



# Trends of Radicalization

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## About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalization and polarization in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalization, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualizes this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalization programs. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalization, which include a sense of being victimized; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of "us vs. them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs, and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion, and de-radicalization.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation-states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalization often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modeling, analyzing, and devising solutions to online radicalization will be central to the project's aims.

## Executive Summary/Abstract

Due to its geographical, political, religious, and socio-economic stand, Jordan has confronted radicalization since the 1970s to the present. What have been steering those radicalized movements are internal and external factors starting with state-led actions, Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi-Jihadism, lone wolves, and refugee radicalization as internal factors and ending with Al-Qaeda in Iraq and ISIS in Syria as external motivators. While the country's policing/ intelligence system is highly alert to prevent violent attacks inside the country, the external factors can be seen as the most threatening of all radicalized agents as they managed to conduct unforgettable violent attacks in the history of Jordan. D.RAD work page entitled "Trends of Radicalization" attempts to explore two major events, referred to as Hotspots of Radicalization: Amman Bombings which was planned by Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2005 and the capture and burning of Jordanian Flight Lieutenant Muath Al-Kasasbeh by ISIS in 2015. These major events symbolize the trends of radicalization in Jordan and provide a good understanding of the threat of radicalization Jordan may have faced or still face.

This report chooses these two violent attacks as hotspots to shed light on the first violent operation for each radicalized agent, Al-Qaeda in Iraq and ISIS, respectively. Contextualizing and analysing those events would help identify the trends of radicalization in order to pin point the political and cultural conditions that structure those major events among others in the country. Relying on research papers and national and international media coverage, the chosen incidents, qualified as hotspots, are viewed and analysed from the micro, meso and macro levels. The report also identifies the political and socio-cultural circumstances as the facilitating factors for the violent attacks. In addition, the perpetrators' motivational factors of the hotspots are examined in perceptions of *injustice*, which lead to *grievance*, *alienation* and *polarization* (I-GAP), a tool which contains a questionnaire about these four components.

## Introduction

Jordan's geographical position, to begin with, has put the country under a lot of pressure in how to politically and diplomatically deal with the wars and conflicts happening in the surrounding countries. It wasn't until the US War on Iraq that Jordan officials have come to realize the negative impact of terrorism and extremism on the country. It started with the repatriation of Jordanian–Afghan Mujahedeen who supported Bin Laden and his organization, Al-Qaeda. This ignited a conflict between Muslim Brotherhood, the only legal political party allowed to perform in Jordan, and Salafi Jihadists, supporters of religious extremism of Al-Qaeda. The latter was used by the state officials to weaken MB and, at the same time, they were prevented from practicing their apolitical and religious agenda. As a result, they found in Al-Qaeda in Iraq and its call for fighting US invasion of Iraq a manifestation to their agenda. This made Jordan encounter many challenges in combatting extremist ideology internally, especially extremist Jordanians who supported and sympathized with external radicalized agents such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Jordanian officials have feared that the external agents would recruit Jordanians, Salafi-Jihadists or lone wolves, to conduct violent attacks. Yet, they were surprised when a shocking terrorist attack was perpetrated by Iraqi people affiliated with Abu-Musab Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2005 marking it as the first insurgency on the Jordanian soil orchestrated by an external agent.

Amman Bombings marked a turning point in reshaping the public's reception of Al-Qaeda in Iraq as a promising utopian Islamic state. As Al-Qaeda in Iraq has repeatedly claimed that they would only target the US and its western affiliates who, according to them, conspire to destroy Islam, fighting this alliance is religiously approved by them while killing civilians is sanctioned. However, the majority of the victims of Amman Bombings were Jordanians who were attending a wedding in one of the hotels. Although Abu-Musab Al-Zarqawi denied that his organization have intentionally targeted Jordanians, Amman Bombings seems to be a warning message to Jordan's regime for joining Bush's global war on terror after 9/11 attacks. His statements couldn't convince the angry public who were shocked and traumatized because of such a horrific violent incident and, as a result, they called for the death of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and supported Jordan's counter-terrorism strategies. Between 2005 and 2015, the state-led actions took all measures to protect the country from encountering another violent attack. The public may have tolerated the bad economic, social and political conditions that were running out in the country for the sake of the country's safety and peace.

Does History repeat itself? The civil war in Syria and ISIS interference to fight against Assad's regime has won the Jordanian's attention and sympathy. To extremists who supported ISIS inside the country, their hope to establish a new Islamic State that adopts Sharia Law was again rejuvenated. They, again, opposed Jordan's joining the international coalition to fight ISIS claiming that this war was not Jordan's war. When ISIS militants captured Jordanian fighter Pilot Muath Al-Kasasbeh after his jet was, for no apparent reason, crashed in Raqqa and when they released the video of burning alive Al-Kasasbeh, ISIS supporters and sympathizers have turned against them, called for revenge, and supported the state's participation in the US coalition against ISIS.

This report, therefore, attempts to analyze these two violent incidents, Amman Bombings in 2005 and the capture and murder of Jordanian Pilot Muath Al-Kasasbeh by ISIS in 2015, in order to identify them as "hotspots" of radicalization central to the history of radicalization in Jordan. The analysis will identify, contextualize and then quantify distinct occurrences of physical or emotional violence that are characteristic of and central to the trends. The report does not aim to deliver a theoretical overview of all socio-economic or geopolitical shifts that shape the contemporary manifestations of radicalization, nor does it attempt to produce an exhaustive catalogue of these manifestations. Instead, the main task is to scrutinize specific,

pivotal moments – “hotspots” of radicalization – that represent a culmination of general radicalization trends and provide meaningful insights into their rise and expansion.

The choice of hotspots aims at presenting a comprehensive portrait of the radicalization trends in Jordan after the year 2001. As terrorist attacks have been rare in Jordan, these two violent events were widely discussed nationally and internationally and affected or motivated the political decisions addressing for example Jordan’s role in the global war against terrorism.

In this report, the two hotspots of radicalisation are presented in the following order: first, a short overview offers a summary of the chosen hotspots. In the next section, we go through the methods that led to these violent attacks and the reasons why these specific hotspots of radicalisation have been chosen to be analysed in this report. After that, an analysis of the micro, meso and macro factors present in each hotspot offers an overview of factors driving and supporting radicalization that correlate with each of the identified hotspots. These include personal factors, social setting factors and institutional, systemic and structural factors. Next, in the section on facilitating factors, we identify specific elements in the political and socio-cultural environment of the perpetrators responsible for the hotspots that facilitated the violent acts, making the violent acts possible or attractive. Finally, motivational factors, quantified with I-GAP questionnaire, will be specified and reflected in the last section.

The I-GAP spectrum is a constructivist method of multifaceted assessment. It is used to assess the hotspots and allows us to trace the motives driving radicalization. The motives are identified from the point of view of the perpetrators involved in the hotspot, based on research papers, national and international news reports. Furthermore, the analysis grounds the chosen hotspots in perceptions of *injustice*, which lead to *grievance*, *alienation* and *polarization* (I-GAP), and finally culminate in the violent act. The actor-oriented perspective of the I-GAP spectrum is combined with contextual information on the Jordanian cases.

## Hotspots of Radicalization

### Overview of Chosen Hotspots

#### Amman Bombings 2005

A series of simultaneous bombings have targeted three five- star hotels (Radisson SAS Hotel, Grand Hyatt Hotel, and Days Inn Hotel) in Amman on November 9, 2005<sup>1</sup>. The attacks started at 21:00 Jordan time beginning with Radisson SAS and then followed by Grand Hyatt (*Daily Times* 2005). The first announcement stated that 69 people have been killed and 300 people injured, but later the Jordanian Government revised the number and declared that 59 people were dead and 115 were injured (Davidsson, 2019, p. 2). These hotels were usually frequented by diplomats but the high number of casualties was Jordanians who have been attending a Jordanian wedding at the Radisson SAS Hotel. The bride and the groom both lost a parent and were injured themselves. As reported by the CNN international, the famous Syrian-American film director, Moustapha Akkad, and his daughter, Monia, were killed in the attacks as they were attending the wedding (‘Amman Bombings’, CNN International 2005). Yet, Akkad, as investigations declared, was staying at Grand Hyatt Hotel with his daughter and were both killed in the attack.

According to *New York Times*, no one claimed responsible for the attacks but there were suspicions that Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi was behind them based on his taped video in 2004 where he stated his interest in attacking Jordan (Fattah and Slackman 2005). However, Jordanian officials identified the identity of four Iraqi suspects. An Iraqi husband and wife— Ali Hussein al-Shamari and Sajida al-Rishawi— entered Radisson SAS hotel to bomb it. Sajida’s

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<sup>1</sup> The bombings are referred to as Amman bombings, Black Wednesday, or 9/11 (November 9).

belt failed to detonate so she left the room immediately while her husband, Ali, detonated himself causing the death of 38 people (Urquhart 2005). Rawad Jassem Abed was responsible for Grand Hyatt Hotel suicide attack. He drank orange juice with an Iraqi fellow in the hotel's coffee shop, and then they left together to another room, apparently to get the suicide belt. After a while, the suspect returned alone and sat at the same seat and detonated his bomb causing the death of a number of hotel employees (Davidsson, 2019, p.4). Simultaneously, Safaa Mohammed Ali detonated himself outside Days Inn Hotel as he tried to pass a security barrier but failed. Three Chinese military delegations were killed (CNN Edition 2005). During that night, the streets of Amman were locked down and police forces were presented in full force (Fattah and Slackman 2005).

Going through all the local news reports of the bombing at that time, we found out that Jordanian officials did not reveal to the public the exact time of the bombings nor the exact locations where these suspects bombed themselves. It is quite surprising why Jordanian authorities would hide such information from the public (Davidsson, 2019, p.6). The time of the bombing was surprisingly reported by *Ha'aretz* and *The New York Times* as to be 20:50 starting with Grand Hyatt hotel then at the Radisson SAS, and finally at Days Inn although other reports claimed that the bombing started first at the Radisson SAS then Grand Hyatt and finally the Days Inn. These conflicting statements between the national and international press may have to do with the horrific incident that happened in the country where the authorities focused on the victims and the suspects first and shows that Jordan did not expect any such terrorist attack on its soil. Furthermore, "*Ha'aretz* also quoted *CNN* reporting an eyewitness who saw the Jordanian Prime Minister's car at the Grand Hyatt at the time of the blast. Whether this fact was true, and if so, whether it had any links to the bombings, has not been established" (Davidsson 2019). Other important Arab people were killed in Grand Hyatt hotel which may have raised some suspicions but the national media coverage did not highlight it much. Beside Akkad and his daughter, Major-General Bashir Nafeh, the head of Palestinian military intelligence in the West Bank, Colonel Abed Allun, a high-ranking Palestinian Preventive Security forces official, Jihad Fatouh, the commercial attaché at the Palestinian Embassy in Cairo, and Mosab Khorma, a senior Palestinian-American banker and former Paltel CEO were also killed in Grand Hyatt suicidal attack. Also, three Chinese were also killed. But what was quiet strange is that the *Chinadaily* news stated on November 10, 2005 at 6:36 that "two members of a Chinese military delegation, now visiting Jordan, were killed in one of the hotel bombings, and two more were injured, one seriously" (Chinadaily (1) 2005). They were members of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Yet, on November 11, 2005 at 5:47, the *Chinadaily* news changed the statement and announced that three Chinese who "were members of a delegation from China's University of National Defence" were killed (Chinadaily (2) 2005). Their deaths have led "a dispatch of an investigating 'working group', composed of officials from the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from China" (Quan 2011). This might suggest that the Chinese delegates of (PLA) may have met with the Palestinian group although there was neither evidence nor any statement to prove it. Yoav Stern and Zohar Blumenkrantz, Israeli reporters at *Haaretz*, published a report entitled "Scores dead in three Amman hotel bombings; Israelis evacuated before attack " on November 10, 2002 in which they stated that "A number of Israelis staying yesterday at the Radisson SAS were evacuated before the bombing by Jordanian security forces, apparently due to a specific security alert. They were escorted back to Israel by security personnel." This statement was also quoted in *Los Angeles Times*. Following this report, *Los Angeles Times* interviewed Amos N. Guiora, a former senior Israeli counter-terrorism official, on the phone who assured the pre- evacuation of Israeli people before the attack. Guiora noted that "It means there was excellent intelligence that this thing was going to happen," but, he added, "the question that needs to be answered is why weren't the Jordanians working at the hotel similarly removed?" This brings us to another incident in which *CNN* interviewed a witness who stated that Jordan's Prime minister's car was at the Grand Hyatt Hotel at the time of the

blast but on the same report there were conflicting statements about whether the prime minister's car was there at the time of the attack or after the attack (CNN Edition 2005).

On November 10, 2005 an internet statement was released at (<http://www.alfirdaws.org/forums>) in which Al-Zarqawi claimed responsible for Amman bombings and called it "a new conquest":

"It was decided to carry out the attacks against some hotels which were transformed by the tyrant of Jordan into a backyard for the enemies of the faith, from the Jews and the Crusaders, a dirty pasture for the traitors of the nation, the apostates, a safe haven for the intelligence of the infidels who run their plots against the Muslims.... and a center for whoredom and immorality, fighting against God,"

The statement, then, addressed King Abdullah II:

"Let the tyrant of Amman know that the protection wall for the Jews, which was built in east Jordan, and the backup military camp to the armies of the Crusaders and [Iraq's Shi'ite-led government], is now a target for the mujahedin and their conquests." (Ridolfo 2005)

On June 8, 2006, Al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. air raid 30 miles near Baghdad. King Abdullah II assured that Jordanian security forces helped in terminating Al-Zarqawi (Sharbel 2009)<sup>2</sup>. People who condemned Amman bombings were happy and relieved by Al-Zarqawi's death while his family and supporters condemned and mourned his death.

In 2017, a US federal Court has ruled that Assad's regime supported Al-Qaeda in bombing Amman hotels through "training, finance, and safe passage" as the court documents revealed (Akkad 2017). Whether this was true, or the attack was planned by the Mossad which "regularly targets high-profile Palestinians for assassination abroad" (Quan 2011), the mere fact is that Amman Bombing was a shocking incident to the public who severely condemned and protested against terrorism, Al-Qaeda, and Al-Zarqawi. Yet, the contradictory statements and the alleged national and international reports on the incident may suggest that "the bombings were a false-flag operation mounted with the agreement of the Jordanian authorities" (Davidsson, 2019, p. 9).

### The Murder of Jordanian Flight Lieutenant Muath Al-Kasasbeh 2015

On December 24, 2014, Flight Lieutenant Muath Safi Al-Kasasbeh, a Royal Jordanian Air Force pilot, was captured by ISIS militant group after his F-16 fighter jet crashed near Raqqa, Syria during a U.S-Jordanian military intervention against the Islamic State (BBC 2015). ISIS group claimed responsible for hitting the jet although US officials denied those claims (BBC 2015). His fate was unknown for several months. According to Gerasanews, retired general Fahd Al-Kasabeh, Muath's uncle, stated that "Muath's family was shocked by the news of Muath's jet crash in Raqqa and his participation with the coalition forces, as he had a sports injury in his left ankle"<sup>3</sup>. He also noted that they haven't heard any news about Muath since the moment of his arrest, but the family received indications that ISIS considered Muath as a guest, not a prisoner. Muath's uncle appealed through Watan FM to release their son or reassure his safety, saying: "We appeal to the brothers in the Islamic State to reassure us about their guest, Muath." He stressed that the embassies of the world that claimed their sympathy for their son were liars, and that Al-Baghdadi was kinder than the world to Muath (Gerasanews 2015).

On December 30 2014, a Video interview with Muath Al-Kasasbeh on ISIS Dabiq magazine was released where Muath appeared with a bruised black eye and wearing an orange Jump suit. He said that after his jet was hit by a missile he managed to land by parachute and then

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<sup>2</sup> The interview was in Arabic and it was translated by the researchers.

<sup>3</sup> The statement was reported in Arabic and was translated by the researchers.

he was captured by ISIS group. At the end of the interview, Muath was asked whether he knew what ISIS would do with him and he replied: "Yes... They will kill me." (BBC 2015). The Jordanian Intel, on the other hand, couldn't verify whether Al-Kasasbeh was alive or dead when "a message purportedly from ISIS had presented an ultimatum to Jordan: Bring convicted terrorist Sajida Al-Rishawi to the Turkish border by sunset January 29 or the pilot will die" (Smith-Spark and Martinez 2015). The Jordanian government claimed that they have demanded for a life proof before consenting to ISIS demands of the swap since ISIS videos released on January 24 and January 27, after Muath's released interview, only showed a Japanese hostage called Kenji Goto asking Jordanian officials to release Al-Rishawi or Muath will be killed (Vinograd 2015). On February 3, 2015, ISIS released a video which shows Muath being burned alive but the Jordanian authority claimed that he was killed a month ago. Jordanian authorities executed Sajida Al-Rishawi as an act of revenge to the purported death of Al-Kasasbeh.

## Method and reasons for choices of hotspots

Jordan's report D 3.1 entitled "Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of Radicalization" presents an analyses of radicalization as a phenomenon and action in Jordan from 2001-2021. It reveals that the country mainly suffers from internal and external radicalized threats. Internal radicalization is manifested in (1) state-led actions; (2) Muslim Brotherhood; (3) Salafi-Jihadism; and (4) Lone wolves. External radicalization is depicted through (1) Al-Qaeda in Iraq and (2) ISIS in Syria. The biggest threat comes from the external radicalized agents (Al-Qaeda and ISIS). The report indicates "how Amman Bombing in 2005 shed light on the dangerous impacts of terrorism and radicalized thoughts in the country." This incident has shaken the political stability in the country and made people question the state's purported claims of safety and security. As for Jordan's collaboration in the ISIS attack which led, indirectly, to the capture and burning of pilot Muath Al-Kasasbeh, D 3.1 shows how "the public opinion put the blame on the regime-led actions in combatting radicalization and for participating in the war in Syria which they consider not our war." It also warns that the state-led actions may have resulted in "provoking radical thoughts in the country." On the other hand, the state succeeded in utilizing those significant hotspots to steering the public opinion and winning their support to combat terrorist organizations with the aid of US army. As a result, D 3.2 focuses on analyzing the motivations that led the perpetrators to consider Jordan as the new target for their violent actions. We may presume that Amman Bombings has inspired ISIS and its supporters inside the country to pursue similar attacks in Jordan. Yet, due to the high security measures taken by the Jordanian Intelligence Department as well as other Jordanian official institutions, these organizations have failed in fulfilling their insurgency inside the country.

Radicalization must not only be understood in a socio-historical vacuum. Its analysis must be attentive to the specificities of political, economic and cultural development and tensions that structure a given region. Jordan Country report D 3.2 will therefore choose specific historical hotspots" Amman Bombings in 2005 by Al-Qaeda Iraqi affiliates and the capture and purported burning of Flight Lieutenant Muath Al-Kasasbeh by ISIS in 2015. The chosen hotspots are depicted as shocking acts of extremist violence committed by radicalized agents and is referred to as general trends that led to the penetration of more violent attacks and the spread of radicalization in the country. By identifying these hotspots, we attempt to correlate them with micro, meso and macro levels and outline the circumstances that facilitated them.

## Micro, meso and macro factors

In the following sections, we analyze each hotspot at micro, meso and macro levels along with the facilitating factors.

## Amman Bombings (2005)

### Micro Level: Personal Factors

Three Iraqi men, Ali Al-Shammari, Rawad Jassem Abed, and Safaa Mohammad Ali, were identified as the suicide bombers responsible for Amman Bombings in 2005 based on the confessions of Sajeda Al-Rishawi, the fourth suicide bomber whose explosive belt failed to detonate.

#### *Sajida Al-Rishawi*

Al-Rishawi, born in 1965, descended from a powerful Sunni clan in western Iraq and her brothers were affiliated to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Sajida's journey with terrorism<sup>4</sup> began after the killing of her brother, the emir of al-Qaeda in Anbar, "Samer," the right-hand arm of the leader of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in addition to the killing of her two brothers, Ammar and Yasser, by American forces in the year 2003. She joined the organization after expressing her desire to participate in the implementation of a military operation in retaliation for her brother Samer (Abu Aldiya 2015). In her confessions, Al-Rishawi stated that while she was in Iraq, her cousin, Nihad Al-Rishawi, visited her on April 11, 2005 after he learned from her brother, Yasser, of her desire to participate in an operation and offered her to marry Ali Al-Shammari for the purposes of carrying out a joint suicide operation. After that, Al-Zarqawi and Nihad Al-Rishawi sent Sajida, her husband and two other people, Safaa and Rawad, to Jordan with the intention of carrying out suicide attacks. Before their arrival to the borders, Ali al-Shammari showed Sajida a fraudulent passport which bore a picture of her with the name of (Sajida Abdul Qadir Latif). He also showed her a medical report stating that she suffers from infertility. He told her that in case she was asked by the Jordanian security men at the border post about the reason for her visit to Jordan, she must confirm that she had decided to come to Jordan with her husband for the purposes of infertility treatment. After they settled in an apartment in Amman, Ali Al-Shammari offered Sajida to accompany him to the Radisson SAS Hotel and trained her on how to pull the detonation rings attached to her hands and press the detonation button. In order to understand Sajida Al-Rishawi's stance in this operation at the micro level, it is best to present further details of how she operated during the attack. Sajida mentioned in her TV life confessions that she and her husband took a taxi from their apartment to the Radison SAS hotel. At about eight thirty in the evening, Ali and Sajida arrived at the hotel and witnessed a wedding party in its hall. Ali managed to enter among the celebrations and Sajida followed him. Meanwhile, Sajida pulled out the detonation keys attached to her hands and pressed the detonation button. However, her belt did not explode, and she signalled to her husband that the belt would not explode. He then asked her to leave the wedding hall before he detonated the explosive belt. She left the hotel hidden among the weary crowd and headed to the city of Salt<sup>5</sup>. There, she searched for the home of Nidal Muhammad Arabiyat, her sister's husband and the military expert in al-Qaeda in Iraq who was also killed in Iraq. She stayed at the home of the Arabiyat family after claiming that she had come to Jordan to get medical treatment. She was captured after her sister's mother-in-law discovered the explosive belt which was

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<sup>4</sup> We collected Sajeda Al-Rishawi's statements from various news resources which were given the permission to publish her testimony in consecutive trials and from the statements of Dr. Marwan Al-Muasher, Jordan's Deputy Prime Minister.

<sup>5</sup> There was another testimony by Al-Rishawi circulated in the media by Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Marwan A;-Muasher who stated that "when the husband noticed his wife was having trouble detonating her bomb by pulling its primer cord, he "pushed her out of the ballroom...and he blew himself up" (Urquhart 2005).

hidden under Al-Rishawi's bed. As a result, she informed the security services Al-Rishawi was referred to the State Security Court (Addustour 2006).<sup>6</sup> There were question marks behind Sajida's failed attempt. Was it intentional? Did she change her mind once she found herself among civilians celebrating a wedding not apostates and foreign spies as Al-Qaeda informed them? Unfortunately, answers to these questions were and still are not available to the public.

On November 13, 2005, Al-Rishawi appeared on the Jordanian state-run TV to state her confession on her failed attempt in the attack. She was "wearing the disarmed explosive belt over her coat, she turned around as if modelling it and demonstrated how she had planned to pull the red cord that would have detonated the explosives" (Urquhart 2005).

Throughout the investigations, Al-Rishawi pleaded not guilty claiming that she did not want to kill anyone and that her husband forced her to carry out the operation. This statement might be an answer to the questions left unanswered mentioned above. It might seem that Sajida was hesitant to pursue the operation once she found herself surrounded by Jordanians and not the enemies of her organization. Or maybe since her belt failed to detonate, she relied on this excuse to not take the blame for an unfulfilled operation.

In the first trial session of the court, the head of the court asked the attendants to read Surat Al-Fatihah on the souls of the martyrs who were killed in the violent attack; Al-Rishawi, surprisingly, remained silent and did not read it. The first trial of Sajida Al-Rishawi only took about half an hour; and despite her classification as a mentally disordered, the Jordanian judiciary sentenced her to death, and the sentence was suspended because she did not kill anyone and because she has 3 young children who live with her relatives in Iraq (Abu-Aldiya 2015). Sajida remained in prison until ISIS released a video of Muath Al-Kasasbeh burned alive. In retaliation of Al-Kasasbeh's death, Al-Rishawi was executed on February 4, 2015.

### *Safaa Ali and Rawad Abed*

As for Safaa Mohammed Ali and Rawad Jassem Abed, both born in 1982, there is not much detailed information about their personal life except what was presented by Al-Rishawi and other international news reports. Safaa Mohammed Ali was a computer specialist at an Iraqi Ministry of Industry factory in Fallujah (Allam 2005). A US military spokesman claimed that a man with the same name was detained by US military during an insurgency between Iraqi fighters and US Marines in Fallujah in 2004. This man was released after two weeks because the investigations "determined there was no compelling evidence that he was a threat to the security of Iraq," yet the US military spokesman couldn't identify whether Safaa Ali was the same man who bombed one of Amman hotels (Allam 2005). Ali's family, on the other hand, assured that he was the same person. Ali was remembered by the spiritual leader of the rebel council in Fallujah as "a fighter in the Black Banners Brigade" (Allam 2005). The spiritual leader noted that "Ali's anti-American stance was hardened after he was detained by US forces in the same mosque where a marine shot dead an unarmed Iraqi man in a controversial incident captured on video by an American TV journalist" (Allam 2005). However, there is no information about how he was recruited by Al-Zarqawi to join in the operation in Jordan. Also, there is no information whatsoever about Rawad Jassem Abed except that he and the other three suspects came to Jordan by car and entered the borders using fraudulent passports a week before the Attack. After carrying out that suicide operation, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi took the initiative to adopt

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<sup>6</sup> These confessions were published by Addustour, an official Jordanian newspaper, on April 24, 2006. It was published in Arabic and the translation were made by the researchers.

it and announced the organization's responsibility for it through one of his websites on the Internet.

Following the published articles and news reports on the suspects, we come to assume that there is still something mysterious that needs to be resolved: Why did Jordanian official's rush to put the blame on Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi before even getting solid evidence? How did the investigations deal with the conflicted testimonies of Al-Rishawi? There is also this un-clear anecdote behind Al-Zarqawi's operation which should have targeted, as he claimed, Americans and Jews, who were evacuated an hour before the attack, while the casualties were mostly Jordanians and some other Arab nationalities. This leads us to investigate and analyze other factors at the meso level.

### Meso Level: Social Setting Factors

After Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi left Jordan to unite with jihadists in Iraq in 1999, he managed to build his own jihadist organization called Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad . He committed a good number of insurgencies against US troops in Iraq and ignited the civil war between Shia and Sunni in the country before pledging allegiance to Al-Qaeda organization under Bin- Laden's leadership in 2004. His organization became known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq. As stated by Nada Bakos, a former CIA analyst, Al-Zarqawi "was looking at the kingdom of Jordan. He wanted to attack the Jordanian infrastructure so that he could make some type of movement against what he felt was an oppression for the Palestinian people, in addition to people that he grew up with that were living in places like Zarqa" (Breslow 2016). As he claimed responsible for the assassination of Laurence Foley, a US diplomat in Jordan in 2002, and a rocket attack on a US warship in Aqaba in early 2005, Jordan authorities claimed that they had foiled many different attacks between 2003 and 2005 (Cordesman, 2006, P. 134). Therefore, when Amman bombings happened, Jordanian officials rushed to blame Al-Zarqawi and his organization for these attacks even before Al-Zarqawi's official announcement.

The investigations that the Jordanian security services conducted with Sajida al-Rishawi did not present anything new, and that the accused, from the moment of her arrest, did not cooperate as the investigators hoped. She constantly repeated the word (I don't know) during her interrogation in the Jordanian General Intelligence building, and it was not really known whether Al-Rishawi did not really know how the suicide cell has planned to strike Jordanian targets and ways to recruit them in Iraq, or was she trying to withstand the intense of the investigation in order not to reveal all the details that were related to the violent plot against Jordan purportedly planned by the expelled Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It was also confirmed that Al-Rishawi has appeared to be the "weakest link" in the suicide cell that targeted Jordan in the violent attack. Her presence may have been used to facilitate their entry into Jordan in the form of a family (husband and wife) and to remove suspicions (Alhantouli 2005). The funny thing was that Al-Rishawi's arrest came as a result of a mistake made by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi when he announced in his statement on the Internet that a woman was among the perpetrators of the hotel bombings. He said that she insisted on accompanying her husband to "heaven" by insisting on blowing herself up at the "Days Inn Hotel" (Abu Aldiya 2015). This was a false statement since Al-Rishawi and her husband targeted Radison SAS hotel and Al-Zarqawi believed that she was killed in the bombings<sup>7</sup>. It was ironic that the

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<sup>7</sup> Since this research couldn't get hold of the official internet statement in which such claimed declarations were written, the researchers relied on media sources who reported such statements. Also in an interview with King Abdullah reported in New York Times, the king assured that the authorities didn't know that Al-Rishawi "was one of the bombers until Mr. Zarqawi issued a statement saying a "married couple" had carried out one of the attacks. At

Jordanian security did not find concrete evidence of what Al-Zarqawi stated about the woman neither from the testimonies of eyewitnesses nor from the body parts collected from the bodies of the suicide bombers (Abu Aldiya 2015). After Al-Zarqawi's announcement, the investigators focused on the presence of an unknown and free woman in Amman who did not succeed in to blow herself up and who was waiting for the appropriate circumstance to escape. The investigators were later informed by the mother in-law of Al-Rishawi's sister's about the place of her hiding.

As illustrated previously, Jordan officials rushed to declare that Al-Qaeda in Iraq was behind the attacks even before starting the investigations or collecting evidence. On the next day of the violent attacks (November 10, 2005), an internet statement was published on a website frequented by Al-Qaeda in Iraq which claimed the group's responsibility for the attacks in Amman. It was reported in the alleged statement that the hotels "have been turned by the dictator of Jordan (King Abdullah II) into a back garden for the enemies of (our) religion, the Jews and the Crusaders" (*Albawaba* 2005), (qtd in Davidsson, 2019, p. 7). After Al-Rishawi's arrest and her pre-taped confession which was released on Jordan State TV, an audio statement was released on November 19, 2005 on a website which contradicted Al-Rishawi's televised confessions, a dangerous indication of the different accounts of media coverage and Al-Rishawi's social circle. The speaker, who was believed to be Al-Zarqawi, talked about "three lions (who) left their dens in Iraq and headed to the heart of Amman to carry out the blessed attacks against three targets known to be headquarters of Jews, Crusaders and other enemies of God" ('Voice on Tape', *CNN* 2005).<sup>8</sup> He rejected the claims that one of the attackers intentionally chose to bomb himself among people in a wedding party and calling them "baseless lies fabricated by the evil Jordanian intelligence services" ('Voice on Tape', *CNN* 2005). The speaker addressed the Jordanians: "Oh, our people in Jordan, what do we have to do with explosions amidst wedding celebrations? If we wanted to blow up our bombs in such places, be mindful that wedding halls are all over the country, open to everyone with no guards or security risk"; "no one cares for you and your blood more than us" and that "you are more beloved to us than our children and ourselves" ('Voice on Tape', *CNN* 2005).

Al-Rishawi remained a prisoner on death-row until 2015 when ISIS asked to swap a Jordanian militant pilot, Muath Al-Kasasbeh, for her life. Although Sajida was one of thousands of suicide bombers or would-be suicide bombers, her background helped her become an icon for the jihadists who focused their efforts on her release. In an interview by *Reuters* quoted in *The Jerusalem Post*, Sheikh Mahdi Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha, Al-Rishawi's cousin and a prominent leader of the Abu Risha clan in Anbar province, said she is an elderly woman and is of little importance. But the Islamic State used her as a political cause to say that "we take pride in our people more than you take pride in yours" (*The Jerusalem Post* 2015). Therefore, if Al-Rishawi had been released back then, it would have been an important victory for the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who succeeded Al-Zarqawi as the latter aimed to show that his group was the protector of Sunni militants across the Middle East, particularly among the Iraqi tribes. In addition, her release could have enabled her clan which has significant support for jihadists in Anbar to continue supporting ISIS in Iraq (*The Jerusalem Post* 2015). In a public speech, Al-Baghdadi vowed that female jihadists would be freed,

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that point, the king said, security agents knew to look for a woman -- and soon after they found her; 'So Zarqawi gave us information; he helped a lot,' the king said" (Fattah and Slackman 2005).

referring to Al-Rishawi as one of them and which “made Sajida's name associated with Al-Baghdadi's” (*The Jerusalem Post* 2015).

So far, the above collected information highlights different accounts mentioned in local and international media coverage of Amman Bombing, Al-Rishawi’s released confessions, and Al-Zarqawi’s statements (written and audiotaped). Based on these contradictory statements, many Jordanians expressed their doubts that Al-Rishawi was a role player in Amman Bombings or Al-Zarqawi has had a hand in it (‘Voice on Tape’, *CNN* 2005). We can deduce that Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s utilization of media has played an integral role in projecting feelings of innocence, grievance, alienation and polarization.

On the other hand, the media coverage of Amman Bombings focused mainly on the mischievous conducts and ideology of Al-Zarqawi’s group. As a result, a widespread condemnation of the attack and of Al-Qaeda in Iraq appeared to the surface although, as we stated earlier, many had their own doubts. The public, then, rallied behind Jordanian authorities calling out in the streets “Burn in hell, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi!” while many Muslim Brotherhood members rushed to condemn the attack stating that “no Muslim would commit such a terrorist act that causes bloodletting and harms the sacred life of citizens” (qtd in Davidsson, 2019, p. 8). The message delivered by the media succeeded in showing the locals and international citizens that now Jordan is a target for radical Islamic groups. This has led to many systemic and structural adjustments which promoted xenophobia against Arab visitors or guests in the country especially refugees.

### Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors

#### Media Coverage

Following local media coverage of Amman Bombings, much of what was released to the public was general news about the attacks while reframing Al-Qaeda into plotting the attacks was not based on solid evidence except Al-Rishawi’s alleged confessions. As it was mentioned earlier, there were some hidden information from the public like the time the explosions happened and the locations of the bombs and the suicide bombers inside the scenes. On the other hand, international media like *New York Times* and *Washington Post* supported the Jordanian story and went through their own uncorroborated investigation relying on unnamed official sources who spoke to *New York Times* “on condition of anonymity because of the work's covert nature” (Slackman and Mekhennet 2005). Those news agencies provided further details about the attack that were never mentioned in local news:

- “a number of Israelis staying yesterday at the Radisson SAS were evacuated before the bombing by Jordanian security forces, apparently due to a specific security alert. They were escorted back to Israel by security personnel” (Blumenkrantz and Stern 2005). Yet, Israel’s Haaretz newspaper “retracted” that report claiming instead that “Israelis staying in the hotel were escorted from the hotel only after the bomb attack” (*AlJazeera* 2005).

-“The only videotape investigators pulled from security cameras was from the Grand Hyatt Hotel, but it proved useless because the images were not clear” (Slackman and Mekhennet 2005).

- Fadi Al Kessi, a witness of Radison Sas bombing stated that “The lights at the wedding hall went off seconds, maybe just one second, before the blast, although there was electricity outside the room in the corridor, the nearby lobby area and the reception. [...]I looked to my right in the darkness and saw what looked liked lightning, then there was a loud boom. It felt like the explosion came *from the ceiling*, then people started running out.” (Fattah and Slackman 2005).

- “[i]t was not clear why the lights went out *just before* the blast” (Halaby and Karam 2005).

- “Several more were killed when a bomb hidden behind a plant exploded in the Philadelphia ballroom of the Radisson SAS where a wedding reception was underway, the sources said” (GulfNews 2005). This same statement was reported in several news agencies without referring to the actual source but never mentioned in local news<sup>9</sup>.

- According to unidentified witness, Al-Shamari, at the wedding ball, “took up position on the right, where men were sitting in the gathering, which was segregated in line with conservative Islamic tradition”; “Al-Rishawi found a seat on the left, near chatting women and a handful of playing children”; Al-Shamari, “was talking constantly on his mobile phone”; Al-Rishawi faced “a problem. She gestured to her husband that it wouldn't explode”; guests told police “they saw the husband angrily gesture toward the woman, telling her to leave [the area]”; “the lights went out and her husband *jumped onto a dining table* and detonated his belt” (Halaby and Karam 2005).

All these reported testimonies were mentioned by unidentified witnesses, yet “the failure by the authorities to produce in public the witnesses to the aforementioned testimonies suggests that the testimonies were either extracted by force or were simply invented” (Davidsson 2019). Similar uncorroborated and unverified testimonies by unidentified witnesses were collected about Grand Hyatt and Days Inn explosions.

Dr. Basheer Al-Dajjah, media Spokesperson for the Public Security Directorate at that time, published an article entitled “My memories with the Amman Bombings 2005” in 2019. He stated that when he arrived at the scene after the attacks, he met Staff Lieutenant General Mohammad Al-Etan, the director of Public Security Directorate at that time, who asked Al-Dajjah to officially announce the bombings because media statements must be issued by the Public Security Directorate and to declare that it was a terrorist operation (Al-Dajjah 2019). Al-Dajjah said it was still too early to confirm that this was a terrorist attack but Al-Etan assured that Al-Dajjah must announce as he was ordered (Al-Dajjah 2019). Al-Dajjah then stated to the media reporters available at the scene that “there had been three explosions in Amman hotels (Radisson SAS, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn), which resulted in a number of deaths and injuries...the bodies and the injured were transferred to the surrounding hospitals ...we cordoned off the capital Amman to arrest the perpetrators....the security services began investigations immediately after the incident, and it was suspected that this incident was a terrorist operation” (Al-Dajjah 2019). According to Al-Dajjah, this announcement was the first official announcement about the bombings and many news agencies reported it. Al-Dajjah notes that after his announcement and around 2:00 a.m., Staff Lieutenant General Mohammad Al-Etan called him and was angry about Al-Dajjah's. Al-Dajjah clarified to his commander that “[he] couldn't announce that it was a terrorist operation in less than half an hour after the explosions occurred without evidence and without beginning investigations. No one in the world would believe us, not even a simple citizen. Therefore, it was necessary to

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<sup>9</sup> “57 killed in Amman blasts”, Daily News and Analysis (India), 10 November 2005 (at [http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report\\_57-killed-in-amman-blasts\\_9210](http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_57-killed-in-amman-blasts_9210)); “Triple suicide bombing in Amman kills 23”, DailyTimes (Pakistan), 10 November 2005 (at <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?>

page=2005\11\10\story\_10-11-2005\_pg1\_3); “53 die as terrorists hit Jordan”, News.Com.Au (Australia), 9 November 2005 (at <http://traveloscopy.com/CMS/content/view/411/35/>).

wait.. and even if we arrest the perpetrator, enough time must pass before the announcement so that the Jordanian citizen and the world believe us” (Al-Dajjah 2015).

However, the Jordanian officials rushed into blaming Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Al-Zarqawi for plotting this attack without providing much evidence. Several news agencies have reported Deputy Prime Minister Marwan Muasher’s statement that Al-Zarqawi “is a prime suspect” (*CNN Edition* 2005). With all these announced claims, media coverage and the governmental interventions succeeded in causing widespread repugnance among Jordanians who once sympathized with Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Al-Zarqawi’s goals. The government assisted in organizing those rallies and in hanging “banners to celebrate Jordan’s unity” (Fattah and Slackman 2005). Also, many Jordanians sent mobile messages that highlighted the date of the attack: “Have you noticed that today is 9-11, similar to America’s 9-11?”<sup>10</sup> (Halaby and Karam 2005). It seems that this was Jordan’s attempt to assimilate Amman Bombings with US 9/11 attacks in all sorts and to increase public revulsion against Al-Qaeda and Al-Zarqawi. *New York Times* published a survey conducted by a firm called Ipsos for the Jordanian newspaper *Al Ghad* in which 1000 Jordanians have participated. The results revealed that “two-thirds of Jordanians asked said they had changed their view of Al Qaeda. More than 87% also said they considered Al Qaeda a terrorist organization, and almost as many said that Al Qaeda’s acts of terror did not represent Islam” (Fattah and Slackman 2005). This goes against previous surveys conducted in Jordan in which “Al Qaeda had enjoyed approval ratings upward of 60%” ( Fattah and Slackman 2005).

### *Institutional Factors*

In an interview with King Abdullah II and his brother Prince Ali in the aftermath of the attack, they both noted that, “there is a longer-term struggle among Muslims over the direction of their faith and a radical ideology that permits -- even encourages -- Muslims to kill Muslims” (Fattah and Slackman 2005). On the other hand, Abd-al-Majid Dhunaybat, controller-general of the Muslim Brotherhood group in Jordan stated that the bombings are “a criminal and terrorist act and no Muslim would commit such a terrorist act that causes bloodletting and harms the sacred life of citizens.” Whether the members of the MB shared doubts about the involvement of Al-Qaeda in Iraq in this attack or not, that was not verified but they reported their condemnation of the attacks calling them acts of terrorism through the many rallies and demonstrations that spread all over Jordan after the attack.

In the same interview, the king expressed his concerns about Jordan becoming a new target to Al-Qaeda in Iraq; he said “it is harder for Jordanian intelligence to follow the actions of Mr. Zarqawi now that he can plan attacks from Iraq and can rely on Iraqis to carry them out” (Fattah and Slackman 2005). Among interviews conducted by Jordanian officials here and there, it was noticed that only the King appeared in interviews on international networks which made it clear that the king is the authoritative representative of such incidents. It also implies that he could not entrust any of Jordanian officials to represent Jordan’s case to the world or that his ministers may have been incompetent or may not have the skills to lead the situation.

As Jordan has decided to join the coalition against terrorism after US 9/11, it is claimed that Amman Bombings appeared to be in retaliation against Jordan (Ridolfo 2005). However, inspecting the institutional, systemic and structural factors in the aftermath of the bombings would suggest that there had been “foreknowledge of the bombings” (Davidsson, 2005, p. 18) and that the authorities may have ignored carrying-out military or police counter-terrorism drill considering the heated political situation at that time.

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<sup>10</sup> The day in the Middle East precedes the month.

## ISIS Capture and Murder of Jordanian Fighter Pilot Muath Al-Kasasbeh

### Micro Level: Personal Factors

#### *Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi*

Born in 1971, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, AKA Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, belonged to Al-Badrien clan (Al-Boubadari) which believed to be a notable clan in Samarra, Iraq. On its first announcement of founding the Islamic State, ISIS published an autobiography of Al-Baghdadi in which they claimed that he descended from Quraish tribe and linked him with Prophet Muhammad (Islamion 2018). He studied Islamic theology and obtained a BA, MA and PhD in this field from Baghdad University and Sadam Hussein University respectively. He worked as an imam and preacher for a mosque in Baghdad before the American invasion of Iraq. It was believed that Al-Baghdadi began to approach Salafi groups that tended to use violence and to adopt jihadist Salafism in the year 2000 (BBC News Arabic 2019). During that time, he founded and supported jihadist groups like the Army of Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a in Iraq; then he joined the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq. He was arrested by US forces in February 2004 in the city of Fallujah and he remained in the detention camp in "Buca" prison, which has become more like the university from which the future leaders of the Islamic State graduated, for about 10 months. He was released in December 2004 after the United States deemed him a low threat. After his release, al-Baghdadi contacted a spokesman for al-Qaeda in Iraq to connect him with Al-Zarqawi (BBC News Arabic 2019).

Al-Baghdadi was responsible for many military activities of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and directed a large number of attacks and operations, such as the August 28, 2011 attack on Umm al-Qura Mosque, which led to the death of 6 people, including the Iraqi parliament member, Khaled al-Fahdawi (US Department of State 2011). He led other terrorist attacks to avenge the killing of Usama Bin Laden in 2011 even after the withdrawal of the US army from Baghdad back then. In 2010, the Shura Council chose Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as the new emir of the organization after the killing of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the founder and emir of the organization. He managed to rebuild the organization, which was greatly exhausted by the strikes of the American special operation forces.

Between 2010- 2014, Al-Baghdadi and his group managed to control many areas in Iraq like Falluja, Mosul and Tikrit as well as other cities in Syria like Aleppo, Deir Ezzor and Raqqa (History 2017). He "announced the formation of a caliphate stretching from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq" (Wilson Center 2019).

Al-Baghdadi relied on some ISIS members like Saddam Al-Jamal to pursue violent attacks in Deir Ezzor's countryside and Raqqah where Muatha Al-Kasasbeh's jet claimed to be shot by ISIS military members. It is important to refer to Saddam Al-Jamal and present an autobiography about him in order to connect the threads of the story of the capture and murder of Jordanian fighter pilot Muath Al-Kasasbeh.

#### *Saddam Al-Jamal*

Al-Jamal was born in Al-Bukamal, east of Deir Ezzor Governorate, on the Syrian-Iraqi border in 1987, to a poor family of 9 people. Due to Al-Bukamal's geographical location on the border between Iraq and Syria, Al-Jamal smuggled tobacco and was arrested by the Syrian regime several times. With the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011, he participated in the demonstrations that were held in his city and was arrested more than once by the Syrian security services. Then he worked with some different armed groups, and moved from one faction to another until he finally settled with ISIS in 2013 and pledged allegiance to the organization. In 2014, Al-Jamal fled with some ISIS members from Deir Ezzor to Al-Raqqah, Al-Hasakah and the cities of Iraq adjacent to the Syrian border. The organization's first attack on Al-Bukamal was led by Al-Jamal in the fall of 2014, which failed to control the city and the

attack caused the death of 70 members of the Free Army, some of whom were field-executed by Al-Jamal and the organization's members. The battles also caused the death of Nader Al-Jamal, Saddam's younger brother, who was also a member of the organization. There is nothing much published about Saddam Al-Jamal's life except what has been mentioned above. Yet, he is famous for the murder and beheading of thousands of Syrians with his bare hands and appeared on videos that showed his violent actions. When he was captured by Iraqi Army in 2018, Al-Jamal denied all the accusations regarding the massacre of Al-Shaitat clan in Deir Ezzor and the burning of Muath Al-Kasasbeh (El-Amin and Ibrahim 2019). Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Al-Jamal was involved in the capture and the burning of Al-Kasasbeh except that the area where Al-Kasasbeh's jet was shot was under Al-Jamal's leadership. In order to approach the micro level comprehensively, we believe that connecting the stories of Al-Baghdadi, Al-Jamal and Al-Kasasbeh together is of importance to shed light on who Al-Kasasbeh is and why his capture and murder by ISIS has shocked the world.

### *Muath Al-Kasasbeh's capture and burn alive*

One of eight children, Muath Safi Al-Kasasbeh was born in 1988. His family name Al-Kasasbeh, belongs to a prominent Sunni Muslim tribe, Bararsheh, located in southern Jordan and is noted for its loyalty to the monarchy. His uncle, Fahd Al-Kasasbeh, is a retired Major General in the Royal Jordanian Army. Muath Al-Kasasbeh graduated from King Hussein Air Force College in 2009 and joined the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF). After he finished his training his F-16 training at the (RJAF), he took part at South Korean-Jordanian exchange programme and was trained with the Republic of Korea Air Force's 120th Flying Squadron which made him qualified as an operational F-16 pilot and was assigned to a Squadron at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in 2012. In September 2014, Al-Kasasbeh got married to Anwar Al-Tarawneh. His wife was pregnant with their first child when Muath was captured in December 2014. He never knew the gender of his baby.

The international coalition, led by the United States and including forces from Britain, Australia, Bahrain, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, began carrying out air strikes in Iraq and Syria in August 2014. The coalition carried out more than 33,000 air strikes which Al-Kasasbeh and his peers participated in some of them. On December 24 2014, Muath called his wife before he started his mission and, as his wife reported, "He had hoped there would be fog, so he wouldn't have to fly" (Tets 2015). This seems to be Muath's last words with his wife who after his death told *The Independent* that "he had the feeling something would go wrong...It was strange, he had never said that before" (Tets 2015). When Al-Kasasbeh, among other fighter jets, was air striking locations near Raqqah, Syria, his jet crashed. ISIS claimed that they shot Al-Kasasbeh's jet and shared an image released by them which purportedly showed him being captured by ISIS military men. A statement on behalf of the Jordanian Army read on state television said "Jordan holds the group (IS) and its supporters responsible for the safety of the pilot and his life" (Thompson 2014). As Al-Kasasbeh's family acknowledged him, they publicly pleaded for his release. His father, Safi, told the *CNN* that since his son was captured by ISIS, he doesn't want to call him a hostage, he would rather believe that "he is a guest among brothers of ours in Syria's Islamic State" and made plea to ISIS to treat him well (Abdelaziz 2015). Later when his family joined hundreds of Jordanians at a solidarity protest held in Amman, his father publicly said "I firmly ask whoever has sent Muath to fight outside the borders of Jordan, on a mission unrelated to us, to make strong efforts to bring back Muath" (Smith-Spark and Martinez 2015). Safi's disagreement of Jordan's participation in the global coalition against ISIS presumably reflects the debate that was prevailing in the country. Three months before Muath's jet crash, twenty-one parliament members, under the lead of MP Khalil Attiyeh, rejected, as stated in a parliamentary memorandum, Jordan's intervention in any war against ISIS claiming that the war is not Jordan's war (Assabeel 2014). Therefore, it seems that Safi's prominent critique of the war, in which his son may have been forced— due to his job— to join

in, may be depicted as an indication of many Jordanian's burgeoning opposition to Jordan's participation in the war. Not only that, Safi has criticized "the ineffectual palace efforts to negotiate or otherwise secure his son's release" (Schenker 2015).

For a whole month, Muath's family have pleaded for Muath's safety and proof of life which all ended when ISIS released a video on February 3, 2015 purportedly showing Muath being burned alive. No information was released about the swap negotiations even after the murder of Muath. His family said that they "can't get Jordan's royal family to answer [their] questions about how [their] son's plane went down, or if it is negotiating for the return of his body" (Fordham 2015).

Sara Elizabeth Williams, a reporter at *Middle East Eye*, interviewed Muath's brother, Jawad, a year after Muath's murder. He expressed his impatience for the many overwhelming and mysterious incidents that roams around Muath's death. He mentioned that there were videos of ISIS hostages who were set free claiming that Muath was still alive. Although he and his family didn't believe what those so called Muath's cellmates claimed, some Jordanian people believed that Muath might be still alive and that the video where it showed Muath being burnt alive was to be believed a hoax. Jawad continued, "What happened with Muath? In our own opinion, it was set up. He was given a task that wasn't his to do, and in his last call with us, he was uncomfortable with it." Jawad's statement, clearly, may assure what Muath's wife said about their last phone call. He further noted that there was different news regarding how Muath's jet crashed as ISIS claimed they shot down the jet while Jordan and US military adamantly stated it was not. Yet Jawad assured that "there must be a reason the plane came down. Muath was a professional pilot. I don't know who shot it down, but I am sure it wasn't IS."

Muath's exact date of death remains a mystery too as there were conflicting news that he was killed shortly after he was captured and interviewed which is somewhere between December 24, and December 29, 2014. Yet the official Jordanian announcement of Muath's death was January 2, 2015 released after the video of his burning came to the public on February 3, 2015. As of why there wasn't any official announcement of Muath's exact date of death released before ISIS's purported video remains an unanswered question. However, we may come to think that this delay on behalf of Jordanian officials was to reveal to the Jordanians and the world of ISIS's atrocious deeds, to make Muath a national hero and a cause to unite the country together, and gain more support from Jordanians on Jordan's fight against Islamic terrorism.

Analyzing published documents and reported news about Al-Baghdadi, Al-Jamal and Al-Kasasbeh's death would compel us to provide further insight on the social setting to more understand what has led to burning Al-Kasasbeh alive. As a result, it is possible to presume that the personal level factors might involve outrage and feelings of revenge on both sides— ISIS members and Jordanians.

### Meso Level: Social Setting Factors

In this section, we present a meso-level analysis that falls between the micro and macro levels. We rely on inspecting and analysing ISIS and its members as an organization responsible for the presented violent attack as well as the Jordanian community and state officials' treatment of and reaction to Al-Kasasbeh's capture and murder.

#### ISIS

One can notice that this organization has many names: "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL), "Islamic State" (IS), "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" (ISIS), and Daesh (the Arabic

acronym of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham). It is believed to be Sunni extremist organization attempting to create a new Islamic state, opposing the leadership of the region's Shiite governments (Ballotpedia, No Date).

ISIS is rooted back to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq which was founded in 2004. After Al-Zarqawi was killed by US airstrikes in 2006, Abu Ayyub Al-Masri, an Egyptian jihadist, took the lead of this organization and renamed it "The Islamic State in Iraq" (ISI) to pursue his precedents' mission to establish a Sunni Islamic State. Al-Masri was assassinated in 2010 by a US-Iraqi operation and Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi became the new leader of ISI. The group joined Al-Nusra Front in their fight against Syrian forces in 2011. It was until 2013 that Al-Baghdadi renamed the organization "The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" (ISIS) as they have expanded their insurgencies to Syria.

After the spark of the so-called Arab Spring uprisings moved from Tunisia and Egypt to Syria in 2011, Al-Baghdadi took advantage of this internal turmoil and sent one of his Syrian aides, Abu Muhammad Al-Jolani, to establish a branch of the organization in Syria, later known as the "Nusra Front". Disagreements soon emerged between Al-Baghdadi and Al-Jolani, who wanted to cooperate with Syrian Sunni groups opposed to the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In 2013, Al-Baghdadi announced that Jabhat Al-Nusra was part of the Islamic State in Iraq, and changed the organization's name to become the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant." Al-Baghdadi rejected the request of Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the leader of the al-Qaeda organization, to grant Jabhat al-Nusra its independence. Therefore, in February 2014, Al-Zawahiri announced the severing of al-Qaeda's ties to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. On June 29, 2014, the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" announced in an audio recording that the organization's name had been changed to "Islamic State" (IS) only, and the words Levant and Iraq were deleted, with the aim of removing the borders within the alleged states. In mid-June 2014, the organization had taken control of the province of Raqqa in Syria and many areas in the province of Deir Ezzor near the Iraqi border and large areas of Aleppo province. The expansion of the organization into territory controlled by the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq and the killing and enslavement of thousands of the Yazidi sect prompted the international coalition led by the United States to launch air strikes on the organization's sites in Iraq and Syria in August 2014 (*BBC News Arabic* 2019).

When Al-Kasasbeh was captured by ISIS members, ISIS published, in its English language online magazine *Dabiq*, on December 30<sup>th</sup>, 2014, a purported interview with Muath Al-Kasasbeh entitled "The Capture of a Crusader Pilot."<sup>11</sup> To support the validity of the interview, ISIS attached a picture of what appears to be Muath's military ID card along with a picture that shows Muath wearing an orange jumpsuit and his eye was bruised. Muath was referred to in the interview as "Murtadd", an Arabic word for apostate. The interview claimed that Muath's fighting was shot down by ISIS using "a heat-seeking anti-aircraft missile" (India Documents). According to the statement, Muath mentioned how his jet crashed. He was quoted as saying

"we were met up by a party consisting of Saudi F15s, Emirates F16s, and Moroccan F16s. we entered the region of Raqqah to sweep the area, then the striker jets entered to begin their attack. My plane was struck by a heat-seeking missile. I heard and felt its hit. The other Jordanian pilot in the mission—the first lieutenant pilot Saddam Mardini—contacted me from a participating jet and told me that I was struck and that fire was coming out of the rear nozzle of my engine. I checked the system display and it indicated that the engine was damaged and burning. The plane began to deviate from its normal flight path, so I ejected. I landed in the Furat River by parachute and

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<sup>11</sup> To read the full article, please check <https://fddocuments.in/document/the-capture-of-a-crusader-pilot-the-capture-of-a-crusader-pilot-qatar.html>

the seat caught on some ground, keeping me fixed, until I was captured by soldiers of the Islamic state.”

The interview ended grimly with the interviewer asking Muath whether he knew what the Islamic State would do with him and he was quoted answering “Yes...They will kill me.” (India Documents). Upon this released interview, Jordan officers approached Turkey and Iraq and some strong Salafi-Jihadist members to help in negotiating the release of Muath. ISIS expressed its interest in releasing not only Muath but also a Japanese hostage named Goto in exchange for Sajida Al-Rishawi, the convicted suspect of Amman Bombings, and Ziad Al-Karbouli, an Iraqi Jihadist. However, a lot of overwhelming mysteries appeared to loom large about the swap. Jordan authorities announced that they were willing to complete the swap if Al-Kasasbeh was proven to be alive.

Abu Mohammad Al- Maqdisi, a Jordanian salafi- jihadist who has strong ties with Al-Qaeda in Iraq and ISIS and who was imprisoned in Jordan at that time, was one of those who initiated the release negotiations (El-Amin and Ibrahim 2019). In one of the interviews tackling the case of Muath’s burning, Al-Maqdisi asserted that “decision-making in the “Caliphate State” is in the hands of former Iraqi officers, and ISIS is more a Ba’athist organization than a salafi-jihadist group” (El- Amin and Ibrahim 2019). He was convinced that those former Iraqi officers “lied to ISIS’s religious legislative members who had vowed not to kill the pilot” (El-Amin and Ibrahim 2019). He also stated that ISIS leaders condemned the burning of Muath “which is anathema to the Islamic dictum: “No one may punish by fire other than the Lord of Fire” (El-Amin and Ibrahim 2019). It is worth noting that the released tapes of kidnappings and massacres conducted by Al-Baghdadi and his group spread terror in the ranks of the Iraqi army, whose repercussions were clear when the attack on Mosul began, and where thousands of Iraqi forces fled despite their large number compared to the number of ISIS fighters. When ISIS released the video of burning Muath Al-Kasasbeh alive, it was clear that Al-Baghdadi was hoping to get the same effect this time too by playing the same game, especially since the video broadcast coincided with the visit of Jordan's King Abdullah to the United States (Krochnik 2015). However, Al-Baghdadi and ISIS probably miscalculated things this time in a dramatic way. Al-Kasasbeh’s killing caused anger and resentment. His murder also resolved the issue of support for the Jordanian monarch's decision to participate in the international coalition and its forces, compared to what it was before the tape was broadcast (Krochnik 2015). Indeed, while it seems that the tape of Al-Kasasbeh’s murder may have won the sympathy of the organization's supporters and increased the pace of foreign recruitment for its ranks, it also likely caused a rift in the field of recruitment. The fact that a Muslim was burned to death is contrary to most schools of Islamic jurisprudence, including those adopted by the most extremist supporters of ISIS. This has resulted in confusion and division within the leaders in the organization as well as Jordan’s intensifying raids on ISIS sites in Syria and Iraq.

Al-Baghdadi shortly disappeared as the international coalition continued to air striking ISIS locations and it was reported that he committed suicide and killed two of his children when he detonated a suicide vest during a US raid in 2019.

### *Jordan Officials and Community*

On the other hand, Jordan has officially joined the coalition fight against ISIS in September 2014 although, as it was stated earlier, there was a disagreement among a wide range of MPs and Jordanians of the country’s participation in anti-terrorist war. Things have accelerated when ISIS captured the Jordanian air fighter Muath Al-Kasasbeh. Reeling with shock, Jordanian officials couldn’t come up with an explanation of how Muath’s jet crashed. They joined the US military opinion that ISIS could not have the capabilities to shot down an airstrike jet. Barbara Starr, a *CNN* pentagon correspondent, said in an interview after Muath’s fighter jet crashed, that they were still waiting for someone to publicly say why the plane went down.

She further noted that since the pilot had to eject, something catastrophic might have happened like the jet might have had mechanical trouble or some sort of failure but they simply did not know. Yet, she assured that the US military and the Jordanian did not believe it was hit by ISIS (Smith-Spark and Martinez 2015).

Based on high-ranking Jordanian resources<sup>12</sup>, *Al-Arab Al-Yawm*<sup>13</sup>, reported, on December 28, 2014, that Al-Kasasbeh's F-16 fighter plane was flying among seven other air fighter planes, crashed at about 7:15 am morning over the Syrian territory of Raqqa due to a technical defect, which was the failure of the pilot to take the instructions for ground and air navigation provided to him by one of the AWACS planes. Al-Kasasbeh's comrades, ground and air control, monitored the location of the plane's crash; this information and maps were passed on to the ground command which immediately studied the nearby and appropriate location from Al-Kasasbeh's place. They formed a parachute team to rescue him through relying on the base at Kurdistan Iraq due to its near location to the area of the accident. However, they couldn't rescue him because of Al-Kasasbeh's fall in the area controlled by ISIS. They have justified that if Al-Kasasbeh had landed in a relatively remote area, even for an hour, he would have been saved. According to *Al-Arab Al-Yawm*, this account constitutes an explanation for the delay by the official authorities in announcing the accident and the details of the crash ('Full Details of Moath al-Kasasbeh's Jet Crash' 2014). On February 5, 2015, it was reported that Safi, Muath's father, has accused Mariam Al-Mansouri, a UAE fighter pilot, for shooting down Muath's jet (*Arabi21* 2015). UAE implicitly denied responsibility for hitting al-Kasasbeh's plane. Yet, what was also remarkable was the UAE's withdrawal from the international military intervention against ISIS a few days after the video of the burning of Muath; they justified their withdrawal by fearing that its pilots would meet the same fate (*Arabi21* 2015). The most important question remains: Why did the coalition warplanes not save Muath the moment his plane was hit? Was there a plan to save pilots in such cases?

Jordan was willing to exchange Sajeda Al-Rishawi and Ziyad Al-Karbouli for Muath and Goto but it was apparent to the Jordanian authorities that these negotiations would be with no avail. On an interview with Fayez Al-Tarawneh, Chief of the Royal Hashemite Court at that time, explained that ISIS refused to exchange the captured pilot for the two prisoners who are accused of terrorist cases in Jordan", adding that Amman executed these two terrorists after the organization burned al-Kasasbeh in 2015" (Stepagency 2021). There were several accounts regarding the prisoners' swap, yet official state statements only reported that they were secretly negotiating the swap without presenting further details. When a video of Muath burning alive was released on February 3 2015, the state television announced that Muath was dead a month ago. We might agree with *NBC News* intelligence consultant, Evan Kohlman, when he stated that "Clearly, Jordan knew more than they were letting on, and kept demanding proof of life for the pilot" (Vinogard 2015). Also, many video analysts have claimed that in Muath's interview with ISIS, he was shown wearing an orange jumpsuit and had a bruised black eye. Similar feature of Muath, with the jumpsuit and the black eye, appeared on the video of his burning which may suggest that "the murder was filmed shortly after the interview" (Vinogard 2015).

In retaliation of ISIS murder of Muath, Jordan executed Sajida Al-Rishawi and Ziyad Al-Karbouli. King Abdullah II, who was on an official trip to the US, cut short his visit and returned back to prepare for more attacks on ISIS targets to avenge Muath. The Jordanians demonstrated in the streets holding up pictures of Muath, the monarch and the flag to show their support for Jordan's intervention against ISIS. For three days, Jordan has conducted an operation called "Martyr Muath Al-Kasasbeh's Operation" in which Jordanian security

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<sup>12</sup> According to the newspaper, these sources preferred not to reveal their identities for the nature of the incident.

<sup>13</sup> A Jordanian privately owned newspaper publishes in Arabic.

operation forces bombed 56 ISIS targets. There were concerns about the country's intervention in more coalition as well as the fear that ISIS would find a justification to defend itself against Jordan's attacks (Ma'ayeh 2015).

## Macro Level: Institutional, Systemic and Structural Factors

### *Structural Factors*

As mentioned previously, ISIS has gone through many phases to establish its structural form. Being a Sunni school affiliated with Al-Qaeda, ISIS attempted to found an Islamic State or Caliphate and spread their own strict Sharia Law which follows the traditional Islamic values and practices. They have announced themselves as an Islamic Caliphate in 2014 after taking control of many important Iraqi and Syrian cities. In his first appearance as an emir of ISIS, Al-Baghdadi "enjoined Muslims to emigrate to IS territory in order to carry out a war for the faith against unbelievers" in which thousands of Muslims all over the world headed to heed the call (BBC News 2019).

ISIS's heinous violent attacks targeting not only Iraqi and Syrian armies but also civilians won the attention of global governments. They claimed responsible for killing thousands of people, selling women into slavery, and threatened to eradicate many ethnic and religious minority groups in Iraq and Syria (BBC News 2019). In August 2014, ISIS militants took control of Iraqi areas inhabited by Kurdish minority groups and killed and enslaved thousands of Yazidis. The Yazidi massacre prompted the US to call for a coalition to fight ISIS and the operation began in September 2014 air striking ISIS sites in Syria. ISIS welcomed this fight with the US-led coalition "viewing it as a harbinger of an end-of-times showdown between Muslims and their enemies described in Islamic apocalyptic prophecies" (BBC News 2019). At the same time, ISIS tried to dissuade this coalition from confronting its militants through releasing videos of beheading two Americans, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, and David Hains, a British aid worker (BBC News 2019).

### *Systemic Factors*

ISIS's relationship with Jordan could be described as critical. Jordan's intelligence succeeded in locating the place Al-Zarqawi was hiding which eventually led to hunting down and killing Al-Zarqawi by US militants (Harris 2014). As a result, Al-Baghdadi threatened to avenge the death of his mentor, Al-Zarqawi, which indicated the stressful confrontation that would become between Jordan and Al-Baghdadi's organization later. Furthermore, ISIS has condemned Jordan's participation in the US-led coalition and has repeatedly threatened the state. We assume that ISIS has targeted Jordan in its threats for many reasons, most importantly because of salafi-jihadists and sleeper cells that supported ISIS inside Jordan as well as the big number of Jordanian fighters who joined ISIS since its foundation as an Islamic State.

Although the reasons behind the crashing of Al-Kasasbeh's jet in Raqqa, is still a mystery, ISIS, as mentioned earlier, claimed that they have shot down Al-Kasasbeh's jet by "a heat-seeking anti-aircraft missile" (Indian Document). Whether their story was valid or the crash was a coincidence due to unknown reasons, ISIS took advantage of this incident to demonstrate that they have the military power and means to counter fight the international coalition since Al-Kasasbeh was the first fighter pilot to be captured. Releasing the video of burning Al-Kasasbeh alive inside a cage was analysed by Laith AlKhouri, NBC News consultant, as a warning message from ISIS not only to Jordan pilots but also to the countries taking part in the US-led coalition: "It's saying: This is an eye for an eye. This is our form of justice" (CNBC News 2015). He also added that, to ISIS, this message would mean "that as we are caged in Syria and Iraq and you are launching these bombs of fire upon us, we can only do so in return" (CNBC News 2015).

### *Institutional Factors-Jordan and the International Coalition.*

The capture and then the murder of Muath in the hands of ISIS have shocked the whole world not only Jordanians. As many Jordanians did not support Jordan's coalition with the fight against ISIS, Muath's murder has been used by the Jordanian officials and institutions especially the military and the media as a national cause to justify Jordan's indulgent in the international coalition against ISIS. This brings up the several media conflicting accounts of Jordan's joining the coalition. We recall Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour's in early July 2014 when he stated Jordan "is not a member of the coalition" (Al-Rashq 2014). This may indicate the prime minister's lack of clarity or transparency on the part of the government at a time when King Abdullah II was more clear and transparent in his statements in this regard. Mohammad Al-Momani, the professor of international relations at Jordan University, was reported calling for the government's media discourse to be "developed and rise to the level of the event, so as to prepare people for their support" in fighting ISIS (Al-Rashq 2014).

Back to the heated prisoners' swap, it was apparent that Jordan was not in a quiet good position. Muath's Al-Kasasbeh capture by ISIS may have threatened Jordan's role in the international coalition. Also, As the negotiations had been running for three weeks, and as Jordan was demanding proof that Muath was still alive, it was clear that ISIS was trying to embarrass if not provoke Jordan due to its intervention in the fight against ISIS. Another possibility would be that ISIS could attempt to "stain [King] Abdullah with some of the responsibility for their murder of the pilot" (Murphy 2015).

Furthermore, what might be brought into question is the role and capabilities of the joint international coalition under the US leadership in protecting their fighters as well as rescuing hostages. For instance, Frank Gardner, *BBC Security Correspondent*, noted that "for all its multi-billion-dollar intelligence-gathering agencies, its satellites in space, and its highly trained special operations teams, Washington has been unable to mount a successful hostage rescue mission in IS territory." He further added that video of Muath's murder "is not just a warning to Arab pilots taking part in the US-led air strikes, it is a calculated mockery of coalition impotence to stop them murdering their hostages, slowly, in broad daylight, at a time of their choosing." These concerns might stand out if we come to inspect how Jordan and US rescue missions failed to rescue Muath after his capture.

In addition, it was reported that Saddam Al-Jamal, described to be ISIS governor for Euphrates province in 2014, was captured in 2018 by Iraqi forces. There were claims that he was being involved in the death of Muath although no official statements assured his role and he denied his involvement in killing Muath. Although it was reported that "the Jordanian security services believe he masterminded the brutal killing of downed pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh in 2015" (*The Whistler* 2018), those beliefs were expressed without bringing solid evidence on the table. Based on these beliefs, the family of Muath demanded that the investigation of Saddam Al-Jamal and his punishment must be within the borders of Jordan after the higher authorities in Iraq approved the decision to execute him (*Arabic.rt* 2019). However, their demands were not guaranteed by the Jordanian officials.

This brings up the state-led actions in the aftermath of Muath's murder. In an official statement written by Human Rights Watch and delivered to Jordan's Prime Minister, Dr. Hani Al-Mulqi, in 2016, the statement expressed HRW concerns about developments that threaten journalists' ability to cover public issues and events, potentially leading to more self-censorship (HRW 2016). HRW published on its website that "in 2015 authorities formally banned media from printing photos or news issued by [...] ISIS, on the murdered Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh, as well as critical statements about Jordan's military after it joined the bombing campaign against ISIS" (HRW 2015). Furthermore, HRW mentioned that the journalist

Hashem Al-Khaldi was detained on January 28 2015 for publishing an article which, as the authorities claimed, involved false allegation about negotiations between Jordan and ISIS over Muath's swap with Sakida Al-Rishawi (HRW 2015). Jordan's terrorism law may be used by authorities to press gag orders and curtail freedom of speech and media speech instead of using it to fight terrorist threats in Jordan.

Although King Abdullah has called the international coalition against ISIS as "a third World War," Jordan entered this battle with caution and deliberation. As a country, Jordan has its own problems like the need for a political reform, unemployment, refugee issues, among others. Yet, we may presume that what would lead us to the facilitating factors in analyzing these hotspots may lie in the number of Jordanians who were and are still recruited by ISIS regardless the public support of Jordan's participation in fighting ISIS which has increased after the murder of Muath.

## Facilitating factors

D 3.2 has taken us so far to discuss two important hotspots from a micro, meso, and macro level. Now this section will tackle analysing the facilitating factors of the two hotspots.

The main facilitating factors regarding the hotspot of Amman Bombings are related to the political situations— ranging from state-led actions, Jordan's stance in fighting Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and the refugee issues— which may have eventually led to failure in taking preventive measures against protecting the country and its citizen from this radical misconduct. Before the violent attack took place, Al-Zarqawi accused King Abdullah II of providing a "backyard base for logistical support for the American army" operating in Iraq ('Voice on Tape' CNN Edition 2005). Jordan's military and intelligence cooperation with the United States might be one of the factors that could have made Al-Qaeda in Iraq a threat to Jordan. Since Jordan officials were worried over the existence of Al-Zarqawi supporters inside Jordan, the threat came from outside when Al-Zarqawi group managed to recruit four Iraqi citizens to conduct Amman Bombings. While the GID and others remain vigilant inside the country, some observers believe that successive governments have erred by not taking preventive measures to secure the borders with Iraq.

Similar facilitating factors were observed in the hotspot of Muath Al-Kasasbeh's capture and murder by ISIS. Jordan's participation in the international coalition against ISIS and putting aside the social, economic and internal political problems for the sake of this war may have led to jeopardizing security operation forces like Muath. Also, Jordan's insistence on conducting more attacks against ISIS justified as avenging Muath's murder would have put the country under threat since, as stated earlier, ISIS would use this as a justification to pursue more violent attacks in the country. On the other hand, the US coalition's failure to rescue Muath puts into question the coalition's strategies and plans for protecting its international army.

## Motivational factors and IGAP Coding

This section will tackle the motivational factors based on the resources that help us analyze the two hotspots. D 3.2 relies on a constructive method referred to as I-GAP which will allow us to trace the motives driving radicalization. It will ground the chosen hotspots in perceptions of *injustice*, which lead to *grievance*, *alienation* and *polarization* (I-GAP), and finally culminate in the violent act. In order to do so, we have relied on local and international newspaper coverage of the hotspots which include analysis of the incidents, testimonies of people involved in the hotspots, and the multiple accounts that identified each hotspot.

As the motives should be identified from the point of view of the individuals involved in the hotspot and should reflect these individuals' own sentiment and impressions rather than external or "neutral" perspectives, we have confronted some limitations trying identify the motives from the direct individuals involved in these hotspots because there was not so much information about them except what was reported by news reports and interviews with their families. Besides, investigations carried out by courts or committees on the chosen hotspots were not shared with the public beside the gag orders spread by officials which prevented sharing or publishing any information other than what is a common knowledge.

### Motivational factors related to the hotspot of Amman Bombings (2005)

The four Iraqi suspects (three of them dead in the attack) were reported to be recruited by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. The only information available to identify the motivational factors of their operation was collected from interviews of Al-Rishawi and her family members at Anbar, Iraq. After her three brothers, Samer, Ammar and Yasser, were killed by the American forces in Iraq, she has expressed her will to participate in a jihadi operation to avenge the death of her brothers. Therefore, we presume that her decision to engage in violent extremism was a response to her sense of the need to seek justice for her deceased brothers. Similar feelings may have urged Safaa Mohammed Ali to engage in this operation especially after he witnessed the US marine killing an unarmed Iraqi man, as illustrated earlier. We shouldn't ignore the environment these perpetrators were living in. They came from Anbar province which served as the primary base for Al-Qaeda insurgency from 2003-2007 (ISW). Sunni tribes reside in Anbar Province much of which pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda. Al-Rishawi's brother, Samer, was the the emir of al-Qaeda in Anbar and the right-hand arm of Al-Zarqawi. If those extremists felt injustice, it would be driven by the US military occupation of Iraq at first then by Al-Qaeda in Iraq's prevalent ideology. We further assume that their sense of injustice stems from the ongoing fight between Jihadists and US military; and due to their religious and ethnic backgrounds, they would side by Al-Qaeda. The act is related to Al-Qaaeda in Iraq wanted to be recognized by the whole world as leaders of global Jihad and founders of an Islamic State.

Grievance, in this sense, lies within Al-Rishawi unfulfilled operation. Thus, when Jordanian officials sentenced Al-Rishawi to death, it was an abstract factor based on her affiliation to Al-Qaeda not her personal character. When interrogating Al-Rishawi, the investigators assumed that she was the weakest link to the cell that planned the plot since she wasn't trained on how to use the explosive belt until a day before the attack and since she was used to enter Jordan as a husband and wife. Yet, she did not kill anyone which might lead us to question her death sentence although she was convicted of possessing explosives and intending to commit a terrorist attack. Al-Rishawi remained in custody and on the death row for ten years until she was executed after ISIS, who wanted to swap her with the Jordanian pilot, burned Muath Al-Kasasbeh. Al-Rishawi appealed to the Jordanian court her conviction but was dismissed yet her appeal to her group was about to be resolved by ISIS if they hadn't burned Muath Al-Kasasbeh alive. This would lead us to believe that grievance factors are prejudiced.

Al-Zarqawi's group, manifested in Amman Bombings perpetrators, expressed a precise sense of global alienation which is tied to their identity, location, ethnicity, religion and ideology. Being perceived as a threat to the safety and insecurity of the world, Al-Zarqawi's decision to pursue violent attacks increased their feeling of alienation. We assume it stems from a sensation of total and comprehensive disengagement from the global surrounding as this group have rejected religious differences and being rejected their recognition as an Islamic State. The political field is highly polarized by the actors as Jordan joined the war on terror which made Jordan the enemy who harboured American military. The violent attack took place after Jordan joined the US led war on terror. The socio-political schism between the two camps was big and there was no way to reconcile Al-Qaeda in Iraq's values and beliefs with the whole

world. The actors considered themselves to be directly/indirectly encouraged by their political or religious leaders to conduct violent attacks while they were denounced by the global political and religious leaders for such acts. Therefore, their acts are based on ethnic, religious and political grievance and alienation with clear indicators of polarization elements.

### Motivational factors related to the hotspot of Muath Al-Kasasbeh.

There are a lot of similarities between what happened in Amman Bombings and burning alive Muath Al-Kasasbeh by ISIS especially when it comes to Al-Qaeda in Iraq vs. ISIS grievance, alienation and polarization factors. As mentioned earlier, analysts believed that ISIS justified burning Al-Kasasbeh alive to send a warning message to the international coalition that targeted ISIS's sites and purportedly killed civilians affiliated with ISIS. On the other hand, the prisoners' swap appeared to be naught as both camps demanded things from each other, Sajida Al-Rishawi's release on behalf of ISIS and proof of life for Al-Kasasbeh on behalf of Jordan. This resulted in ISIS burning Al-Kasasbeh alive which eventually led to executing Al-Rishawi in response to this act. Therefore, in this section we attempt to focus on the motivational code of ISIS's decision to murder Al-Kasasbeh. We will analyze the motivational factors based on reports published in international websites. Due to its geographical location, Jordan's involvement with the US coalition provoked ISIS to condemn and threaten Jordan's regime. However, ISIS was busy expanding its control on Iraqi and Syrian sites in order to establish its Islamic State. Therefore, it relied on its supporters inside Jordan, Jordanian salafijihadists and Syrian refugee supporters, to conduct violent attacks inside the country but these attempts failed thanks to the Jordan intelligence efforts in securing the internal stability of the country.

Air-striking ISIS sites in Syria compelled ISIS to increase the level of its violent misconduct in order to spread fear among the globe and to dissuade the coalition from pursuing its fight against ISIS. Therefore, the capture and burning of Al-Kasasbeh was justified by ISIS based on its sense of injustice. By claiming that they have shot down Al-Kasasbeh's jet, ISIS aimed at presenting its sense of injustice rooted in lack of political, legal, or symbolic recognition of the group and its power by the world. Yet, they may have not imagined that murdering Al-Kasasbeh would be perceived as a wrongdoing and a threat to their ideology as well as their existence. In this sense, it is possible to argue that ISIS's misconduct in regards to Al-Kasasbeh's case might be perceived as systemic wrongdoing.

Grievance, in this sense, lies within ISIS's being condemned as a terrorist group, not internationally recognized as an independent Islamic state, and being disowned by Al-Qaeda and other significant extremist leaders like Abu Mohammad Al-Maqdisi. In addition, ISIS may have not expected Jordan's participation in the US-led coalition due to their shared religious and geographical backgrounds, the high number of Jordanian supporters of ISIS,<sup>14</sup> and the calls of several Jordanian officials and people not to indulge in a war that does not represent them. We may assume that the demand and the prospects to address the grievance are both abstract and unrealistic.

Alienation may refer to ISIS's feeling of powerlessness with respect to wider, apparently hostile forces, leading them to lose agency in the decisions they make at the time of Al-Kasasbeh's capture and murder. Al-Maqdisi, a Jordanian Salafi-Jihadist who took part in the prisoners' swap negotiations, stated that ISIS legislative leaders at that time were weak because decision making was in the hands of former Iraqi armed Force officers who adopted Ba'hist doctrines (El-Amin and Ibrahim 2019). It seems that ISIS legislative leaders perceived their alienation as resulting from an undesirable reality forced upon them by the different

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<sup>14</sup> Jordan is the third largest source of fighters recruited by ISIS according to Emily Przyborowski. <https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/jordan-isis-foothold/>

ideological behaviours of former members of Syrian and Iraqi armies who joined the Islamic State along with the rapid uncalculated expansion of ISIS territories. Furthermore, its situation is similar to Al-Qaeda in Iraq's as they experienced a precise sense of global alienation which is tied to their identity, location, ethnicity, religion and ideology. Thus, their alienation resulted of the world's rejection to recognize them as a systemic organization or state. The actors consider the political field as highly polarized, as Al-Kasasbeh has been used by ISIS to warn the international coalition not to continue their fight and to spread fear on the global level of ISIS militant and violent power.

## Conclusion

The report has analysed two hotspots, Amman Bombings 2005 and the capture and murder of Jordanian pilot Muath Al-Kasasbeh by ISIS in 2015. These hotspots represent the trends of radicalization and the nature of extremism in Jordan. Both hotspots were conducted by two international known organizations—Al-Qaeda in Iraq and ISIS— which are categorized as external radicalized factors in the country. These two violent incidents were chosen as hotspots because they mark as a turning point in Jordan's political stance in and the public perception of countering extremism and terrorism. As mentioned earlier, many Jordanians who supported and sympathized with Al-Qaeda in Iraq and ISIS condemned the State's participation in the international fights against these organizations in the first decade and the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. They claimed that the international alliance to fight those extremist organizations was not Jordan's war and the state's interference may have threatened the country's safety and peace. As the victims in both attacks were unharmed civilians, the public, unanimously, supported Jordan's fight against terrorism.

The hotspots chosen in this report are similar in the sense that both were conducted by external radicalized agents and their violent acts were meant to represent a warning message to the Jordanian regime not to participate in the US coalition against terrorism in 2001 and 2014. These events epitomize the political and ideological atmosphere of radicalization not only in the country but also in the region. In analysing these specific hotspots of radicalization, we hope to represent a culmination of general radicalization trends and to provide meaningful insights into their rise and expansion.

In the case of Amman Bombings, the analysis clarified that the attack was not a complete surprise although it shocked the public. Amman Bombings appeared to be in retaliation against Jordan (Ridolfo 2005). However, inspecting the institutional, systemic and structural factors in the aftermath of the bombings would suggest that there had been "foreknowledge of the bombings" (Davidsson, 2005, p. 18) and that the authorities may have ignored carrying-out military or police counter-terrorism drill considering the heated political situation at that time. On the other hand, the capture and burning of of Muath al-Kasasbeh by ISIS is also perceived as an act of revenge. It may have been anticipated based on his family's repeated statements because of Jordan's indulgence in a war that does not represent the country. Al-Kasasbeh was the first fighter pilot in the US-led coalition to be captured by this organization. What was shockingly surprising was the mysteries that roamed around his release negotiations and ISIS haste to burn him alive. However, what is important to consider is the political aftermath that accompanied these attacks which can be summarized as the nation's support of the state's decision to pursue fighting these terrorist organizations and the state's led actions to prevent further insurgencies which are manifested in gag orders and violating some human rights.

The perpetrators of the violent attacks analysed in this report were affiliated with internationally known terrorist organizations. The organizations' beliefs and practices play a central part in shaping the perpetrators' ideology or motivation. In the case of Amman Bombings, the perpetrators were motivated by anger because of the practices of the US army in Iraq. Al-

Rishawi, on the other hand, may have had questioned the legitimacy of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the violent attack when she attempted to bomb the wedding hall. This also puts into question her motivation and role in this attack as she was the only survivor of the four suicide bombers and was considered by the Jordanian officials as the weakest link in this case. Furthermore, she was forsaken by her organization, yet became a hero of the Mujahedeen by ISIS when the prisoner's swap between her and Muath Al-Kasasbeh was put on the table. In the case of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and Saddam Al-Jamal, both conducted horrific violent actions against Syrian and Iraqi militants as well as other religious sects. Burning Al-Kasasbeh was an act of retaliation against the US-led coalition which prevented them from establishing an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, their violent attack was meant to instil fear among nations and dissuade the US-led coalition from air-striking ISIS locations. .

Analysing these hotspots shows how the interpretation of violence is in itself a political and power conflict, but not a religious one, between extremist organizations and the international alliance. Despite the perpetrators' denial of targeting non-combatants, their victims were civilians. They have justified their actions religiously and politically as means to let them reach their ultimate goal which is founding an Islamic State that rules by Sharia law.

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## Annex: I-GAP Coding

### Amman Bombings

#### Injustice Coding

<b>Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?</b>	3
<b>Comments to Q1</b>	After her three brothers were killed by the American forces in Iraq, Al-Rishawi has expressed her will to participate in a jihadi operation to avenge the death of her brothers. Therefore, we presume that her decision to engage in violent extremism was a response to her sense of the need to seek justice for her deceased brothers.
<b>Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?</b>	2
<b>Comments to Q2</b>	We shouldn't ignore the environment these perpetrators were living in. They came from Anbar province which served as the primary base for Al-Qaeda insurgency from 2003-2007. Sunni tribes reside in Anbar Province much of which pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda. If they felt injustice, this would be due to their environment and religious background.
<b>Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?</b>	3
<b>Comments to Q3</b>	We assume that their sense of injustice stems from the ongoing fight between Jihadists and US military; and due to their religious and ethnic backgrounds, they would side by Al-Qaeda.
<b>Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?</b>	5
<b>Comments to Q4</b>	The act is related to Al-Qaeda in Iraq wanted to be recognized by the whole world as leaders of global Jihad and founders of an Islamic State.
<b>Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?</b>	5
<b>Comments to Q5</b>	The act is related to Al-Qaeda in Iraq wanted to be recognized by the whole world as leaders of global Jihad and founders of an Islamic State.

#### Grievance Coding

<b>Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?</b>	2
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<b>Comments to Q1</b>	Grievance, in this sense, lies within Al-Rishawi's unfulfilled operation. when Jordanian officials sentenced Al-Rishawi to death, it was an abstract factor based on her affiliation to Al-Qaeda not her personal character.
<b>Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?</b>	1
<b>Comments to Q2</b>	Al-Rishawi was the weakest link to the cell that planned the plot since she wasn't trained on how to use the explosive belt. She was motivated by the death of her brothers to take part in the attack.
<b>Q3. How personal is the grievance?</b>	1
<b>Comments to Q3</b>	she did not kill anyone which might lead us to question her death sentence although she was convicted of possessing explosives and intending to commit a terrorist attack
<b>Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?</b>	2
<b>Comments to Q4</b>	Al-Rishawi appealed to the Jordanian court her conviction but was dismissed yet her appeal to her group was about to be resolved by ISIS if they hadn't burned Muath Al-Kasasbeh alive.
<b>Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?</b>	1
<b>Comments to Q5</b>	Grievance factors are prejudiced. Awareness campaigns especially in that area should be spread through the help of NGOs and UN institutions.

#### Alienation Coding

<b>Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q1</b>	Al-Zarqawi's group, manifested in Amman Bombings perpetrators, expressed a precise sense of global alienation which is tied to their identity, location, ethnicity, religion and ideology. Being perceived as a threat to the safety and insecurity of the world, Al-Zarqawi's decision to pursue violent attacks increased their feeling of alienation.
<b>Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?</b>	1
<b>Comments to Q2</b>	Their alienation resulted from an autonomous and (re)active decision due to their ideology and ethnic culture.
<b>Q3. How complete is the alienation?</b>	5
<b>Comments to Q3</b>	We assume it stems from a sensation of total and comprehensive disengagement from the global surrounding as this group have

	rejected religious differences and being rejected their recognition as an Islamic State.
<b>Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q4</b>	We shouldn't ignore the environment these perpetrators were living in. They came from Anbar province which served as the primary base for Al-Qaeda insurgency from 2003-2007. Sunni tribes reside in Anbar Province much of which pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda.
<b>Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?</b>	1
<b>Comments to Q5</b>	There was no way to reconcile Al-Qaeda in Iraq's values and beliefs with the whole world.

### Polarisation Coding

<b>Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?</b>	3
<b>Comments to Q1</b>	The actors considered themselves to be directly/indirectly encouraged by their political or religious leaders to conduct violent attacks while they were denounced by the global political and religious leaders for such acts
<b>Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q2</b>	The socio-political schism between the two camps was big
<b>Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?</b>	2
<b>Comments to Q3</b>	The actors considered themselves to be directly/indirectly encouraged by their political or religious leaders to conduct violent attacks while they were denounced by the global political and religious leaders for such acts.
<b>Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q4</b>	
<b>Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?</b>	1
<b>Comments to Q5</b>	They have no representation in the country as they are forbidden by the State's institutes

	to represent themselves in political institutions.
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## The Murder of Jordanian Flight Lieutenant Muath Al-Kasasbeh

### Injustice Coding

<b>Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?</b>	3
<b>Comments to Q1</b>	the capture and burning of Al-Kasasbeh was justified by ISIS based on its sense of injustice
<b>Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q2</b>	Air-striking ISIS sites in Syria compelled ISIS to increase the level of its violent misconduct in order to spread fear among the globe and to dissuade the coalition from pursuing its fight against ISIS.
<b>Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q3</b>	They thought that by burning alive Al-Kasasbeh, they would dissuade the international coalition from fighting them.
<b>Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q4</b>	By claiming that they have shot down Al-Kasasbeh's jet, ISIS aimed at presenting its sense of injustice rooted in lack of political, legal, or symbolic recognition of the group and its power by the world
<b>Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q5</b>	ISIS doesn't have a political representation globally which increased their sense of injustice.

### Grievance Coding

<b>Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?</b>	1
<b>Comments to Q1</b>	We may assume that the demand and the prospects to address the grievance are both abstract and unrealistic
<b>Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?</b>	3
<b>Comments to Q2</b>	Grievance, in this sense, lies within ISIS's being internationally condemned as a terrorist and being disowned by Al-Qaeda and other significant extremist leaders. In addition, ISIS may have not expected Jordan's participation in the US-led coalition

	due to their shared religious and geographical backgrounds.
<b>Q3. How personal is the grievance?</b>	3
<b>Comments to Q3</b>	ISIS was/is condemned as a terrorist group, not internationally recognized as an independent Islamic state, and was disowned by Al-Qaeda and other significant extremist leaders.. The US-international coalition against ISIS was a threat to their expansion. Jordan joining the coalition was frustrating to ISIS. Burning alive Al-Kasasbeh affected ISIS as an organization.
<b>Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q4</b>	We may assume that the demand and the prospects to address the grievance are abstract
<b>Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q5</b>	We may assume that the demand and the prospects to address the grievance are unrealistic

#### Alienation Coding

<b>Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?</b>	2
<b>Comments to Q1</b>	Alienation may refer to ISIS's feeling of powerlessness with respect to wider, apparently hostile forces, leading them to lose agency in the decisions they make at the time of Al-Kasabeh's capture and murder
<b>Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?</b>	2
<b>Comments to Q2</b>	It seems that ISIS legislative leaders perceived their alienation as resulting from an undesirable reality forced upon them by the different ideological behaviours of former members of Syrian and Iraqi armies who joined the Islamic State along with the rapid uncalculated expansion of ISIS territories. Furthermore, its situation is similar to Al-Qaeda in Iraq's as they experienced a precise sense of global alienation which is tied to their identity, location, ethnicity, religion and ideology
<b>Q3. How complete is the alienation?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q3</b>	their alienation resulted of the world's rejection to recognize them as a systemic organization or state
<b>Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q4</b>	ISIS is a Sunni school affiliated with Al-Qaeda, ISIS attempted to found an Islamic

	State and to unite Islamic organizations like Al-Qaeda in Iraq under ISIS. Therefore, their sense of alienation was a reaction to long term preparation and indoctrination.
<b>Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?</b>	1
<b>Comments to Q5</b>	ISIS has established its own identity based on ethnic and religious backgrounds. We presume ISIS would never accept the other.

### Polarisation Coding

<b>Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q1</b>	ISIS is marginalized by the whole world
<b>Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?</b>	2
<b>Comments to Q2</b>	socio-political schism between ISIS and the whole world is big. No dialogue is possible
<b>Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q3</b>	ISIS are directly and indirectly denounces]d by the political and religious leaders
<b>Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?</b>	4
<b>Comments to Q4</b>	ISIS is not recognized internationally. In Jordan, the politicians are divided which reflects on the polarization in society.
<b>Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?</b>	1
<b>Comments to Q5</b>	They are prohibited by law to feature in a platform of a political party or to be voiced in the parliament