DeRadicalisation
in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Reintegrate

Trends of Radicalisation

Germany/3.2 Research Report

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards the measurable evaluation of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include the person's sense of being victimised, of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation in order to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of 17 nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering the strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project's aims.

Executive Summary/Abstract

This country report uses three exemplary 'hotspots' of radicalisation to examine the factors at the micro, meso and macro levels that have fostered extremist violence in Germany over the past 30 years: the National Socialist Underground (NSU), the anti-refugee Freital Group and the synagogue shooting in Halle. Thus, it covers the gradual diversification among right-wing perpetrators, from the long-term development of the clandestine terrorist network NSU and its massive supportive network to the rapid radicalisation visible in the open commitment to violence against refugees. It further turns to the return of attacks committed by individual far-right perpetrators since 2016, whose radicalisation is closely linked to online-communities. All three cases illustrate that right-wing extremist ideology, especially hatred against minorities, is the primary motivational factor for violence. They are also united by the feeling of extreme marginalization and lack of representation by politics, which they use to justify their acts. At the same time, differences between the groups can be seen in terms of their political agenda. While the members of the NSU and the Halle shooter refer to abstract enemy stereotypes to justify their violent acts, the Freital group pursues political goals, with which they exert pressure on the state authoritarians and partly find political representation through parties like the AfD. In addition, the report identifies various factors that facilitated the terrorist attacks and critically discusses the role and failures of security authorities.

Introduction

Radicalisation processes do not take place in a socio-historical vacuum, but are conditioned by the political, economic and cultural developments and conflicts of specific social contexts. This country report therefore uses three exemplary 'hotspots' of radicalisation to examine the factors at the micro, meso and macro levels that have fostered extremist violence in Germany over the past 30 years. Although radicalisation does not necessarily result in extremist violence, the WP3.2 report focuses on the most vivid and consequential manifestations of political violence to explore their factors of origin.

As most countries in Western Europe did following the 9-11 attacks, Germany witnessed a concentration of law enforcement and research on phenomena linked to religious violence, and in particular Jihadist radicalisation. However, since the discovery of an underground-operating group of armed far-right extremists, the National-Socialist Underground (NSU), in November 2011, there's been an increasing acknowledgement of the gravity of far-right radicalisation in the country. While on first sight it was easy to dismiss the NSU's existence as evidence of the far-right's lacking capacity to organise collective mobilizations, preferring instead clandestine operations in small cells of perpetrators, this perception too had to change when a nation-wide wave of arson attacks on immigrants took place in 2015-16. Attracting the mass participation of people without any previous involvement in far-right structures, the arson wave dramatically showed how fast radicalisation can occur and how little organisational structures it requires. This report covers the gradual diversification among right-wing perpetrators, from the long-term development of the clandestine terrorist network NSU and its massive supportive network to the rapid radicalisation visible in the open commitment to violence against refugees. It further turns to the return of attacks committed by individual far-right perpetrators since 2016, whose radicalisation is closely linked to online-communities. With four such attacks committed between 2016 and 2020 and twenty-two resulting victims, this series of far-right actions remind that Germany is no exception to the trend exemplified by A. Breivik in Norway and B. Terrant in New Zealand.

The analysis of radicalisation trends follows four main steps. First, based on an analysis of the most important radicalisation trends, three 'hotspots' of radicalisation are selected that are central and emblematic for the history of radicalisation in Germany over the past 30 years. By hotspots, we mean those events that are deliberate (and potentially scalable) acts of extremist violence of significant duration committed by radicalised individuals in conjunction with a radicalised milieu. Second, we provide an overview of factors at the micro, meso, and macro levels driving and supporting radicalisation that correlate with each of the identified hotspots. We then address specific elements in the political and socio-cultural environment of the individuals responsible for the hotspots that facilitated the violent acts. Finally, using the I-Gap schema, we identify and quantify the motivating causes of the hotspots.

The aim of the report is not to provide a theoretical overview of all the socioeconomic or geopolitical shifts shaping current manifestations of radicalisation or to produce an exhaustive catalog of these manifestations. Rather, the main task of WP3.2 report is to present key trends of radicalisation and to highlight their respective specifics in order to gain a basic understanding of right-wing radicalisation in Germany.

Hotspots of radicalisation

Overview of chosen hotspots

In this report, we first discuss Germany's most important radicalisation hotspot, responsible for enabling the decade-long illegal operations of the National Socialist Underground (NSU), the country's best-known far-right terror cell. Authorities uncovered the three-member cell in 2012 (the group self-disclosed itself when two members committed suicide in order to escape arrest), after more than 10 years of underground operation, ten assassinations, at least two bombings, and multiple bank robberies and other criminal offences. A complex network of far-right sympathizers supported its operation with funds, information, and hiding, turning the NSU together with its supporting far-right milieu into arguably Europe's most extreme case of a far-right hotspot. While largely based in cities in the East-German federal states of Thuringia and Saxony, the milieu has numerous connections to the far-right scene in Western Germany, where the majority of murders was committed. While Report 3.1. documented the grave errors committed by authorities that have facilitated the group's underground survival, this Report will focus instead on the characteristics of the perpetrating group (the NSU) and its supportive milieu.

Our second case moves from the 2000s (the years of the NSU's operation) to the mid-2010s, when a country-wide mobilization against the arrival of refugees took place and resulted in series of arson attacks against refugee homes. Totaling hundreds of attacks in 2014, 2015 and 2016, the arson series of the mid-2010s resemble the attacks on refugee homes taking place between 1991 and 1992, and are typical of "hive"-terrorism ("terrorist acts or violent hate crimes committed by a spontaneously formed crowd that quickly disbands after the incident." (Koehler, 2018). Our analysis, however, is more skeptical about how such spontaneous the attacks are, and instead identifies strong organised far-right presence[1]. Most likely, such attacks are instance of the far-right's capacity to mobilize wider participation and radicalise adult individuals that were previously unassociated with it over brief time periods. We focus the discussion in this Report on the Freital Group, a group to have increased and further developed its involvement in the arson attacks until its arrest and trial in 2015.

Finally, while in both the case of the NSU and of Freital perpetrators knew each other well and had radicalised within clearly identifiable far-right milieus, our final case of a radicalisation hotspot focuses on the online radicalisation that preceded the attack on a synagogue in the city of Halle. Arguably, the online medium has become the most important radicalisation hotspot, as it featured heavily both in the arson attacks of the mid-2010s, as well as in a series of armed, „lone wolf"-type attacks committed by individual perpetrators in Munich (2016), Halle (2019), Wolfhagen (near Kassel, 2019), and Hanau (2020), killing twenty-one people, including Kassel district president Walter Lübcke. Only Lübcke's murderer Stephan Ernst had

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[1] For a collection of official quotes claiming that the roots of arson attacks and anti-refugee mobilization are to be found in "the middle of society" and not in far-right networks, see Eppelsheim and Freidel; their and earlier also Biermann et al.'s analysis shows that in numerous violent anti-refugee mobilizations ending with arsons, it was far-right extremists that committed the most violent acts (Biermann et al., 2016; Eppelsheim & Freidel, 2016).

a past in organised far-right structures, while all other perpetrators had radicalised through "impersonal", online interactions with the far-right

Method and reasons for choice of hotspots

Our approach builds on studies in the sociology of violence distinguishing between the organisational and the communicative dimensions of violence (Blee, 2005). For instance, law enforcement agencies tend to define political violence and terrorism in terms of how organised and premeditated actions are; sociological approaches have expanded this focus by pointing out that actions with relatively little organisation have a high "communicative" intent and effect of intimidating and scaring their addressees. A case in point is so-called "hive terrorism" (see above), perpetrated by people with little to no previous involvement in far-right organisations that came together in 2015 to carry out arson attacks on refugee homes in Germany. Combining the two dimensions, our method allows us to select not only hotspots identified as such, according to their protagonists' organisational capacities, but also cases of violent groups (initially) showing little organisational capacity, but that have achieved largely unprecedented success in radicalising precisely because the communicative effects were relatively easy to replicate and achieve tremendous, country-wide resonance. Beyond this distinction between organisational characteristics and communicative effects, we sought cases that represent a broad spectrum of radicalisation (see table 1), ranging from radicalisation through direct personal contacts to radicalisation in online venues (Lindekilde, Malthaner, & O'Connor, 2019), rapid to long-term radicalisation, as well as radicalisation within civil society to radicalisation or involvement in radical violence of state actors. All three hotspots of radicalisation selected as case studies relate to far-right violence, due to its symbolic and political relevance in Germany, but also because of the threat it poses: the number of people killed or injured by right-wing perpetrators exceeds any other type of political or religious violence. At least 13 people were killed in the last three years, and between 107 according to official statistics and 213 according to the data of independent organisations and journalists in 1990-2020 (Brausam 2021). The far-right is also more threatening as it also it is the only current sphere of radicalisation in which state authorities are involved, including individuals from secret services, the army, and the police force. This unique threat most recently received confirmation by the discovery of the so-called Hannibal Network, which formed around a military special operations unit.

Table 1: Traditional and new patterns of radicalisation

Traditional patterns of radicalisation since 1990	New patterns of radicalisation since 2015
Long-term development of terrorist structures. e.g. National Socialist Underground; murder of Walter Lübcke	Turbo radicalisation, e.g. Freital Group; Revolution Chemnitz

Personal networks of radicalisation, e.g. National Socialist Underground; murder of Walter Lübcke	Impersonal networks of online-radicalisation, e.g. Munich (2016), Halle (2019)

In comparison to right-wing extremism, evidence of jihadist terrorism appears relatively low in Germany. Since 2011, authorities have documented 17 deaths caused by jihadist terrorism. The most serious incidence occurred in December 2016 when an ISIS sympathizer from Tunisia drove a stolen truck into a crowd of people at a Christmas market in the German capital Berlin, killing 12 people and injuring more than 70. Apart from this deadly attack, jihadism rather remains a potential threat, exemplified by the terrorist attacks carried out in other European and non-European countries. Against this backdrop and given that very little information is available on the personal factors that drove the radicalisation processes of Anis Amri – the perpetrator of the 2016 Christmas market attack who was killed by police before his arrest – no jihadist attack was considered as a hotspot of radicalisation for comparative analysis in this report. Beyond right-wing extremist and jihadist terrorism, there is no evidence of the existence of other forms of terrorism, such as left-wing or ethno-separatist terrorism in contemporary Germany, so that accordingly, no other cases could be considered for analysis.

The varying patterns of radicalisation identified above are not necessarily mutually exclusive (unless they form an opposing pair), but can complement each other. Moreover, it exemplifies a pattern of radicalisation that state actors have contributed to by paying members of the network as informants. Against this background, we have chosen three hotspots that epitomize the trends identified above and at the same time build contrasting cases showing one pattern of radicalisation exclusively. They qualify as hotspots as they constitute (1) premeditated and (2) potentially scalable acts of (3) extremist violence within (4) a larger series or pattern of similar acts that are committed by radicalised individuals (5) clearly linked to or influenced by a radical group, network or organisation.

The NSU represents our first case. It is not only the country's best-known case but also one that clearly represents the traditional pattern of long-term development based on personal networks. The core trio of the network were radicalised as teens and young adults in the early 1990s in Jena, a small town in Thuringia. They organised in the so-called Thuringia Home Protection, a neo-Nazi comradeship that was part of a German-wide network of militant neo-Nazis. Their murderous terrorist campaign unfolded over a period of 13 years without being detected, indicating their broad personal support network. Another specific feature of this radicalisation hotspot is the role of security agencies that have facilitated the long-term development of terrorist structures. This kind of entanglement of state and civil society actors in radicalisation is only exceeded by the terrorist network "Hannibal" between former and current members of special units of the police and the military, which became public in 2018. However, the data material available is not sufficient to reconstruct the process of radicalisation according to the I-GAP scheme.

The Freital Group is our second case, representing recent trends of "turbo radicalisation" that have been taking place against the backdrop of the so-called "refugee crisis",and are enabled

by massive social mobilisation against the government's migration policy led by actors of the New Right, such as Pegida or the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Similar to the NSU, the perpetrators have been part of a network of personal relationships that emerged during protests against the reception of refugees (and that were initiated by local Neo-Nazis). Unlike the NSU, however, their members radicalised at an especially rapid pace and quickly committed life-threatening attacks. Comparable cases are the terrorist cell Revolution Chemnitz that formed against the background of rising anti-migrant sentiments in Germany. Unlike the Freital group, however, its members had previously belonged to the hooligan, skinhead and neo-Nazi scene in the area. Nevertheless, the rapid spiral of radicalisation that led to a willingness to plan terrorist attacks on politicians and officials resembles our chosen case.

Our final case - the synagogue shooting in Halle 2019 - focuses on online communities as hotspots of radicalisation. The case refutes the myth of isolated right-wing terrorism by so-called lone wolfs and demonstrates that even supposedly individually acting perpetrators are embedded in (online-)networks and intentionally spread hate and fear with support obtained from digital spaces. Indeed, as a study by Schuurman et al. (2017) has proved, most lone actors depend on social ties to develop and maintain the motivation and capability to commit terrorist violence. This type of radicalised violence can be understood as part of a larger global series or pattern of similar acts, including El Paso, Mexico or Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019, which are committed by far-right individuals who have radicalised in online networks and streamed their attacks online. The selected cases allow us to scrutinize pivotal moments of right-wing radicalisation that represent a culmination of general radicalisation trends and provide meaningful insights into their rise and expansion.

Factors of radicalisation

Micro Level: Personal factors of radicalisation

National Socialist Underground

This report describes the NSU as a group consisting of more than just the three-member cell of perpetrators operating underground from 1998 to 2011: Uwe Mundlos, Uwe Böhnhardt and Beate Zschäpe. It expands the group to include also Ralf Wohlleben a prominent member of the "immediate circle" of supporters that assisted the group with hiding, funds, and firearms (this report will refer to these four as NSU members). Authorities identified over 100 other supporters, however most of these have not faced charges during the trial and most often their identity has not been revealed. Zschäpe and Wohlleben faced court charges and received prison sentences (together with three other supporters).

The personal background of NSU members is very diverse. On one end, in the case of the group's informal leader Mundlos, who committed suicide to escape arrest in 2011, it is not possible to identify problematic aspects in his personal development. As a child, he had a very good school record, coming from a better-off family and having a father who worked as a mathematician at the local university and as an IT professor after the fall of communism (Baumgärtner & Böttcher, 2012). All NSU members finished primary and secondary education and all had started apprenticeships, with Mundlos also finishing his. Böhnhardt, Zschäpe and

Wohlleben had more traumatic experiences; their families experienced financial (Zschäpe) or emotional distress (Böhnhardt, due to the death of his older brother) shortly before and after the reunification of Germany. Zschäpe was raised by her grandmother; Böhnhardt and Wohlleben both spent time in children's homes, Böhnhardt at a time when he was already involved in petty crime and the local neo-Nazi scene, following a request from his parents who were concerned about his newly-found entourage. Both Böhnhardt's and Mundlos' parents attempted to stop their sons' turn to the far-right scene by alerting social workers (the analysis in this section builds on information presented in Aust & Laabs, 2014; Baumgärtner & Böttcher, 2012; Jüttner & Heil, 2011; Koehler, 2017; Nebenklage NSU-Prozess, 2017).

Freital Group (FTL 360)

The members of FTL 360 came together during anti-refugee protests of early 2015 and consisted of at least 8 members, judging by the number of people convicted in the ensuing trial. The group was active in Freital, a town on the oustkirts of Dresden, in the Eastern German federal state of Saxony. Most members were born in the late 80s and early 1990s. Timo Schulz, born in 1989, was the group's informal leader and worked as a local bus driver. Originally from Hamburg, his radicalisation long precedes the activities of FTL 360, going back to the late 2000s, when he was first spotted in neo-Nazi demonstrations (Biermann et al., 2016). There are no reports of any traumatizing experiences nor of exposure to far-right ideas during his childhood and teenage years, spent in a relatively better-off family from Bergedorf near Hamburg, in Western Germany. He apparently radicalised only after moving out, already in his late teenage years, starting to participate in far-right activities in Hamburg and becoming a member of the Dresden-based hooligan group *Faust des Ostens* ("Fist of the East"), 470 kilometers east of his hometown. Back in Hamburg, he hid his political view until passengers complained that Schulz, then already working as a bus driver, played neo-Nazi music in the bus; subsequently, his company fired him and Schulz moved to Freital. Together with Patrick Festing, a pizza delivery boy and local member of *Faust des Ostens*, he launched FTL 360 in January 2015. Except for Schulz and Festing, all other members of FTL 360 provided no evidence of earlier radicalisation and seemingly radicalised only by increasingly interacting within FTL 360. However, at least two members, Ricco Knobloch (b. 1977) and Philip Wendlin (b. 1987, working as a bus driver on the Hamburg bus line 360, just like Schulz) became so radical as to adopt national-socialism, with Wendlin keeping a picture of Aufschwitz in his prison cell and with both participating in a 2015, NPD-initiated riot in Dresden's Bremer Straße. Knobloch even travelled to Leipzig in January 2016 to participate in a mass far-right attack on left-wing venues in the Connewitz district (the analysis in this section builds on the information collected in Biermann et al., 2016; Litschko, 2020; Maxwill, 2017; Wüllenleber, 2017).

Halle Synagogue Shooting

Stephan Balliet, 27 years old at the time of the crime, lived with his parents in the small eastern German city of Halle. He was unemployed and suffered from a complex psychological disorder. However, according to the expert opinion of psychiatrist Norbert Leygraf represented during the trial, the deeds cannot be explained by the psychological disorders of Stephan B., because it did not affect the perpetrator's ability to control and his consciousness of wrongdoing (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2020). This is proven by the fact that Stephan B. had

planned his act meticulously and had been able to wait with the attack for an occasion that seemed logistically favourable to him, which would not be the case with perpetrators who act under delusion (ibid.). Instead, the main personal motivation of the attack draws from various far-right ideologies of inequality, including antisemitism associated with the notion of a Jewish world conspiracy, White Supremacy, and antifeminism. According to witness statements, the immediate family environment, especially the mother, knew about their son's antisemitic and racist ideas and partly supported them (Democ, 2020). The testimonies suggest that the family environment tolerated Stephan B.'s radicalisation, although it may have repressed the extent of it.

The choice of the victims clearly indicates an anti-Semitic and racist motivation. The first target, a synagogue full of people celebrating the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, points to the perpetrator's hatred against Jews. The second crime scene, a kebab diner, points to his racist motivation. In addition, while fleeing, the perpetrator targeted Adiraxmaan Aftax Ibrahim, a Somali refugee, because of his skin colour (Potter, 2020). In addition, numerous indications of the perpetrator's far-right affiliation were found on his USB stick, which he carried with him during the attack. For instance, it included a video of the right-wing terrorist group "Atomwaffen Division" (AWD) and killing videos of the "Islamic State" as well as right-wing extremist and Hamas-glorifying songs (ibid.). The perpetrator's hard drive also contained many memes, such as the "Pepe the Frog" meme, which is very popular in right-wing online circles (ibid.). A folder with many videos with racist titles also contains the file "VolkslehrerJuden.mp4", which presumably shows a video of the anti-Semitic and Holocaust-denying YouTuber Nikolai Nerling (ibid.). In addition, he also played a hymn of praise to one of the "incel" terrorists from Toronto during his attack indicating his affinity to misogynist ideas (Manemann, 2020, p. 14).

Meso Level: Social setting factors

National Socialist Underground

NSU members met (and several also grew up) in Winzerla, a district of the city of Jena in the federal state of Thuringia. Winzerla is a typical communist-era neighbourhood largely consisting of prefabricated high-rise buildings, built for the workers of the Carl Zeiss works, a prestigious employer in the former German Democratic Republic (Baumgärtner & Böttcher, 2012). With the collapse of communism, Winzerla and Jena experienced the common problems that many others similar localities went through, with an increase in unemployment, outward migration, and crime, although by the late 1990s the situation had stabilized and improved (Platzdasch, 2011). By that time, the NSU had already gone underground. The future NSU members met in the local youth club Winzerclub, a state-sponsored institution intended to provide youth with opportunities to interact and practice sport and hobbies. Mundlos and Wohlleben, by that time already holding far-right views, had to leave the Winzerclub. As an alternative to a location they perceived as dominated by the far-left, they initiated or participated in the creation of a host of far-right organisations. This started with the establishment of Kameradschaft Jena (a small group consisting of the future NSU members and two other) and culminated with them joining newly created Thüringer Heimatschutz (THS) in 1996, the latter one becoming the most important organisational structure to support the NSU during its underground operation (sources used in this section: cicero.de, 2011; Nebenklage NSU-Prozess, 2017; Verfassungsschutz des Landes Thüringen, 1997).

During its thirteen-years of underground existence, the NSU relied on two large organisations or networks of the far-right: the THS and the German chapter of "Blood & Honour" (B&H). THS and B&H members provided the NSU with information, guns, hideout apartments, money (at least until the NSU achieved financial self-sufficiency through bank robberies), and fake IDs. It was members of these two networks that registered the apartments – located in Zwickau and Chemnitz, in nearby Saxony – and IDs under their names; on IDs, the NSU simply replaced the photographs with their own. Wohlleben, Mundlos and Böhnhardt were considered "top" or "core" members of both the THS and B&H. Members of the main neo-Nazi political formation, the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands), were also involved in supporting the NSU; Carsten Schultze, one of the four extremists to face charges in the original NSU trial, founded the NPD section in Jena and supplied the NSU the main murder weapon. Furthermore, NPD party members employed Böhnhardt as a driver for its deputy chairman in the late 1990s, and helped with destroying the evidence in the NSU's apartment in Zwickau (Aust & Laabs, 2014; Koehler, 2014, 2017).

Freital Group/FTL 360

Prior to the creation of Gruppe Freital, FTL 360 leader Schulz as well as Festing had been members of the *Faust des Ostens* hooligan group. Back in Hamburg, Schulz had also been active in the structures of the clandestine *Weiße Wölfe Terrocrew* (White Wolves Terrorcrew). FTL 360 members repeatedly participated in actions of other far-right groups and networks, proving that at least they tried to become parts of a wider far-right movement. Among the events that drew in their participation are the riot in Heidenau (2015), the NPD-initiated demonstration in Dresden's Bremer Street (2015), and the January 2016 attack of around 250 far-right extremists on left-wing locations in Connewitz, Leipzig (URA Dresden, 2016).

FTL 360 received support for their actions from members of two far-right parties, the local cell of the NPD, and the Dresden and Freital representatives of the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD). The local council representative of the NPD gave the group information about the whereabouts of refugee apartments, thus siphoning out information from local council meetings and files (Pietrzyk & Hoffmann, 2017). The NPD member (Dirk Abraham, 53 years old) faced charges together with the other FTL 360 members; the court treated Abraham as a de facto member of the same group. The support from the AfD was equally important: it was the AfD politician Rene Seyfried that launched the *Bürgerinitiative Freital (Freital wehrt sich)* ("Citizens' Initiative Group Freital/Freital defends itself"), a network of anti-refugee protesters that become a first radicalisation site for Philip Wendlin, before FTL 360 (ADDN, 2019). Furthermore, one of the group's meeting places in Freital was the bar of a local AfD politician and far-right sympathizer, and it was an AfD politician and member of Saxony's parliament to defend three of the FTL 360 members in court.(Nebenklage "Gruppe Freital", 2018)

Halle Synagogue Shooting

In contrast to the terrorist attacks discussed before, the Halle shooter relied on and received support by a global online community, which was essential to the arrangement and execution of the terrorist attack. He not only radicalised on online forums, but also learned how to build weapons and obtained necessary equipment, such as a rifle from the website American Civil War and a 3D Printer, with which he manufactured his own(NSU Watch, 2020). Moreover, in

order to address a global community from which he expected recognition for his deeds, the perpetrator joined the online platform Twitch, which he chose over Facebook because of suspicions that Facebook would take down the livestream more quickly, as cautioned by the case of the Christchurch shooter (ibid.). Investigations also revealed that the attack was announced beforehand on the Image Board Meguca, together with written explanations of his motives for the crime as well as notes and instructions on the weapons he had built himself for that day (Frontal 21, 2019). Afterwards, the live stream of the shooting was quickly spread through Telegram. Within less than 30 minutes an audience of 15,625 accounts received the video (Megan Squire, 2019). Moreover, on image boards such as Kohlchan or 4chan the live stream was quickly spread and heavily commented by an online community (Potter, 2020). These online reactions to the crime show that the Halle perpetrator was not a "lone wolf". Although he acted alone, he very deliberately appealed to a certain milieu on the net, users of which acted as multipliers by sharing and spreading the pictures of his deeds (ibid.). In this way, the attack resembles the Christchurch attack in March 2019, which served as inspiration for the Halle assassin. Such live streams are a typical mean of global far-right terrorism and contributes to a glorification of violence, which facilitates radicalisation and potentially motivates other members of the community to commit terrorist attacks in future.

Macro level: institutional, systemic and structural factors

National Socialist Underground

Originating in Eastern Germany around the years following the Reunification, the NSU is often presented as the most extreme manifestation of a generation of young people that had lost orientation in the social tumult of the early 1990s (Baumgärtner & Böttcher, 2012). The collapse of established communist party structures, resulting in rapidly increasing unemployment and outmigration, meant that young people in the early 1990s grew up with little if any adult oversight, and were particularly susceptible to taking interest in ideologies prohibited under communism, especially if these ideologies presented themselves in subcultural terms, from music to dress style. Furthermore, socialized in the former GDR, adults knew little about ways to recognize the subcultural elements particular to the far-right skinhead scene, and reacted only too late to their children's radicalisation. This is, for instance, how Ilona Mundlos, the mother of the deceased NSU leader, explained his son's radicalisation in court (Fürstenau, 2011). Equally important is the fact that the early 1990s were the years of unprecedented mass mobilization of the far-right in Eastern Germany, with a first wave of arson attacks committed against immigrant and asylum seeker dormitories in Mölln, Solingen, Hoyerswerda, and Rostock. Images of the burning dormitories were broadly televised for the first time, culminating with the 1992 riots in Rostock-Lichtenhagen (Baumgärtner & Böttcher, 2012). This wave of attacks might have created a deep impression on the then teenage members of the Kameradschaft Jena (the future NSU), as it was consequential for the development of the wider far-right scene in Germany and the perception that its time had come to impose its ideology through violent action.

Freital Group FTL 360

The arson attacks of 2015-2016 (close to 100 in 2015 alone) took place following the federal government's decision to allow the free entrance of refugees from Syria in 2015, which was

contested with inflammatory attacks from the far-right party AfD, calling for the police to stop the refugees by use of firearms (Steffen, 2016). While on first sight it is logical to relate the increase in attacks, such as the ones carried out by FTL 360, to the increase in immigration, it is important to point out the resemblance of the arson attacks of 2015-16 to the far-right actions that had characterized the early 1990s, when a similar arson campaign culminated with the Rostock riots (see above). As in the early 1990s' *Asyldebatte* ("Asylum Debate"), the arson attacks came after a massive public campaign problematising the arrival of refugees. While prior to 1992, the campaign was largely carried out by the center-right wing, Christian Democrats and the media outlets of the Springer publishing house (Herbert, 2001), in 2015 it was the AfD that organised a campaign, this time largely fought on social media and in particular Facebook (Müller & Schwarz, 2018). The campaign problematized the steady increase in refugee numbers, doubling every two years since the Arab spring to reach 173,000 asylum applications in 2014; the figure would double again in 2015, to reach 441.899 applications and 722,370 in 2016 (Statista 2021). The year 2015 marked also the further radicalisation of the AfD, with an openly far-right faction growing so strongly in influence as to change the profile of the party from a conservative and Euro-skeptical political formation to a far-right party (Althoff, 2018; Laskowski, 2018). This development, best symbolized by the party's March 2015 "Erfurt resolution", preceded the federal government's opening of the borders in September 2015 by several months.

Halle Synagogue Shooting

The structural element connecting the terrorist attack in Halle with other global instances of far-right violence like in Christchurch, Poway or El Paso is an ideology of 'white supremacy', with elements of antisemitism and anti-feminism that particularly shape Western societies. The target of the attack, a synagogue holding ceremonies for the Jewish holiday Yom Kippur, undoubtedly points to the perpetrator's antisemitic ideology, which is structurally rooted in German society (Kahane, 2020). Moreover, the selected second site of crime, a nearby kebab restaurant, demonstrates not only the perpetrator's racist ideology but also points to a discoursive trend in Germany that treats kebab restaurants as places of "foreigners". Finally, anti-feminism, which represents a key element of right-wing extremism, has built an ideological structure that influenced the terrorist attack of the Halle shooter. While anti-feminism takes its most extreme form with the intentional killing of women, such as the "incel" terrorists of Isla Vista in 2014 or Toronto in 2018 (Manemann, 2020), it is also driven by an anti-feminist movement of the New Right that mobilizes against gender equality policies (gender mainstreaming), women's and gender studies (gender studies), and sexual difference (e.g., gay marriage) under the self-chosen label "anti-genderism" (Sauer, 2019).

Facilitating factors

National Socialist Underground

The radicalisation process of the NSU's members started relatively early in their teenage years and long before finishing secondary education. First contacts with the Neo-Nazi scene and adoption of skinhead dress-style took place already before the fall of communism. When joining the *Winzerclub* youth club, the future members of the NSU were already looking for

recruits and interacted with the other subcultures present there (punks), already with a polarised mindset. By the early 1990s, when most members reached their 20th birthday, they had become so radical that the chances of a de-radicalising interaction with social workers were rather low. Still, there are reports of successful de-radicalising efforts by social workers in apprenticeship programmes that have led to the withdrawal from the scene of at least one member of the NSU entourage. Once radicalised and operating underground, the single most important facilitating factor for the successful operation of the NSU was the existence of a broad supportive milieu. Even though heavily infiltrated by secret services, this milieu and its constituent networks (THS, B&H) had found ways to control the flow of information to authorities, while accepting the presence of informants as a way of evading state repression (Koehler, 2017). Informants were without exception far-right extremists themselves, which makes it likely that, despite their readiness to serve secret services with information, they kept their allegiance to the group's ideology. Throughout the NSU's 13-year underground operation, and despite the presence of tens of informants among THS and B&H, informants leaked almost no information to authorities, and authorities ignored the little information that was leaked. After the death of Mundlos and Böhnhardt, many secret services illegally destroyed their NSU-related files. This includes the files in the headquarters of the interior secret service Verfassungsschutz in Cologne (the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), destroyed only one week after the death of the two.

Freital Group/FTL 360

The Gruppe Freital acted in a community that offered considerable support for its actions. The number of participants in some of the FTL 360's operations was in the hundreds, with mostly local people participating (mobilized earlier by the *Bürgerinitiative Freital*, see above). Telling about the lack of condemnation from local power holders, the Freital mayor, a CDU (Christian-Democrats) politician, relativised the violent attacks of FTL 360 members, refusing to see any far-right component in the motivation of perpetrators, and later on denying any mass participation in events initiated or co-organised by FTL 360 (Meyer, 2020). Other notable CDU politicians also relativised the group's actions, questioning the interpretation of the attacks as acts of terror, and referring to them as "Böllern" (Meisner, 2016), "lighting firecrackers", referring to the explosive material used by the perpetrators, illegally smuggled in from neighbouring Czechia and purposively prepared to increase the explosive power. Furthermore, the climate of 2015 and numerous mass mobilizations against the arrival of refugees offered FTL 360 members numerous occasions to participate in rallies, such as the riots in Heidenau, when far-right rioters pushed back police forces and in which several FTL 360 members participated. It can be hypothesized that the effect of such participation, the collective experience of defeating the police and getting away with it, might have further strengthened the motivation of FTL 360 perpetrators.

Facilitating factors of the Halle Synagogue shooting

An important role in enabling the unhindered attack on the synagogue on the holiday of Yom Kippur was played by the fact that the synagogue was not guarded by police, as recommended in an OSCE document (Ottersbach, 2020). The regional Interior Minister Holger Stahlknecht (CDU) later explained that there had been no indication of a planned attack and that the

number of antisemitic incidents in Halle was low (Baeck & Speit, 2020). This demonstrates a systematic underestimation of the threat of antisemitism by politicians and security forces in Germany (ibid.). Furthermore, an important factor facilitating hotspots of online radicalisation is that security agencies struggle to identify and assess online representations of violence and fail to draw conclusions that could prevent such deadly attacks as in Halle. Despite the growing recruitment and radicalisation efforts by right-wing actors in the online sphere, government and law enforcement continue to frame instances of far-right violence as individual and isolated attacks, sometimes referring to the perpetrators as 'lone wolves' (NSU Watch, 2020). Large parts of the public discourse, the criminal investigations and the trial showed that there is very little knowledge about the about spaces, codes and ideology of this new generation of right-wing terrorists, as well as a a tendency to underestimate the associated threat. Even after the terrorist attack, security agencies hesitated to keep track of relevant online forums, where the attack was announced just before it was carried out. The programme Frontal 21 of the public broadcaster had uncovered through its own investigations that the livestream of the attack as well as the manifesto of the assassin with which he tried to justify his crime were linked on the Image Board Meguca (Frontal 21, 2019). At this platform he also posted plans for the production of his self-made firearms. However, this research came too late, as all references, including communications with other participants, were deleted shortly thereafter. Moreover, during the trial, it was revealed that the Federal Criminal Police Office was not able to analyse and evaluate the online gaming behaviour of the perpetrator, who had spent hundreds of hours on the gaming platform Steam, which could have provided information about his online networks (Rafael, 2020). This lack of knowledge is a major obstacle to clarifying the networks and thus the structures that facilitate right-wing terrorist acts and to prevent them in the future.

Motivational factors to be quantified in the IGAP Coding

All three cases illustrate that far-right ideology, including racism, antisemitism, and misogyny, is the primary motivating factor for violence. All groups perceive state action as deeply lacking and illegitimate and are united by a sense of extreme marginalization and lack of representation by politics, which they use to justify their acts. At the same time, there are differences between the groups in terms of their political goals. The members of the NSU and the Halle shooter did not formulate a political agenda or attempt to bring about political change. Instead, the primary purpose of their violent activities was to spread fear among targeted minorities. The NSU operated underground for more than a decade without a letter of confession. The assassin from Halle also did not formulate any political goals and considered the government to be part of a Jewish world conspiracy.

In comparison, the Freital group, in addition to spreading hatred, also pursued concrete political goals with which they wanted to put pressure on the state authorities. The group, which emerged from anti-refugee protests, sought a state-enforced temporary or permanent halt to migration, which seemed realistic since this was the official German policy until the mid-2010s and found political representation in part through parties like the AfD. Thus, their actions are not only based on the goal of intimidating minorities. At the same time, they seek to change migration policies that they perceive as unjust.

Injustice Coding

Q1 To what extent is the hotspot a response to injustice?

NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle Synagogue shooting coding: 5 out of 5; ideology was the motivating factor for committing attacks

Q2. To what extent were the actors motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?

NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle Synagogue coding: 5 out of 5; all groups perceive government actions as deeply lacking and illegitimate

Q3. To what extent is the injustice linked to issues of redistribution?

Halle Synagogue shooting coding 1 out of 5; redistribution was not an issue in the perpetrator's ideology

NSU coding: 2 out of 5; redistribution was hardly an issue from the perspective of this group's members

Gruppe Freital coding: 4 out of 5: the financial help extended by the government to refugees was considered by FTL 360 members as unacceptable

Q4. To what extent is the injustice linked to issues of recognition?

Members of NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle synagogue shooter felt deeply marginalized in "their own" country, so all groups score 5.

Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?

Members of NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle synagogue shooter felt unrepresented in "their own" country, so all groups score 5.

Grievance Coding

Q1 How specific is the experienced grievance?

Members of NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle synagogue shooter score 1 out of 5. They all expressed grievances in highly racist/culturalist terms.

Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?

Members of NSU and Gruppe Freital score 1 out of 5. Their main grievance is the expulsion of perceived "foreigners". Halle synagogue shooter scores 3 out of 5. The resentments are directed against different groups such as refugees, Jews, women and climate activists, but can all be subsumed under a right-wing ideology.

Q3. How personal is the grievance?

Members of NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle synagogue shooter score 5 out of 5. They all blame the control of foreign powers or forces over their government; NSU members and Halle synagogue shooter referred to the German government as "ZOG", that is, "Zionist-occupied-government". Halle synagogue shooter sees "white men" as victims.

Q4.   How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?

Members of NSU and Halle synagogue shooter score 5, as their statements are very vague in terms of addressees. Gruppe Freital scores a 3 out of 5; despite their distrust of government, some of their actions actually address authorities.

Q5.   How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?

Members of NSU and Halle synagogue shooter score 5 on this one, as their grievances cannot be addressed by authorities. Gruppe Freital scores a 2 out of 5 on this one; a government-enforced, temporary or permanent stop to migration was realistic and was German official policy until the mid-2010s.

Alienation Coding

Q1.   How specific and central is the sense of alienation?

Members of NSU and Halle synagogue shooter score 5 on this one, as the sense of alienation was very strong. Gruppe Freital scores a 4 out of 5 on this one; feelings of alienation were prevalent, however less than in the case of the NSU.

Q2.   How voluntary is the process of alienation?

NSU, Freital Group and Halle synagogue shooter score 1 out of 5; their rejection of the established party spectrum and public space is an autonomous decision grounded in perceptions of radical alterity.

Q3.   How complete is the alienation?

NSU and Halle synagogue shooter score a 5 out of 5. FTL 360 a 3 out of 5, since members perceived their local community as supportive of their grievances.

Q4.   How entrenched is the alienation?

The NSU members score a 4 out of 5; they had not been raised by neo-Nazis, but had undergone an almost decade-long process of indoctrination before starting to engage in killings. The Halle synagogue shooter scores 3 out of 5; he had not been raised by neo-Nazis, but had been radicalising online for years. Gruppe Freital scores a 2 out of 5; most had radicalised in only a few months, however 2 out of seven members had been involved in far-right networks also long before the hotspot's emergence.

Q5.   How reversible is the sense of alienation?

NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle synagogue shooter score a 5 out of 5. They expressed no regrets and regard their process of estrangement as legitimate.

Polarisation Coding

Q1.   To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarised?

NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle synagogue shooter score 1 out of 5. They all perceived their groups as part of wider and very potent movements.

Q2.   How high is the perceived level of the polarisation?

NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle synagogue shooter score 5 out of 5. They all perceived the polarisation of their socio-political environments as irreversible without force.

Q3.   To what extent do the actors' opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?

NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle synagogue shooter score a 5 out of 5. They all perceived intense enmity vis-à-vis the political establishment.

Q4.   To what extent do the actors consider the political field to be polarised as compared with the social sphere?

NSU, Gruppe Freital and Halle synagogue shooter perceive political parties and institutions as captured. They score a 1 out of 5.

Q5.   Did the actors consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?

NSU and Halle synagogue shooter score 1 out of 5 here, harbouring deep enmity vis-à-vis all political forces represented in Parliament. FTL 360 score a 4 out of 5, as by the time it emerged a strong far-right party was operating in Germany (the AfD).

Conclusions

This country report has examined three exemplary 'hotspots' of right-wing radicalisation to examine the factors at the micro, meso and macro levels that have fostered extremist violence in Germany over the past 30 years. Each case represents a specific type of radicalisation. The NSU shows the traditional pattern of long-term radicalisation based on personal networks. The second case, the Gruppe Freital, exemplifies recent trends of "turbo radicalisation" that have been taking place against the backdrop of the so-called "refugee crisis", driven by massive social mobilisation against the government's migration policy. Finally, the third case, the Halle Synagogue shooting, represents patterns of online radicalisation that have globally gained relevance during the last decade.

All three cases illustrate that right-wing extremist ideology, especially hatred against minorities, is the primary motivational factor for violence. They are also united by the feeling of extreme marginalization and lack of representation by politics, which they use to justify their acts. At the same time, differences between the groups can be seen in terms of their political agenda. While the members of the NSU and the Halle shooter refer to abstract enemy stereotypes to justify their violent acts, the Freital group pursues political goals, with which they exert pressure on the state authoritarians and partly find political representation through parties like the AfD. As with the NSU and the Halle Shooter, their violent actions are based on racist ideology, but at the same time, they refer to concrete political grievances, such as the belief that too much money is spent on providing for refugees. Thus, their actions are not based solely on the goal of intimidating minorities. At the same time, they seek a change in migration policies that they feel are unjust. With this demand, the Freital group is also not isolated. They can refer to numerous actors of the New Right, which had sharply condemned the refugee policy of the German government. Moreover, they are building on a social mood in which the influx of refugees was interpreted as a crisis, which may have reinforced the impression of the urgency of political change. This belief that they were not alone in their hatred of refugees, but represented larger groups, also explains why the radicalisation processes of some of the group's members occurred so rapidly. While in the case of the NSU and the Halle Shooter, the process of radicalisation and alienation has been lasting for years before their hatred translated into deadly violence, only a few months passed for some of the members of the Freital group before committing a terrorist crime. A heated social mood together with widespread crisis framing, represented in numerous mass media as well as by politicians, can thus be seen as a central facilitating factor for right-wing terrorism. Moreover, the relativization of right-wing protests as mobilizations of "concerned citizens" may have contributed to the sense of legitimacy.

In the case of the NSU and the Halle Shooting, further facilitating factors can be identified. The NSU was able to murder undetected for years because the security authorities failed at various levels. Although all but one of the victims had a migrant background, a racist motive was never seriously pursued, and instead, the cliché of clan criminality was served. The informants paid by the secret service also did not contribute in any way to solving the crime. Acts of violence such as the Halle shooting can also be traced back to mistakes and a lack of commitment on the part of the security forces, although this can be attributed primarily to ignorance of the online scene.

Strategies must therefore be implemented at various levels in order to break the trend of right-wing extremist violence in Germany. In the public discourse, there must be clear condemnation of right-wing ideology and a critically reflected approach to racist narratives, which are also represented in the general public and by politicians. At the same time, security forces must become more professional with regard to online radicalisation in order to at least be able to assess the threat better.

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Annex: I-GAP Coding

National Socialist Underground

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	5
Comments to Q1	Ideology was the main motivating factor for committing attacks
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	5
Comments to Q2	NSU perceived government actions as deeply lacking and illegitimate.
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	2
Comments to Q3	Redistribution was hardly an issue from the perspective of this group's members
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	5
Comments to Q4	NSU felt deeply marginalized in "their own" country
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	5
Comments to Q5	NSU felt unrepresented in "their own" country

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	1
Comments to Q1	NSU expressed grievances in highly racist/culturalist terms
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	1
Comments to Q2	Their main grievance is the expulsion of perceived "foreigners".
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	5
Comments to Q3	NSU blames the control of foreign powers or forces over their government; they referred to the German government as "ZOG", that is, "Zionist-occupied-government"
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	5

Comments to Q4	Statements are very vague in terms of addressees.
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q5	Their grievances cannot be addressed by authorities

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	5
Comments to Q1	The sense of alienation was very strong
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	1
Comments to Q2	Their rejection of the established party spectrum and public space is an autonomous decision grounded in perceptions of radical alterity
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	5
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	4
Comments to Q4	They had not been raised by neo-Nazis, but had undergone an almost decade-long process of indoctrination before starting to engage in killings
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	5
Comments to Q5	They expressed no regrets and regard their process of estrangement as legitimate.

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	1
Comments to Q1	They perceived their groups as part of wider and very potent movements.
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	5
Comments to Q2	They perceived the polarization of their socio-political environments as irreversible without force.
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	5
Comments to Q3	They all perceived intense enmity vis-à-vis the political establishment.

Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	1
Comments to Q4	They perceive political parties and institutions as captured.
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	1
Comments to Q5	They harbor deep enmity vis-à-vis all political forces represented in Parliament

Freital Group FTL 360

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	5
Comments to Q1	Ideology was the motivating factor for committing attacks
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	5
Comments to Q2	They perceived government actions as deeply lacking and illegitimate
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	4
Comments to Q3	The financial help extended by the government to refugees was considered by FTL 360 members as unacceptable
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	5
Comments to Q4	They felt deeply marginalized in "their own" country
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	5
Comments to Q5	They felt unrepresented in "their own" country

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	1
Comments to Q1	They expressed grievances in highly racist/culturalist terms.
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	1

Comments to Q2	Their main grievance is the expulsion of perceived "foreigners".
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	5
Comments to Q3	They blame the control of foreign powers or forces over their government
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	3
Comments to Q4	Despite their distrust of government, some of their actions actually address authorities.
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	2
Comments to Q5	A government-enforced, temporary or permanent stop to migration was realistic and was German official policy until the mid-2010s.

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	4
Comments to Q1	Feelings of alienation were prevalent, however less than in the case of the NSU.
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	1
Comments to Q2	Their rejection of the established party spectrum and public space is an autonomous decision grounded in perceptions of radical alterity.
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	3
Comments to Q3	Members perceived their local community as supportive of their grievances.
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	2
Comments to Q4	Most had radicalized in only a few months, however 2 out of seven members had been involved in far-right networks also long before the hotspot's emergence.
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	5
Comments to Q5	They expressed no regrets and regard their process of estrangement as legitimate.

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	1
Comments to Q1	They perceived their groups as part of wider and very potent movements.

Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	5
Comments to Q2	They perceived the polarization of their socio-political environments as irreversible without force.
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	5
Comments to Q3	They perceived intense enmity vis-à-vis the political establishment.
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	1
Comments to Q4	They perceive political parties and institutions as captured.
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	4
Comments to Q5	By the time it emerged a strong far-right party was operating in Germany (the AfD).

Halle Synagogue Shooting

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	5
Comments to Q1	Ideology was the motivating factor for committing attacks
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	5
Comments to Q2	He perceived government actions as deeply lacking and illegitimate
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	1
Comments to Q3	Redistribution was not an issue in the perpetrator's ideology
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	5
Comments to Q4	He felt deeply marginalized in "their own" country

Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	5
Comments to Q5	He felt unrepresented in "their own" country

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	1
Comments to Q1	He expressed grievances in highly racist/culturalist terms
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	3
Comments to Q2	His resentments are directed against different groups such as refugees, Jews, women and climate activists, but can all be subsumed under a right-wing ideology.
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	5
Comments to Q3	He blame the control of foreign powers or forces over their government and referred to the German government as "ZOG", that is, "Zionist-occupied-government". He sees "white men" as victims.
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q4	His statements are very vague in terms of addressees
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q5	His grievances cannot be addressed by authorities
Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	1

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	5
Comments to Q1	HIs sense of alienation was very strong
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	1
Comments to Q2	His rejection of the established party spectrum and public space is an autonomous decision grounded in perceptions of radical alterity.
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	5
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	3

Comments to Q4	He had not been raised by neo-Nazis, but had been radicalizing online for years
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	5
Comments to Q5	He expressed no regrets and regard their process of estrangement as legitimate.

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	1
Comments to Q1	He perceived himself as part of wider and very potent movements ("white unsatisfied men")
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	5
Comments to Q2	He perceived the polarization of his socio-political environments as irreversible without force.
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	5
Comments to Q3	He perceived intense enmity vis-à-vis the political establishment.
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	1
Comments to Q4	He perceived political parties and institutions as captured.
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	1
Comments to Q5	He harbor deep enmity vis-à-vis all political forces represented in Parliament