	Jihadist	Ethnic	Jihadist	Jihadist	Jihadist	Jihadist	Right wing	Right wing
Type of hotspot	Attack	Attack	Radicalization	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Radicalization	Radicalization	Radicalization	Radicalization	March	Gathering
Group/Individual	Individual	Group	Group/family	Group	Group	Group	Group				Group	Group	Group
Actors								Actor 1	Actor 2	Actor 3			
Victims	Immigrants	Academic	-	Infrastructure	Hotel	Military Officer							
Injustice 1	5	1	1	1	3	3	5	2	4	5	4	5	3
Injustice 2	5	4	5	5	2	4	4	2	5	5		3	3
Injustice 3	4	4	1	3	3	4	5	2	2	5		3	3
Injustice 4	1	2	3	5	5	4	3	1	4	5		5	3
Injustice 5	2	1	5	4	5	4	5	1	3	4	5	3	1
Grievance 1	1	3	3	3	2	1	3	3	4	4	2	1	1
Grievance 2	2	5	3	5	1	3	3	2	3	3	4	5	1
Grievance 3	5	5	1	3	1	3	4	3	1	4	3	5	5
Grievance 4	5	5	2	1	2	4	4	5	3	4	3	5	5
Grievance 5	5	5	3	2	1	4	2	3	3	3	5	5	5
Alienation 1	1	5	5	5	4	2	4	4	5	3	3	3	3
Alienation 2	1	3	1	5	1	2	3	5	3	3	3	1	1
Alienation 3	5	3	5	3	5	4	3	3	3	4		5	5
Alienation 4	4	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	5	3	4	2	5
Alienation 5	5	5	5	1	1	1	3	4	3	3	4	2	1
Polarisation 1	1	1	1	4	3	4	4	3	3	4	2	1	1
Polarisation 2	5	5	5	4	4	2		3	3	4	3	5	5
Polarisation 3	4	5	5	3	2	4		3	5	5	5	4	4
Polarisation 4		1		4	4	4	4		3	3	4	2	2
Polarisation 5	3	1	1	5	1	1	4		3	3	3	1	1


	Serbia		Slovenia	Turkey		UK		
Political/religious motives	Right wing	Environmentalist	Right wing	Nationalist	Jihadist	Right wing	Right wing	Right wing
Type of hotspot	Protest	Violent clashes	Attack	Attack	Attack	Attack	Gatherings	March
Group/Individual	Group	Group	Group	Individual	Group	Individual	Group	Group
Actors								
Victims	Parliament	Private developers	LGBTQI	Armenian Journalist	Alevi minority	Politician	Refugess	BLM Movement
Injustice 1	3	1	2	1	1	3	4	2
Injustice 2	4	4	4	3	3	3	5	2
Injustice 3	1	4	1	1	1	5	5	2
Injustice 4	2	4	4	1	1	2	4	5
Injustice 5	5	3	2	1	1	4	5	5
Grievance 1	2	5	2	1	1	3	3	5
Grievance 2	5	2	2	1	1	4	3	4
Grievance 3	5	2	5	5	5	2	3	4
Grievance 4	5	1	5	4	3	3	3	5
Grievance 5	3	1	5	5	5	4	2	3
Alienation 1	1	2	3	3	3	3	4	3
Alienation 2	5	5	2	1	1	4	2	1
Alienation 3	1	1	2	3	2	4	3	3
Alienation 4	2	2	3	4	5	4	3	2
Alienation 5	1	1	4	4	1	2	3	3
Polarisation 1	1	1	3	1	3	2	2	2
Polarisation 2	5	3	3	5	1	4	4	3
Polarisation 3	5	4	2	3	2	2	2	2
Polarisation 4	1	4	3	1	5	2	4	4
Polarisation 5	4	5	4	5	1	1	5	3

Annex II: Mapping Radicalisation


D.Rad Case-Studies



Extreme-Right-Wing Hotspots




Jihadist Hotspots




Other Extreme Religion-Driven Hotspots



Ultra-Left-Wing Hotspots



Separatist Hotspots



School Shooting Hotspot

