



Trends of Radicalization

Poland/D3.2 Research Report

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

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Executive Summary

The aim of this report is to delineate trends of radicalization in Poland by evaluating specific 'hotspots.' The main source of data are the court files of twelve subjects, which are supplemented with academic literature, as well as offenders' perspectives available in the legal documentation and their (social) media.

The study provides rich qualitative evidence about how personal characteristics of the offenders, their direct environment, as well as systemic and structural factors that might have contributed to the offence. The proposed micro, meso and macro factors for the specific hotspots in this report are evidenced with court files, examples of subjects' narratives and supported with findings of well-established criminological research traditions of the past fifty years, while the evidence for facilitating factors is derived from the court files and jurisprudence. The report then situates three purposively sampled participants of the hotspots on the injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization (I-GAP) spectrum.

This study reinforces pre-existing research about what contributes and motivates offenders and adds to the understanding of the relationship between radicalization and crime. The absence of criminal records among the subjects indicate that radicalization is not necessarily connected with criminal lifestyle. It also suggests how in the Polish context the type of radical group might impact upon offending patterns, as well as how the normative beliefs about gender acting might be conducive to crime. Moreover, it demonstrates, consistently with the criminological research, that individuals who belong to extreme groups do not always share common traits or trajectories. It indicates that for some hotspot participants just the experience of being subjected to criminal proceedings or secret service supervision has a deterrent effect, while for others rehabilitation and deradicalization might be necessary. Finally, the absence of agreement among scholars and judges regarding hate speech and appropriate criminal justice responses continues to present difficulties.

Introduction

According to the latest report of the Internal Security, main agent in Poland responsible for prevention of extremism, this phenomenon in Poland poses a relatively low threat (Internal Security Agency, 2020). The existing criminological research indicates to right-wing and football hooliganism as a general tendency in contemporary Polish extremism (Holyst, 2020; Duda, 2016; Plywaczewski and Lubiewski, 2014). The literature, however, does not provide much explanation on the macro, meso, micro or facilitating factors. Moreover, there are no consistent data on the relationship between radicalization and crime.

This country report is prepared within Work Package 3 'Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of Radicalization' under the project D.Rad 'De-Radicalization in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, and Re-Integrate'. The core objective of this report is to depict general trends that led to specific processes of radicalization i.e. 'hotspots,' correlate them with contributing factors and situate on the injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization (I-GAP) spectrum.

This report followed the guidelines as outlined in Work Package 3.2. and it is composed of an abstract, an introduction, a section on hotspots of radicalization: their overview, methods, reasons for the choice. Next it describes micro, meso and macro and facilitating factors that could have contributed to the hotspots. These factors are generally true for both hotspots, but differ in relevance for individual participants when considered in more detail. The last part of the report are the conclusions emphasizing the most important findings. The appendices consisting of: List of chosen hotspots, List of micro, meso, and macro factors, List of facilitating factors and I-GAP Coding were submitted via [this electronic form](#).

Hotspots of radicalization

Overview of chosen hotspots

Although the Internal Security Agency sees an extremist threat mostly within jihadism,¹ recently, it has been more and more often noted that radicalization is also a problem related to nationalist groups, which strongly penetrate the milieu of football fans, ultras, hooligans and criminal gangs that recruit at football stadiums. Correspondingly, the criminological research has also been focused on football hooliganism (Plywaczewski and Lubiewski, 2014), while the most extreme cases of hate speech have been ignored. This is possibly because hooliganism tends to be violent and linked with organized crime. However, at the same time, this type of radicalization is less involved with hate speech or political ideology and more with ordinary crime: attacks, robberies, drug trade and even murders. For this research two hotspots were chosen that focus specifically on political violence and depict extreme examples of hate speech. The reasons for the choice of hotspots is presented in the section 2b of this report.

The first hotspot is related with the 'Independence March' – an event annually held to commemorate gaining independence by Poland in 1918. The March is attended by nationalist organizations and football fans. The number of people attending the March grows rapidly. Initially about several thousand people participated, and in the recent marches the numbers were about two hundred and fifty thousand. During the March nationalist slogans are presented. The first hotspot took place in 2017 and it relates to presenting the following banners during the March: 'White Europe', 'Europe white or deserted', 'Clean blood, sober mind'. The group responsible for the slogan – the 'Stormtroopers' ('Szturmowcy') – describes itself as 'ethnonationalist.' They are known for being the 'Black Block' of the March, dressed up in black with no distinguishing features, wearing balaclavas. Witkowski (2020) described the 'Stormtroopers' as 'an angry, twisted twin brother of the anarchists' because they took over nearly all emblems of the anarchist movement including some ideology and added racist, homophobic and xenophobic input. After the March several members of the 'Stormtroopers' have been arrested for promoting racial hatred, but no one has been proven guilty. This organization is related with other events. On the night of 16-17 March 2019 on several vegan restaurants in Gdańsk following slogans were stuck on the windows: 'There is never enough racism and fascism in Trójmiasto,' 'White Power,' a Celtic cross and vulgar threats (Wiercinski, 2020). The attackers signed as 'Stormtroopers.' Three persons have been arrested for promoting hatred and their trial is still ongoing.

The second hotspot is related to organisation of Adolf Hitler's birthday in 2017 by eight members of a nationalist organization 'Pride & Modernity' ('Duma i Nowoczesność'). The 'celebration' took place in a forest and has been documented by undercover journalists. During this event participants wore Wehrmacht and SS uniforms, burned a swastika and praised Hitler's government. The suspects' apartments were searched and weapons and ammunition as well as items that contained content that promoted Hitler's regime were found. The organization was subsequently delegalized in 2019, but it is still active on social media. As one of its statutory goals, the group worked with young people. In order to promote physical

¹ A successful jihadist terrorist attack so far has never taken place in Poland.

culture among youth they organized survival camps during which participants could learn how to shoot a gun or throw a knife at the target. They also gave lectures on 'modern patriotism'.

This report utilizes court files analysis as a main research method and source of data. For this research 12 subjects engaged in the abovementioned hotspots were studied, including 3 women and 9 men. The limited number of female subjects in this study is consistent with longstanding criminological research findings indicating that females tend to commit less crime than males (Messerschmidt, 1993). The majority of the subjects finished secondary education. Although they differed in their occupations, the majority worked as manual workers. As the subjects used their place of work for recruitment, among occupations the miners were overrepresented. They were in similar age with the median of 31. None of the subjects had a criminal record.

For the motivational factors and I-Gap coding, three sampled individual actors have been analysed. The first selected actor participated in hotspot 1 and is a member of the 'Stormtroopers.' This participant is male, 27 years old, has a secondary education, but there was no information about his current occupation. The second actor, from the second hotspot, is male, 37 years old, has finished secondary education and is a miner. He was an informal leader of the 'Pride & Modernity' association, and the organizer of the second hotspot, as well as other initiatives of the organization. The third participant, female, 27 years old, was also involved in the second hotspot. She was not a member of the organization and was invited to the hotspot by her husband, a member of 'Pride & Modernity.' According to the court files she had no occupation, but had finished secondary education.

Method and reasons for choice of hotspots

The methods follow WP 3.2. Guidelines. I-GAP spectrum is based within constructivist framework and helps to trace the motives behind radicalization from the offenders' perspective. In I-GAP violent act is a culmination of offenders' perceptions of *injustice*, which lead to *grievance*, *alienation* and *polarization*. Data in this study have been coded according to guidelines for I-GAP coding, which allows for quantification of offenders' perspectives with five scaled-response questions.

Court files are widely used in Polish criminological research to analyse situational factors of the crime or factors that facilitate the crime or motivate offenders. This method has the advantage of being a documented and official source that can evidence in an objective way factors related to the crime. The court files were accessed after obtaining a permission from the relevant courts' Presidents. As opposed to quantitative research methods or some qualitative methods where data are gathered in a consistent manner, in this approach the researcher is limited to the content of the files. This content depends usually on the type of case and the nature of committed offence. The most useful for this report were testimonies of the subjects, psychological reports, information about criminal record, and witness testimony that often described the process of subjects' radicalization. The courts' reasoning were useful to determine how the legal system perceived radicalization and what could facilitate commitment of an ideologically motivated crime. For some subjects the process of radicalization and their views could be inferred from the documentation, but for some the information was scarce and limited.

As this study utilizes radical discourse, considerations around the risk of promoting hatred and forbidden ideologies needs to be addressed. First, as an academic, I positioned my voice to critically confront this discourse and I am hopeful that this report will contribute to limiting it from public forum. Secondly, I mitigated the risk by reducing its circulation to only when it was necessary, and when it was not possible to avoid using the voice of the radical subject. Moreover, to avoid giving publicity or fame to subjects and their ideology that they are striving for, some of the sources have not been disclosed. That was also the reason why interviews have not been conducted, although the subjects could be easily accessed e.g. via their social media. In order to protect anonymity of the subjects, their names have not been disclosed.

The choice of hotspots has been guided by the directions in activities of the Internal Security Agency. The Prime Minister and the Parliamentary Commission on Secret Services in particular have an influence on activities of the secret services, so the Agency's choices reflect the current political trends in perception of radicalization. The most recent report (Internal Security Agency, 2020) provided data with examples of right-wing, left-wing and jihadist extremism investigations. However, the criminological research in this area indicated that right-wing radicalization is most prevalent in Poland (Holyst 2020; Duda, 2016; Plywaczewski and Lubiewski, 2014), and the choice of hotspots reflects this trend.

Both events qualify as hotspots within the definition included in WP 3.2. guidelines. They are 'premeditated and potentially *scalable acts of extremist violence* within a larger series or pattern of similar acts that are committed by radicalized individuals clearly *linked to or influenced by* a radicalized group, network or organization.' The data of the Internal Security Agency did not list any political violence hotspots that caused physical harm, and both hotspots relate to acts of emotional violence.

In terms of terrorist attacks Poland is a country of low risk compared to the rest of Europe, therefore the chosen hotspots for Poland might not be extreme in a comparative perspective. Although the hotspots reflect verbal violence rather than physical, it is worth to note that statements that evoke hostility towards people of different nationality, race, sexual identity or religion might realistically lead to statements calling for violence and committing crimes against these people as well as physical attacks. In Gdańsk, one of the main centres of Polish neo-Nazism, a following graffiti was posted on a wall: 'Today we are writing on the walls, tomorrow we will shoot' (Plaszczyk, 2014).

The first hotspot, contrary to the second one, was not mentioned directly in the report, although the Agency was much involved in aiming to both prevent it and later to prosecute it. The hotspot has been chosen because of the seriousness and gravity of hate speech as well as the ostentatious way of presenting these views. The 'Stormtroopers' is a group that openly promoted neo-Nazi content, compared to 'Pride & Modernity' which officially denied any neo-Nazi sympathies. The 'Stormtroopers' directly and publicly incited hatred on the basis of race, nationality, and ethnicity.

Relying on Agency's report for the choice of the hotspot has its disadvantages. First, the Agency has been repeatedly criticized for the lack of transparency (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019). It is not clear how the Agency chooses its cases. It is possible that the Agency might focus on some types of extremism, while ignoring others, according to the political climate. Another disadvantage of relying on Agency's choices is a possibility of excluding hotspots where the offenders have been prosecuted by another entity e.g. by the police or

have not been prosecuted at all. At the same time there are advantages of relying on Agency's data. For example, the fact that the Agency was involved in the prosecution of the hotspots and their prevention might attest to the fact that they are serious enough threat for the Polish internal security to be chosen as hotspots for this report.

Three individual actors for the I-Gap coding have been sampled purposively (Palinkas, 2015). Purposive sampling is justified with the richness and depth of the data, limited number of primary data sources, as well as the kind of interpretative analysis used when applying the I-Gap framework to understand the phenomenon of motivational factors influencing individual participants. The first actor was chosen because of his active participation in the events organized by the group and his online presence that allowed for a detailed analysis. The second actor was selected because of his leading role in organising of the second hotspot and other ideological activities. The third actor was chosen, by way of contrast, to draw attention to those participants who did not play an active role in the hotspots. The views and motivations expressed by these actors are not representative of Polish radicals, and not even of other hotspot participants, but nevertheless are illuminating examples to explore in finer detail.

Micro, meso and macro factors

Micro factors

Biopsychological factors

The court files indicated that besides being involved in crime all subjects, including the three individual actors selected for I-Gap, seemed to be well-adapted to function in the society and within their families or social circles. There was either no information about psychological or psychiatric treatment or there was information that the subjects did not undergo such a treatment. They managed to get a certain level of education, were able to keep a job, able to concentrate and cope in stressful situations, such as during court hearings. Although no evidence on abnormal personality was gathered, committed acts indicate to lack of empathy, lack of remorse or shame, entitlement, and a grandiose sense of self-worth. Manipulative behaviour was repeatedly displayed by the members of 'Pride and Modernity,' particularly by its informal leader, who aimed to demonstrate that he was a victim in the situation. Another example was the fundraising against 'genocide of Afrikaans,' which was organised in such a way to look as if the aim of the fundraising and the organization was legitimate.

This is consistent with criminological research on biopsychological factors, which are considered relatively less important in comparison to other factors. These are also the most controversial micro factors, as reliance on them might lead to false stereotypization and social engineering (Błachut, Gaberle, and Krajewski, 2004). Biopsychological factors are evaluated mainly in the field of clinical criminology and psychiatry. They encompass the following factors: anthropological, genetic, psychosomatic, related to problems in the functioning of the central nervous system, endocrine and chromosomal disorders, lowered intellectual efficiency, personality and abnormal personality (e.g. psychopathy). Since criminology became a scientific discipline, biopsychological factors have been evaluated, but the research did not indicate a single biopsychological factor or a combination of them that would determine deviant behaviour. Today there is a consensus on refutation of concepts related to innate

criminal tendencies, but biological or psychological factors might be correlated or increase the chances of crime occurrence. For example, a study of all prisoners of Kerman, Iran through stratified random sampling, showed that 87.3% of women and 83.3% of men had a personality disorder at the time of committing the crime (Fakhrzadegan et al, 2017).

Attempt to gain power over other individuals

Radicalization might also be viewed from Fromm's theory point of view as an attempt to control and subdue others, which requires the use of violence, force and cruelty (Fromm, 1997). However, as the first actor reflects aggression and violence is not always necessary: 'there are many good ways to intimidate or discourage a leftist from activism. Experience tells me that in many cases they are much more effective than breaking their arms.' This quote indicates to the need to subordinate and control certain persons within the society. This factor is more relevant to those subjects who rely on premises that consider individuals holding certain some views or representatives of some minorities as a threat, therefore they attempt to remove this threat by attacking individuals belonging to these minorities in a variety of ways in order to subdue them.

Rebellion

By residing in a post-industrial small city of Wodzislaw Slaski, the members of 'Pride and Modernity' did not feel that they can reach cultural goals as young people in neighbouring, better developed cities. Rebellion could have been a factor for subjects of this hotspot, who used socially unapproved methods striving to exchange cultural goals.

However, it seems that this factor might be relevant equally for the 'Stormtroopers.' Rebellion as a micro factor for deviant behaviour is consistent with criminological research. It can be traced back to Merton's strain theory (1957). According to this theory, people are expected to pursue societal goals through legitimate means. However, because the means are not fairly distributed, the impossibility for some members of the society to achieve societal goals through institutionalised means might lead some individuals to replace cultural goals and means.

Compensation for an unsatisfied need for positive relations

The compensation and the need to discharge the complex of inferiority could have been the reason why some subjects in this study participated in both hotspots, which was reflected in the quote posted on 'Pride and Modernity' social media: 'we need to rebuild pride so that people are not ashamed of being from Wodzislaw, we don't have to have inferiority complex because we are from Wodzislaw.'

Within psychoanalysis aggressive behaviour is compensatory. According to Freud, when not discharged, aggression becomes the cause of behavioural disorders, because directing energy inwards causes self-destruction. As Duda (2016) observed, this can also be viewed within Fromm's concept (Fromm, 1998) as a manifestation of an unsatisfied need for positive relations. The inability to satisfy the need for love with positive interpersonal relationships results in hatred and a destructive reaction. Problems with self-realization cause a sense of lower value, which may result in denying other individuals this value (Duda, 2016).

Frustration

According to the evidence gathered for this report, frustration played a role in both hotspots. Participants expressed their dissatisfaction, for example with the potential emergence of Muslim refugees in Poland (testimony of undercover journalists) or the political situation more generally: 'due to the ineffectiveness of our authorities, we have become a civilization desert' (according to one member of the 'Stormtroopers'). Frustration is an obstacle, caused by external factors, to achieving a goal or as a break in the sequence of activities aimed at achieving the goal, which causes the experience of an unpleasant subjective state (Duda, 2016). In Dollard and Miller's theory frustration caused by various criminogenic factors provokes aggression that emerges in the form of criminal behaviour (Dollard et al., 1939).

Anger

'My beliefs coincide with the slogan "Death to the Enemies of the Fatherland". When some people openly say that we have to be fought with all possible methods, threaten us with death and disability, I do not see any other way than to fight. Fighting until destruction, ruthless and brutal, as long as the enemy does not bend and give up' (the first actor). The emotions expressed in this quote are consistent with Berkowitz's findings (1965) that the 'frustration-aggression' scheme is too simplistic and needs to be supplemented with an intermediate stage – anger. This emotion increases the individual's readiness to aggressive behaviour, but does not automatically result in aggression, which is conditioned by the occurrence of both anger and situational stimuli associated with aggression or the habit of reacting with aggression (Duda, 2016). If an individual is used to react with anger, even a presence of a potential hate crime victim might result in committing a criminal act.

Internalization in the process of socialization

The discourse presented in the groups' media indicated that some subjects might identify themselves with historic figures, writers, politicians to imitate their racist, anti-Semitic, or nationalist views. Personal role models can be other individuals, or be derived from literature or film (Duda, 2016). The second actor expressed his admiration for Adolf Hitler, while the first actor found a life inspiration in the biography of Léon Degrelle – a Belgian politician, Nazi collaborator and a Holocaust denier. This is consistent with criminological research. An individual internalizes patterns of criminal behaviour when he or she begins to imitate the behaviour of some other real or imagined person or social group (Glaser, 1956).

Exculpation

Sykes and Matza (1964) rejected the idea that young people internalize the appropriate patterns of norms and values in the process of socialization. Instead, they suggested that offenders are aware of the reprehensibility of the act, but use various techniques of guilt neutralization. Exculpation allows the offenders to neutralize certain values within themselves which would normally prohibit them from committing a deviant behaviour. Subjects of this study used various techniques. For example, the first actor appealed to higher loyalties – he believed that their actions are for the greater good: 'Someone may say that we are not at war ... We are at a much worse war, because our enemy can kill us without firing a single shot. Europeans are dying out ethnically thanks to the collapse of the family and abort ion, and

they are drunk with liberalism, stimulants and sexual deviations. Our civilization may completely cease to exist in several dozen years. People often do not realize what a critical moment we are at. This is war! A war that depends on whether we will survive at all.' The second actor during the court's proceedings used the technique of injury denial – he believed that 'celebration' of Hitler's birthday did not cause any harm or damage because it took place in the woods, not in a public space. The third actor, on the other hand, claimed that hotspot 2 was in fact a joke: 'all had a humorous tone to it.'

Meso factors

Collective suggestion

The analyses of both hotspots indicate that among meso factors collective suggestion might have played an important role. For G. Le Bon every crime committed by the crowd is the result of a powerful suggestion, and the individuals involved in the crime are convinced that they are doing their duty (Duda, 2016). Being a member of a group gives a sense of strength and security, while anonymity in a crowd, a sense of impunity. Individual loses a sense of self and gains enthusiasm for ideas supported by the members of the group (Duda, 2016). As Vold observed (1958), the processes that taking place in the group are also important: the emotional attachment to the group, seeking to advance group's interests, even to the point of committing a crime for the good of the group.

Neighbourhood influences

It can be inferred from the court files that the subjects in this study resided mostly in working-class residential districts. As one of the sympathizers of 'Pride and Modernity' complained Wodzislaw Slaski was a small town with one functioning mine and no entertainment such as a cinema or a club. According to well-established criminological research, because of demographic, cultural and architectural factors, certain areas are more prone to becoming places where crime is prevalent. Crime according to Burgess (1925) is a natural result of the process of city development and this process is criminogenic itself. On the other hand, for Shaw and McKay (1942) crime is rather the result of a weakened social control in certain regions and territories, which might be also true for the areas where the subjects reside.

Subculture membership

The court files indicated that several subjects, rather than by ideology, seemed to be motivated in hotspot participation by social reasons, boredom and lack of entertainment. Participation in the group was often a way to satisfy their emotional need for socializing. They knew each other from work or were from the same social circles. They like to meet up, drink together alcohol and chat about things unrelated to forbidden ideologies. This was expressed by the third actor about her involvement in 'Pride and Modernity': 'We used to meet to socialize. I wasn't interested in the aims of the association'.

Stereotypes, attitudes of intolerance and hatred are often learned in the process of socialization (Duda, 2016). Subculture gives young people a sense of belonging. Learning those attitudes and criminal patterns of behaviour takes place in the process of communicating with other people, in a verbal or non-verbal way. A particular role here is played by primary groups: family, peers, neighbours, but when aspirations cannot be legally realized, subcultures

form (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). For some criminologists the existence of youth subcultures is the result of the cultural traditions of the lower classes (Miller, 1958). For a subculture group to emerge it is necessary to create group values which assert what kind of behaviour allows to obtain prestige in the group. The subculture in this sense is an autonomous group of people sharing similar values, which are different compared to the values of the middle class. For Cohen (1955), on the other hand, the inability to meet middle class requirements is enough. As Matza (1964) observed it is also necessary to rationalize and find an excuse for the deviant behaviour. As the examples of the subjects studied for this report show, criminal lifestyle is not an inevitable consequence of belonging to a radical subculture.

Another factor that has an impact of probability for a subculture to engage in conflict with the authority is the level of organization and technological preparedness (Turk, 1969). The better organized and technologically sophisticated the group is, the higher chances that the members will engage in hate crimes. Tomasiwicz (2007) who researched Polish neo-Nazi milieu found that compared to the communities in other countries they are weaker in numbers, less organized and less motivated. They are not willing to make sacrifices in the name of the ideology and treat it instrumentally. He justified it with lack of neo-Nazi traditions in Poland and the absence of racial conflicts.

Lack of guardianship

For a crime to occur three elements need to converge in time and space: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Felson (1995) inspired by Clarke's ideas on surveillance types (Clarke, 1992) distinguished between personal, assigned, diffuse, and general guardians. In the context of radicalization, personal guardians (those with personal level of responsibility for crime discouragement) include family members, relatives and friends of the offender, while other guardians may include professionals who have a specific assignment to prevent radicalization, such as employees of an NGO that works with radicalized youth, or guardians with diffused assignments in this context. General guardians are usually bystanders.

The examples in this report suggests that lack of guardianship might be considered a meso factor for both hotspots. The data shows that some of the subjects might not have personal guardianship necessary to protect them from radicalization. While the court files did not provide coherent data in this regard, some striking examples of lack of personal guardianship were found. A father of one of the 'Stormtroopers' was a Nazi-skinhead, a criminal gang leader and a procurer who was involved in a murder of another gangster. Other types of guardians might also be missing. In Poland, as radicalization and extremism are not considered prevalent, there is a general lack of organizations that work specifically with radicalized youth, except for one NGO. The same goes for general guardians. According to Duda (2016) the Polish society has a low awareness of the fact that behaviours classified as hate crimes are punishable, and as a result the society remains indifferent.

Normative beliefs about gender acting

The court files in case of the second hotspot indicated that it was not socially expected from women to engage in hate speech or forbidden ideologies. The female subjects did not show any interest and did not participate in any activities related to promoting hatred. According to the account of the third actor: 'I found out about this event from my husband and I went there

thinking that I was going to a bonfire to meet my friends.’ During the official part of the meeting, the women sat separately and discussed ‘feminine’ issues. At the same time the men needed to fulfil their gender role through radical expressions. This was well-evidenced in the testimonies of the undercover journalists, who in order not to raise suspicions had to follow these roles. For the male journalist it meant that he had to salute, help in preparing the ‘decorations’ as well as be engaged in a political, hate speech, discourse. Likewise, the documentation gathered for the second hotspot indicates that although women were involved, their role was less essential.

Gender is a critical crime variable and one of the strongest predictors of criminal involvement (Messerschmidt, 1993). It is typical for a subculture to have a deep sense of gender division (Thorne, 1993) and quite often this division shapes normative beliefs about gender acting. In the context of radicalization ‘doing gender’ might involve certain practices with preserved gender differences, and a certain type of masculinity – ‘essential toughness’ and ‘maleness’ – might be constructed, validated and strengthened (Messerschmidt, 1993:107; Messerschmidt, 1995). Normative beliefs about gender acting are also present in the Polish nationalist political discourse. A member of the Polish Parliament Janusz Korwin-Mikke (Confederation) made the following statement: ‘Men must know how to kill. If we don't know how to kill, we'll be slaughtered by the Arabs, by Chinese, by anyone’ (Nigdy Wiecej, 2020).

Macro factors

Social disorganization and normative chaos

Radicalization processes in Poland became particularly visible in 2014, when the European Agenda on Migration of the European Commission proposed distributing 40,000 refugees between EU member states. Anti-refugee discourse led to the growth of negative attitudes towards Arab and African immigrants. The recent poll showed that in Poland 55% of respondents had prejudices against Arabs (Public Opinion Research Center, 2020), which is not surprising as the political narratives often rely on creation of an enemy and instrumentalization of conflicts. Poland has a homogeneous national and ethnic structure with 97.1% of citizens declaring Polish national and ethnic identity (Statistics Poland, 2015). Such societies might be more susceptible to manipulation and perception of the world in a dichotomous manner. Very limited contact with representatives of different religions, nations and skin colours might foster nationalism. In such a homogeneous society, differences are easily noticeable, which might contribute to a higher prevalence of hate crime.

Criminological research is consistent that migration might be perceived by the rest of the society as a threat to its current domination and cause social conflicts (Burgess, 1925). Because of the discrepancy between the set of cultural goals and the possibilities of their implementation in a conflict society, the social structure breaks down (Merton, 1957). Loosening of social ties leads to the breakdown of social control and normative chaos (Thrasher, 1960). The disorganization of society and the disorientation of individuals in terms of the applicable norms leads to the disclosure of selfish drives which increases the probability of criminal behaviour (Durkheim, 2000). In a disorganized society conflict groups explain crime within the framework of their social norms (Turk, 1969).

Both groups seem to have a different attitude towards social norms. 'Pride and Modernity' aimed to remain in the mainstream nationalism, hiding neo-Nazi sympathies. The members alleged that the organization was supported by different politicians and scholars of prestigious universities. 'Stormtroopers,' on the other hand, not only felt politically alienated, but also felt rejection from other nationalist organizations: 'It is also not surprising that the current neoconservative government of Law and Justice, as well as part of the co-liberal right wing, are joining the campaign against Polish nationalists. However, this time, the organizers of the Independence March (calling themselves nationalists) stood in line with the systemic and anti-fascist circles and attacked the initiative of the nationalist Black Bloc at this year's Independence March. They used direct lies and a series of manipulations.' They are dissatisfied with those who were supposed to be their allies, the politics, and decided to take the matters in their own hands, as accounted by the first actor: 'Me and my friends have been hunted many times, often with heavy iron, knives or stun guns, should we remain passive and allow them to harm us?'

Selective law enforcement

The 'Stormtroopers' have a clear anti-law enforcement stance: 'When fighting the system, we also fight the institutions that protect this system, so collaborating with the police is not an option - never and under no circumstances (the first actor).' One member spoke about tortures, sexual abuse and death threats experienced by members of his group from the hands of the police during the Independence March, but it is difficult to find any sources to confirm his account. 'Pride and Modernity' approach to law enforcement seems to be rather a negotiated coexistence reflected in the following quote: 'No sudden actions, no major crimes, no screwing up in politics. This is how the services presented the matter, in return they gave us peace' (Tomasiewicz, 2007).

Although no research has been conducted so far in this context, because of the political support for nationalist ('patriotic') worldview, there is a possibility of law enforcement bias. As law enforcement agencies are dependent on politics, and as they might act in a way to maximize benefits and minimize costs, might tend to overlook politically weak, and avoid processing the politically powerful (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971). This has been utilized by 'Pride and Modernity.' The group officially adopted nationalist stance, while in fact the organization promoted forbidden ideologies. There are also nationalist elements of ideology by the openly racist group 'Stormtroopers'.

The phenomenon of radicalization might not be systematically tackled at all levels. Even when the police efforts intensify, and the arrest rates are high, this does not necessarily lead to high conviction rates. At higher levels, if prosecutors or judges have a different attitude towards radicalized crime, there will be low conviction rates and less severe sentences. According to OSCE (2019) data in 2019 there were 972 cases reported to police, 432 prosecutions and 597 convictions. The most reported bias motivation was racism and xenophobia. For most cases type of crime was 'unspecified' in OSCE database, but the information about the most common legal qualifications can be derived from the Polish national statistics (National Prosecutorial Office, 2018). These were: Art. 256 § 1 of the Criminal Code – promoting a fascist or other totalitarian system of state or inciting hatred based on national, ethnic, race or religious differences or for reason of lack of any religious denomination, Art. 257 of the Criminal Code – publicly insulting a group within the population or a particular person because

of their national, ethnic, race or religious affiliation or because of their lack of any religious denomination or for these reasons breaches the personal inviolability of another individual, and Art. 119 § 1 of the Criminal Code – using violence or unlawfully threatening a group of people or a particular individual because of their national, ethnic, political or religious affiliation, or because of their lack of religious beliefs.

Facilitating factors

Solidarity among members and preparedness for obstruction of procedural activities

The efforts of Polish extreme movements are directed towards penetration into mainstream. The organizations are prepared to respond to attempts of suppression by the law enforcement, which has been reflected in the court files. What facilitates this process is well-organized exchange of information and solidarity within these groups. Individuals involved in neo-Nazi organizations rarely collaborate with law enforcement. They exchange instructions on how to behave towards law enforcement officials and trigger hate campaigns against ‘informers’ (Plaszczyk, 2014). A striking example is a publication, without the author and publication data, circulated among Polish neo-Nazis entitled ‘Hammer for Internal Security Agency’, that includes information about rights within the Code of Criminal Procedure which aims to serve as a toolkit to obstruct procedural activities.

Use of vague terms for legal excuses by the legislator

The offence of publicly promoting a fascist or other totalitarian system of state or inciting hatred on the basis of national, ethnic, racial, religious differences or due to non-denominationalism provides also circumstances excluding the unlawfulness of the act. These circumstances include committing the act as part of an artistic, educational, collector's or scientific activity. However, there is no definition of what is meant by artistic, educational, collector's and scientific activity. This may result in excessive exclusions of liability, as a person presenting a banner with fascist content may declare that it is an element of an artistic performance (Duda, 2016). For example, the court files indicated that the members of ‘Pride and Modernity’ jointly claimed that the found items with forbidden content were kept for collector's purposes. In case of lack of clarity, the court should decide in favour of the accused (*nullum crimen sine lege certa*). However, as Ćwiąkowski (2017) observed this legal excuse may only apply to situations if the actual artistic, educational, collector's or scientific activity takes place, and not when it is simulated.

Use of ambiguous symbols to avoid criminal liability and inconsistency in the jurisprudence

In the course of criminal proceedings, it is necessary to prove that the publicly presented symbolism promotes a totalitarian system or incites hatred on a discriminatory basis. However, the offenders present forbidden symbols in ambiguous manner to avoid criminal liability. For example, there are different variations of the swastika, runic symbols or Totenkopf. Moreover, extremists use symbols that are not commonly identified with fascism (e.g. numbers 18, 88, 1919, 28). As established by the Court of Appeal in Warsaw the use of such symbols also promotes a totalitarian regime and is a form of propagation, since such a form of

communication, even if it is ignored by some recipients due to incomprehension, will cause interest in others and thus a desire to determine the content that results from it (Judgment of the of 30 May 2018, II AKa 432/17).

'Pride and Modernity' used totalitarian symbols claiming that they are engaged in reconstruction activities. The use of symbols in the public space which have been used before totalitarian ideologies emerged and only adapted by neo-totalitarian movements, for example the Celtic cross, the sun cross, runes or the Greek meander, should be assessed on an individual basis (Urbańczyk, 2020). However, if the presence of such symbols is accompanied by racist slogans or takes place at a neo-Nazi demonstration, the symbol should be considered to promote a totalitarian regime. On the other hand, the presence of a Greek meander at exhibitions on the culture or art of ancient Greece won't be considered as promoting a totalitarian system.

In this context, the inconsistency of courts in the jurisprudence regarding neo-Nazi symbolism is thought-provoking and might be facilitating. For instance, in the judgment of the Appellate Court in Katowice of August 4, 2005, II AKa 251/05, the court recognized that the behaviour of the defendants i.e. wearing jackets with patches on the sleeves and collars depicting the swastika, does not fulfil features of the criminal offence, while conversely was found by the District Court in Brzeziny in the judgment of II K 242/18 regarding the armband with the swastika sign hung on the left sleeve of the jacket.

No punishability of sale of items containing forbidden content

In the Polish legal system, disposal (disposing of possession for a fee or free of charge) of recordings and other items containing content promoting a fascist or other totalitarian system of the state or inciting hatred on the basis of national, ethnic, racial, religious differences or due to non-denominational status is not punishable. In the current legal status purchase of a newspaper, CD or video containing such content is a crime under the Criminal Law Code on with regards to the buyer but remains unpunishable with regards to the seller (judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 19 July 2011, K 11/10). Relevant changes to the Criminal Law Code are currently being elaborated.

No punishability of propagating forbidden ideologies at a private meeting

The assessment of the perpetrator's motivation for any prohibited act must be appraised by the court, as it is important for determining the degree of social harmfulness of the committed act, as well as the degree of culpability. As stated in the Judgment of the Appeal Court in Wrocław of March 7, 2013 (II AKa 398/12) in a democratic state ruled by law: 'it is not punishable to identify with any subculture, including the neo-Nazi, skinhead or football supporter groups,' and it is not punishable to 'have views that accept the totalitarian system of the state, and even national, racial, religious hatred, due to different political views or due to belonging to the sexual and other minorities.' However, the problem is when these views are publicly expressed under the terms of the Criminal Law Code. It is the public nature of the perpetrator's behaviour, which is the condition for the criminality of promoting a fascist or totalitarian system of the state. Organizing Hitler's birthday at a closed social meeting, unavailable to the public, does not fulfil constitutive elements of this criminal offence. The second actor was aware of this and used it to his advantage: 'I did not want anyone to post

this poster on the Internet, as I know that I cannot organize such an event in public, because it is prohibited by law. In this way, I made sure that this event would not turn into a public one.'

The prosecutor carried out a very detailed and meticulous preparatory procedure. With regard to the constitutive element of the public nature of the perpetrator's behaviour, a number of evidentiary activities were performed. In particular, the site of the incident (forest) was inspected three times, and the event was recreated practically minute by minute. However, the prosecutor was unable to prove that the offence was committed in public. For this reason, it was suggested in the literature to establish criminal liability not only for acting in public, but also for using national socialist signs or slogans during a private gathering of a group of people (Kulesza, 2018).

Motivational factors for the I-GAP Coding

Perceived injustice and grievance were central motivational factors for the 'Stormtroopers' and 'Pride and Modernity.' Both hotspots were radicalized by claims of perceived injustice. The 'Stormtroopers' are particularly triggered by people of political views favourable to the left spectrum of the political scene and exhibit highly racist, homophobic, and anti-Semitic opinions. They tend to reflect on the future of Europe and lament the collapse of Aryan civilization because of cultural Marxism. The injustice claims that motivate them are driven by the fact that 'Europe is plagued by the disease of liberal democracy, multiculturalism and multiracialism, public promotion of all deviations' (Witkowski, 2019). There is also opposition to 'the colonial subjugation of Poland as a reservoir of cheap labour' (Witkowski, 2019). While for the 'Stormtroopers' these claims are clearly voiced, 'Pride and Modernity' have not expressed those injustices. However, it can be inferred from the character of the second hotspot, that they sympathise with similar opinions. Both hotspots were motivated by grievance – they blame 'the system' – the state, politicians, left-liberal elites and 'Berlin-Moscow protectorate.'

The sense of social alienation for the hotspots is a continuous process of indoctrination which started in the 1980s with the skinhead subculture. While some participants of the hotspot gave been raised in families where such an indoctrination took place, it is possible that for others the experience of alienation was a recent reaction. Alienation is relevant particularly for the first hotspot. The 'Stormtroopers' are not only rejected by the state and the society, but particularly troubling for them seems to be the rejection by other nationalist groups. In contrast, within 'Pride and Modernity,' the majority of the participants felt that they were or would like to be a part of the mainstream with no sense of social alienation.

In terms of polarization, both hotspots were motivated by the segregation between the in-group and the out-group. The first hotspot is perfectly linked with the actual beliefs and will of the 'Stormtroopers.' The banners reflect racist views clearly voiced in the group's online magazine. On the other hand, the organizers of the second hotspot put a lot of effort to separate it from the official activities of the association. It is very plausible that some members or sympathizers of 'Pride and Modernity' did not share enthusiasm for forbidden ideologies of the hotspot organizers.

Using the I-Gap spectrum, below the motivations of three of the individual actors who participated in the hotspots are analysed.

ACTOR 1
Male, 27, secondary education
Hotspot 1, 'Stormtroopers'

INJUSTICE

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?

Score 5 The decision to participate in the hotspot was central to the perceived sense of injustice.

Q2. To what extent were the actors motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?

Score 3 The perceived injustice is produced by events caused by specific groups (antifascists) and by specific government actions (police, Internal Security Agency), but at the same time these events have a somewhat systemic character.

Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?

Score 3 The sense of injustice is rooted in redistribution in a limited way. The overall analysis of available evidence of the group ideology and actor's own statements indicate that societal inequality seems to be less central compared to other factors.

Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?

Score 5 Sense of injustice is rooted in lack of political, legal, social or symbolic recognition, also from other nationalists.

Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?

Score 3 The sense of injustice is rooted in lack of political representation, but in a limited way. The overall analysis of available evidence indicate that lack of political representation seems to be less central compared to other factors.

GRIEVANCE

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?

Score 1 The grievance is very abstract.

Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?

Score 5 The grievances are very distinct from each other, very diverse.

Q3. How personal is the grievance?

Score 5 The grievances apply to the global, large-scale perceived injustice.

Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?

Score 5 Similarly to the grievances, the identity of the person or body that is able to address the grievance is vague. It is neither clear who is responsible for causing the grievance nor who should address it.

Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?

Score 5 The prospects to address the grievance are not coherent or sensible.

ALIENATION

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?

Score 3 The sense of social alienation is tied to personal identity, location, ethnicity, religion, but in a limited way.

Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?

Score 1 The sense of social alienation is tied to an autonomous decision.

Q3. How complete is the alienation?

Score 5 The sense of social alienation is a comprehensive disengagement from the social surrounding.

Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?

Score 2 In contrast to some other members of the 'Stormtroopers', the Actor's parents are role models in their community and could serve as capable guardians. Therefore, it is not certain what triggered the process of alienation, perhaps it was the rebellion or the neighbourhood influences, such as participation in a football fan subculture.

Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?

Score 2 The sense of social alienation can be mitigated, there is a desire to reverse the process of estrangement.

POLARIZATION

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?

Score 1 The actor sees himself as acting as part of a socio-cultural group. He is directly influenced by the group's ideology.

Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?

Score 5 The perceived socio-political schism is a major motivation for the hotspot. He considers his group values and beliefs irreconcilable with the other camp.

Q3. To what extent do the actors' opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?

Score 4 The political opinions of this actor are contrasting with legal order and political elites have stimulated his prosecution. However, some of his opinions that relate to nationalism might be favoured by the political elites.

Q4. To what extent do the actors consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?

Score 2 His statements indicate that 'it is all one evil,' as the organization is unanimously condemned by the political elites, media and society in general.

Q5. Did the actors consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?

Score 1 Expressing publicly opinions that this actor voiced is forbidden by criminal law. There is no political establishment that supports such extreme opinions.

ACTOR 2
Male, 37, secondary education, miner
Hotspot 2 'Pride and Modernity'

INJUSTICE

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?

Score 3 The actor had an idea that the hotspot is a private meeting, separate from the ideological values of the group.

Q2. To what extent were the actors motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?

Score 3 Compared to Actor 1, this Actor seems to be less radical and avoided engaging in physically violent events. However, he also holds a level of perceived systemic bias or prejudice.

Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?

Score 3 His sense of injustice is rooted in redistribution in a limited way. The overall analysis of available evidence indicate that societal inequality seems to be less central compared to other factors.

Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?

Score 3 This subject aimed for his organization to flourish in mainstream. It was legally registered but was delegalized. Therefore, there is a limited sense of injustice rooted in lack of political, legal, social or symbolic recognition.

Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?

Score 1 The representation was not a motive. The statements in the court files indicated that the subject of this hotspot believed that he had been well represented and had strived to stay in mainstream.

GRIEVANCE

Q1 How specific is the experienced grievance?

Score 1 The grievance is abstract, also due to the fact that the actor is not open about the grievance, probably fearing legal consequences.

Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?

Score 1 The list of grievances is unclear.

Q3. How personal is the grievance?

Score 5 The grievances are not personal and apply to the global, large-scale perceived injustice.

Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?

Score 5 Similarly to the grievances, the identity of the person or body that is able to address the grievance is vague. It is neither clear who is responsible for causing the grievance nor who should address it.

Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?

Score 5 As in case of the first actor, the prospects to address the grievance are not coherent or sensible.

ALIENATION

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?

Score 3 The sense of social alienation is tied to personal identity, location, ethnicity, religion, but in a limited way.

Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?

Score 1 The sense of social alienation is fully tied to an autonomous decision.

Q3. How complete is the alienation?

Score 5 The sense of social alienation is a comprehensive disengagement from the social surrounding.

Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?

Score 5 This actor was a member of a skinhead subculture where his process of indoctrination started.

Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?

Score 1 He would like to be part of the mainstream nationalism and concealed his interests in forbidden ideologies.

POLARIZATION

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?

Score 1 The subject put a lot of effort to separate the hotspot from the organization.

Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?

Score 5 The perceived socio-political schism is a major motivation for the hotspot. His values and beliefs are irreconcilable with the other camp.

Q3. To what extent do the actors' opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?

Score 4 The political opinions that relate to the hotspot are contrasting with legal order and political elites have stimulated his prosecution. However, other opinions expressed by the actor that relate to nationalism might be favoured by the political elites.

Q4. To what extent do the actors consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?

Score 2 The actor might perceive the differences between political parties, possibly favouring some.

Q5. Did the actors consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?

Score 1 Expressing publicly opinions that the actor professed during the hotspot is forbidden by criminal law. There is no political establishment that supports such extreme opinions.

ACTOR 3
Female, 27, secondary education, no occupation
Hotspot 2 'Pride and Modernity'

INJUSTICE

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?

Score 1 The decision to participate in the hotspot was not central to the perceived injustice. The subject testified that she assumed she is attending a bonfire to meet with her friends.

Q2. To what extent were the actors motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?

Score 1 According to her testimony the subject was not motivated with perceived bias or prejudice.

Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?

Score 1 Redistribution was not a motive.

Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?

Score 1 There is no evidence of the sense of injustice being rooted in the lack of political, legal, social or symbolic recognition.

Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?

Score 1 The representation was not a motive. The actor presented herself as a part of the mainstream society.

GRIEVANCE

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?

Score 1 The grievance has not been voiced.

Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?

Score 5 The list of grievances is completely absent according to the court files.

Q3. How personal is the grievance?

Score 5 This actor did not express intimate grievances.

Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?

Score 5 Similarly to the grievances, this actor did not disclose the identity of the person or body that is able to address the grievance.

Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?

Score 5 This actor did not disclose the prospects to address the grievance.

ALIENATION

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?

Score 1 The actor did not disclose sense of social alienation.

Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?

Score 1 The actor did not disclose sense of social alienation.

Q3. How complete is the alienation?

Score 1 The actor did not disclose sense of social alienation.

Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?

Score 1 The actor did not disclose having an interest in forbidden ideologies.

Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?

Score 1 The participant believed that she is a part of the mainstream with no sense of social alienation.

POLARIZATION

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?

Score 1 The organizers put a lot of effort to separate the hotspot from the organization. This actor was motivated by social reasons.

Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?

Score 1 Polarization was not, in itself, a major motivation for this actor.

Q3. To what extent do the actors' opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?

Score 1 The political opinions that relate to the hotspot are contrasting with legal order and political elites have stimulated prosecution of the actors. However, this actor maintained a passive participation and came after the 'official' part.

Q4. To what extent do the actors consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?

Score 1 The actors has not been reflecting about the differences between political parties. The court files indicated that participation at the hotspot was motivated by the desire to socialise.

Q5. Did the actors consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?

Score 1 Expressing publicly opinions similar to those voiced at the hotspot is forbidden by criminal law. There is no political establishment that supports such extreme opinions.

Conclusion

The court files provided rich information that enabled to explore micro, meso, macro and facilitating factors, as well as placing the motivation factors on the I-GAP scale. It helped to look into the nature of the link between radicalization and crime, and well as the legal system's response. However, evaluation of the court files indicated also limits of this method in gaining insights into what motivated offenders. An in-depth life-history narratives approach could be a promising way to further explore the factors that contribute to radicalization and the subsequent crime.

The subjects in this study felt socially excluded. They found an outlet of their frustration and anger in the form of engaging in totalitarian ideologies and hatred. Organizing a 'celebration' around Hitler's birthday, serving a cake with a swastika and praising Hitler's attitude towards women might seem nothing more than a sad 'hate joke.' However, trivializing the seriousness of the ideology will lead to its normalization and further reinforcement of antisocial attitudes, which needs to be challenged. It shows the necessity of creating a society, where young people experience equal opportunities, regardless of their background or where they come from. There is a need for education towards openness and social skills trainings, in particular in vulnerable for radicalization areas of Poland.

This report also indicated the differences in opinions among experts on hate crime, how these differences are reflected in the courtroom and how this can facilitate flourishing of hate groups within the society. Disagreements within the academic community about hate speech have an impact on the jurisprudence. The academic community and the judiciary should work together to develop best criminal justice responses to hate speech and radicalization. A thorough criminological research on offender motivation and contributing factors is needed to develop the most appropriate preventive methods and deradicalization programs.

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