



Stakeholders of (De)- Radicalisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

D3.1 Country Report

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Adnan Pečković, Jasmin Jašarević – PRONI
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Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at: jjasarevic@gmail.com; a.peckovic@gmail.com

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About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

Executive summary/Abstract

This report examines the main radicalisation and de-radicalisation processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including main influences of certain individuals, institutions and groups who influencing these processes. It will also discuss types of radicalism that has been recorded in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2001 and what are the main drivers of radicalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This report also includes information on who are the main actors of radicalisation and de-radicalisation processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including political influence of certain political parties and their relationship towards existing radical (extremist) groups active in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As this report will show, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we witness two types of radicalism with different ideological influence. One of them is the religiously motivated radicalism (mostly Islamic) and the other is ethno-nationalistically oriented radicalism that is present in political expression and among some ethno-nationalistic radical groups. Throughout this report we will see that radicalism, especially the ethno-nationalistically oriented type, is structural in the sense that it has its roots in political parties and that it is institutionalized through social institutions, such as educational institutions, presented through their curriculums.

This report will also talk about the efforts officials and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina on different levels have implemented, in order to combat radicalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as producing and implementing strategy and action plan for combating terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will also show change and the efficiency of certain laws that were changed after producing strategy and action plan for combating terrorism.

1. Introduction

This report is designed to provide certain analyse and inform you about current radicalisation and de-radicalisation processes and events in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the year 2001. We see this year (the year of attack on WTC) as a starting point of major radicalism events in the world, but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its main aim is to delineate main radicalisation and de-radicalisation actors and efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

What is meant by radicalisation in this report is a process involving the increasing rejection of established law, order, and politics and the active pursuit of alternatives, in the form of politically-driven violence or justification of violence. By de-radicalisation we mean processes countering such rejection at individual (micro), organisational (meso), or societal (macro) levels resulting in a shift from violent to nonviolent strategies and tactics.

We believe that in effort to describe radicalisation and de-radicalisation processes, it is very important to put it in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to understand these events and processes better, and, eventually, even produce a proper response to radicalisation.

According to previous research (Dušanić 2020, Pečković 2018, Bećirević 2018) we are able to observe two major types of radicalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- Right-wing radicalism that manifest itself in the form of radical and nationalistic political discourse and narrative, but also in forming different extremist and violent groups that undertake violent actions in order to produce fear amongst people of different nationality.
- Religiously oriented (mostly Islamic) radical groups

At this point it is important to mention that, there are no information on organised left-wing groups or any extremist or terrorist behaviour connected with this kind of groups.

In the contextual background we will give some information on context of Bosnia and Herzegovina and some of the experience that Bosnia and Herzegovina had with radical groups or individuals. We will also mention political discourse and discriminatory practices that contribute to radicalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the Structures of radicalisation part of the report we will discuss political violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the perception of radicalism by the political elites and general public. The chapter on agents and channels of radicalisation part of the report will contain information on main agents of radicalisation, as well as their socio-political and ideological background. In the section related to the stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation, we will describe state and non-state organisations and programmes involved in de-radicalisation.

Main sources of the report will be academic work of different authors involved in radicalisation research, reports of organisations and institutions dealing with radicalism and media reports.

2. Contextual background

In the recent years political spectrum in the world has shifted right, which made it possible for different radical extremist groups to be formed and to plan, as well as to implement terrorist attacks in different regions in Europe, such as the attacks we have witnessed in Germany, Belgium, France and elsewhere. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country that has pass through the war (1992–1995) and as a country with still remaining ethnic tensions is a fertile ground for different kinds of radical and extremist ideologies and movements.

High unemployment (33.6%), ethno-nationalistic political discourse, ethnically segregated education (three ethnic curriculums: Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian), ethnically homogeneous territories, and institutional corruption, have all contributed to growing radicalism, especially amongst young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is estimated by ICSR that 330 citizens have participated in Syrian war under ISIS (Azinović & Jusić, 2015). According to the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina no Bosnians have gone to Syria as fighters since 2015, but the security threat is now represented in the once, because that are returning from fighting regions and they are militarily trained now (Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for preventing and combating terrorism 2015 – 2020, 2015).

Some of the terrorist attacks that happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the attack on the American embassy in Sarajevo by Mevlid Jašarević in 2011 who was convicted to 15 years in jail, Nerđin Ibrić who attacked police station in Zvornik (town in north–east Bosnia), in 2007 we had a conviction of a person with initials M.B. who planned a terrorist attack on a target somewhere in Europe, in 2008 we had an attack on the trading centre FIS in Vitez and other (see Appendix 1).

The roots of the problem with Salafi extremism can be traced back to the war time when mujahedeen fighters came to Bosnia and Herzegovina fighting on the side of Bosnian army. Some of them have decided to stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina and have produced settlements which are under suspicion to be organising spots for terrorist attacks in Bosnia and Herzegovina and wider. Even though officially the Mujahedin unit that belonged to the third corps of Bosnian army was dissolved international community demanded that foreign fighters leave Bosnia and Herzegovina which most of them did, but still there are suspicions that some that remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina form training camps for foreign fighters. One of them was an alleged training camp at the Jablanicko Lake, which is about 45 minutes driving from Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital (Numanovic, 2001). Even though, Salafi movements have after the war formed communities in remote parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Gornja Maoča, Ošve, Bočinje, Dubnica, and Liješnica), recreantly this movement has spread also in urban parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Even though most of the research has focused on Islamic radical groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Innes 2006, Metodieva 2021, Azinović 2013, Azinović & Jusić 2015) we believe that it is important to focus also on some other ethno-nationalistic radical groups, who are equally radicalised as Islamic groups. Some of the examples are: Chetnik (Serbian nationalistic organisation) gatherings in Višegrad (eastern Bosnia) (see Appendix 1) and Serbian Honour (Serbian nationalistic organisation), whose member have fought in recent war in the Ukraine on the side of Russian forces. Several local media are reporting on, among other, Croatian nationalistic and even fascist symbols on football fields in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Some of the examples are fans of football club Zrinjski from Mostar and fans of football club Široki Brijeg Škripari. One of the examples is when football club Zrinjski fans saluted to Marko Radić who was a member of Croat army units in Bosnia and Herzegovina and convicted to nine years in prison because of forming a concentration camp for Bosniaks (Raport, 2020). It is also common to see Swastikas or symbols of Croatian army from WWII among members of this group.

Constitutional arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the product of Dayton peace Agreement, which has stopped the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but has also cemented almost ethnically clean territories that are mostly based on the military line divisions from the war. Bosnia and Herzegovina has today the consociation democracy that gives lots of political power to different ethnicities, but gives very little power to individual (citizen). According to Mujkić (2010) this as alone is not a problem, but the problem is the “discrimination practice that is produced and relies on the principle that ethnic homogeneity is a guarantor for stability of political community” (p.8).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina we have been witnessing number of discriminatory policies that have the potential to radicalise individuals or groups. One of such policies is a decision of Ministry of Education in the Republic of Srpska to name Bosnian language in into Bosniak language. In some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina this has produced resistance amongst Bosniak population. The resistance was the strongest in Konjević Polje (eastern Bosnia) when parents decided to remove their children from school. This issue has not been resolved till today (Aljazeera Balkans, 2019).

Information gained from the research “Resilient Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Guest, Machlouzaride & Scheerder, 2020) show us that citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are still leaning towards ethno-nationalism. It argues that “ethno - nationalist narratives enjoy high support across the three main ethnic groups and play a pivotal role in processes of violent citizenship” and that “across Bosnia and Herzegovina, intergroup relations are lukewarm, although there are some areas with alarmingly high levels of tension” (p. 6). This research also suggests that active ethno-nationalist constitute 14.5 % of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and passive ethno-nationalist constitute 15.6 % of Bosnian population. Active ethno– nationalist are described as “fertile ground for recruitment” and passive ethno– nationalist are described as “disengaged and under strain”. The same research argues that active Anti-Ethno nationalists constitute 15.3 % of Bosnian population and passive ones 14.7 %.¹

We see here that according to above mentioned research 30% of Bosnian population has active or passive ethno-nationalistic tendencies which create tensions and social distance

¹ What according to above mentioned research constitutes an active ethno nationalist is violent civic behaviour, aggression, highest trust in political parties and religiosity. Passive ethno nationalist is described as a person that is of low level of civic violent behaviour, high level of economic stress, disagrees with entity (Republic of Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) integration and low level of civic responsibility and awareness. Active anti-ethno nationalist are described as people who have high sense of civic responsibility and civic awareness, are resilient against ethno nationalism, but not against violent citizenship, support multi-ethnic politics and entity integration. Passive anti-ethno nationalist are described as cooperative, empathetic, low aggression, mistrust political parties and NGOs, harmonious with all ethnic groups and resilient against ethno nationalist ideology.

amongst citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This also leads us to believe that, especially people who fall under the category of active ethno-nationalist are in danger to involve themselves in some of the active violent and extremist groups that functioning in Bosnia and Herzegovina or, under the right circumstances even form new ones.

From the above mention, we can see that we have two different types of radicalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have the religiously motivated one, where certain members of Salafi community stand out and commit violent acts of terrorism, and on the other hand, we are witnessing ethno nationalistically motivated radicalism embodied in Serb and Croatian nationalistic groups involved in promoting ideologies present in WWII, more specifically Chetnik and Ustaša politics from the WWII. Mevlid Jašarević has attacked the American Embassy in Sarajevo as a symbol of U.S.A. the enemy of Muslims, which indicates also an ideological context of religiously motivated terrorists that is similar for M.B. arrested for planning a terrorist attack in Europe, since the European Union is perceived as an ally of United States in war against Muslims.

3. Structures of radicalisation

“Country Reports on Terrorism” (2019) describes Bosnia and Herzegovina as “cooperative counterterrorism partner and continued to increase its CT capacity in 2019” but “extremist ideology and regional nationalist groups remain potential sources of terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (p.68). Religiously related extremism and terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has changed after the September 11th, by being led by foreign fighters that came to Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war in order to being locally organised. According to Azinović (2013) this was mostly a product of official attitude change of Bosnian authorities towards foreign fighters in Bosnia. In the latter years many “Mujahedeen” have lost Bosnian citizenship and had to leave the country, but the ideology remained present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The official organisation Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina has never approved Selefi organisations, so in the year 2005 they form their NGO that could have become a parallel Islamic Community “but the people who have supported our cause with money did not support the idea to form a parallel Islamic Community and endanger the already existing one” (Turčalo & Veljan, 2018).

3.1. Data and trends on radicalisation

Since 2002 Bosnia and Herzegovina has experienced six terrorist attacks that are attributed to “Islamic terrorists” (Zvijerac, 2020). In those attacks seven people have died and over 50 have been wounded. According to the Global Terrorism 2020 (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020) reports that terrorism influence Bosnia and Herzegovina and it ranks 95th from 135 countries that participated in the research.

Mevlid Jašarević who has attacked a U.S. embassy in Sarajevo in 2011, was wounded during the attack, but has, also, wounded a police officer that was on the scene during the attack. Mevlid was convicted to 15 years in jail. It is important to mention that he was a member of Wahabi movement associated with Gornja Maoča (Village in North – East Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Appendix 1) Mevlid Jašarević has in the video message explained the

reasons of the attack: “I don’t have to explain why I attack Americans. They are fighting Islam and Muslims all over the world. They kill Muslims and rape their women. Americans, together with Serbs and Croats are preparing new massacre over Muslims” (Huseinović, 2013). Nerdin Ibrić has in the year 2015 attacked a police station in Zvornik (town in east Bosnia and Herzegovina) and during the attack killed one police officer and wounded two. He was killed by police during the attack (see Appendix 1). His associate Abdulah Hasanović was previously arrested with 14 other associates as a suspect for financing and encouraging others to commit terrorist activities and participate in Syrian war. Suvad Đidić was convicted to 9 years in jail for planting a bomb in Trading centre FIS in Vitez where one security guard was killed and 8 people was wounded. One of the worst terrorist attacks happened in Bugojno (town in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina) when a group of radical Islamists planted a bomb at the police station in Bugojno. One police officer died and 6 people were wounded. According to the court verdict main organiser of the attack was Haris Čaušević. He was accused of wanting to make a pressure to Bosnian institutions and to enforce a fear in Bosnian population (see Appendix 1).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina politically motivated terrorist attacks have also been recorded. One of the examples is an attack on Adisa Omerbegović-Arapović, member of political party Union for a Better Future (SBB) from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2018. During this attack her car was burned down near her residence in Sarajevo. She stated that this was an attack organised by the regime mafia (Klix, 2018). Another example was an attack on a journalist of radio-television of Bijeljina, Vladimir Kovačević in 2018 in front of his home in Bijeljina. He was attacked by two persons, had severe injuries and no group took the responsibility for this attack (Civil Rights Defenders, 2018).

There have also been other attacks on journalists by members of radical groups. Another example is the attack on journalists from N1 TV station during the gathering of Serbian nationalistic organisation “Ravnogorski četnici” (Chetniks from Ravna Gora) in 2016. According to the states of journalists, they were attacked while they filmed gathering by the members of the Organisation near Višegrad (Bosnia and Herzegovina) (N1, 2016). On the video recorded by the attacked journalist you can clearly hear that the reason for the attack is that the N1 television station is based in Sarajevo, and that the attackers believe that the journalist is a Bosniak (Muslim), so the attack is ethno-nationalistically motivated. Another such attack happened in Banja Luka in 2015, when a citizen of Banja Luka, potentially a Serb, attacked journalists from Sarajevo FACE TV (O Kanal, 2015).

According to the Global Terrorism Database 29 terrorist attacks were recorded in Bosnia and Herzegovina in time period from 2001 to 2019, were 8 people have lost their lives and 31 have been injured (GTD, 2021). According to the same database 6 of the attacks are attributed to Muslim Extremist connected to the Salafi movement and other are marked as unknown. Analysing the database we see that 3 of the attacks were targeted to journalists, which indicates that those were politically motivated attacks and 3 attacks were ethno-nationalistically motivated. It is also notable that in 2020 no attacks were recorded. Since 2001 only two years no attacks have been recorded in Bosnia and Herzegovina, year 2004 and 2012. The years with the highest number of attacks in single year was in year 2004 (4 recorded attacks) and 2015 (6 recorded attacks). Year 2015 is the year with high intensity of fights with ISIS in Syria, which could have influenced also radical groups to implement attacks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Last recorded terrorist attack happened in September 2018. It was an attack

on Adisa Omerbegović-Arapović, a member of political party Union for a Better Future (SBB) from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3.2. Perception or radicalisation by the political elite

In the context of mainstream politics and its relation to radical movements and organisations it is obvious that leading politicians undermine the influence of extremists that belong to their ethnic corpus, but have different opinion to organisations that belong to “the other”. The statement of Bakir Izetbegović, a leader of the main Bosniak political party “Party for Democratic Action (SDA), for one local TV station show just that: “For the existence of the community in Gornja Maoča are responsible the people of Gornja Maoča. What did they do? How dangerous is that? I would not like to judge in advance. There are much dangerous things in Bosnia then this, like as referendum on dissolution of Republic of Srpska” (Balkanijum, 2010) Milorad Dodik, current member of Bosnian presidency argued that “there is no information about illegal engaging of “Serbian Honour”, and all that are talking about it have no proof that that is a paramilitary unit”. Catholic Church has organised a mass for victims of Bleiburg, which was, according to Croat nationalists, a war crime of Yugoslav Partisans at the end of the WWII. Jewish community and others have opposed this event, but Croatian Democratic Community (lead Croatian political Party) has supported it.

It is important to mention at this point that there was no record on acknowledging a terrorist threat produced by terrorists from the same ethnic background as the leading politicians. Usually, leading politicians use phrases such as “it will be investigated” or “why don’t they talk about other extremist”, which is notable from the examples mentioned above. Ethno nationalistic political discourse and narrative does not allow presenting “my own” as bad, but only the “other”. Still there is no concrete proof that any political party is cooperating with extremist groups in terms of concrete terrorist activities.

Still, one of the examples of sympathies of Bosnian leading politicians towards nationalistic groups is a photograph of Milorad Dodik (Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina) with Serbian ethno-nationalistic organisation “Serbian Honour” from Serbia from January 2018 (Žurnal, 2018). Members of the same group have been photographed in the People’s Assembly of the Republic of Srpska. According to journalists from web portal “Žurnal”, persons who can be seen sitting in the Assembly were leaders of “Serbian Honour” are Igor Bilbija and Bojan Stojković, who have been previously arrested for organising prostitution and other forms of organised crime. Milorad Dodik has denied any kind of involvement with “Serbian Honour” by saying “Several years ago I have taken a picture on the street and they are making an ideology out of that and they are spreading the rumour that we have paramilitary forces here. It is all coming from SDS (Serbian Democratic Party)” (Istinomjer, 2020). Still, Milorad Dodik never explained what Serbian Honour did in the Assembly of Republic of Srpska.

3.3. Perception of radicalisation by the general public

The Citizens Perception Survey in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vukotić et al, 2017) has found that 54 % of citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina believe that violent religious extremism is a problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina (About 64% of Republic of Srpska citizens believe this is a problem, compared to 48% in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Participants in the

research have labelled religious extremists, local nationalistic extremist and returnees from foreign battle fields as the main threat. In the research “Attitudes on Violent Extremism and Foreign Influence” (IRI, 2017) 71 % of participants have said that they do not support the existence of para-jamaats,² which indicates that they also do not support organisations that form them. 3 % of Bosniaks believe that para-jamaats teach “original and correct version of Islam and same percentage of Bosniaks have positive opinion on people from Bosnia and Herzegovina going to other countries as foreign fighters.

Respondents that have participated in the research “Contemporary youth in Bosnian society: Attitudes and challenges towards radicalism” (Pečković, 2018) implemented by “PRONI” Centre for Youth Development, 82 % of them, have said that hate speech they see on social networks is dedicated to people of other nationality, which indicates strong ethnic tensions amongst young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same research suggests that 4.5 % of young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina believe that there are circumstances where terrorist attacks are justified, for example if your religion or nation is occupied or under attack.

We see in this part of the report that radicalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is very much present and that it takes two major shapes, religiously motivated radicalism and ethno-nationalistically motivated radicalism. The main political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina tend to undermine the radical acts or behaviour committed by “their own peoples” and use the ones committed by “the other” in everyday political purposes as mentioned in examples above. In terms of perception of general public of terrorists and radical organisations, above mentioned research has shown that most of the citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not in favour of such behaviour, in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or in Republic of Srpska. Still, certain percentage of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially young people believe that there are circumstances where terrorist attacks are justified (Pečković, 2018).

4. Agents and channels of radicalisation

4.1. Main agents of radicalisation

Individuals that are accused or prosecuted for being in connection or participating in wars in Syria and Iraq being members of terrorist organisations such as ISIS or other are mostly brought in connection with the Salafi community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of the members of this community live in remote parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina like villages Ošve in Maglaj municipality or Gornja Maoča in Srebrenik municipality. Village Ošve has the most Salafi members who has joined ISIS or some other terrorist organisation in Iraq and Syria. One of the most aims of such individuals is to change the political system in the countries they live in. They propose to introduce the Sharia law so that one Islamic state can function properly. They invite all Muslims that live in non-believer states to immigrate to Islamic state so they could practice Islam fully (Azinović & Jusić, 2015). To this day 40 returnees have been

² Para-jamaats are Islamic communities that are not under the umbrella of official Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Official Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina has invited members of Para-Jamaats to join the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina and close down the unofficial places where they organise prayers (Lovrenovic, 2016).

arrested for participating in different wars as foreign fighter. Around 28 of them have been convicted to time in jail from 1 to 4 years mostly for public incitement to terrorist activities, organising a terrorist group and illegal formation and association of foreign paramilitary formations. It is important to mention that Salafi movement itself has not been prohibited by any authority, but the fact is that all the people convicted belonged to it and followed its belief and principles. As Srđan Puhalo, psychologist from Banja Luka says: "most differences between them come when they talk about Jihad...Most of the members of Salafi movement see, I believe, Jihad as a fight inside them self, but one part of them, I believe those are the ones that went to Syria, spoke of Jihad as fighting the unbelievers" (CIN, 2019).

In the ideological sense members of Salafi movement believe that they are the "real Muslims" and are in conflict with all "non-believers", even with other Muslims. "For Salafists, hakimiyya (sovereignty) means that God is the only legislator and that everyone is obliged to literally follow Sharia to the letter. All forms of change, deviation or renewal are deemed sinful and a denial of truth that requires fighting Shirk (polytheism) and Kuffar (non-believers)" (RAN, 2019).

The leader of Salafi movement, Husein Bilal Bosnić has been convicted in the Court of Low for propaganda activities (speeches in different places and on the internet) and attempted of recruitment and promotion of terrorism. Husein Bilal Bosnić was sentenced to 15 years in jail together with his 15 associates. Muhamed Jusić, Islamic theologian, argues that "Salafi movement is not really a mass movement" and that they are not financed by any official state authority, but "some like minded individuals from the East and the West" (Karabeg, 2010). Salafi movement has been officially rejected by Islamic authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to this date any kind of connection with any political party has not been proven.

Recruiting Bosnian Muslims for war in Syria and other countries is done mostly by Salafi religious leaders such as Husein Bosnić, unofficial leader of Salafi movement in Bosnia. It is estimated that at least six Bosnians that attended Bosnić lectures died in Syria (Sučić, 2015). Organisation like ISIS and similar also use Internet as a recruiting tool. Spechhard and Ellenberg (2020) have noticed the following: "...recruiters utilize methods of swarming and love-bombing, in which those who respond to ISIS recruitment on social media by liking, retweeting, sharing or otherwise endorsing ISIS propaganda messages that are then contacted by ISIS recruiters" (p. 98). One of the protagonists of the documentary movie "The Search" (Potraga), who lived in Gornja Maoča (Salafi village), argues that "his father died when he was 11 years old and that he then received help from Qatar. The help was taken from people from Gornja Maoča and they started to set conditions for the help. The one who receives the help must come to their lectures... Dehumanizing anybody but them" (Potraga, 2019). This is a clear case of ideological indoctrination of a young person who in the future maybe be a fighter wherever is needed. The unofficial leader of the Salfies from Gornja Maoča, Nusret Imamović, was placed on the black list by the Bureau of Counterterrorism (US Department of State), because of his contentions to the al-Nusrah Front (US Department of State, Executive order 13224). He was also a close associate of Husein Bosnić.

In the context of foreign fighters, according to the Ukraine Security Services, around 300 Serbs (from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) were involved in the Ukrainian conflict, mostly in the area of Donbas on the side of Russian paramilitary forces. Ukraine Security Services have notified Serbian authorities about this in 2014, and until 2017 they have not received any

response. In the ideological sense, as some of the fighters have said, Serbs see the Russians as “brothers” and they went to Ukraine to help them. One of the fighters, Radomir Počuča, said for Radio Free Europe the following: “If it wasn’t Russia, there would not be Serbia. We are the same blood, same religion, same people...” (Radio Free Europe, 2017). He was conditionally sentenced in Serbia. Serb fighter that went to Ukraine to fight argues that that region was once a Serb town called “Slavjenoserbsk”. That was sometime in the 18 Century.

According to state Agency for Investigations and Protection (SIPA) at this stage there are 16 organisations that function under the Serb ethno-nationalist ideology which originates in the Chetnik movement from the WWII. During the WWII Chetniks presented themselves as the army of the Serbian king who fled to England. They were a Serbian nationalistic army who cooperated with NAZI Germany and are responsible for numerous war crimes during the WWII. During the last war they were closely tied to the leadership of Republic of Srpska who were members of Serbian Democratic Party. Annually there is a gathering of members and sympathizers of these movements in Višegrad (Bosnia and Herzegovina) where one can see the entire folklore specific for the Chetniks in the WWII, including songs, uniforms and other. One of the songs that could be heard in Višegrad during the gathering in 2019: “There will be hell again and bloody Drina, here come the Chetniks from Serbian mountains” (Rovčanin & Sorguč, 2021).

It is important to mention that all these movements are legally registered in Republic of Srpska as NGOs and currently, all though police structures are investigating these organisations, there is no official effort to shut them down. This can indicate that these ethno-nationalistic organisations enjoy certain amount of support from leading politicians in Republic of Srpska. Official narrative of political elites in this Bosnian entity is that Chetniks were during the WWII anti – fascist military organisation, just like the communists. What is also notable is during the anniversaries of the day of forming Republic of Srpska groups of, mostly young people, carry signs and badges of the Chetnik movement. There is no record of anyone being arrested or removed as the consequence of showing such signs.

4.2. State-driven radicalisation

Official politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina with its main ethno –nationalistic narrative is mostly dedicated to ethnic homogenization of Bosnian people and keeping ethnically clean territories by using the narrative of “otherness”. In that sense political structures are supporting, maybe not violent actions (openly), but the extremism. One of the cases is the case of Fata Orlović (Konjević Polje, Republic of Srpska – Bosnia and Herzegovina). During the war an Orthodox Church was built in her backyard. After 20 years of struggle on different courts, this Church will be removed from her back yard after the decision of European Court. The Church will be removed to Bratunac (Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Sekulić, 2020). The state Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees states that there is no political will in Republic of Srpska to remove the Church from the backyard of Fata Orlović. The residents in Konjević Polje are mostly Bosniak returnees, which feel that their ethnic and religious rights are violated by not removing this church that could lead to radicalisation and violent behaviour.

Another event is connected with Bosnian language and its negation by education authorities of Republic of Srpska, which just as the previous example, has radicalising potential. Namely, in Konjević Polje and Vrbanjica and some parts of Zvornik municipality, children of Bosniak

nationality are not attending school, because, as the Ministry of Education of Republic of Srpska argues, Bosnian language is not recognized by entity Constitution. They named it the language of Bosniak people. The parents of Bosniak children demanded to incorporate the National Group of subjects in schools, but until today that was not implemented. In Kotor Varoš we have similar situation. Parents have taken their demands to court. The court in Kotor Varoš has on the 8th September of 2020 decided that National Group of Subjects should be incorporated in schools and that Bosniak children should attend classes of Bosnian language, but this also was not implemented until today (Katana, 2020). This struggle has lasted for 6 years.

These are just a few of examples of political decisions that could lead to radicalisation in this case of Bosniak returnees in Republic of Srpska who feel that their ethnic identity has been threatened and that they have right for their children to learn their own language. It is important to say at this point that the areas mentioned above are the area, where vicious war crimes have happened during the 1992-95 war, that were committed by the Republic of Srpska army and that the wounds of people have not healed yet. By now, we know that main push factors of radicalism are among other grievances, a sense of injustice and discrimination, social exclusion and marginalisation, as well as disappointment with democratic processes. It is clear that cases like the ones mentioned above include all the push factors and we can expect radicalisation of Bosniaks in this area in some form or shape.

5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation

Since the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina number of international and local NGOs have focused on peace building projects in order to support re-establishing and connections between different ethnicities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that war ruined during the war. These organisations were mostly financially supported by international donors. Lately, major donors were different embassies from the EU countries, U.S. embassy, and international organisations like OSCE, UNDP, as well as International Organisation for Migration and others.

After the terrorist attacks on the 11th September of 2001 in the U.S. focus was mostly shifted to “the fight against terrorism” and was mostly devoted to Islamic radicalism, although many organisations continued to work on peace building, knowing that it was crucial for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In 2015 Bosnia and Herzegovina has developed a strategy for preventing and combating terrorism and an Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy for Preventing and Combating Terrorism 2015-2020 (OSCE, 2017) (see Appendix 3). The goal of the strategy was “to counter all forms of extremist and terrorist activity respecting the values of democracy, rule of law and human rights and freedoms – make Bosnia and Herzegovina a place safe for life and work for all citizens, and others with their territories”. The strategy is based on prevention, protection, investigation and criminal prosecution and response/reaction to terrorist attacks. The institution responsible for development and implementation of this strategy was Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a product of this strategy several laws have been changed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as: Criminal code of Bosnia

and Herzegovina, Criminal code of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal code of Republic of Srpska and others.

Main reforms of criminal code happened in 2003 where Bosnia and Herzegovina dealt with establishing new legal norms concerning commitment of offences related to terrorism. In the article 201 and 202 of Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina such acts including financing of terrorist activities are criminalized. These reforms were introduced at the state level, but also at the entity level and Brčko District. "Therefore, the general provisions of the Criminal Code of B&H provide for the criminalisation of not only organised terrorist activities, but also incitement, accessory, accomplices and similar types of activities mentioned above, which can also be applied to other criminal offences" (Committee of Experts on Terrorism, 2014, p.3)

Since 2009 several NGOs did extensive research on radicalism and extremism issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina that contributed to developing strategies and policies in order to combat radicalism and extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Atlantic initiative and Democratization Policy Council has in 2012 issued a survey "Estimation of Potential for New Ethnic Conflict: Analysis of Safety Risks". Another survey issued by the Atlantic initiative was "The Lure of Syrian War and Bosnian Contingent of Foreign Fighters" where authors (Azinović & Jusić, 2015) try to describe motivational factors for participating in Syrian and Iraq war and give possible recommendations for combating such phenomena (see Appendix 3). Democratization Policy Council has published a series of policy notes such as: Inflammatory political rhetoric and hate speech in Bosnia and Herzegovina: political elites and the media, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Unfulfilled Promises, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Nexus with Islamist Extremism and other (Parry, 2016). Since young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the group that is in most danger of being radicalised PRONI Centre for Youth Development implemented a survey amongst young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Contemporary Youth in Bosnian Society: Challenges and Attitudes towards Radicalisation and Extremism" (Pečković, 2018) was a survey with the aim showcase what types of radicalism and extremism young people recognize in their communities and what are their attitudes towards it. All the research and survey mentioned above are aimed at giving the academic community and institutions information and recommendations for policy making and combating radicalism and extremism in a proper way.

Organisation Interreligious council of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was formed in 1997 is an organisation formed by leading religious institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Islamic Community, Catholic Church, Orthodox Church and Jewish community of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The idea behind forming such an organisation is to promote peace amongst citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their activities, in relation to extremism and terrorism, are mostly based on condemning terrorist activities and promoting interethnic dialog amongst people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There has not been any survey about the influence of religious institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but never the less we cannot ignore their influence on building attitudes and values amongst, especially, young people. This institution was mentioned in the strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for combating radicalism and extremism as an institution that should be supported in its efforts. One of the examples was Interreligious council of Bosnia and Herzegovina is sending a message that they do not support interethnic or interreligious violence is their "Statement of Shared Moral Commitment" (Interreligious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1997). In its fourth paragraph they clearly state (see Appendix 3):

We jointly, in mutual recognition of our religious differences, condemn all violence against innocent persons and any form of abuse or violation of fundamental human rights. Specifically, we condemn:

- *Acts of hatred based on ethnicity or religious differences. We express our especial concern at the burning of houses, the desecration of religious buildings, and the destruction of graveyards.*

Several NGOS have recognized the danger and need to combat extremism and radicalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So has PRONI Centre for Youth Development based in Brčko Distrikt of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2018 PRONI Centre starts a project “Youth countering the Violent extremism” with aim to “support and increase the participation of young women and men in activities aimed at preventing violent extremism by prioritizing significant mechanisms for engagement at the local and national levels, as set out in UN Resolutions 2178 and 2250; and provide a physically, socially, and emotionally secure and stimulating environment for the participation of young women and men in the prevention of violent extremism” (see Appendix 3). Another project PRONI has implemented, also young people as main target group, was project “Citizens against terrorism” (see Appendix 3). Citizens against Terrorism or #CAT was inspired by research findings that Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a target for national and global extremist recruitment efforts, due to recent historical and political conflicts, as well as high unemployment rates among youth - 63% unemployment rate among young Bosnians (age 15-30). Team is comprised of members from 3 different regions of B&H and who will work together to promote credible voices from each of the 3 regions to counter extremist efforts. CAT was a Facebook campaign that reached 347.000 people. Another important project PRONI Centre implemented was the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina Resilience Initiative (BHRI) with support of International Organisation for Migration that resulted with opening of 13 youth clubs in different regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aim to engage young people in socio – political life in their communities. PRONI Centre is an organisation that works with young people directly. This is the case with above mentioned project. What makes them stand out from other youth organisations is the fact that they directly work on combating violent extremism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia and Herzegovina Resilience Initiative (BHRI) implemented by International Organisation for Migration is one of the initiatives aiming to prevent radicalism amongst young people (see Appendix 3). BHRI has following aims:

1. *Support Inception Phase Assessment and Analysis in order to understand drivers of radicalisation/factors of resilience and develop tailored interventions to address drivers of radicalisation based upon findings.*
2. *Support monitoring, analysis, and the measurement of impact.*
3. *Support the design and implementation of tailored psychosocial support for at-risk of radicalisation in targeted communities.*
4. *Support implementation in the field through Community Liaison Points.*

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with its Action Against Terrorism Unit is working on building capacities and assisting authorities on different levels for combating terrorism (see Appendix 3). Focus of activities is placed on advancing inter-agency, civil-military and multisectoral co-operation. Among other OSCE has assisted Bosnia and

Herzegovina Council of Minister to produce Strategy for Preventing and Combating terrorism and has organised different conferences concerning terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina such as “Media and Terrorism” conference in 2016. Additional areas where OSCE is involved that concern countering terrorism are: countering the use of internet in terrorist purposes, preventing violent extremism and radicalisation that leads to terrorism, border management, conflict prevention and resolution and other.

Several other organisations are working on peace building in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of them is the Centre for Peace Building based in Sanski Most. One of the projects they have implemented is the Societal Transformation and Reconciliation (STaR) project is co-implemented by Karuna Centre for Peace building (“Karuna Centre”) and our organisation Centre for Peace building (“CIM”), and other Bosnian organisations Mali Koraci, PRONI Centre for Youth Development (“PRONI”), and Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“YIHR”) (see Appendix 3, Figure 4.1). This project was dedicated to young people in order for them to establishing healthy relationship between young people of Bosnia and Herzegovina based on universal values. The project takes place in 10 cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Centre for Peace Building is trying to produce social change through working with young people on peace building activities. They are, currently, not involved in programmes or projects concerning any radical groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Even all the above mentioned projects, research and activities Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the beginning stages in fight against terrorism. In the EU Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2020 it is stated that “Bosnia and Herzegovina” still needs to build its capacities for the struggle against terrorism” (European commission, 2020), but no specific capacities were put forward in this report. The information and recommendations that came from above mentioned reports have contributed to improvement of Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Still, there is no clear information of the successfulness of these programmes.

6. Conclusion

Through all above mentioned we can see that extremism and terrorism are still present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It manifests itself through religiously motivated violent behaviour and ethno-nationalistic narrative and discourse. Left-wing radicalism has not yet been recorded in Bosnia and Herzegovina, either in form of any organised group or any kind of attack.

Religiously oriented terrorist groups are mostly associated with the Salafi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and are connected with similar groups in Europe and other parts of the world. They live in small communities outside of towns and their numbers is not known and at this stage it not possible to find even approximate number. In the context of their political connections it has not been proven that any political party supports their cause. Parts of Legislative have been changed in order to adjust the combat against terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the one in European Union. The effects of legislative change are hard to measure at this point, since they have been announced few years ago, but still most of the accused of terrorist attacks have been prosecuted according to new legislative.

Other, besides Salafi movement ethno-nationalistic organisations are the part of the general ethno-nationalistic political narrative, which is dominant among leading political parties and it seems that these political parties and organisations follow the same ideology. These individuals and groups are in some cases focusing on attacks on religious objects, such as the attack on Ferhadija (Main Mosque in Banja Luka) on 12th September 2014 or the attacks on the same Mosque in 2018. (see Appendix 1)

Both terrorist attacks have a similarity that they have the aim to impose fear to the enemy, which is the effect that, for example, annual gathering of Chetnik movement in Višegrad that has an impact on Bosniaks living there. As the war against ISIS ended number of terrorist attacks has decreased, but the attacks in the EU countries have continued, which indicates that these groups are still active, even in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the different report and academics the new kind of danger needs has to be dealt with in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that are the Bosnian fighter that fought in Iraq and Syria in the unites of ISIS or other extremist groups. Till now, 24 of them have returned and are either convicted or under prosecution on domestic courts. The question also remains how to deal with radicalised children that lived in Iraq and Syria during the war there.

Ethno-nationalistic political discourse, segregated education, returning of Bosnian fighters from Iraq and Syria, remaining existence of groups with radical religious views, tell us that Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain a country with luring danger of radicalism and terrorist attacks. What could influence these groups are geo-political movements outside Bosnia and Herzegovina like for example existence of new radical movement such as ISIS or the growing of right – wing movements in Europe and U.S. On the other side it is crucial to build the resilience to these kinds of movements among citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially amongst young people.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Main (de)-radicalisation events in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2001

Name	Date or period of time	Description
Attack on the Mosque in Banja Luka	07.05.2001	Around 4000 protesters had attacked the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka as worker started to build it up. Ethno-anticlastic attack was a message that Muslims are not welcome in Banja Luka and showed the existence of organised groups in Banja Luka who plan and implement such actions. One person has died and several were injured.
Terrorist attack on the trading centre FIS Vitez	October 2008	During this attack one security guard was killed and 8 people were hurt. Trading centre FIS Vitez is one of the most famous trading centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 2500 employees, so the message attackers wanted to send is wide heard.
Terrorist attack on the police station in Bugojno (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	26.06.2010	During this attack one police officer has been killed and 6 more injured. The concrete motives for this attack where never resolved, but generally, this attack serve to impose fear on the enemies and destabilize local communities or states.
Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Prevention and Combat of Terrorism	May 2010	This document resulted with changes in legislative that made it possible to prosecute terrorist acts and arrest and prosecution of several terrorist in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Attack on the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo.	October 2011	Attack on U.S. embassy in Sarajevo was a message about and to the "enemy of the Muslims".

Attack on the police station in Zvornik (Republic of Srpska – Bosnia and Herzegovina)	April 2015	Attack was characterized as an attack on the republic of Srpska. There are evidences about harassment of Bosniak returnees in this Bosnian entity and the attack could be motivated by it.
Attack on the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo.	November 2015	The attacker was, according to witnesses, close to Salafi movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and his brother in law participated in Syrian war. According to the security cameras footage, he aimed at killing the soldiers which he did.
Attack on the Catholic Church in Vogosća near Sarajevo	December 2018	Since nothing was taken from the church we can presume that this was an attack with ethno-nationalistic motivation.
Gathering of Chetnik movement in Višegrad	Annual	With the aim of keeping alive and promoting the ethno-nationalistic ideology Chetnik movement with members from Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro use to organise the annual gatherings in Višegrad.
PRONI Centre project “Youth countering the Violent extremism”	2018	Project resulting in combining progressive young people from Bosnia and Herzegovina working together on combating extremism and ethno-nationalism on different levels.
STaR Project	2018 – 2020	The Societal Transformation and Reconciliation (STaR) project is co-implemented by Karuna Centre for Peacebuilding (“Karuna Centre”) and Bosnian organisations Centre for Peacebuilding (“CIM”), Mali Koraci, Proni Centre for youth development (“PRONI”), and Youth

		initiative for human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“YIHR”). The project is taking place in Stolac, Bijeljina, Velika Kladuša, Olovo, Sokolac, Jajce, Banja Luka, Doboj, Mostar and Sarajevo.
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Appendix 2. Political discourse about radicalisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Quotation	Author(s)	Date of quotation	Source	Comments
<p>"It is, indeed, a heinous, criminal act committed against innocent people in France. On behalf of the Islamic Community, allow me to express my condolences to the families, above all, and to the French people, on behalf of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina. we need to stand up, both Muslims and Christians together, to help each other and cooperate with the authorities, "</p>	<p>Husein Efendija Kavazović, Leading figure of Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina</p>	08.01.2015	<p>https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/reis-kavazovic-za-rse-o-napadu-u-parizu-to-je-zlo-koje-osudjujem/26783372.html</p>	<p>Kavazović in this interview is condemning the terrorist attacks in Paris, but he is also sending a message that this kind of actions are not supported by Islam as a religion.</p>
<p>"In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have certain sources of terrorism; we have radical ideology that is propagated and accepted, violent extremism and certain terrorist acts."</p>	<p>Dragan Mektić, Ministry of Security, Serb Democratic Party</p>	14.11.2015	<p>https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dragan-mektic-terorizam-u-bih-prijeti-da-unisti-drzavu/151114107</p>	<p>Ministry of Security has acknowledged that radical ideologies are accepted, but did not explain what he meant by that.</p>
<p>"I have been repeating and saying for a long time that we in BiH have certain problems with radicalism, violent extremism and terrorism that this is a war recurrence left to us, that we did not engage in a serious fight against that radicalism and that it escalated at</p>	<p>Dragan Mektić, Ministry of Security, Serb Democratic Party</p>	05.10.2017	<p>https://www.dw.com/hr/ministar-sigurnosti-bih-nije-leglo-terorizma/a-40821769</p>	<p>Ministry of Security has recognized that there is a problem concerning radicalism and that Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to engage more strongly to combat terrorism.</p>

<p>one point in one serious sense. Serious terrorist threats were threatened, certain groups were even formed and some terrorist acts were carried out, so that was a serious problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.</p>				
<p>“In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina now lives 50,000 people that came from the Arab world. They are trying to spread Islam as a religion. Many of them carry radical characteristics. Of course we are very worried about that”.</p>	<p>Milorad Dodik, Prime minister of Republic of Srpska</p>	<p>07.11.2017</p>	<p>https://poskok.info/dodik-u-bih-vidljivo-jacanje-radikalnog-islama/</p>	<p>Prime minister of Republic of Srpska is arguing that people that came to Bosnia from the Arab world are trying to spread Islam in Bosnia, but he did not give any explanation which indicates that this statement is part of ethno – nationalistic discourse.</p>
<p>"We are the first country in the region to declare the participation of its citizens in foreign paramilitary formations and organisations a criminal offence. All this has resulted in the fact that in the last 18 months there have been no departures from Bosnia and Herzegovina to foreign battlefields."</p>	<p>Bakir Izetbegović, Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina</p>	<p>20.11.2017</p>	<p>https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/izetbegovic-bih-nije-utociste-terorista-bosnjaci-su-jasni-u-osudi-ekstremizmu/1008674.aspx</p>	<p>This was the answer of Bakir Izetbegović on some claims of the EU officials that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a nest of Radicalism.</p>
<p>The letter sent by Čović, among others, to US President Donald Trump, British Prime Minister Theresa May and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, points out that “the activation</p>	<p>Dragan Čović, Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina</p>	<p>05.12.2017</p>	<p>https://rs.n1info.com/region/a347128-pismo-covica-zemljama-nato-a-problem-</p>	<p>We see in the quotation that Mr. Čović is also claiming that Islamic radicals are a danger for safety of Bosnian citizens.</p>

<p>of the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) is very important because, as he states, BiH is faced with the great problem of the legacy of radicalised individuals who came to BiH from Islamic countries during the war, but also because of the departure of BiH. Citizens on the other side of the battlefield”.</p>			<p>islamski-radikalisti/</p>	
<p>“Don’t let the loudspeakers sound so strong there that is howling like that because I'm not that. Why would they do that”.</p>	<p>Milorad Dodik, Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats</p>	<p>19.07.2018</p>	<p>https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/sramne-izjave-dodika-u-beogradu-s-dzamijs-u-bih-se-arlauce-srbi-su-istraumirani/180719087</p>	<p>In this interview Dodik spoke of the prayers from the Mosques being too loud and waking people up early. Such radical and provoking public statements can provoke local Muslims and contribute to their radicalisation.</p>
<p>“We have not accepted for that entity (Republic of Srpska) to be a place with continuous domination, with oppression of other people”.</p>	<p>Bakir Izetbegović, Leader of Party of Democratic Action</p>	<p>19.01.2019</p>	<p>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGSxRKhVMLk</p>	<p>In this statement Bakir Izetbegović talks about Serbian domination in the entity of Republic of Srpska which could contribute to ethnic mobilization in this entity.</p>
<p>“See you in 60 days. I believe that I will be more convinced when I address you then and that I will be closer to what I said at the beginning - goodbye BiH, welcome RS exit.”</p>	<p>Milorad Dodik, Prime minister of Republic of Serbs</p>	<p>18.02.2020</p>	<p>https://www.dw.com/hr/dodik-goodbye-bih-welcome-rs-exit/a-52413985</p>	<p>Milorad Dodik speaking of secession of Republic of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina which serves as a tool for homogenisation of Serb ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p>

<p>“Bosnian” language is called “Bosniak” language in Serbian”.</p>	<p>Milorad Dodik, Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats</p>	<p>14.09.2020</p>	<p>https://rs.n1info.com/region/a639760-dodik-o-bosansko-m-jeziku-bosanski-se-na-srpskom-kaze-bosnjacki/</p>	<p>Even though Bosniak people in Republic of Srpska are protesting because of calling their language the language of Bosniak people, the officials in this entity tend not to change it which contributes to their radicalisation.</p>
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Appendix 3. Main de-radicalisation programmes in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Name	Dates	Agents	Approach	Scale	Targets
Statement of Shared Moral Commitment	1997	Interreligious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Integrative	National	Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Atlantic Initiative (Research on Security Issues in B&H)	2009 - ongoing	Centre for Security and Justice Research	Research	National	Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Academic Community, NGOs
Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for Preventing and Combating Terrorism	2015	Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Prevention	National	Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Action Against Terrorism Unit	2017 - ongoing	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)	Civic education, multi-stakeholder dialog, awareness raising, capacity building	Europe	Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Citizens Against Terrorism	2017 - 2020	PRONI Centre for youth development, Youth Council Tuzla and Local Voluntary service Bijeljina	Civic education	Regional, worldwide through internet campaign	Youth workers and generally young people

Youth countering Violent extremism	2018 - 2019	PRONI Centre for youth development, Youth Council Tuzla and Local Voluntary service Bijeljina	Civic education	Regional	Youth workers and generally young people
Bosnia & Herzegovina Resilience Initiative (BHRI)	2018 - 2020	International Organisation for Migration	Civic education	National	Young people
Social Transformation and Reconciliation (STaR)	2018 - 2020	PRONI Centre for youth development, Youth Council Tuzla and Local Voluntary service Bijeljina PRONI Centre for youth development, Youth Council Tuzla and Local Voluntary service Bijeljina Karuna Centre, Centre for Peace Building (CIM) Youth Initiative for Human rights (YIHR), Small Steps and PRONI Centre for youth development	Civic education	Regional	Youth workers and generally young people Young people of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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