



Trends of Radicalisation

UK/D3.2 Country Report

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List of Abbreviations

British National Party (BNP)

Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BME)

Black Lives Matter (BLM)

Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA)

English Defence League (EDL)

European Union (EU)

Member of Parliament (MP)

Royal Air Force (RAF)

The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

Vkontakte (VK)

About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalization and polarization in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalization, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualizes this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalization programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalization, which include a sense of being victimized; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of "us vs them" identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs, and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion, and de-radicalization.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation-states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalization often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing, and devising solutions to online radicalization will be central to the project's aims.

Introduction

This report identifies the crucial “hotspots” of radicalisation that are central to the history of radicalisation in the UK and are emblematic of its contemporary environment with links to the historical legacies of radicalisation in the country. The report provides an in-depth and multilevel analysis of the most important force of radicalisation in the UK at the moment, which the report identifies as the far-right political organisation and mobilisation in the UK. We chose to focus primarily on right-wing extremism instead of other radicalised movements such as contemporary jihadist extremism due to the existing attention that the latter has from policy-makers, prevention organisation and its over-representation in media. The threat of far-right movements is often overlooked, underestimated and sometimes normalised within the United Kingdom as demonstrated by the country’s history with marginalising various groups, for example through colonisation and the narrative behind the Brexit referendum, which we discussed in the D.Rad 3.1 report (Ozduzen, Ferenczi, Holmes, Rosun et al., 2021). We draw our justification for this focus on far-right hotspots from repeated calls from Britain’s counter-terrorism chief, Neil Basu, and the counter-terrorism police unit that the most underestimated and yet fastest growing terrorism threat to the UK is from the far-right (Dodd & Gierson, 2019).

Over the past few years, the actors and ideologies behind radicalised movements have started to shift and currently, the UK ranks third among Western countries in terms of far-right political violence and activities (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020). There has been 35 far-right incidents and deaths in the UK between 2002 and 2019. Despite a number of right-wing extremist attacks being misrecorded as hate-crimes (Liang & Cross, 2020), in 2019 the UK faced the highest number of far-right attacks and plots (Dearden, 2020). Although far-right groups engage in a greater frequency of relatively lower-level acts of political violence, these attacks and violence have severe cumulative impact on racial and gender minorities and migrants. These events are also less likely to be covered by the mainstream media in the UK (Briggs & Goodwin, n.d.), whilst existing policy on de-radicalisation in the UK does not mainly target these groups and organisations.

Although this report focuses on the growing far-right threat, we do not disregard the intricate link between jihadist and right-wing radicalised violence. The narratives behind both extremist movements are intertwined and the two groups capitalise on each other's actions and words (Guhl & Ebner, 2018). Jihadist violence tends to be viewed as the blueprint for defining terrorism and holds the implication that these acts are perpetuated by external agents (“*them*”). Since far-right perpetrators do not fit in with these expectations as they are mainly majority group nationals of the country (i.e. “*us*” vs “*them*”), this form of extremist acts tends to be overlooked as a form of terrorism. Nonetheless, both groups exploit a sense of victimisation, a perceived lack of representation and the demonisation of extremist organisations. In the far-right narrative, this is coupled with the fear of invasion and “Islamisation” of the West, often associated with refugees coming to the country. There also prevails the fear of ethnic replacement, associated with the waves of mass migration towards the West over the years. The various lower-level acts of right-wing radicalised violence are often portrayed as acts intended to protect the country, its culture and its resources. This ideology can be seen underlying the various hotspots that we discuss in this report.

This report situates the hotspots of far-right radicalisation in the UK within their geographic locations by drawing on collective constructions of place-identity (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000) as

a method of self-categorisation (Lewicka, 2008). As places are crucial for the creation and maintenance of identity and are “re-conceived as dynamic arenas that are both socially constituted and constitutive of the social” (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000, p. 27), this report highlights the ways that geographic locations function as anchors for idealised British identities and histories which have been co-opted by the right. The report focuses on the far-right hotspots and events of radicalisation in the UK, specifically the murder of MP Jo Cox in West Yorkshire, anti-immigrant mobilisation and violence in Dover in January 2016 and the anti-BLM march in London.

In this vein, this report shows the ways in which the West Yorkshire, Dover, and London “hotspots” of radicalization represent a culmination of contemporary far-right radicalisation trends in the UK, whilst providing insights into different ideologies underpinning far-right mobilisation and political violence on a broader scale. This report incorporates rural-urban, North-South, economically thriving-stagnating, and interior-liminal dimensions to illustrate the ways that far-right ideologies facilitate the creation of group identities and divisions. Importantly, the hotspots showcase the increasing ‘patriotic unity’ of far-right groups in pursuing collective goals. Highlighting the intimate links of far-right groups and their collective identities to the chosen hotspots of West Yorkshire, Dover and London, the report identifies the facilitating and motivational causes for the three hotspots and quantifies them by placing them on the I-GAP spectrum. In doing this, the report connects the contemporary hotspots of far-right radicalisation to the D-Rad’s conceptual framework, I-GAP (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarization) spectrum and the vulnerability index.

These hotspots in the UK serve as recruitment hotspots for far-right extremism due to unemployment, isolation, polarisation, and youth alienation among other factors. There are many ways identity is related to places, such as place identification, which refers to a person’s expressed identity with a place (Twigger-Ross and Uzzell 1996). Although it may be argued that we have moved away from rooted identities based on a specific place in the late-modern period (see for instance Giddens 1991; Bauman 1997; 2001), there is more recently a resurgence of nationalism and the subsequent formation of place-based identities. Landmark places such as London, wider regions such as West Yorkshire or new identity places such as Dover rejuvenate as places of collective memory that enable far-right activists and sympathisers to participate in protests, identify with activists in these locations and engage with the political realm of street politics (Ekman 2014). Collective memories centre not only on personal individual memories, but also encompass the actual or even mythologised memories of others embedded within the same social structure (Lewicka, 2008) and amplify narratives of group and personal threat across temporal and geographic distance. These collective memories of perceived injustice and grievance in terms of the loss of identity and employment (Hotspot 1), fewer resources and the loss of representation (Hotspot 2), and threat to values and cultural histories (Hotspot 3) are shared and transmitted within these groups (Connerton, 1989), and act as further catalysts for far-right support and recruitment. While West Yorkshire and London represent historical hotspots of radicalisation in the UK, Dover has more recently come into fruition as a hotspot of far-right radicalisation in the UK.

Hotspots of radicalization

In this report, three hotspots of right-wing radicalisation were selected to represent three emerging narratives of right-wing ideologies within the UK (and specifically, within England).

Collectively, these hotspots all draw on notions of idealised British identities which are embedded within their geographies, and highlight the importance of place attachment - the affective involvement with spaces (Hummon, 1992) in right-wing ideologies. The perceived injustices, grievances, and alienation are constructed through perceived infractions on physical spaces such as counties (Hotspot 1), liminal areas such as ports (Hotspot 2), and capital cities (Hotspot 3). Thus, the hotspots themselves are enacted with intent to reclaim space and through it, recapture a mythologised image of imperial Britain. Collectively, these hotspots capture the North-South divide and resulting tensions which have contributed to a declining sense of identity and place (Hotspot 1), boundaries with perceived 'Others' which engender external threats (Hotspot 2), and dense urban spaces which are envisioned as the originators of internal threats such as multiculturalism and as battlegrounds (Hotspot 3).



Figure 1. Geolocation of selected UK hotspots.

Hotspot 1: The murder of MP Jo Cox in West Yorkshire

The murder of Jo Cox, member of parliament (MP) for Batley and Spenningsdale in June 2016 sent shockwaves through the country (Boyle and Akkoc, 2016). The first person to murder a sitting MP since the assassination of Eastbourne MP Ian Gow in 1990, by a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, reporting initially suggested that her killer, Thomas Mair was a lone-wolf attacker with mental health issues (Calamur, Vasilogambros and Ford, 2016). However, it soon became clear that Mair was involved with far-right extremist groups, with the Southern Poverty Law Center revealing he had made several purchases from the US-based

Neo-Nazi group National Action. In addition, in the resulting byelection for the seat, four right-wing parties fielded candidates, despite other more mainstream parties refusing to contest the election as a mark of respect (Lavigueur, 2016). In a more recent by-election in the seat won by the sister of Jo Cox and triggered by incumbent MP Tracy Brabin's election as mayor of West Yorkshire, three of the candidates running for the Member of Parliament for the area are far-right (for example, Jayda Fransen or Anne Waters of the For Britain Movement) and three others made use of far-right dog whistles in their literature (BBC, 2021). This demonstrates how Mair's actions continue to have an impact in the area.

We also examine how the geolocation of the hotspot may have impacted Mair's actions and amplified the effect of his crime. Batley and Spens is an area in the county of West Yorkshire, one of the places in the UK with the most real-world rallies in 2019, and it is also home to the founders of organisations such as Redwatch and Patriotic Alternative (Townsend, 2016; Finnegan, 2021; Scott, 2020). In addition, there have been a number of far-right extremists arrested in the area, which Nick Griffin, the former leader of the British National Party, once referred to as "unusually radicalised" (BBC, 2021; Cobain, Parveen and Taylor, 2016).

Hotspot 2: Dover anti-immigration mobilisation in January 2016

Since the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and the Brexit vote in 2016, Dover has been re-imagined as a potent symbol of the British national border, especially by far-right groups (Wood 2020), such as Britain First, For Britain, the former Combat 18 and English Defense League. Since then, Dover has witnessed a surge in the presence, events and acts of far-right organisations and individuals, to stand against refugees and migrants who could potentially reach the port and to inflict fear on immigrants, who might plan to reach the UK in the future. Dover far-right protests since 2016 were organised by various far right organisations in their imagined response to Britain's intake of immigrants more widely and the channel crossings of refugees more specifically. Organised far-right groups mobilised anti-refugee and anti-immigrant protests in the area since 2016 and carried out vigilante patrols of Dover's beaches and other areas nearby to "catch" illegal immigrants arriving in the area. The most notable anti-immigrant political mobilisation in Dover took place in January 2016. During the violent far-right protests on the 30th of January 2016, far right groups marched from the Dover station to the docks. The most visible banners and placards of the crowds consisted mostly of the flags of the British far-right organisations, such as the English Defense League. Some of the "official" flags of these organisations also had inserted text, such as "For our country, for our people", accounting for the proliferation of idealised British identities and values. In addition to union jack flags, most protestors holding national flags held St George's flag, which visually represents an act of patriotism in the particular protest space and beyond. While the protests were against the refugee intake of the UK, the far-right protesters also burnt an EU flag during the event (Osborne 2016). In their violent actions on the day, the protestors not only dehumanised refugees with their banners and slogans such as "secure our borders", but they also denounced the perceived European refugee resettlement and protection policies by burning an EU flag.

Hotspot 3: London and the Anti-BLM march 13th June 2020

In response to the murder of George Floyd by US police on May 25th 2020, a number of Black Lives Matter (BLM) marches were coordinated in the UK to highlight the prominence of

systemic and institutionalised prejudice and race-based violence. On June 7th, several BLM protests were held across the UK which were attended by tens of thousands people. These protests resulted in a statue of Winston Churchill in central London being tagged with “was a racist” in paint, and the statue of 17th century slave trader Edward Colston being pulled down from its plinth and rolled into Bristol harbour (Topping, Sabbagh, & Carrell, 2020). The dissemination of these images via social media further stoked far-right rhetoric around perceived grievance and injustice (Sabbagh, 2020). In this way, London was constructed as a cultural battleground for what are perceived as ‘authentic’ British values and social norms in the Anti-BLM march which occurred on the 13th of June 2020 and which consisted of many attendees travelling from outside of London to ‘defend British history’ (Campbell, 2020; Lowles, 2020). The third hotspot of this report is the far-right counter-protest which occurred on June 13th in response to the BLM marches which were coordinated as a call to defend the hegemonic imperial and white British narratives (Lowles, 2020); indeed, Paul Golding, leader of the far-right fascist group, Britain First, described the protest as an opportunity to “guard our monuments” (Gayle, 2020). Golding had been convicted a month earlier under the Terrorism Act (PA Media, 2020), whilst Britain First had been de-registered as a political party and was

Overview of chosen hotspots and events

Hotspot 1: The Murder of MP Jo Cox in West Yorkshire

Jo Cox was shot and stabbed to death by right-wing extremist Thomas Mair as she made her way to attend a constituency surgery in Batley and Spen on June 16th 2016 (Cobain et al., 2016). Mair shouted “Britain first, keep Britain independent, Britain will always come first. This is for Britain” to witnesses as he carried out his attack. He had spent significant time online researching methods of violence, right-wing and fascist groups and ideologies, and subscribing to a number of far-right groups. Originally described as a “lone-wolf” by many, we would argue that the physical and social setting of his West Yorkshire home played into Mair’s beliefs. Batley and Spen has a higher-than-average population of Muslims which makes for an easy and highly visible scapegoat for the region’s economic woes (ONS, 2011). Cox was also well known as a campaigner for refugees and immigrants and the Remain campaign during the Brexit referendum (Grice, 2016). Indeed, Mair had clipped a pro-remain column written by Cox (Burgis, 2016). Given this it is not surprising that he saw Cox as a “collaborator”, and a betrayer of her constituents as well as her race (Cobain et al., 2016). Indeed, when asked by a judge to give his name, he instead shouted “My name is death to traitors, freedom for Britain” (Calamur *et al.*, 2016).

Although Mair was not a member of any local right-wing groups, when police entered Mair’s home following the attack, they found a treasure-trove of far-right books, DVDs and Nazi memorabilia (Burgis, 2016). Mair owned a copy of the Turner Diaries, an account of race war in which politicians are executed as “race traitors”, associated with other extremists such as Timothy McVeigh. As previously mentioned, he had also made several purchases from the neo-Nazi group National Alliance, founded by Turner Diaries author William Pierce, including guides to explosives and guns. Pierce was an advocate for violence, believing that this was the only way for the far-right to gain power and that democracy was ultimately futile (SPLC, 2021). It appears that Mair subscribed to this same belief.

Hotspot 2: Dover anti-immigration mobilisation in January 2016

Dover has engendered far-right activism in the UK since the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and the Brexit vote in 2016, by focusing on two major violent far-right protests in this area in 2016 and 2020. Dover port has been a destination where migrants have attempted to reach from the sea or through the English Channel. Due to the rising anti-immigrant and anti-refugee movements in the UK, the town's geographical position implied that it has been re-imagined as a symbol of the national border in the UK (Wood 2020). Based on this, Dover currently represents a hotspot of anti-refugee and anti-immigrant political action in the UK, which stems primarily from anti-immigrant policy-making. This tendency of policy-making by the Conservative governments have informed the rise of far-right radicalisation in the UK. During the violent far-right protests against "illegal migrants" on the 30th of January 2016, far right groups such as the National Front marched from the Dover station to the docks. During the 2016 protests, a variety of members of far-right organisations coalesced in the Folkestone Road and town centre areas with most visible anti-refugee banners such as "refugees not welcome", chanting "no more refugees". About 150 far-right protesters participated in the anti-refugee protests consisting predominantly of white men. On the day, the police arrested three protesters and seized various weapons, such as knives, knuckle dusters and hammers (Sommers 2016). The protests were primarily against the "threat" of immigration in the UK. The most visible banners were related to refugees whilst some of the far-right protestors wore "fck ISIS" t-shirts, which accounts for the ways in which far-right groups equate refugees with Jihadist terrorism and radicalisation whilst providing evidence for the Islamophobic ideology of these extremist groups. September 2020 saw another rise in the far-right groups' presence and activities in Dover as a response to the rising numbers of migrants attempting to reach the port using these deadly routes during the Covid-19 pandemic. About a hundred far-right protesters gathered on the 5th of September 2020 walking from A20 to the docks, chanting "Rule Britannia" and "Whose streets? Our Streets" with banners reading 'How many illegal immigrants are terrorists' and '4200 homeless veterans abandoned'. After some members of the protesters clashed with the police, there were at least nine arrests during the day.

Leading to the violent protests in Dover since 2016, there have been many social media posts and profiles dedicated to beach patrols and demonstrations against refugees and immigrants in Dover. Using social media platforms, especially Telegram, Britain First has organised beach patrols to look out for asylum seekers since 2019, calling this violent activity "Operation White Cliffs". Britain First also organised a sailing ship to carry out "migrant patrols" in August 2020. Amongst other profiles and posts, a new extremist right wing group called British Hand has used Instagram to recruit children and teenagers in order to inform users about how to make weapons and call them for urgent and extreme violence against refugees in Dover (n.a. 2020). In addition to specific groups, far-right celebrities such as Nigel Farage, the former leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), have produced videos on YouTube in order to draw attention to the alleged "scandal" channel crossings in Dover and dehumanize asylum seekers. To combat the far-right groups' visibility and violent activity in Dover directed against migrants and refugees, antifascist and anti-racist groups, such as Kent Anti-Racism Network, have also organised demonstrations in Dover since 2016, as a response to the far-right violence and activities in the area.

Hotspot 3: Anti-BLM march June 13th 2020 in London

The right-wing anti-BLM march which occurred on the 13th of June (2020) in London can be understood within the narrative of perceived grievance to 'protect symbols of British history' (BBC News, 2020). Although the march was planned as a response to the BLM protests, which included the tagging of statues which were widely shared on social media, it also served as an outlet for the increasingly dominant ideology that British culture, and specifically, white British culture, was at threat from external and internal sources. This is illustrated in the overt acknowledgement of intentions to 'come for a fight' that many of the attendants and members of the attending groups expressed on social media prior to the march (BBC News, 2020). The march was loosely organised by the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), and was attended by the leader and members of the English Defence League (EDL), the leader and members of Britain First, other right-wing groups, and veterans (Campbell, 2020). During the week between the BLM marches (7th June) and the anti-BLM march on the 13th of June, right-wing sentiments were stoked mostly online via social media and extremist channels and chat groups (Sabbagh & Dodd, 2020). Notably, the leader of the EDL, Tommy Robinson, posted a video as a call to arms on the 7th of June, in which he encouraged individuals to attend to protect a shared (implicitly white) culture, stating that "If you're a lad or you call yourself a lad, and you're a football lad and you go to football and you give a shit at all about our country, our history, our culture, our identity. I expect you are going to be in London next Saturday" (Lowles, 2020). This demonstrates that although the march was organised around the specific response to the damage to statues, it also encompassed perceptions that the overarching British culture and identity had been threatened. Importantly, it shows an increasing "patriotic unity" amongst far-right groups which coordinated their plans across extremist channels (Sabbagh & Dodd, 2020).

Despite calls from the Home Secretary for all travel for the purpose of protests to be delayed due to the Covid-19 restrictions in place, the march took place on the 13th, unlike the BLM march which was cancelled due to fears of clashes with counter-protesters (Campbell, 2020; Sabbagh & Dodd, 2020). It is important to note that attendance at this march was national, with hundreds of football gangs from across the country travelling to London, including from places which had some of the highest Covid-19 infection rates, such as Sunderland, Yorkshire, East Anglia, West Midlands (Lowles, 2020). Many of the right-wing groups boasted via social media that they had secured coaches and buses that would transport attendants from outside of London (Sabbagh, 2020). The march occurred within central London, specifically, in Whitehall where the Cenotaph – the national war memorial – is located and Parliament Square, where the statue of Winston Churchill is located. Several monuments in both of these locations were boarded up in preparation to protect them from protesters (Dearden, 2020).

Already by mid-morning several hundred individuals were in attendance at both sites (Campbell, 2020), who were mostly white men who were already drinking (Casciani, 2020b). Speeches were given by Paul Golding, leader of Britain First. There were also chants of "Tommy, Tommy" in support of Tommy Robinson, leader of the EDL. Other violent group behaviours included Nazi salutes in front of both the Cenotaph and Churchill memorials, and clashes with the police which included the throwing of bottles (Campbell, 2020) and a smoke cannister (Hope not Hate, 2020a) at the police. Attendees also threatened media representatives and assaulted one member of the media (Casciani, 2020a). Attendees

chanted “You let your country down” at police and “England, England!” (Campbell, 2020). Over the course of the day, the march also moved over into nearby Trafalgar square where fireworks were thrown across the crowds (BBC News, 2020). Despite Covid-19 restrictions that all protesters must disperse by 17:00, several pockets remained past the curfew. Overall attendance was estimated in the several thousands (Campbell, 2020). 23 officers were injured (Halliday & Slawson, 2020), and more than 100 arrests were made on various offences, including possession of offensive weapon, assault, and violent disorder (BBC News, 2020).

Method and reasons for the choice of hotspots

As part of the D.Rad 3.1 report, we have identified the most important contemporary agents of radicalisation and stakeholders of de-radicalisation in the UK (Ozduzen, Ferenczi, Holmes, Rosun et al. 2021). On the 3.1 report, we mapped contemporary Jihadist, separatist and far-right radicalisation patterns and pathways in the UK. In doing this, our report identified the increasing importance of and the lack of wider engagement with the far-right radicalisation patterns in the UK. This includes the lack of official de-radicalisation stakeholders for far-right mobilisation in the UK as the Prevent programme primarily aims to target Jihadist extremism. We used a place-identity perspective to embed the hotspots within their geographical locations to highlight their role in the construction and maintenance of idealised British identities and values. Based on this background, we have thus chosen our three hotspots namely West Yorkshire, Dover and London related to the increasing prominence and mainstreaming of far-right radicalisation from the spectrum of rural to urban geographies in the UK based on our identification of the most important but under-studied form of radicalisation in the UK. In order to map and engage in an in-depth analysis of three prominent contemporary far-right hotspots of radicalisation in the UK, we used secondary data including but not limited to think tank and human rights NGO reports, official statistics, news items, publicly available social media data, and other public datasets. These secondary data sources helped us not only to determine the crucial hotspots of radicalisation in the UK but also enabled us to map the spatial, cultural and political connections between the three hotspots.

First, we chose West Yorkshire as it is representative of many regions in the UK that have distinct and proud cultural personalities and have struggled with deindustrialisation. In West Yorkshire, the issues of Wales, Northumbria and other areas are mirrored, as the far-right groups blame immigrants and minorities as scapegoats for the results of years of deprivation following Thatcherism (Dean, 2013; Cochrane and Nevitte, 2014). West Yorkshire is somewhat unique, however, in that it has a thriving ethnic minority community, which perhaps only serves to make the scapegoating easier for the right-wing groups. The sense of regional identity seen in areas like West Yorkshire, the “Yorkshireness” for which the area is well known (Marshall, 2011), is an essential identity marker that must be considered to fully understand right-wing extremism in the UK. This type of regional pride creates the perfect breeding ground for an “us vs them” mentality, and is further exacerbated in this case by the north-south divide in funding, which creates a sense of betrayal in those who are left behind (Bounds, 2015). Britain has been described as a “world beater” in terms of geographical inequality, with some of the biggest gaps in measures like GDP between regions, and it is important that one of our hotspots captures the effect this has on extremism (The Economist, 2020). In addition, we were informed by a member of a group that helps far-right activists to exit the lifestyle that West Yorkshire was considered a stronghold for right-wing activity, a view also held by Nick Griffin, the former leader of the fascist group the British National Party (Cobain et al., 2016).

Considering the number of marches held by extremists in the area that opinion seems well supported, indeed, there were seven marches in the area in a single two-year period (Townsend, 2016).

Second, we chose Dover as another hotspot of radicalisation in the UK because of its centrality in the increasing anti-immigration agenda and policy-making in the UK as well as its liminal position as a border town. Unlike West Yorkshire, Dover is a smaller geographical region, a port town in the South-East of England that has seen the rise and consolidation of far-right activity in recent years. Dover has seen 8000 “illegal” channel crossings in 2020 and so far 3500 in 2021. Dover represents contemporary forms and formats of far-right activity and radicalisation in the UK not only due to channel crossings of asylum seekers stemming from its geographical position as a “border town” but also because of its majority Conservative voting population as well as the town’s overall cultural dislocation from the movement of goods and people in the port area. Among other reasons, the fact that Conservative Party increased its votes in Dover by over 13% between 2015 and 2019 accounts for the wider populations’ endorsement of right-wing ideologies in Dover. While it is true that Dover and the wider Kent region are both predominantly Conservative Party voting areas and the region already has its far-right groups, other far-right groups and individuals have travelled to the symbolic port town following calls on social media platforms in order to organise anti-immigrant protests and beach patrols and engage in violent acts against the asylum seekers who may arrive in the area. We also chose Dover because in the wake of increasing far-right activity in the border town, anti-racist groups and organisations also arrived in Dover in order to support asylum seekers.

We chose the anti-BLM march in London as our final hotspot for four primary reasons. First, for its recency - this event occurred on the 13th of June in 2020, and demonstrates the ways that far-right groups are starting to converge in their collective goals in the UK. Relatedly, we chose this hotspot because of its unique situational context. This event occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic and demonstrates the increasing reliance on and the efficiency of digital spaces by the far-right. That this anti-BLM march could have an attendance of several thousand individuals (Campbell, 2020) that was mostly planned online in collaboration between far-right groups is evidence of their increasing shared goals. Third, this hotspot occurred within the capital of England, but many of the attendees travelled across the country, with some groups hiring coaches and buses for this purpose (Lowles, 2020). This demonstrates the tension between the most culturally and ethnically diverse region in England (British Government, 2020) and the rest of the country. It also highlights the ways that London has been incorporated within these narratives as a location which requires defence. There is a suggestion of the threat in London stemming from the residents of the city itself - in this case, those that had tagged Winston Churchill’s statue with “was a racist”, which placed London as the battleground in which members of the far-right had to protect British symbols and history. Thus, we can infer that global movements such as BLM were perceived by the far-right as emanating from London but which were argued as not being representative of British culture - in fact which were perceived as not caring about the culture (Lowles, 2020). This hotspot shows the conflict between diverse conceptions of what it means to be British, and how parts of this identity have been co-opted by the far-right to represent white British identity and culture as the dominant and singular narrative. Finally, although the march was organised with a highly specific intent - to protect the statues in Whitehall and Parliament Square - it nonetheless captured the general aims of the far-right and evidences how intent which is

constructed as positive - protecting culture and identity - is co-opted to fulfil exclusionist, racist, and fascist goals which are in direct contradiction with the proposed intent, e.g., through the use of Nazi salutes in front of memorials which partly commemorate the war against Nazi powers (Campbell, 2020).

Micro, meso and macro factors

Hotspot 1: Murder of MP Jo Cox in West Yorkshire

Micro factors

Mair appears to have been driven by a sense of betrayal by the political elite, as evidenced by his outburst at trial (Burgis, 2016). In the past, when writing about the apartheid in South Africa, Mair has stated his belief that white liberals were the biggest threat to the white race and the cause of the far-right. There is also a clear link here to the feeling of marginalisation and left-behind-ness that is commonplace in West Yorkshire, which was exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic (Blackall, 2020). Adding to this is a sense that the North of England, where West Yorkshire is located, is repeatedly over-looked by politicians in terms of funding and other development policies in favour of the South (The Economist, 2020).

Mair was often described as a loner, who had few friends and had one-word interactions with neighbours (Burgis, 2016). This isolation made him extremely susceptible to right-wing recruitment, and perhaps led him to seek out the community of extremists, even if they were on a different continent. Embracing white nationalist thought may have allowed him to romanticise his isolation, portraying himself as a lone and brave defender of the white race. We should note here that beyond the exclamations he made as he murdered Cox and the few sentences he shouted in court, Mair has refused to explain his actions. Therefore, this report pieces together his motives based on his belongings and the interactions he had with right-wing groups.

Meso factors

The rhetoric of the Brexit campaign that relied primarily on the tendency to say no to experts, the idea of Westminster being miles away from the public and its being unrepresentative impacted on the Mair's murder of MP Jo Cox and the wider far-right mobilisation in the West Yorkshire area. Mair made several purchases from the neo-Nazi group National Alliance, including guides to explosives and guns, accounting for the transnational links between far-right organisations. Furthermore, social media groups like "West Yorkshire Grooming Gangs Awareness" with over 14K followers help far-right violence, recruitment and mobilisation and create moral panic in spreading hate for immigrants and widely demonising Muslim men (Gill and Harrison, 2015). As an example, one commenter stated "I feel the same, writing letters to mp's does nothing, violence is not the answer but it sure as hell starts a debate and that initiates change, very quickly", demonstrating themes of betrayal by those in power, as was the case with the discourses the far-right extremist Mair used when he attacked Jo Cox. This reflects a shared collective belief of the need to engage in violent action to protect their own (white) ethnic group.

Furthermore, there is a demonisation of Muslim men in particular in the area, exacerbated by white flight from cities such as Bradford, which has led to segregation in neighbourhoods, and, perhaps more importantly schools (Rahman, 2009). This creates a highly visible yet separate population, the perfect target for scapegoating. For an area with such a strong regional culture, the perceived failed integration of the 'other' creates the sense that traditional cultural values are under attack. The perception that politicians care more about so-called identity politics compounds the issue, as the white working class in the area struggle to accept the argument that they have privilege compared to their ethnic minority counterparts.

Macro factors

West Yorkshire is a county in the North of England containing the most western parts of the historic county of Yorkshire. The area is well-known for a sense of regional pride and a strong identity (Marshall, 2011). Historically West Yorkshire has been an industrialised area, with a thriving coal-mining and textile industry, and immigrants from commonwealth countries were encouraged to emigrate to the region to fill vacancies in the 1960s, meaning the area is ethnically diverse (The Saltaire Collection, n.d.). However, since the 1970s there has been a collapse in these primary and secondary sector industries and cities like Bradford struggle with higher than average unemployment (City of Bradford, 2021). Against this backdrop of multiculturalism, economic deprivation and wounded community pride, far-right extremist groups have flourished.

In the post-industrial transition, West Yorkshire was home to many primary and secondary sector industries, with whole towns and cities developing around one industry. For example, in 1947 following coal industry nationalisation, there were 156 collieries in all four ridings of Yorkshire, and for villages like Lofthouse in West Yorkshire, life centered around the pit (Northern Mine Research Society, 2021). Not only did the industry provide a wage but also a culture and way of life (Hall, 2011). In the secondary sector, life was tied to the mill or steelworks, and cities such as Bradford became hotspots for migration from Commonwealth countries in the 1960s as mills grew desperate for workers. Indeed, in some villages in Pakistan, half the population moved to England to work in towns like Bradford (The Saltaire Collection, n.d.).

However, by the 1970s and 1980s, industry had begun to decline in the region. In 2000, there were just nine collieries open, and the mills stood empty, later converted into flats (Northern Mine Research Society, 2016; Wall, 2016). In this way, the entire economic foundation of the majority of the region was swept away. It is estimated that pit villages like Lofthouse saw real unemployment rates of roughly 26% for men, and those who did stay in employment had their wages fall by an average of £74 a week (Beatty and Fothergill, 1995). The losses were not just economic: the culture of towns and villages was lost, and tight knit communities disintegrated as neighbours migrated for work. For an area with such a strong sense of culture and pride built around industriousness and hard work, this decline was a crippling blow.

In more recent times, investment in the area has led to regeneration of cities like Leeds, in West Yorkshire. However, in areas such as Bradford, where a vast hole in the ground defined the city centre for over a decade from the late 2000s on, growth has been slow (Harris, 2015). Unemployment in the city remains stubbornly high at 9.7% compared with a national rate of 6.3% (Bradford Council, 2021). Immigrants provide an easily identifiable other and their arrival

before mill closures makes them easy scapegoats. There is also a sense of discontent in the ethnic minority residents, heightening tensions. For example, 2001 saw rioting amongst the British Asian population, and more recently the use of an image of the prophet Muhammad in a religious studies lesson in Batley led to protest and counter protest (Sharma, 2021; Kundnani, 2001).

Hotspot 2: Dover anti-immigration mobilisation in January 2016

Micro factors

Since 2016, Dover has consistently seen white supremacist male groups' social movements and violent acts in the centre of this port town. During the violent far-right protests on the 30th of January 2016, the far-right organisations such as the National Front marched from the Dover station to the docks. The visible banners and placards amongst the crowds were mostly the flags of the far-right organisations, such as the English Defense League. The far-right protesters, consisting of predominantly white men and a small number of white women, clashed with the police whilst designating the EU as an entity and refugees and immigrants as agents that stood against UK's thriving. These events have illustrated the overlap of physical and digital spaces to help the spread and visibility of far-right information and ideology. For example, in the aftermath of the January 2016 protests, on its official Facebook profile, the National Front recounted "a big well done and thank you to all white nationalists who attended Dover today to save our country from invasion. Respect to all in attendance." This "invasion" rhetoric underpinned the anti-immigration and anti-refugee political action in Dover, the social media publics of the protests as well as the anti-immigration agendas in the wider British public sphere. As a response to violent far-right activities in the area that have attempted to dehumanize, fear, and scapegoat refugees directly and other migrants indirectly, there was also anti-racist and "refugees welcome" demonstrations in Dover in January 2016. At the end of the day of the protests in January 2016, the then Conservative MP Charlie Elphicke tweeted saying "the anti-fascist demonstrators are "unwelcome" in his town. After Elphicke was condemned on social media, he added that fascists were "equally unwelcome", accusing both groups of being "damaging to our nation's economy" (Osborne 2016). The former Dover Conservative MP's initial condemnation of the anti-fascist and anti-racist protestors accounts for the parallel between the far-right radicalisation and the Conservative Party's right-wing ideology.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, the summer of 2020 saw another rise in the far-right groups' presence and activities in Dover as a response to the rising numbers of migrants attempting to reach the port using these deadly routes. On the 5th of September 2020, the far-right groups blocked the dual carriageway in Dover, clashed with the police and sang "Rule, Britannia!". Some of the banners on the day of the violent protests read "illegal migrants not welcome", "how many illegal immigrants are terrorists" and "illegal means criminal, arrest and deport!". This rhetoric at the heart of the protests associated immigration and asylum seeking with criminality and illegality, which serves to dehumanize immigrants and refugees and creates further divisions and polarisation in British society.

Among the protestors on the 5th of September 2020 was Nigel Marcham, who is an increasingly well-known far-right figure attacking asylum seekers. During the protests, Marcham exploited and subverted the "taking the knee" symbol of Black Lives Matter protests,

which is a symbol adopted by millions following the brutal murder of George Floyd in Minnesota in the summer of 2020. On the day, Marcham screamed on the megaphone saying “take a knee for the brethren of this fucking country.” Following his call, other protestors knelt on the docks (Townsend 2020). As this example illustrates, the anti-refugee and anti-immigration movement in the area embraces a multi-action and multi-issue perspective, where the far-right protests and action rest more broadly on anti-equality and anti-freedom values for minorities, especially refugees, asylum seekers and wider BME communities in the UK. More recently, sixty far-right individuals gathered in Dover on the 29th of May 2021, waving “England” flags and four of them were arrested during the event.

Meso factors

Dover has been at the forefront of the destinations where migrants using dangerous routes have attempted to reach the UK. Dover is a town and a major ferry port in Kent in the South East of England. Similar to some of the older southern and naval ports such as Plymouth in the UK, Dover recorded a substantially below average growth, modest natural increase and net migration loss in the 19th century (Lawton and Lee 2002). The port of Dover is one of the busiest ports in Europe, but the town of Dover is largely disconnected from the activities stemming from the port. The port is generally used for cheaper travel to the European continent. The coaches coming from the European countries generally take cruise passengers away from the Western Docks to the historic streets of Canterbury or the retail outlets at Ashford (Cassidy et al 2018). The historical transformation of the port of Dover as well as the more recent Dover protests have made Dover one of the hotspots of anti-refugee and far-right political action and social movement organisation in the UK, especially since the heightened moment of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015. Dover is predominantly a white area with 96.7% of citizens of white ethnic origin and lowest percentage of BME populations in the wider Kent region (3.3%). Dover’s becoming a hotspot of radicalisation also results from its majority Conservative voting population. Conservatives win a majority in all elections in the area. For example, in the 2019 general elections, 56.9% of the population in Dover voted for the Conservative Party, whilst 32.6% and 5.7% of the population voted for Labour Party and Liberal Democrat Party respectively. It should be noted that Conservative Party received 43.3% of the votes in 2015, which implies that between 2015 and 2019, Conservative Party’s votes increased by over 13%. Similarly, 62% of the population voted “Leave” for the Brexit vote, whereas 37.8% voted remain. The results of these different elections are proof of not just Dover’s majority anti-immigration and anti-EU population but they are also consistent with the strong “Leave” Brexit vote in the wider Kent area.

Amongst other locations in the UK, Dover has been at the forefront of the destinations where migrants having to use these dangerous routes have attempted to reach the UK. Existing research discusses whether the two cities of Dover (the UK) and Calais (France) could be identified as potential examples of binational cities as they have been connected by the Channel tunnel while the inner state borders of the European Union have disappeared since 1993 (see Heddebaut 2001; Ehlers et al. 2001). This process is referred to as the de-bordering in and of Dover. State-sponsored de-bordering processes in border towns like Dover contribute to a reduction in employment in occupations traditionally associated with the ‘industry’ of the border, e.g., the march at the port (Cassidy et al. 2018). Since the so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and especially the Brexit vote in 2016, Dover has been re-imagined as a potent symbol of the British national border, especially by far-right groups (Wood 2020).

Dover events have been mediated by social media posts and profiles of far-right groups where far-right organisations and individuals organised on social media platforms to plan their physical protests and violent acts in Dover against refugees and migrants that may potentially reach the port and to inflict fear on immigrants who might plan to reach the UK. Social media platforms afford opportunities to far right groups and their anti-immigrant mobilisation, such as these groups' calls to urgently arrive in Dover in order to prevent the refugee intake and inflict violence on the new arrivals. Most of these groups migrated to less regulated social media platforms such as Telegram and Gab (Nouri et al. 2021, Ferenczi, Ozduzen, Holmes and Liu 2021). However, Facebook still largely allows far right presence and visibility on its platform, such as the Pembrokeshire Patriot's recent call and event on their Facebook profile in April 2021. The most recent far right protests in May 2021 in Dover were organised through a Facebook page entitled "Pembrokeshire Patriot" with the text "Protect Our Borders. Dover Demo Sat 29th May 1pm". The public Facebook page describes the protests as a "demo against illegal immigration" (Lennon 2021). Dover as a town has thus become a hotspot of anti-refugee and far-right political action and violence in the UK since the heightened moment of the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, especially through consistent beach patrols and demonstrations organised via social networking sites.

Macro factors

Dover's transformation into a hotspot of radicalisation owes to the wider anti-immigration policy in the UK and EU in the aftermath of the so-called refugee crisis. Our WP5.1 report (Ferenczi, Ozduzen, Holmes and Liu 2021) has shown how the mainstream media, specifically the mid-market and tabloid newspapers in the UK, have framed extreme right-wing ideas and ideologies with positive attributes, for example the Daily Mirror's framing of the perpetrator of the Christchurch attacks in New Zealand as an "angelic boy" that turned into a terrorist (Hellyer 2019). The partisan stance of the mainstream media in the UK facilitates the formation of far-right echo-chambers.

Whilst the refugee "crisis" in European Union and United Kingdom dates to the summer of 2015, migration has been the most important theme dominating the campaign for the "Brexit" referendum in June 2016. This theme culminated in the strong anti-immigration rhetoric from the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) leader, Nigel Farage, followed by a rise in reported racist hate crimes in the UK in the post-Brexit vote context (Bennett 2018), where the immigration policy in the UK has increasingly become restrictive across all visa routes, especially the high-skilled, low-skilled and general routes. This tightening of immigration policy began with the new Labour Party leader and prime minister Gordon Brown (2007-2010), who from a populist perspective attempted to mitigate the electoral risk of Labour's openness towards work migration. In this framework, Brown pledged to "create British jobs for British workers" (Consterdine & Hampshire 2020). This understanding has been extended and bolstered by the subsequent Conservative Party governments in power in the 2010s (2010 - present), leading to the Brexit and post-Brexit environments of strict border securitisation and restricted immigration routes, which directly resulted in many alarming events. These disturbing events included the Windrush Scandal, where hundreds of Commonwealth citizens who moved to the UK from the Caribbean countries between 1948 and 1973 have been wrongly detained and/or denied legal rights (JCWI n.d.).

Furthermore, The UK asylum system is controlled to the greatest extent and it is very complex, creating difficulties for people seeking asylum to provide the evidence required to be granted protection where the decision-making process is tough and many people's claims are rejected. Currently the UK is home to 1% of the 26.4 million refugees who are forcibly displaced (Refugee Council n.d.). While mostly the developing countries look after the 86% of the refugees in the world, anti-immigrant and anti-refugee rhetoric, political action and policy-making have swept across Europe and the UK, especially since the so-called refugee crisis in 2015. The overall 'crisis' discourse has de-legitimised cultural diversity, whilst dehumanising migrants in the UK. The UK's response to the humanitarian crisis in Calais and the Mediterranean have been through a distant or non-proximate approach by increasing securitisation at the borders and outsourcing border controls, where Britain has consistently maintained a position of exceptionalism, opting out of EU agreements on free movement, asylum and immigration and the removal of illegal migrants even before the UK exited the European Union (Ibrahim and Haworth 2018).

The border securitisation also includes the UK's agreements and relationship with France. In September 2014, the French interior minister Bernard Cazeneuve and his British counterpart Theresa May signed a bilateral agreement 'including a British contribution of 5 million euros per year for three years' to 'strengthen security, both around the port and in the port area. In January 2018, the strengthening of the border was again addressed by the Sandhurst Treaty by president Macron and the then prime minister Theresa May. The provisions of this treaty included an additional €50 million contribution from the UK for fencing, CCTV and detection technology in Calais and other ports, and the setting up of a joint information and coordination centre for police in Calais (IRR European News Team 2020). The securitisation of the borders in Calais and Dover and the racialised party politics and public opinion added to the tense majority-minority relationships (Brits vs migrants and refugees).

To provide context on the refugee camps on the UK and France border zones, the Red Cross built the Sangatte refugee camp near Calais in 1999, as a response to asylum seekers fleeing wars specifically in the Balkans as well as in other places. In 2002, the camp was closed but some asylum seekers remained in the area. Despite being closed down, this camp has continued to attract migrants planning to reach the UK, using deadly routes. In the aftermath of the Syrian revolution and war as well as other conflicts in the Middle East, the UK has strengthened its border security at the French-UK border. In October 2016, the Calais migrant camp (referred to as Calais Jungle), hosted 7000 migrants. Despite the closure of Sangatte refugee camp and the clearance of the Calais Jungle, deadly channel crossings have continued regularly since 2018 (Walsh 2020). In July and August 2020, the deadly channel crossings reached a new peak (see Figure 2).

In the decrease in the legal routes to reach the UK, migrants have increasingly used various "illegal" routes to enter the UK from Belgium and France, such as hiding in lorries and other transportation vehicles or in small aircraft. 3,226 people attempting to cross the English Channel from Calais, Dunkirk and other places in small boats have reached the UK since 2018 (Migration Watch UK 2020). In June 2000, Dover witnessed the death of 58 Chinese migrants in a lorry coming from a ferry from Belgium. In recent years, the increasing securitisation approach related to borders has also led to many other tragic events in the UK, for example the Essex lorry deaths where the bodies of 39 Vietnamese people were found in the trailer of

a refrigerator lorry in October 2019. In trying to reach the UK, nearly 200 people have died since 1999 (IRR European News Team 2020).




Figure 2. Channel crossings by migrants in small boats between 2018-2020.

Hotspot 3: Anti-BLM protest in London on June 13th 2020

Micro factors

Insight into the micro-level factors of the anti-BLM march in London can be found in some of the candid interviews given by attendees on the day of the march (PoliticsJOE, 2020) which show an individual-level perceived sense of injustice of the tagging and destruction of symbols of British culture, a colour-blind approach to racism, the dismissal of systemic prejudice, and an overlap between personal and social identities. In their interviews, attendees implicitly suggested that those who would seek the statue's removal supported fascist causes and were betraying the country by questioning whether "without the war, would they want Adolf Hitler's descendants looking after us? This is democracy and this is what it's supposed to be, a democracy." (PoliticsJOE, 2020). This link between maintaining the hegemonic white British perspectives and democracy serves to dismiss criticism and nuanced historical interpretations, and further conceptualises British identity and history as a rigid form to which any revision is perceived as an existential threat. It also represents a moral absolutist individual perspective which effectively separates the attendees from others and defines their ideology as just. The narrative of guarding monuments reflects concerns of honour, which can

be conceptualised as a form of reputational defense at both individual and group level (Uskul, Cross, Sunbay, Gercek-Swing, Ataca, 2012). Although the perceived injustice did not occur at a micro level, through national identity, honour can be linked with the personalisation of national threats (Barnes, Brown, Lenes, Bosson, & Carvallo, 2014). Because it the main theme of this march was the defence of British identity and culture, one can infer that attendees all highly identified with British national culture. In this way, national identity served as a mechanism through which greater preoccupation with honour was associated with making the damage to statues a personal individual threat.

Additionally, during the march, banners were presented which stated "all lives matter", however, it is very important to take into perspective that all of the individuals who participated in the anti-BLM movement were mainly all white males (Campbell, 2020). Many of the attendees also consumed large amounts of alcohol, starting in the morning (Casciani, 2020). As mentioned, the problems underlying racism might not be taken into view as the reason for the BLM movement was to highlight the inequalities that people of colour are facing. Individuals who do not experience day-to-day discrimination would be unlikely to understand the problems yet possess an unconscious bias, shaping the larger stereotypical narratives within society which minimise Black lived experiences. Attendees at the anti-BLM march stated that their actions, despite the march having been organised directly as a result of the BLM protests that had taken place the previous week, had "nothing to do with colour, creed", and that "this has turned into a slavery issue from some bloke dying by a corrupt policeman". This minimisation of the death of George Floyd and the statement that they do not see colour are examples of the myth of colour blindness, which is the belief that race is no longer a factor that shapes the life experiences of others (Bonilla-Silva, 2003). In this way, individuals describe and justify persistent racial inequalities in non-racial terms whilst policies and practices continue to disadvantage people of colour. Two attendees overtly discussed colour-blindness by stating that "I didn't see any colour, I see a man die by a corrupt policeman" with one saying "stop with the colour, stop it". This highlights the actions of the protesters and the actors who mainly claim to protect the national heritage but tends to forget that Great Britain is not solely built by white individuals, but individuals from diverse cultural and racial backgrounds. Importantly, attendees positioned themselves as not only defenders of British history and identity, but also peacekeepers, in opposition to BLM supporters, "because every time you say Black Lives matter you are putting a divide in between us all, you are being racist".

Collectively, the shared interviews and online discourse around this event demonstrate an overlap between micro, meso, and macro levels vis-a-vis identity. Identity fusion is a visceral feeling of oneness with one's referent group - in this case other attendees at the protest and members of far-right groups (Swan, Jetten, Gomez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012). Individuals with identity fusion have a porous membrane between their person and social selves, which allows them to channel personal agency into group behaviour and to perceive the group through both the social self and the personal self. These two mutual processes engender a strong bond with one's social group. Thus, meso factors (such as the destruction of statues) and macro factors (such as the BLM movement and an increased focus on systemic prejudice and inequality) were experienced on an individual level.

Meso factors

Although several cases of discrimination issues against people of colour were brought up such as the rising movement of BLM due to the murder of George Floyd, the messages seemed to be ignored by attendees. There are multiple reasons behind the engagement of far-right groups in the anti-BLM protest. Several social groups would have different opinions towards the protest. One of the arguments against the BLM movement was to protect the cultural heritage and the historical identity of Britain, which led to a community that emphasised on protecting the statues of previous leaders such as Winston Churchill. In context, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, a far-right activist, known as Tommy Robinson claimed that the reason for their protest was to “defend our memorials” on Parliament Square, in response to the BLM Movement (Sabbagh & Dodd 2020). However, the intention behind the tagging and destruction of statues in the BLM protests was to highlight systemic inequalities which lead to dominating historical narratives, social stereotypes, and negative perceptions of people of colour, particularly within the context of British identity and culture. However, the main ideology of the far-right to protect the British landmarks and its historic tradition shows the differences in interpreting the main message of the BLM movement whereby racism as a social and political problem was neglected.

Although attendance to the march was not limited to official members of far-right groups, it was organised by the DFLA, and both Britain First and EDL groups were present. The DFLA was formed in 2017 following the Islamist attacks in the UK as a street-protest movement. The aim of the DFLA was to unite rival football group supporters against Islamist extremism and perceived Islamist threats to British values, culture, and way of life in a counter-jihad movement (Allen, 2019). The DFLA is unique to other far-right groups in that it draws on a shared group identity centring on football (Allen, 2019). The EDL is a far-right Islamophobic socio-political movement which has used social networks effectively to recruit members, mobilise forces for protests and patrols, and share its ideology (Allen, 2011). Britain First has synthesised the approaches of both the EDL and the BNP by practicing ‘Christian patrols’ and submitting candidates for elections, respectively, but is more militaristic and overtly confrontational (Allen, 2014). The boundaries between these groups are porous, with members often moving between groups or identifying with more than one group. In the case of mobilisation for the anti-BLM march, these far-right groups created a shared narrative of patriotic unity through multiple online channels and social media affordances such as hashtags (e.g., #AllLivesMatter). The anti-BLM march also demonstrated the increasingly racist ideology of these far-right UK groups, as Paul Golding, the leader of the Britain First party questioned “Why should we have a communist terrorist mass murderer in the capital city of England? It doesn’t make any sense,” when asked about the Nelson Mandela statue on Parliament square, and urged its removal on account of it not being like the “rest of them [which] are our historical heritage” (Campbell, 2020).

Macro factors

As the capital city of England, London is the seat of political, economic, and symbolic power. It is also the region with the highest ethnic diversity in England and Wales, with 40% of its residents ascribing their identity as Asian, Black, Mixed, or Other (UK Government, 2020). London’s multicultural identity is historic despite some of the more contemporary discourse which has claimed it as a new narrative (Sandhu, 2003). London has often been positioned

as the multicultural centre in the UK, which has been co-opted in right-wing narratives as a symbol of division from the political, wealthy, and educated elite. For example, London was one of the epicentres of BLM protests and marches in May-June 2020, and the first UK BLM protest was held in London.

Indeed, offline large-scale events, such as the BLM protests, play an integral role in shifting collective online identities in the far-right, and can serve to bolster a sense of purpose (Bliuc, Betts, Vergani, Iqbal, & Dunn, 2019). The tagging and destruction of statues, as well as the increased public discourse following the death of George Floyd could have served as a catalyst for the reinvigoration of collective far-right identities and ideologies. Relatedly, the perception that institutions had failed were also factors in the organisation of the anti-BLM march. Protesters voiced their frustration with formal channels of protection, stating that they had travelled to London because the police have done nothing about it, we've come here because they won't look after them [the statues]" (PoliticsJoe, 2020).

The institutionalisation of Islamophobia by the political elite and media (Gilks 2020) is also a macro factor for the overt expression of racism in the anti-BLM march because it reinforces right-wing ideologies through placing the West in opposition to Islam (Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2019). The minimisation of right-wing political violence and the amplification of Islamist threats perpetuates racial and religious hierarchies and disseminates the seeds of white superiority (Busby, 2018) which emerged in the anti-BLM march. This is reflected in the claim reported by the representative of Britain First that approximately two-thirds (5,000) of its members joined the Conservative Party in support of the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson's and the Foreign Secretary, Priti Patel's hard-line approaches to migration and "radical Islam" (Corbishley, 2019).

Facilitating factors

Hotspot 1: The Murder of MP Jo Cox in West Yorkshire

The most obvious facilitating factor in the murder of Jo Cox in West Yorkshire hotspot is the downplaying of the threat of right-wing extremism by successive British Home Secretaries (Ozduzen et al., 2021). The UK's main anti-radicalisation programme, Prevent, has explicitly focused on Islamist extremism, despite the rise in right-wing referrals to the programme, especially in the North of the country, although there are currently acknowledgements of the threat the right-wing poses in the region (Beever, n.d.). This, in part, explains the lack of security provided to MPs such as Jo Cox when in constituency. Further to this, online platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter enable the spread of right-wing material, as do messaging apps like WhatsApp. In fact, Laura Towler, a Yorkshire based far-right YouTuber named as one of the top eight most influential vloggers in the UK, has over two million views on video streaming platform YouTube, despite her complaints about "draconian censorship" (Scott, 2020).

A further facilitating factor for this hotspot is the British Press (Ferenczi et al. 2021). For example, if we examine the coverage of Pakistani Muslim gang child sexual exploitation and compare it to the coverage of white perpetrators, also operating as gangs, it comes to the forefront that a far-right narrative emerges on the British mainstream media. Muslim perpetrators are presented as products of a deviant culture, and headlines in papers such as

The Sun have suggested that victims of such gangs have been failed by a “PC Brigade”, who let abuse continue unchallenged due to the perpetrators’ ethnicity (Stephens, 2019). This same Islamophobic double standard can be seen in reporting on terrorist attacks in the UK; Jo Cox’s murderer was described by The Sun, which is the most commonly read paid newspaper across the UK (Sherwin, 2018), as a “mentally ill loner”. Nevertheless, the two brothers who planned and carried out the Manchester Arena bombings, a Jihadist attack, are described as “sadistic brothers” (Sims, 2016; Cavanagh, 2020). As it could be seen from these two examples, the former’s actions are minimised as an illness whereas the latter’s actions are framed as inhuman by the mainstream British newspapers, illustrated by the Sun.

Hotspot 2: Dover anti-immigration mobilisation in January 2016

The consistent far-right activity in Dover is due mainly to years of deindustrialisation and privatisation in the UK since the Thatcher era (1979-1990), which directly connects the Dover hotspot to the West Yorkshire hotspot. This was followed by the Conservative government’s austerity programmes over the years, leading to increasing poverty, which may lead to alienation from society. Second, Dover far-right mobilisation and violence also represent the grievance of the wider population on and media propaganda of anti-immigration, which informed anti-immigrant policy-making in recent years.

Priti Patel, the current home secretary of the Conservative Party government since 2019, has overseen an immigration policy that has threatened to breach the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as international obligations on rights to dignity and health and the rights and welfare of children, drawing the wrath of several senior officials, promising legislation to ‘deny asylum’ to people using ‘illegal routes’ to enter the UK. The Home Office’s recently increasing securitisation response “to the Channel crossings includes Royal Air Force (RAF) patrols of the Channel, monitoring by naval drones, the appointment of a ‘clandestine Channel threat commander’ with responsibility to make the Channel route ‘unviable’, the trialling of a physical blockade, consideration of a floating wall, or netting to trap boats, consideration of offshore asylum processing centres on Ascension Island, Papua New Guinea, Morocco or Moldova, or using disused ferries as floating asylum centres off the coast” (IRR European News Team 2020).

The common anti-immigrant policy supports the activities in Dover and facilitates the formation of larger far-right groups around the cause. In the Dover far-right protests, refugees and immigrants are blamed for loss of jobs and decrease in the resources, which happen due to years of austerity programmes as well as deindustrialisation in the UK. Additionally, social media platforms such as Instagram, Facebook, YouTube and Telegram have helped the organisation of the protests and their message to be spread in the aftermath of the protests.

Hotspot 3: Anti-BLM march in London June 13th 2020

There were several facilitating factors for the anti-BLM march on June 13th which can be conceptualised as institutional and technological factors. First, during the summer of 2020, figures from the Mayor of London’s Office also accounted for a radical increase in stop and search during the first lockdown particularly in London and black people were ten times more likely to be stopped, forty-three times more when police stops required no ‘reasonable suspicion’ (Webber 2021). The police also used excessive force against black protesters at

BLM protests in the UK, during the summer of 2020 when a global wave of protests took place in the aftermath of the police's murder of George Floyd in USA. #BlackLivesMatter hashtag and social movement surfaced in 2013 as a response to racial segregation and injustices faced by black communities. Along with #BLM hashtag, #AllLivesMatter hashtag and social movements emerged representing the grievances against openly speaking about racism and white supremacy prevalent in Western societies, including the UK.

The second facilitating factor is the use of online channels. This factor is also transnational, as right-wing extremism has been given more freedom online in terms of accessibility to platforms, dissemination of online propaganda, and in organisation of collective action (Europol, 2019) such as the anti-BLM march. The use of online platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as those which have much more flexible moderation guidelines and use encryption such as Gab, Telegram, and VK were particularly important facilitators of this hotspot, especially as it occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic. Thus, the disclosure of the planned activities was limited and socially managed by the organisers and attendees. This made it particularly difficult for authorities to monitor the reach and estimated attendance of the march at a time when national restrictions were in place for large-scale events. Even the reported provocations of this hotspot - the BLM images of statues being tagged and pulled down - were circulated via online channels. In response, far-right groups began mobilising their members across the country using similar online channels. Because this hotspot included the collaboration of several far-right groups, online channels and chat groups were crucial both for individuals posting their intentions for attendance (BBC News, 2020), and for far-right groups to construct a unifying narrative of defending shared (white British) cultural histories and symbols (BBC News, 2020; Campbell, 2020; Sabbagh & Dodd, 2020), as illustrated in Figure 3. Indeed, the leader of the EDL published an online video six days before the march was due to take place to encourage attendance for all those who cared about “our country, our history, our culture, our identity” (Lowles, 2020).



Figure 3. Promotional materials for the anti-BLM march (Lowles, 2020)

Motivational factors to be quantified in the IGAP Coding

Hotspot 1: Murder of Jo Cox in West Yorkshire

Injustice

There is an overwhelming sense of injustice in the region of West Yorkshire, preceding any ethnic tensions in the region. Historically, residents have felt a real sense of deprivation stemming from the North South divide in investment (Bounds, 2015). This deepened following the miners' strikes and eventual colliery closures in the area. As a result, headlines about Muslim grooming gangs and Jihadist attacks have found fertile ground for breeding resentment and the idea that white British people in the region are under attack (West Yorkshire Grooming Gangs Awareness, 2021). In addition, the deprivation in the area means that movements to improve the circumstances of minorities are perceived as a further slight against white working-class citizens.

Alienation

The loss of culture following colliery closures has created towns and villages where once close-knit communities are now set adrift, isolated and alienated from one another. Poor literacy still remains an issue and many have to travel long distances or move to find work, meaning they cannot contribute socially to their hometowns (BBC, 2019). In addition, there is a feeling that politicians in far away Westminster do not listen, or are "traitors" (Cobain et al., 2016).

Grievance

Radicalised individuals in West Yorkshire feel most strongly aggrieved by the Muslim community. We can see this in the language and imagery used in the Grooming Gangs Facebook group, where one commenter shared an image of a person kicking the star and moon of Islam, overlaid with the text "Kick Islam Out of All Countries". However, there is also a sense of grievance regarding all immigrants to the region, who are routinely blamed nationwide for poor employment prospects (Travis, 2016).

Polarisation

The narrative of polarisation in West Yorkshire can also be traced back to the North South divide which created an "us vs them" mentality. We can also see this polarisation in attitudes towards ethnic minorities in the area, which has helped create segregation in areas like Bradford, sometimes referred to as "Bradistan" (Asian Sunday, 2013). The pandemic has highlighted some of these beliefs and the residents of predominantly white areas such as Ilkley complain about this, because of "certain demographics" in Bradford, they have been punished with local lockdowns. In addition, Craig Whittaker, an MP for the West Yorkshire constituency of Calder Valley, claimed that "black, Asian and minority communities" were not taking coronavirus seriously enough and were to blame for rising cases (Harley, 2020).

Hotspot 2: Dover anti-immigration mobilisation in January 2016

Injustice

The far-right protesters in Dover view asylum seekers specifically and immigrants in general as strains to the British economy. Furthermore, these groups identify refugee and immigration intake in the UK as an injustice to the traditional and idealised British values. These protesters

compare the economic cost of refugee and wider immigrant intake in Britain with the poverty of veterans. This example is symbolic of the perceived injustice to the “white British men”, who are conceptualised as the real victims in these protests and beach patrols, rather than people fleeing from wars and conflicts in other parts of the world.

Grievance

Various far-right groups gathered and organised protests in Dover primarily because of their unifying grievance related to the perceived “threat” immigration poses in the UK. These groups believe in “Britain is full” and that “immigrants take our jobs” as well as the increasing belief in “refugees are terrorists”. The ways the far-right groups equate refugees to terrorists accounts for these groups’ grievance against Islam. Far-right groups identify refugees with Jihadist terrorism and radicalisation and they thus mobilise against their arrival to the UK, as in the perception of far-right groups refugees commit crimes in the UK. The arrival of asylum seekers to the UK is perceived by these far-right groups as an invasion of the UK by illegals, who are unsuited to “our” culture.

Alienation

The far-right activities and political mobilisation in Dover between 2016 and 2021 are representative of the wider alienation of white men from society due to increasing poverty, unemployment, lack of social prospects, and the overall decline in social welfare programmes.

Polarisation

In Dover far-right protests since 2016, an “us vs them” mentality is created by the protesters similar to the West Yorkshire hotspot. Some of the slogans during the protests recounted ‘immigrants don't matter’ and ‘veteran's lives matter’ (Kemp 2020). “Veterans” have become a group identifier for the Dover protesters. In addition to the binary opposition placed between veterans vs immigrants, the protesters’ activities and political action rely on a polarised discourse of “Muslim refugees” and “white British”, showing not only the wider impact of anti-immigrant policy-making but also the institutional legitimisation of Islamophobia in Britain over the years.

Hotspot 3: Anti-BLM march London on June 13th 2020

Injustice

When asked about their motivations, some of the protesters stated that they were protecting the historical identity of Britain. Thus, one of the core motivational actors for the organisers and attendees for the anti-BLM march in London was the perceived threat to (white) imperial British culture and history. Specifically, the destruction and tagging of statues of white British men who were historically in seats of power (e.g., Winston Churchill and Edward Colston) was perceived as injustice directed to a cultural group (meso-level), which was internalised as a personal sense of injustice (macro-level), reflected in the discourse used by Tommy Robinson’s invitation to attend for all those who “give a shit about your country, our history, our culture, our identity” (Lowles, 2020). Here we see an overlap between personal identity and individual motivation (to attend the march and protect the statues) with social identities, through the use of “lad” as a group identifier. Additionally, attendees vocalised injustice at an

institutional level through the use of racist discourse such as reverse discrimination, 'no white guilt' and 'white lives matter too'.

Grievance

Grievance by the attendees was directed towards two main targets. First, the perpetrators of the perceived injustice were those who supported and organised BLM causes and marches. There was a conflation of abstract groups such as BLM supporters and activists with 'Antifa' groups, which have been positioned as the antagonists to far-right causes; indeed, some attendees at the anti-BLM march actively looked for 'the Antifa' (Campbell, 2020). This group was perceived as the direct aggressor and threat to British imperial culture and history through the lens of the far-right organisers. Second, institutional systems were perceived as indirect causes of grievance through their lack of inaction to effectively protect against the encroaching threat. For example, attendees attacked police at the march and shouted "You let your country down" (Campbell, 2020), showing the perception of betrayal by law enforcement and the legal system. This reflects wider perceptions of the organisers of the march that the government and political elite have - to a large extent - ineffectively defended what are seen as the dominant and 'true' British histories and identities.

Alienation

Embedded within the grievance and injustice of the damage to the statues as symbols of white power is the perceived alienation from the institutional systems which were previously allies. The anti-BLM march allowed for the affirmation of far-right group identities and values by bringing together attendees from across the country (Lowles, 2020) as a response to alienation from what is perceived as an increasing threat to existing cultural narratives - the BLM movement and from a more general perspective, the threat of suppression of expression through the means of social pressure and assent in the form of 'political correctness' (Reinelt, 2011).

Polarisation

Perceptions of polarisation were used by the organisers and attendees of the anti-BLM march to justify their actions as defenders of cultural values and identities. The anti-BLM march was positioned as a group response to the perceived injustice from an outgroup - BLM supporters. The anti-BLM march highlighted these opposing group memberships and ascribed further meaning to them by conceptualising a conflicting dichotomy of 'true' citizens of the UK as their protectors, and those who support the BLM movement and seek to apply a critical lens to British history as traitors. Indeed, high moral absolutism, or the tendency to attribute right/wrong judgements to others and simplification of complex phenomena is linked with more white identitarian beliefs - strong identification and solidarity white culture and the equation of Western culture with whiteness (Moss & O'Connor, 2020). Thus, moral absolutism may function as one mechanism through which polarisation is justified in the far-right.

Conclusions

This report identified the ways white supremacist, Islamophobic and anti-immigrant ideologies facilitate the formations of different hotspots perpetrated by sole actors (Hotspot 1),

communities (Hotspot 2), and a mixture of far-right groups working together (Hotspot 3). These hotspots occurred in urban and rural areas in the UK. Drawing on collective constructions of place-identity (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000), the report showed how geographic locations of West Yorkshire, Dover, and London have functioned as anchors for idealised British identities, values and histories, which have been co-opted by the far-right organisations and individuals in their mobilisation towards political violence. While far-right organisations and groups encompass many different ideologies today, the hotspots in the UK show the unifying trends, ideologies, and pathways of far-right radicalisation in the UK. Neoliberal ideology since Thatcher's era including privatisation and de-industrialisation and the rise of neo-colonial policies and tendencies such as "British jobs for the British" have created and bolstered the far-right hotspots of radicalisation – from murder of those that are perceived to be traitors to the UK, to protests centring on borders and perceived threats to resources, to organised violent marches against perceived threats to values and narratives of a lack of support from institutions. The report has covered rural-urban, North-South, economically thriving-stagnating, and interior-liminal dimensions to illustrate the ways far-right ideologies facilitate the creation of group identities and divisions in current British society, which facilitate extremist demonstrations and violent attacks on streets.

While Dover anti-refugee protests, the murder of Jo Cox in West Yorkshire, or the anti-BLM protest in London may appear to constitute an anomalous or exclusive cycle of events, these far-right activities and political mobilisation have acted as a facilitator of the mainstreaming of far-right ideas and ideologies in Britain. These far-right ideologies and political action represented by the abovementioned events in the report resonate with the Conservative Party's racism denying and anti-immigrant policies in recent years (e.g. Sewell Report in 2021). The recent hotspots of radicalisation in the UK unveil the white men's alienation from society, as well as their grievances and perceived injustices vis-a-vis minorities, women and migrants. Additionally, these hotspots uncover the polarised discourses of far-right groups in the UK, mirroring the wider polarised discourse worlds of right-wing groups beyond the British context.

In addition to showing how geographical locations of West Yorkshire, Dover and London are crucial for the creation and maintenance of identity in the UK, the report has also accounted for the impact and roles of social media platforms in facilitating far-right protests in these symbolic places, whilst mentioning the roles mainstream British media play in the mainstreaming of far-right ideologies. From the popular videos taken by Nigel Farage in Dover to widely shared Islamophobic posts on Facebook in West Yorkshire, from hashtags such as #AllLivesMatter to Instagram posts by British Hand, social media posts and profiles act as drivers of radicalisation in amplifying narratives of group and personal threat across temporal and geographic distance. On this report, we have shown how meso and macro factors are intertwined in facilitating far-right violence in the UK. The perceived economic and social injustices and alienation of white men from society constitute common motivational factors for different types of far-right radicalisation in West Yorkshire, Dover and London.

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Annex: I-GAP Coding

Hotspot 1: The Murder of MP Jo Cox in West Yorkshire

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	3
Comments to Q1	
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	3
Comments to Q2	
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	5
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	2
Comments to Q4	
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	4
Comments to Q5	

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	3
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	4
Comments to Q2	
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	2
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	3
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	4
Comments to Q5	

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	3
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	4

Comments to Q2	
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	4
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	4
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	2
Comments to Q5	

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	2
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	4
Comments to Q2	
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	2
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	2
Comments to Q4	
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	1
Comments to Q5	

Hotspot 2: Dover anti-immigration mobilisation in January 2016

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	4
Comments to Q1	
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	5
Comments to Q2	
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	5
Comments to Q3	

Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	4
Comments to Q4	
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	5
Comments to Q5	

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	3
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	3
Comments to Q2	
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	3
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	3
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	2
Comments to Q5	

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	4
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	2
Comments to Q2	
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	3
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	3
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	3
Comments to Q5	

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	2
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	4
Comments to Q2	

Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	2
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	4
Comments to Q4	
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	5
Comments to Q5	

Hotspot 3: Anti-BLM march in London June 13th 2020

Injustice Coding

Q1. To what extent the hotspot is a response to injustice?	2
Comments to Q1	
Q2. To what extent was the actor motivated by a real or perceived systemic bias or prejudice which leads to consistently unfair treatment?	2
Comments to Q2	
Q3. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of redistribution?	2
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of recognition?	5
Comments to Q4	
Q5. To what extent the injustice is linked to issues of representation?	5
Comments to Q5	

Grievance Coding

Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	5
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How extensive and diverse is the list of grievances?	4
Comments to Q2	
Q3. How personal is the grievance?	4
Comments to Q3	

Q4. How formalized is the demand to address the grievance?	5
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How realistic are the prospects to address the grievance?	3
Comments to Q5	
Q1. How specific is the experienced grievance?	5

Alienation Coding

Q1. How specific and central is the sense of alienation?	3
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How voluntary is the process of alienation?	1
Comments to Q2	
Q3. How complete is the alienation?	3
Comments to Q3	
Q4. How entrenched is the alienation?	2
Comments to Q4	
Q5. How reversible is the sense of alienation?	3
Comments to Q5	

Polarisation Coding

Q1. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized?	2
Comments to Q1	
Q2. How high is the perceived level of the polarization?	3
Comments to Q2	
Q3. To what extent do the actor's opinions radically contrast with the institutions (political, religious, cultural) and policies that are currently in place?	2
Comments to Q3	
Q4. To what extent does the actor consider the political field to be polarized as compared with the social sphere?	4
Comments to Q4	
Q5. Did the actor consider their radical positions to have a clear outlet on the institutional, cultural, or political spectrum prior to the hotspot?	3
Comments to Q5	

