



Stakeholders of (De-) Radicalisation in Austria

D3.1 Country Report

April 2021

Miriam Haselbacher, Astrid Mattes, Ursula Reeger
– INSTITUTE FOR URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH,
AUSTRIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES



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Reference: D.RAD D3.1

This research was conducted under the Horizon 2020 project “De-Radicalisation in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Re-integrate” (959198).

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Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at: ursula.reeger@oeaw.ac.at

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List of abbreviations

| | <u>German</u> | <u>English</u> |
|--------------|---|--|
| BMEIA | Bundesministerium für Europa, Integration und Äußeres | Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs |
| BMI | Bundesministerium für Inneres | Federal Ministry of the Interior |
| BVT | Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung | Austrian Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counter-Terrorism |
| DERAD | Netzwerk Sozialer Zusammenhalt für Dialog, Extremismusprävention und Demokratie | Conversational Sessions for risk assessment and ideological disassociation |
| DÖW | Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes | Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance |
| ECRI | | European Commission against Racism and Intolerance |
| EU | Europäische Union | European Union |
| EUMC | | European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia |
| FgA | Forum gegen Antisemitismus | Forum against Antisemitism |
| FPÖ | Freiheitliche Partei Österreich | Austrian Freedom Party |
| FRA | Agentur für Grundrechte | Fundamental Rights Agency |
| HiNBG | Hass-im-Netz-Bekämpfungsgesetz | Hate-on-the-Net-Combat-Act |
| IKG | Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Wien | Jewish Community Vienna |

| | | |
|-----------------|---|------------------------------------|
| NEOS | Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum | The New Austria and Liberal Forum |
| ÖVP | Österreichische Volkspartei | Austrian People's Party |
| PStSG | Polizeiliches Staatsschutzgesetz | Police State Protection Act |
| RAN | | Radicalisation Awareness Network |
| SPÖ | Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei | Social Democrats |
| StGB | Strafgesetzbuch | Austrian Criminal Code |
| TeBG | Terror-Bekämpfungsgesetz | Terror Combat Act |
| VdU | Verband der Unabhängigen | Federation of Independents |
| VerbotsG | Verbotsgesetz | National Socialist Prohibition Law |
| VersG | Versammlungsgesetz | Austrian Assembly Act |
| VfGH | Verfassungsgerichtshof | Constitutional Court |
| VwGH | Verwaltungsgerichtshof | Administrative High Court |
| ZARA | Zivilcourage & Anti-Rassismus-Arbeit | Civil Courage and Anti-Racism Work |

About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

Executive summary/Abstract

This report gives an overview of the stakeholders of radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Austria. Overall and compared to other countries, violent extremism is quite low and terrorist attacks have been rare exceptions in Austria. Nonetheless, certain tendencies towards radicalisation and alienation have become increasingly observable in recent years. The terror attack in Vienna in November 2020 caused four fatalities and brought the topic of Islamic extremism to the fore. At the same time, right-wing extremist groups have taken to the streets and xenophobic, anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic sentiments and assaults are growing. While right-wing extremism is publically downplayed, political actors have used populist rhetoric to link immigrants and people of Muslim faith to political Islamism and terror.

This report introduces the Austrian context as well as national discourses and events in connection to the radicalisation and extremism of the past 20 years. It shows how the public perceptions of and the data on radicalisation only partially match. To give an overview on channels of radicalisation, we provide insights into two networks which are exemplary for the Austrian case, namely the Identitarian Movement and the Terror Militia Islamic State. Finally, we provide an overview of de-radicalisation programmes, which have been developed comparatively late and which, analogically to the other findings, emphasise Islamic extremism despite high numbers of right-wing extremist activities. National measures are a heterogeneous mix of private bottom-up and official government initiatives.

1. Introduction

In this report, which is part of D.Rad Work Package 3, 'Mapping Stakeholders and Situations of Radicalisation', we delineate the main radicalisation agents and de-radicalisation stakeholders in Austria. In what follows, we introduce the Austrian context and discuss the structures, stakeholders and channels of radicalisation, providing insights into two networks of radicalisation. This is followed by the mapping of stakeholders and strategies of de-radicalisation and a conclusive discussion of Austrian particularities. In the appendices to this report, we provide examples for (de)radicalising events of the past 20 years (Appendix 1), quotes that exemplify the positions of political elites (Appendix 2), the networks of the main agents of radicalisation (Appendix 3) and de-radicalisation programmes in Austria (Appendix 4).

In D.Rad, we understand radicalisation as a process involving the increasing rejection of established law, order and politics and the active pursuit of alternatives, in the form of politically driven violence or the justification of violence; by de-radicalisation we mean processes countering such rejection at the individual (micro), organisational (meso) or societal (macro) levels, resulting in a shift from violent to non-violent strategies and tactics; de-radicalisation might or might not be an outcome of de-radicalisation programmes. While radicalisation can lead to violence, we are also aware of early steps in radicalisation processes, namely tendencies that level the field for violent extremism.

The important concepts of radicalisation which we address in this report are right-wing extremism, jihadism and what we subsume as imported conflicts. Right-wing extremism refers to an ideology aiming at inegalitarianism, as transported in notions of so-called 'natural inequality', e.g. nationalism, racism and xenophobia, mostly in combination with anti-democratic and authoritarian ideas (Carter, 2018). We refer to Jihadism when we speak of globally acting movements that call for a 'holy war' against non-Muslims as well as enemies whom they consider 'not truly Muslim' (Sedgwick, 2015). We speak of 'imported conflicts' when referring to 'political mobilisation for homeland politics' among diaspora communities (Baser, 2013) as well as in reference to violent acts that were rooted in ethnonationalist conflicts abroad but took place on Austrian territory. Other concepts – such as left-wing extremism (which strives to overcome social inequalities through overturning existing state and social orders, Carter, 2018) and radical animal-rights activism (whose adherents also pursue their goals by violent means, Munro 2012) – are mentioned as well but are less significant for the Austrian case.

2. Contextual background

Austria is located in the south-eastern central part of Europe and consists of nine federal provinces, including Vienna, the capital. Currently, the country is home to 8.88 million people. Its population has experienced growth on account of international migration, with EU countries such as Germany, Romania and Poland as well as the former Yugoslavia and Turkey as the main areas of origin (Bauböck & Perchinig, 2006). More recently, in 2015 and 2016, large numbers of refugees from the Middle East arrived in Austria and applied for asylum.

The official language in Austria is German. However, Hungarian, Croatian and Slovenian are officially recognised languages in some municipalities where these groups are historic language minorities. The respective regulations originate in the protection of minority rights and date back to the Austrian State Treaty of 1955; nevertheless, their legitimacy has been contested by right-wing extremists and nationalists up until today (Hiesel, 2010; kaernten.ORF.at, 2021). Other languages, such as those spoken by recent immigrants (e.g. Turkish) are not subject to the protection of minority rights.

After World War II, Austria was constituted as a federal, representative democratic republic with a division of powers between the federal level or *Bund* and the nine federal provinces (*Länder*). Austria accessed the European Union in 1995 but retained its constitutional status of neutrality up until today. The political system displays a mix of presidential and parliamentary elements, although the presidential element is somewhat weak (Pelinka & Rosenberger, 2003). Corporatism, with its continuously high degree of coordination between business and labour stakeholders, as well as its institutionalised bargaining practices, is another typical feature of the political landscape of the Austrian Second Republic (Tálos, 2005).

For many years, the Austrian party system has been considered as highly stable and characterised by a two-party domination of the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the People's Party (ÖVP). This changed from the late 1980s onwards, with declining votes for these two Lager-Parties and upcoming new parties, among which the Green Party and, more recently (2012) the liberal party NEOS. Since the early years of Austria's Second Republic, right-wing parties have been represented in parliament. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and its forerunner, the Federation of Independents (VdU), experienced name changes and party splits but continuously provided a political home to Austria's strong far-right supporters (Debus, 2005).

Unlike in Germany, where – due to its critical engagement with the National Socialist past – a far-right party was for many years completely unthinkable, rightist ideologies remained politically represented and partially incorporated in the political system throughout Austria's post-war history (Ager, 2014; Pirker, 2020). The strength of rightist ideas also results in the country's strongest strand of radicalisation, namely right-wing extremism. The anti-fascist Ernst Kirchwegger, who was killed in a demonstration in 1965 by a right-wing extremist in the course of a demonstration against the anti-semitic university professor Taras Borodajkewyczis, was often considered the first victim of political violence in Austria after World War II (Bruckmüller, 2018). Most noticeably, the right-wing terrorist Franz Fuchs killed four people and injured 15 in bomb attacks in the 1990s (El Refaie, 2004). Nonetheless, most cases of right-wing radicalism were less violent (e.g. verbal abuse, racist graffiti, national socialist activities, etc.) and somewhat embedded in established structures, such as the FPÖ surroundings and nationalist fraternities or *Burschenschaften* (Weidinger, 2014).

The political left, by contrast, is smaller, less institutionalised, fragmented and less violent. After the communist party dropped out of parliament in 1959, no party left of the Social Democrats (and, from 1986 onwards, the Green Party) has been elected to the National Assembly. Left-wing extremism has always existed but has played a relatively small role compared to other European countries such as Germany, France or Italy (Hartleb, 2011). Violence by left-wing extremists almost exclusively concerned different kinds of property damage and violations of the law concerning assemblies (*VersG*).

As a centre for international organisations and diplomacy, Vienna also experienced imported conflicts, such as the attack by the Palestinian Abu-Nidal group on the Israeli airline *El Al*, which killed three people at Vienna International Airport in 1985 (Bunzl, 1991; Pluchinski, 2006). Conflicts between Kurdish or Armenian minorities and Turkish or Iranian actors also repeatedly resulted in violent incidents in the city of Vienna, such as the killing of the Turkish diplomat Enver Ergun in 1984 or the murder of the Kurdish politician Fadel Rasoul in 1989 (vienna.at, 2016). Although, in this report, we focus on events since the terror attacks of 9/11, it is worth mentioning these long-term developments, as they are still relevant for the current landscape of radicalisation.

More recently, due to international developments, jihadist terrorism has played a significant role. While a relatively large number of so-called foreign fighters from Austria joined jihadist groups or attempted to do so (Hofinger & Schmidinger, 2020), Austria has mostly been spared from jihadist attacks. This changed in November 2020, when a terrorist affiliated with the terror militia Islamic State shot four people and wounded 22 in the Viennese city centre (Bell, 2020). As Bauer and Mattes note (2021, p. 1): 'This terror attack has shaken Austria heavily and has brought the already dominant securitisation of Islam to the very centre of attention'.

Overall, and compared to other countries, violent extremism and terrorist attacks have been rare exceptions in Austria. Nonetheless, certain tendencies towards radicalisation and alienation have been increasingly observable in recent years. On the one hand, the recent terror attack was a caesura in a country with a very low number of fatalities related to extremism; on the other hand, hate speech and anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiments are high. In recent years, new kinds and unseen levels of hatred in the far-right spectrum were directed primarily at Austria's Muslims and at refugees. This can be related to anti-Muslim discourses across the globe that gained strength in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the political aftermath of the summer of migration in 2015. Populist rhetoric by the political elite, most notably the Austrian Freedom Party and the Austrian People's Party, is steering this process (Wodak, 2018); however, right-wing extremist groups such as the Identitarian Movement (*Identitäre Bewegung*) have increasingly mobilised among Austria's right-wing sympathisers (Bonvalot, 2018; Bruns, Glösel & Strobl, 2017). Antisemitism, too, is a growing problem that cuts across different strands of radicalisation – nationalist, racist and anti-Israel ideologies – held by both right-wing extremists and some recent refugees (Edtmaier, 2020).

Currently and throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, Austria is experiencing the growth of new, internally diverse radical groups that can not really be pigeonholed. Among those demonstrating against the governmental anti-Covid measures are anti-vaccinists, esoterics, conspiracy theorists, radical-right extremists and many more who, in the course of unapproved marches, are causing multiple violations of the prevailing lockdown regulations (Euronews, 2021). The Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (DÖW) also describes how convicted neo-nazis and other radical-right extremists attacked journalists and used the protests as a platform to present a picture of their ideology as a broad movement (DÖW, 2021). In line with developments across Europe, the threat which these groups pose in terms of radicalisation and violent extremism becomes more and more evident, although it is yet too early to make assumptions about further developments.

3. Structures of radicalisation

The first terror attack in Austria related to the terror militia Islamic State last November has not been fully analysed and processed yet. Annual reports on the year 2020, that include the terror attack, have not been published until now. The following section thus centres primarily on extremism and not terrorism. In Austria, there are comparatively low numbers of violent acts in the context of extremism and terrorism. This contrasts with the political discourse, which is polarised and characterised by the populist rhetoric of the political elite as well as xenophobic and islamophobic overtones in political speech. Both characteristics of the Austrian case mirror the public perception of radicalisation; while, in the population, there is generally a high level of feeling safe (CEP, 2020), the topic of immigration has been the main concern of Austrians since 2015, evoking mostly negative feelings (European Commission, nd). For more detailed examples of the main events and the political discourse on radicalisation, see Appendices 1 and 2.


3.1. Data on political violence

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT), as a department of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, collects data on political violence and extremism which are published in the Annual Reports on the Protection of the Constitution.¹ These reports reflect the official narrative of the Ministry of the Interior regarding extremist activities and terrorism and compile information on various focus areas. Figure 1 shows the number of incidents listed in the BVT reports. The number of criminal acts caused by right-wing extremist groups has been significantly higher over the years than incidents ascribed to the field of left-wing extremism. Left-wing extremist groups are fragmented and focus primarily on anti-facism, criticising the system of capitalism, globalisation and restrictive asylum policies. The mobilisation potential of the left is tied to certain events, targeting above all right-wing extremist groups. The authorities have thus expressed concern about the 'explosive nature of the relationship between right-wing and left-wing extremism' (BVT 2018, p. 80).

Although Islamic terrorism has constantly been considered as the biggest threat to national security, there are no statistical numbers available on Islamist extremism except for aggregated data on foreign fighters. According to the annual report of 2019, 'Attacks based on Jihadist motives continue to pose one of the greatest challenges for Europe and Austria in terms of security' (BVT 2019, p. 84). This focus on Islamic extremism and terrorism has been prevalent since the 9/11 attacks and was further enhanced in 2014, when a growing number of foreign fighters returned from Syria to Austria.

¹ <https://www.bvt.gv.at/401/>

Figure 1: Incidents listed in the BVT reports, 2001–2019



For almost two decades, the annual reports of the BVT had a separate section on so-called ‘militant animal protection’. Targeting in particular the groups Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Association Against Animal Factories (VGT),² no acts of physical violence were reported and the vast majority of incidents concerned damage to property. After a heavily criticised trial based on article §278a (Criminal Organisation) of the Austrian Criminal Code (StGB), all the accused were acquitted and it was evident that the surveillance and the focus of attention on activities concerning animal rights was not proportionate (Mackinger & Pack, 2011; Maier, 2010; Metzker, 2015). As a consequence, the Austrian legislation on terrorism was reformed and animal-rights activism was no longer the target of the BVT.

In 2015, an Austrian citizen founded the Federation of States of Austria.³ Members of this group, more often referred to as state rejecters, have issued their own pseudolegal documents, call the state a company and refuse to pay taxes (Kleiner & Pausackl, 2017). Sympathising with the Reich-citizen movement in Germany, these groups reject the legitimacy and sovereignty of the established government, the Austrian state as such and its legal system (CEP, 2020). The former Austrian Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Sobotka, spoke of ‘paper terrorists’⁴ and the BVT summarised the activities of state rejections in a section titled *subversive anti-state movements*. In 2017, the government introduced the new criminal offence *anti-state movement (Art 247a StGB)*, which was criticised for criminalising a state of mind and for overshooting (Adensamer, 2017; Pichler, 2018). In 2019, the founder of the Federation of States of Austria was sentenced to 14 years of prison for high treason.⁵

Compared to other countries, violent attacks resulting in injuries and fatalities are quite scarce although the number of right-wing extremist groups and their activities is high and they hold well-established political connections and strong networks (Opratko, 2015; Weidinger, 2016).

² Verein gegen Tierfabriken, vgt.at

³ Staatenbund Österreich

⁴ https://www.kleinezeitung.at/oesterreich/5158372/Reichsbuerger-und-Co_Der-Staat-will-mit-den-Papierterroristen

⁵ <https://www.diepresse.com/5568324/hochverrat-14-jahre-haft-fur-staatenbund-prasidentin>

Until 2000, the Ministry of the Interior published a separate report on right-wing extremist activities. With the first ÖVP–FPÖ coalition in 2000, this report was abolished and right-wing extremism was incorporated into the BVT reports. As a consequence, data and information on incidents became less detailed and lacking in concrete examples (Falter, 2014) and ‘The Austrian government has struggled to address far-right movements’ (CEP 2020, p. 5). Furthermore, the BVT was recently caught up in a number of scandals.

Right-wing extremist offences reported by the BVT have been rising in recent years, especially Internet activities concerning hate speech; national socialist offences have also been growing. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance by the Council of Europe (ECRI) has criticised Austria in its latest report (ECRI, 2020) for its lack of a comprehensive and systematic collection of data on hate speech and hate-motivated violence. The estimated number of unreported cases with regards to xenophobic, islamophobic and anti-semitic acts is much higher (ECRI, 2020; ZARA, 2020).

There are several other independent institutions which are collecting data on right-wing extremism, anti-semitism and anti-Muslim attacks. The association ZARA (Civil Courage and Anti-Racism Work) publishes annual reports on racism and the Documentation Centre for Islamophobia and Anti-Muslimic Racism collects data on anti-muslim attacks. Regarding anti-semitic incidents, both the Jewish Community Vienna (IKG) and the Forum against Antisemitism (FgA) are collecting and publishing data. The Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (DÖW) is focusing, among other topics, on right-wing extremism, compiling data on their networks, incidents, media and organisations. Furthermore, the Mauthausen Committee has collected information on right-wing symbols, codes and terminology and keeps a list of right-wing extremist ‘individual’ cases within the FPÖ. The Institute for the Sociology of Law and Criminology, based in Vienna, carries out research on various forms of extremism and terrorism and has compiled in-depth studies on the radicalisation of foreign fighters. On an international level, the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) and other specialised organisations such as Europol and the Global Terrorism Database are good sources for certain topics. Looking at the more international sources, however, shows how the Austrian case is comparatively moderate. For example, the Global Terrorism Database only lists 16 incidents in the past 20 years, of which the majority pertains to imported conflicts with a nationalist background.

Finally, incidents of police violence have come to the fore. Human-rights organisations have highlighted racist discrimination by the police and the judiciary system for quite some time (Amnesty International, 2009) and have demanded the establishment of independent investigative authorities (Amnesty International, 2009, 2019). A study by the Austrian Centre for Law Enforcement Sciences (Reindl-Krauskopf et al., 2018) has shown that, of 1,518 reported incidents of police violence between 2012 and 2015, only seven cases were brought before court. Most recently, police actions in the context of anti-lockdown rallies organised by right-wing extremists on the one hand and anti-deportation protests on the other have fueled public discussions on differential treatment and a potential bias of the police.

3.2. Perceptions of cases of radicalisation by the political elite

In Austria, the facts and figures as presented in the previous section and the public discourse on radicalisation and extremism by the political elite do not match. Although criminal acts

related to right-wing extremism have been prevalent in Austria throughout the Second Republic, the topics of immigration and Islamist extremism have dominated public debates and elections and right-wing extremist activities have been downplayed (Falter, 2014). Since “Muslim” has become a frequently applied category in immigrant integration policy (Mattes, 2018), this category was used for anti-Islam mobilisation which threatened security and common values. In its most recent report on Austria, the ECRI (2020, p. 7) has expressed concerns about the high levels of Islamophobia in public discourse, noting that ‘political speech has taken on highly divisive and antagonistic overtones particularly targeting Muslims and refugees’.

Linguists and social scientists have highlighted the role of the FPÖ in steering public debates, making use of aggressive populist rhetoric and hate speech (Heinisch, Werner and Habersack, 2020; Wodak, 2018). Building on nativist elements, populist parties fuel xenophobic and anti-Islam sentiments, framing immigration as a problem and associating Islam with extremism and terrorism (Ajanovic, Mayer & Sauer, 2016). Recent studies show how the rhetoric and the party programmes of the Austrian Peoples Party (ÖVP) and the FPÖ have converged in recent years, as the ÖVP has developed a strong anti-immigrant profile under the leadership of Sebastian Kurz (Hadj Abdou & Ruedin, 2021; Hadj Abdou, Bale & Geddes, 2021; Heinisch, Werner & Habersack, 2020).

Pelinka (2013) has shown how the FPÖ and right-wing extremism had become ‘socially acceptable’ due to its peculiar continuity in the Austrian political system which set it apart from right-wing extremist parties in other countries. The FPÖ and its leading figures – among them Jörg Haider, Heinz-Christian Strache and Herbert Kickl – have continuously shifted the boundaries of what can be said (Wodak, 2020). Quotations by members of the FPÖ listed in Appendix 2 show how they do not shy away from using violent language, equating the threat from COVID-19 with that from the Quran, warning of the imminent Islamisation of the occident and using pejorative adjectives to describe immigrants.

Looking at Appendix 2, both the dominance and discursive linkages of immigration and Islam as well as changes in the positioning of key actors are well displayed. Taking the example of quotations following the summer of migration in 2015, the short period of openness – characterised by quotes that make reference to human-rights frames – is followed by verbal statements that call for restrictive measures. The government, under the leadership of the Social Democrat Werner Faymann, thus introduced an annual upper limit for asylum applications and built a border fence in 2016. This discursive shift normalised restrictive policies and criminalised immigration to ‘protect Austria from refugees’ (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018).

Both the Ministry of the Interior and the integration agendas (gradually institutionalised since 2011) have been in the hands of either ÖVP or FPÖ ministers since 2000. Following their party line, the respective ministers have framed integration primarily as a problem and migration and Islam as the central threat to society and social cohesion. Regarding Islam, the role of the ÖVP and Sebastian Kurz is particularly interesting (Gruber, Mattes & Sadlmair, 2015). Quotes from the beginning of his career show how he distinguished between Islam as a religion and the phenomenon of political Islamism (see quotes of Sebastian Kurz in Appendix 2). This differentiation was later blurred when Austria’s Islam politics changed (Hafez & Heinisch, 2018). Since then, representatives of the ÖVP have continuously made reference

to 'political Islam', demanding the commitment to the constitution by people of Muslim faith and introducing a number of legal provisions specifically targeting Muslims.

At the same time, Sebastian Kurz has been a driving force in restricting migration to Austria and has presented himself as the person who closed the so-called 'Balkan route'. His statements regarding migration are illustrative of how migration and integration are discursively linked to Islam and criminal acts. Regarding statements made after the terrorist attack in November 2020, most politicians emphasised the need to take a unified stand against violence and to move closer together to overcome the hatred (Bauer & Mattes, 2021). Shortly after, the FPÖ and the ÖVP called for stricter laws and punishment, which resulted in the Anti-Terrorism Act in December 2020.

To include debates in the context of right-wing and left-wing extremism despite the low salience of the issue, we gathered quotations on the FPÖ's Academics Ball and reactions to riots at a left-wing demonstration which followed. Here, the left-right polarisation in society and across the party spectrum came to the fore. Furthermore, we included citations on recent demonstrations against measures to contain COVID 19 – which were led by prominent right-wing extremists – and reactions to anti-deportation protests. Here, the new actor constellation at governmental level becomes evident: while the FPÖ has used the topic of Corona to mobilise its voters as an opposition party after recent inner-party scandals, the Greens have formed a coalition with the ÖVP and have been since been somewhat hesitant about positioning themselves against their coalition partner or in publically criticising its actions and statements due to party discipline.

3.3. Perceptions of cases of radicalisation by the general public

According to the Austrian report for the Counter Extremism Project (CEP, 2020), only 7 per cent of Austrians were concerned about terrorism in 2018, reflecting the high sense of security felt in the country. Surveys conducted after terrorist attacks in foreign countries show how the sense of insecurity and threat rises after these events. After the Paris attack, 88 per cent of Austrians feared another terror attack in Austria and 85 per cent feared religious radicalisation.⁶ Data collected before and after the terrorist attack in 2020 show the changes in public perceptions: while 97 per cent of the respondents of a survey⁷ conducted in August 2020 did feel safe or quite safe, a quarter of Austrians were afraid of terrorist threats according to an online survey⁸ conducted in November 2020, while less than a fifth did not feel threatened at all and 42 per cent felt little or not threatened. However, as the first terrorist attack since the 1980s took place recently, its impact on public perceptions is not yet fully clear.

The European Social Survey⁹ shows how the level of feeling safe has been relatively stable with only minor fluctuations. When asked what Austrians perceive as the biggest threat, the

⁶ <https://www.diepresse.com/5066874/osterreicher-haben-angst-vor-terror>

⁷ <https://www.tt.com/artikel/30745955/umfrage-97-prozent-fuehlen-sich-in-oesterreich-sicher>

⁸ <https://www.sn.at/politik/innenpolitik/terror-in-wien-viertel-der-oesterreicher-fuehlt-sich-bedroht-95199964>

⁹ [Europeansocialsurvey.org](https://europeansocialsurvey.org)

different surveys name climate change,¹⁰ economic crisis and inflation¹¹ and crime, disease and old-age poverty.¹² However, this diversity in answers is quite new, as immigration was perceived as the biggest threat between 2015 and 2019 (European Commission, nd). The Viennese newspaper *Wiener Zeitung* summarised the results of two surveys by the OECD as 'Happy Austrians fear evil'.¹³

Public debates on radicalisation centre on jihadism and Islamic extremism. The political discourse described in the previous section is reflected in opinion polls on migration. Here, 42 per cent of Austrians perceive migration as a threat as a recent report of the Austrian Society for European Politics (ÖGfE) shows (Schmidt, Schaller and Millford-Schaber, 2020). This corresponds with election polls where, with only a few exceptions, asylum and integration have been the dominant topics in campaigns in the last decade. Hadj Abdou and Ruedin (2021) show how the heightened emphasis on immigration partly mirrors the public salience of the issue; however, more recently, the emphasis on migration by political parties is in contradiction to the decreasing public salience of the issue.

4. Agents and channels of radicalisation

In order to give an overview of the main channels of radicalisation, we selected two networks which are exemplary for the Austrian case and which mirror the public perception as well as specific threats. First, we focus on the Identitarian Movement. The so-called 'new right' is exemplary for modern right-wing extremism in Austria and holds well-established connections to the FPÖ and other key actors across the right-wing scene. Second, we chose the Islamic State as an example of recruitment patterns for foreign fighters in Austria. Appendix 3 visualises both networks and provides an overview of its structure and connections.

4.1. Right-wing network: *The Identitarian Movement*

Fielitz and Laloire (2016, p. 14) cite three recent key developments in far-right politics: a) the boundaries between parties, movements and subcultures are increasingly blurred, b) it has become increasingly difficult to draw the line between the political mainstream and the far right and c) far-right actors have successfully built international networks envisioning common geopolitical strategies. These developments set the margins for the activities and the functioning of the new right and apply perfectly well to the Identitarian Movement, which was founded originally in France. The Movement is a modernised form of right-wing extremism which strives for cultural and political hegemony in opposition to the '68 Movement, including conservative and right-wing extremist elements (Strobl & Bruns, 2016, p. 106). Groups like the Identitarian Movement have replaced race with culture, making use of the concept of ethnopluralism and rooting their ideas in the 'Conservative Revolution'. These discursive shifts

¹⁰ https://www.kleinezeitung.at/oesterreich/5693666/Neue-Studie_Worin-die-Oesterreicher-die-groessten-Bedrohungen-sehen

¹¹ <https://www.tt.com/artikel/30745955/umfrage-97-prozent-fuehlen-sich-in-oesterreich-sicher>

¹² <https://www.oecd.org/austria/Risks-That-Matter-2018-AUT-en.pdf>

¹³ <https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/chronik/oesterreich/2001861-Oesterreicher-haben-mehr-Angst-vor-Kriminalitaet.html>

have been used to distance the movement from National Socialism while being able to hold on to 'an anti-pluralist, nationalist and racist worldview' (2016, p. 107).

The three main levels of action of the Identitarian Movement comprise intellectual work, street action and party politics (2016, p. 107). As a consequence, the face of right-wing extremism has changed from neo-Nazism and Skinheads, which dominated the scene earlier, to young urban bourgeois students who are well connected with activists from other countries as well as politicians and other key actors (Bauer & Mernyi, 2019). In order to attract and recruit young people, the new right presents its ideologies by using pop culture-like images and professionally feeding their social media channels (Mandl & Katona, 2018). Hereby, the movement follows its own aesthetics and makes use of the Identitarian symbol, a yellow and black Lambda, which is prominently put on flags, T-shirts and flyers. The movement employs activist methods that generate intense images in order to attract public attention. For example, activists of the Identitarian Movement have stormed the stage during a performance by refugees at the University of Vienna and have shed fake blood on the stage while distributing flyers which read 'multiculturalism kills'.¹⁴

The BVT has monitored the Identitarian Movement since 2012 but it was mentioned by name in a BVT report for the first time in 2016 (Glösel, 2019). In 2019, the BVT drew up a list of the movement's members which included 364 persons.¹⁵ A fifth of the people listed had a weapon and 32 were convicted. Membership numbers are quite low as the movement is strictly hierarchical and elitist but its protagonists have successfully mobilised large numbers of people for joint marches and campaigns. In this context, international connections play a decisive role and campaign material is translated and dispersed throughout various countries. For the 'Defend Europe' Campaign, activists from different national organisations chartered a ship to hinder NGOs from rescuing refugees in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the movement organises joint summer camps for networking activities and training. The targets of their activities and campaigns are primarily migrants but also left-wing groups.

Although the FPÖ has tried to distance itself from the Identitarian Movement after it entered government, there remain several links and overlaps. In the past, there were financial flows from the FPÖ to the movement, which was able to use rooms provided by members of the FPÖ. The FPÖ has constantly spoken against a ban of the movement and has downplayed its actions. There are a number of common events which are attended by both the FPÖ and members of the movement – such as the earlier-mentioned *Akademikerball* or *Academics Ball* – and both make use of the same right-wing media channels (such as *Aula*, *Sezession* or *Info-direkt*). Members of the FPÖ have also frequently been invited to speak at demonstrations and assemblies organised by Identitarians.

In 2018, after the attack in Christchurch, the Identitarian Movement was put under pressure by the BVT when links between the assassin in Christchurch and Martin Sellner, the leader of the movement, became public. After a raid at Sellner's home, the movement was banned from social media (Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, TikTok, Instagram), taking away its main communication channels. Today, the movement has switched to using Telegram channels

¹⁴ <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000034915518/identitaere-stuerme-auffuehrung-im-audimax-der-uni-wien>

¹⁵ <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000101266781/verfassungsschutz-forschte-364-mitglieder-der-identitaeren-ausaus>

and has successfully built a new network of followers (Gartner, Peter & Walchhofer, 2020). In February 2021, the Identitarian Movement France was prohibited and there are plans to ban the symbols of the movement in Austria as well.¹⁶ Newspapers already talked of the end of the movement in 2020;¹⁷ however, current events in the realm of COVID-19 protests indicate a resurgence of protagonists of the movement who were able to use the demonstrations for their own purposes.

4.2. Jihadist network: Terror Militia Islamic State

The terror militia Islamic State has been actively recruiting ‘jihadists’ or ‘Muhajirun’ from all over the world since 2014 (Hofinger & Schmidinger, 2020). According to the BVT (2019), by the end of 2019, 326 people had travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the so-called ‘Islamic State’. Of these, probably 69 people died in the region, 93 people returned to Austria, 62 were detained before leaving the country and 102 jihad travellers are believed to still be in the war zone (BVT, 2019). Although these number are quite small compared to other countries, Austria has one of the highest *per capita* shares of foreign fighters in Europe (Hofinger & Schmidinger, 2020). As the Austrian authorities have highlighted the high risk stemming from returnees, they are hesitant about bringing people back.

It is primarily young people who have become radicalised. Most are from Muslim immigrant families with low incomes and low educational background (Hofinger and Schmidinger, 2017). Marginalisation is thus an issue with regard to radicalisation and increases the risk of a person being convicted (BVT, 2019, p. 196). Hofinger and Schmidinger (2020, pp. 290-292) identify at least three different networks of jihadist salafism in Austria: a) the Balkan connection, which is based at the heart of the Slavic Muslim diaspora in Austria with ties to Bosnia and the Sandžak of Novi Pazar and which centres on the figures of salafi preachers like Muhamed P. or Nedžad B., with Vienna being a central hub; b) jihadis of Chechen origin, a group which comprises mostly Chechens who fled to Austria as refugees after the second Chechen war in 1999/2000 and who became radicalised in their resistance against Russia; and c) homegrown jihadis – young jihadist activists who grew up in Austria with no connection to jihadist groups in other countries. However, based on their study of young jihadists in Austria, Hofinger and Schmidinger point out that young extremists ‘do not exclusively belong to one of the groups described above but have multiple connections to these networks and milieus’ (2020, p. 295).

The Vienna-based scholar of jihadism, Rüdiger Lohlker (2016, 2017), points out that, while the terror militia Islamic State has a theological foundation, the personal contact in the course of recruitment only relies on a minimum number of religious references, which is also mirrored in online activities (Lohlker, 2016, p. 11). On the one hand, certain mosques and preachers play a key role in the process of radicalisation (for Austria, various problematic sites have, for example, been reported in Vienna and Graz – see Gepp, 2015; Holzer, 2019; Strohmayer, 2020); on the other hand, it is social media channels and, above all, Telegram (Bloom, Tiflati & Horgan, 2019). After platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube blocked accounts that posted content related to the terror militia Islamic State, ISIS has turned to Telegram channels for matters of recruitment and coordination. Telegram has also been used by other groups as it opens the possibility of sharing propaganda material with a large number of people

¹⁶ <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000124394268/verbot-der-rechtsextremen-identitaeren>

¹⁷ <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000114822616/rechtsextreme-identitaere-bewegung-offenbar-am-ende>

via chat rooms, which are either open (an indefinite number of users) or private (an upper limit of 200,000 users) which can be uni- or multi-directional. Furthermore, the platform offers a 'self-destruct' timer to delete messages and its content is only very scarcely monitored (Bloom, Tiflati & Horgan, 2019; Etschmaier, 2020). Besides mosques and social media, prisons may also be place for radicalisation as 'feelings of exclusion and discrimination' as well as anger against the state may be reinforced there (Al-Hassan Diaw & Hajek, 2017; Hofinger & Schmidinger, 2020, p. 303).

In 2020, jihadism became an even more decisive issue, as the first explicit terror attack with casualties occurred in November. In a first reaction, Austrian political leaders emphasised the importance of differentiating between radical Islamism, Austrian Muslims and Islam in general (Bauer & Mattes, 2021). Nonetheless, in the aftermath of this far-reaching event a series of legal measures was proposed, among them the introduction of a new criminal offence – 'religiously motivated extremism' (*religiös motivierter Extremismus*). This was in addition to previous law amendments, as described above, which had been targeting Muslims in particular. Austrian security forces conducted a large-scale raid – 'Operation Luxor' – a week after the attack which was directed at suspect members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This prominently featured raid also received severe criticism, as the Viennese perpetrator had relations to the terror militia Islamic State and radical groups in the Balkans but no known affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood (Bauer & Mattes, 2021).

4.3. Radicalisation as an interactive process

In D.Rad, we understand radicalisation as an interactive process that is driven not only by violent agents and their political allies but also by state institutions. As mentioned in Section 3, the monitoring of right-wing extremist groups has continuously decreased in the past decade (Falter, 2014). On the other hand, Muslims are under general suspicion, which fosters feelings of injustice, grievance and alienation. When Herbert Kickl, FPÖ, became Minister of the Interior in 2019, he did not stop using populist rhetoric, saying, for example, that refugees should be kept 'concentrated in one place'¹⁸ and introducing a special unit called PUMA to secure Austria's borders. While he publically displayed a dubious interpretation of the law, saying that the law must follow politics¹⁹, he advocated for discriminatory laws that were targeting and criminalising asylum-seekers. Due to his proximity to the right-wing extremist scene, media and members of the opposition parties doubted whether the Ministry of the Interior did monitor right-wing groups sufficiently. These doubts were strengthened when a raid on the offices of the BVT was carried out and, among other things, sensitive data on right-wing extremism were confiscated. As a consequence of the BVT affair, foreign intelligence services restricted their collaboration with the Austrian intelligence services²⁰. Furthermore, there have been allegations of right-wing extremist incidents in the police: Apart from cases of police violence as documented in Appendix 1, members of the police have been documented as sympathisers of right-wing ideology²¹, and the police have been confronted

¹⁸ <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000071880249/asyl-fpoe-kickl-will-fluechtlinge-konzentriert-an-einem-ort-halten>

¹⁹ <https://www.diepresse.com/5566984/asyl-recht-muss-politik-folgen-nicht-politik-dem-recht>

²⁰ <https://www.diepresse.com/5605324/bvt-noch-immer-international-ingeschrankt>

²¹ <https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000119528008/ein-hund-namens-adolf-rechtsextreme-umtriebe-bei-polizei-aufgedeckt>

with the allegation of not intervening sufficiently in right-wing extremist activities and being reluctant to resort to punitive measures.

The BVT was also criticized due to investigative errors prior to the Vienna terror attack. Here, the BVT had been informed by the Slovakian authorities that the perpetrator had tried to buy munition but the BVT did not act on it by informing other bodies. The investigative reports by an independent commission which examined the events leading up to the Vienna attack stated that there is a clear need for a reform of the BVT (Zerbes et al., 2021). According to the reports (Zerbes et al., 2020; 2021), there is an urgent need to set up a data processing and analysis system to which all relevant departments have access to. Those responsible would need to enter all information relevant to the protection of the state that is available to them to enhance cooperation across departments and to clearly define responsibilities. Furthermore, the commission recommends the professionalisation of de-radicalisation work and the installation of regular case conferences including a variety of stakeholders.

5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation

According to some experts in the field and, given the fact that Austria has seen a comparatively low number of truly violent acts in the context of extremism and terrorism, the country is quite a latecomer when it comes to introducing specific measures and programmes focusing on the prevention of extremism (Reicher, 2015). Götsch (2017, p. 170) describes the current situation of measures dealing with prevention, intervention and de-radicalisation as a heterogeneous mix of private bottom-up and official government initiatives.

Currently, public discourse and measures of de-radicalisation have a strong focus on the youth in general and on Muslims in particular, which is surprising given the overall numbers and the scope of extremist offences as provided in official sources (see Section 3). Experts interviewed by Tamas (2020) argued that there is currently a rise in right-wing extremism in Austria which is not reflected in the media, which leads the public to believe in an even stronger rise in Islamist religious extremism. One explanation may be the long prevalence and history of right-wing extremism in Austria that results in a weaker perception of the 'new' religious extremism. In any case, this past decade has seen a quite vivid phase of implementation of new initiatives or the reorientation of existing measures, which should be seen in the context of the 'summer of migration' of 2015. This latter heralded the arrival of a large number of refugees with a Muslim background, which incident was discursively intertwined with the attacks associated with the terror militia Islamic State across Europe.

There are several ways to group the stakeholders and their initiatives – such as discerning between the public and private sphere and cooperative action, by scale (national, regional, local), by target groups (whole population, specific target groups, individuals) or by type of approach (punitive, integrative, educational). In this section, we focus on approaches that are integrative or educational in nature, while the punitive element will be discussed only briefly.

Punitive measures targeting extremism have been reformed a number of times and can be found in several laws. Concerning right-wing extremist activities, the National Socialist Prohibition Law (*Verbotsgesetz*) and the norm 'incitement to hatred' determined under Section

283 of the Criminal Code (StGB) are the most relevant legal provisions, as most of the criminal acts in connection with right-wing extremism are usually subsumed under either or both of the two norms. While the former prohibits all activities concerning fascism, national socialism and the resurgence thereof, the criminal offence of incitement to hatred concerns the public provocation to commit violence against a certain group or its disparagement. In 2020, a Hate-on-the-Net-Combat-Act (*Hass-im-Netz-Bekämpfungsgesetz – HiNBG*) was introduced to facilitate the prosecution of those posting hate speech on the Internet.

The substantive criminal law on terrorism can be found in the Criminal Code, while investigative powers are determined – amongst others – in the Police State Protection Act (*Polizeiliches Staatsschutzgesetz – PStSG*). The Twentieth Section of the Criminal Code concerns ‘Criminal acts against the public peace’. This section contains the offences ‘criminal association’, ‘criminal organisation’ and ‘terrorist organisation’, as well as provisions on terrorist financing and training. Here, religiously motivated extremism was not explicitly named. After the terror attack in Vienna in 2020, the government announced that it intended to reform the law by introducing a Terror-Combat-Act (*Terror-Bekämpfungsgesetz TeBG*). The government is now planning to introduce a new provision explicitly targeting religiously motivated extremist groups. This has been heavily criticised by experts who state that the current law is sufficient to combat terrorism and that the draft legislation is partially unconstitutional, leaving too much room for interpretation (Amnesty International, 2021; IRKS, 2021).

Moving on to integrative and/or educational approaches, we group stakeholders and their programmes according to their major targets and discern between primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. Of course, there are overlaps and blurred lines in this respect that we will elaborate on shortly wherever necessary. An overview comprising more examples – though not a comprehensive list – can be found in Appendix 4. In order to keep it concise, we equate actors and programmes in many cases, as some actors generate a multitude of larger and smaller measures but all going in the same direction, in line with the general approach of the respective actors.

5.1. Primary prevention

Primary prevention consists of encompassing programmes and approaches aimed at larger groups with no pre-defined targets trying to prevent radicalisation before the process even starts. This area of primary prevention has recently received major political attention in Austria and measures usually comprise a very large number of public and civil-society actors with emancipatory efforts prevailing in these preventive activities (Mandl & Katona, 2018). To give one example, the Vienna Network for Democracy, Culture and Prevention (WNED) of the City of Vienna has been pursuing a municipal strategy against extremism and devaluation ideologies since 2014, using already-existing institutions and structures responsible for the care, counselling and education of children, adolescents and young adults. WNED deals with all forms of group-related devaluation ideologies and anti-democratic attitudes, placing particular emphasis on protecting children and young people and promoting social cohesion.

Other important actors in this field are those primarily engaged in data collection, documentation and awareness-raising. The NGO ZARA became active in anti-racism work some 20 years ago and Dokustelle started to engage some five years ago in the documentation of and

counselling for people who experience islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism. The Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (DÖW) has a long history (since 1963) of working in the field on topics such as resistance, persecution and exile during the Nazi era, Nazi crimes, Nazi and post-war justice, right-wing extremism in Austria and Germany after 1945, the restitution and reparation of Nazi injustice and the strong commitment of public actors (at national level, and the City of Vienna).

5.2. Secondary prevention

Secondary prevention measures address identified target groups or individuals, trying to help in difficult situations in order to avoid problematic action and the progressing of radicalisation. Two important examples prove that this is often done in an indirect way via close relatives, mothers, friends or other close-contact persons who are searching for help and advice. The Counselling Centre on Extremism²² is an Austria-wide contact point for all questions on the topic of extremism. It is available to youth workers, social workers, teachers and affected family members alike. The counselling centre is located at BOJA – the Austrian Network of Open Youth Work – and offers a free helpline, personal counselling sessions and training. The second noteworthy initiative is Mothers' School, a bottom-up initiative by Edith Schläffer, a renowned sociologist. This is a programme for mothers, who are thus trained in the early detection of signs of radicalisation among their children, a programme that has been implemented in other countries as well, in some earlier than in Austria.

Noteworthy bottom-up approaches include Not in God's Name.²³ founded by Alexander Karakas in Vienna's second district in 2015 in a martial arts centre, where Muslims, Christians and Jews train together. In their mission statement, the actors state that young people who feel accepted in neither one culture nor another tend to radicalise. The goal is to reach these young people where they are, to develop perspectives in Austria with and for them and to help them becoming authentic role models for other young people who find themselves in the same situation.

5.3. Tertiary prevention

Tertiary prevention programmes are aimed at individuals who have put their extremist views into action or who are or have been imprisoned or otherwise legally punished. These programmes focus on changing one's behaviour and involve a large number of agents from federal ministries (most notably the Ministry for Justice and Internal Affairs), local administration and non-governmental actors. According to Mandl and Katona (2018) the most important actors are Derad²⁴ and Neustart.²⁵ Derad offers de-radicalisation programmes and support for prison detainees, follow-up support for persons convicted of relevant crimes, educational measures for judicial guards as well as workshops and consulting, often provided by Muslims with religious expertise (e.g. religious-education teachers and theologians). The focus is explicitly on religiously based political extremism in all its forms. Neustart is an example of an NGO which has been engaged in the field of probationary support since 1957 and which has included de-radicalisation in its portfolio since 2015. Ever since then, Neustart

²² <https://www.boja.at/index.php/beratungsstelle-extremismus>

²³ <https://nign.eu/>

²⁴ <https://www.derad.at/>

²⁵ <https://www.neustart.at/at/de/index.php>

has been cooperating with Derad on issues of Islamic theology. Neustart applies an individual-centred approach during the phase of probation, the goals in de-radicalisation work include a reduction in the willingness to use violence and of violent ideas through a change in behaviour towards non-punitive behaviour, a change of attitudes, the recognition of democratic values and non-violence as well as a critical reflection, reappraisal and distancing from violent extremism.

Summing up, de-radicalisation measures in Austria are encompassing very general – primary – interventions and more-targeted measures for persons who are in danger of being radicalised as well as, finally, measures for those who have been imprisoned or otherwise punished for radicalised acts. We see quite innovative new approaches alongside measures that have been in place for a long period of time and are adjusted to new challenges. Still, there is ample room for improvement in terms of the provision of resources and the development of comprehensive strategies, especially as Austria is a relative latecomer in this field.

6. Conclusion

This report provides an overview of the actors and channels of radicalisation and de-radicalisation in Austria. Summarising the points presented, it becomes clear how actors and focal points have changed over the past 20 years. After 9/11, Islamist terror became the main concern in most European countries but it was especially the phenomenon of foreign fighters who left Austria to join the terror militia Islamic State which changed the focus of national de-radicalisation programmes. Although Austria did not suffer from any terror attacks until November 2020, the field underwent a process of securitisation through the introduction of strict surveillance laws and laws explicitly targeting Muslims. Analogically, people of Muslim faith and migrants in general have suffered from discriminatory actions and violent attacks as well as public hate speech, which has constantly been linking religion to political Islamism and migration to the threat of terror. The recent foundation of a documentation and counselling centre for victims of anti-Muslim racism can be seen as a reaction to this development.

In addition to so-called Islamic terror, right-wing extremism plays a major role in Austria. Austria, as a country that has long had difficulties in confronting its National-Socialist past, is still reluctant to name and monitor right-wing extremist activities. Looking at the various sections, the gap between the number of incidents, perceptions by the public and the political elite and de-radicalisation programmes aiming at right-wing extremism becomes evident. Here, the high degree of institutionalisation of right-wing parties plays a key role, as does the shift of mainstream parties to the right. Right-wing rhetoric and positions driven by elitist groups have been used to mobilise large numbers of voters and have succeeded in making right-wing politics socially acceptable.

Legislative changes and de-radicalisation programmes have been characterised by these developments. While punitive measures have become ever more restrictive, raising questions on proportionality and further alienating and marginalising those affected, innovative de-radicalisation programmes are driven by NGOs active in the field, proving a strong bottom-up development in de-radicalisation most of all in the realm of secondary prevention. Quite

general approaches are docking onto well-established networks aimed at 'youth' as such, with no pre-defined targets trying to prevent radicalisation before the process even starts. Nevertheless, we again see a focus on Muslims rather than on right-wing extremism in de-radicalisation efforts.

Currently there are a number of changes and developments whose effects are not yet clear. On the one hand, there are anti-Covid protests and nationalist movements that take to the streets; on the other, Austrian Security Forces – and here most notably the BVT – have been caught up in scandals and are currently subject to restructuring, which is accompanied by heavy political controversies. This is in line with the findings of the previous sections, which show how channels, agents and stakeholders of radicalisation and de-radicalisation are not static but subject to political and societal change.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Main (de)-radicalisation events in Austria since 2001

| Name | Date or period of time | Description | Sources |
|---|------------------------|---|--|
| Conflicts between Turkish nationalists and Kurdish activists | | | |
| Arson attack on Turkish consulate Salzburg | 19.10.2008 | Suspected Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) activists broke into the Turkish consulate in Salzburg by throwing a rock through the window of the building and set a room on fire using a Molotov cocktail. No casualties were reported, and no claim of responsibility was made for the incident. | https://www.derstandard.at/story/1224255939271/salzburg-brandanschlag-auf-tuerkisches-konsulat |
| Arson attack on Kurdish facilities Vienna | 25.10.2008 | Unknown arsonists threw several Molotov cocktails through the door and window of a Kurdish club in Vienna. As the devices went out before the firefighters arrived only minimal damage was caused. No claim of responsibility was made for the incident. These two examples are exemplary for ongoing conflicts between Turkish nationalists and Kurdish activists. | https://www.derstandard.at/story/122476346554/brandanschlag-auf-kurden-lokal-in-wien-keine-verletzten https://www.diepresse.com/425529/wieder-anschlage-auf-turken-und-kurdenlokale |
| Attacks on Kurdish activists during women's support marches | June 2020 | Turkish nationalists attacked Kurdish activists during a support march for women and on multiple consecutive occasions in June 2020. In course of the riots, Turkish nationalists associated with the Grey Wolves threw bottles, stones, and pyrotechnical articles. Multiple aggressors were arrested. | https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000118369179/demos-in-wien-favoriten-was-steckt-dahinter-wer-ist-involviert https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000118302002/erneut-angriff-grauer-woelfe-auf-kurdische-demo-in-wien |
| Radical Animal rights' activists and their activities | | | |

| | | | |
|--|----------------|---|--|
| Arson attack on Novartis CEO's residence | 08.03.2009 | Assailants set fire to the private residence of the chief executive officer of Novartis, destroying the residence but causing no casualties. The group Militant Forces Against Huntingdon Life Science Austria (MFAH) claimed responsibility for the attack and reasoned the attack with their fight against the company's animal testing. | https://www.derstandard.at/story/1246543895996/tirol-militante-tierschuetzer-bekennen-sich-zu-brandanschlag |
| Trial against animal rights activists | 2010 - 2011 | A group of animal rights activists faced charges of "founding a criminal organisation". The group had been subject to intense police surveillance, including an undercover agent. In court, all accused were acquitted. The overall failure of the police work and the subsequent trial led to a reform of the Austrian legislation on terrorism (§ 278a). | https://www.diepresse.com/3804601/tierschuetzer-prozess-freispruch-in-wiener-neustadt |
| Confrontations in the context of left-wing activism | | | |
| Annual demonstrations regarding the "Akademikerball"; trial against Josef S. | 2008 - ongoing | The Akademikerball (academic ball) is the replacement of the WKR Ball (Viennese Fraternity Ball) which was organised by extreme right nationalist fraternities. In 2013, the FPÖ assumed the organisation in order not to lose the venue at Wiener Hofburg. Since 2008, there are annual demonstrations taking place against the event, which have been prohibited by the police in some years. In 2014, riots during the demonstration resulted in a high amount of property damage. The German citizen Josef S. was convicted after a heavily criticised trial based on the offence breach of the peace. The article § 274 StGB was reformed later. | https://oe1.orf.at/artikel/383231/Urteil-im-Akademikerball-Prozess https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000003414235/spoe-und-gruene-kritisieren-urteil |
| Eviction of "Pizzeria Anarchia" | 2014 | In 2014, the police evicted the squat "Pizzeria Anarchia" making use of water cannons, armored vehicles and special forces. The police deployment was heavily criticised for not being proportionate as 1,700 police officers stood vis a vis 40 protestors. 19 persons were arrested and released the following day. | https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000003586717/wien-vorbereitungen-zur-raeumung-der-pizzeria-anarchia-begonnen |

| Developments, following increased political agitations against Muslims | | | |
|--|-------------------------|---|--|
| Ongoing acts of vandalism at the KZ Memorial Mauthausen | February 2009 - ongoing | In February 2009, right-wing extremist slogans were written on the wall of the Nazi concentration camp Mauthausen, referring to Muslims as “new Jews”. According to the Mauthausen Committee, the Mauthausen facilities were vandalised by right wing extremist’s 22 further times between 2013 and 2020. Across all Austrian concentration camp memorials, the committee documented 107 incidents over the past 7 years. | https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000117284788/mauthausen-komitee-regierung-schwieg-schaendungen-von-gedenkstaetten-tot https://www.mauthausen-memorial.org/assets/uploads/Jahresbericht-2019_final.pdf |
| Islam Law 2015 | 2015 | The revised version of the Islam Law, which regulates the legal status of Austria’s Islamic communities (originally from 1912) contains a paragraph explicitly calling for “a positive attitude towards the Austrian state” and “state law before religious law”, thereby expressing the government’s mistrust in the country’s Muslim communities. | https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20009124 |
| Vandalism at Mosque in Graz | 06.05.2016 | Four right wing extremists positioned a pig’s head in front of a Mosque and daubed the building with pig blood. In addition to the right-wing extremist perpetrators, two officials of the Austrian military intelligence faced criminal charges as they knew about the extremists’ plans and did not impede them. | https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000040308065/anschlag-auf-moschee-in-graz-verdacht-gegen-geheimdienst |
| Founding of the Documentation Centre “Political Islam” | July 2020 | The government identified “Political Islam” as a potential danger and founded this facility to document developments and groups sympathising with “Political Islam” with scientific means. | https://religion.orf.at/stories/3201806/ |
| Anti-muslim attacks | Ongoing | In Austria, the association ZARA (civil courage and anti-racism work) and “Dokustelle Islamfeindlichkeit und anti-muslimischer Rassismus (Documentation Centre Islamophobia and anti-muslimic racism) have collected data on anti-muslim attacks. The assaults have been rising since | https://assets.zara.or.at/download/pdf/ZARA-Rassismus_Report_2019_EN.pdf https://dokustelle.at/fileadmin/Documents/Reports/Report-2019-A4.pdf |

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| | | 2015 and very recently after the terrorist attack in November 2020. | |
| Incidents following increased polarisation after the 2015 “refugee crisis” | | | |
| Arson Attack on refugee accommodation Altenberg | 01.06.2016 | The newly build accommodation centre for asylum seekers in Altenfelden was set on fire and fully burnt down. No group or individual claimed responsibility for the incident. The mode of violence is typical for right-wing extremists. In 2015, 25 violent attacks on accommodation centres had been recorded by the BVT | https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000037998380/neugebautes-fluechtlingsheim-in-oberoesterreich-abgebrannt |
| Arson attack refugee centre Himberg | 27.11.2016 | Three right-wing extremists belonging to the Identitarian Movement threw a Molotov cocktail at a refugee centre in Himberg. Although the centre was full of people, nobody was injured. | https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000111159424/identitaere-fuer-brandanschlag-auf-asyheim-verantwortlich |
| Gun attack on refugee accommodation in Rosenau/ Hengstpass | 27.08.2017 | An unknown perpetrator shot multiple times at a refugee accommodation from his car but did not hit the inhabitants. No group or individual claimed responsibility for the incident. The mode of violence is typical for right-wing extremists. | https://www.meinbezirk.at/kirchdorf/c-lokales/schuesse-auf-asyunterkunft-in-rosenau_a2229118 |
| Incidents related to the Terror Militia Islamic State and other jihadist groups | | | |
| Austrian residents joining the terror militia Islamic State | approximately 2011 - ongoing | Approximately 326 Austrian residents joined or tried to join the terror militia Islamic State as so-called “foreign fighters” over the past years. Following Austrian Intelligence services, 69 died in Iraq, Syria and neighbouring countries, 93 returned, 62 were caught before they left Austria and 102 people remain in the region. | https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/2020-11/islamismus-oesterreich-wien-dokumentationsstelle-politischer-islam?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.qwant.com%2F |
| New anti-terror legislation | 2015 | In 2015, following the attacks in Paris, a series of legislative acts addressed jihadist terrorism, among them the “Symbol Law”, which forbids the use of symbols of Islamic State and | https://www.diepresse.com/5538891/symbole-gesetz-beschlossen-auch-wolfsgruss-verboden |

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| | | Al-Quaida (by 2020, this list has been extended to Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hisbollah, Grey Wolves, Kurdish Worker's Party, Ustasha, and affiliated groups, as well as symbols of all groups listed as terrorist organisation according to European Union legislation). | |
| Terrorist attack in the city centre of Vienna | 02.11.2020 | A single gunman affiliated with the terror militia Islamic State shot 4 people in the Viennese city centre and wounded several others. He was shot by the police on site. | https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000121392028/terroranschlag-in-wien-ein-ueberblick |
| Anti-semitic Incidents | | | |
| Acts of vandalism at an open-air commemorative exhibition in Vienna | May 2019 | During the open-air exhibition "Lest we forget", portraits of Holocaust survivors were exhibited at the Ring, in the first district of Vienna. The pictures were damaged three times consecutively as unknown perpetrators slashed the canvases. As a consequence, several youth organisations held vigils. | https://www.erinnern.at/themen/e_bibliotheek/ausstellungen/vandalismus-an-der-ausstellung-2019egen-das-vergessen201c-2013-portraitfotos-von-verfolgten-des-nationalsozialismus-zerschnitten |
| Anti-semitic attack | October 2019 | On the eve of Jom Kippur, a man was assaulted and verbally abused after visiting the synagogue in Vienna. The incident occurred only two hours after the attack in Halle/ Germany. The the Jewish Community Vienna (IKG) and the Forum against Antisemitism (FgA) are collecting data on anti-semitic incidents. In 2019, 550 incidents were recorded which is a doubling within five years (255 incidents in 2014). | https://religion.orf.at/v3/stories/2992814/ https://wien.orf.at/stories/3050504/ |
| Attacks on Jewish and LGBTQ facilities, and a Jewish representative in Graz | July 2020 | A single perpetrator and sympathiser of the terror militia Islamic State vandalised several buildings, among them a Synagogue and a LGBTQ facility and physically attacked the Jewish representative Elie Rosen. | https://kurier.at/chronik/oesterreich/anti-semitische-angriffe-ein-schwarzer-tag-fuer-oesterreich/401008970 |
| Right wing extremism | | | |

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| Trial against Gottfried Küssel, National Socialist Reactivation and Incitement to hatred | 2012 | The trial against Gottfried Küssel was one of the biggest in the past decade concerning the Prohibition Act (Verbotsgesetz) which prohibits all activities concerning fascism, national socialism and the resurgence thereof. Gottfried Küssel is a leading figure of the Neonazi-Scene and had already been sentenced to eleven years in prison before. The trial in 2012, which focused on the extreme-right Homepage alpen-donau.info ended with another conviction. The numbers of convictions based on the prohibition act have been rising in the past years. | https://kurier.at/politik/inland/neun-jahre-haft-fuer-gottfried-kuessel/2.437.380 https://kurier.at/chronik/oesterreich/ns-wiederbetaetigung-zahl-der-verurteilungen-gestiegen/400431535 |
| Identitarian Movement; disruptive action at the university of Klagenfurt | 2012 - ongoing | The Identitarian Movement Austria is a rightwing extremist youth organisation that was officially founded in 2012 as "Association to preserve and promote cultural identity". After disruptive actions at the university of Klagenfurt, the rector was injured and one member of the movement was convicted. | https://www.diepresse.com/5658432/identitarer-in-graz-zu-sechs-monaten-bedingt-verurteilt |
| Covid-19 Demonstrations | 2020 - ongoing | Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, Austria has experienced the growth of new, internally diverse radical groups that can hardly be pigeonholed. Among those demonstrating against the governmental anti-Covid measures are anti-vaccinists, esoterics, conspiracy theorists, radical right extremists and many more. The Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (DÖW) has documented how convicted Neo-nazis and other radical right extremists attacked journalists and used the protests as platform to picture their ideology as a broad movement. | https://wien.orf.at/stories/3085165/ |

| Police violence | | | |
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| Torture of Bakary J. | April 2006 | Bakary J., a Gambian citizen, was tortured by four policemen after a failed deportation attempt. The police had brought him to a warehouse in Vienna, where they enacted a mock execution, kicked and beat him using batons and electrical shockers causing several heavy injuries. | https://www.bakary-jassey.at/ https://orf.at/v2/stories/2116973/2116974/ https://www.amnesty.at/media/2387/osterreich_opfer-oder-verdaechtige.pdf |
| Police violence during a demonstration against climate change | 31.05.2019 | <p>When police officers ended a sit-in during a demonstration against climate change, at least three activists were injured by the police. One activist was pushed to the ground and put beneath a police car that started to drive.</p> <p>In an answer to a Parliamentary question regarding the demonstration issued by the liberal party "NEOS", the Minister of Interior published data on police violence that record a total of 3,677 allegations of ill-treatment between 2017 and 2019. Only 21 of the 1,244 proceedings resulted in a conviction of the accused police officer.</p> | https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVI/AB/AB_03676/index.shtml https://www.amnesty.at/media/6553/amnesty_kurzbericht-polizeigewalt-bei-klimademo_dezember-2019.pdf |

Appendix 2. Political discourse about radicalisation in Austria

| Quotation | Author(s) | Date of quotation | Source | Comments |
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| On conflicts between Turkish nationalists and Kurdish activists | | | | |
| <p>"We will not let anyone jeopardise the peaceful coexistence in our city. The Viennese are characterised by cohesion and that they look out for each other. Especially in times of Corona, this is more important than ever. We deeply reject violence and it has no place in our city. It is in our DNA to stand up with all our strength against any kind of fascism and radicalism", Ludwig told City Hall Correspondence. "We have seen images of the past few days that have no place in our city. People who deliberately and provocatively make use of legally prohibited hand signs and are willing not only to provoke, but also to use violence." The incidents in Favoriten are a security issue, Ludwig stressed. "For the 99% peaceful people in Vienna there is integration policy, for violent radicals there is security policy, which is enforced by the police with full consequence and severity."</p> | <p>Michael Ludwig, Mayor of Vienna, SPÖ</p> | <p>25.06.2020</p> | <p>https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20200626_OTS0120/buergermeister-ludwig-kein-platz-in-wien-fuer-gewalt-und-extremisten-auf-den-strassen</p> | <p>Most recent attacks on Kurdish activists by Turkish nationalists (see also Appendix 1) took place shortly before the elections in Vienna. Vienna has traditionally been under Social Democratic rule, with a liberal approach to immigrant integration that emphasises social cohesion. Favoriten is the largest district of Vienna, a former working-class district and with a high percentage of immigrant population. The attacks were driven by the Grey Wolves, a Turkish right-wing extremist group whose salutation and symbols had been prohibited in 2018.</p> |
| <p>"I don't want any confrontations between migrant groups on Vienna's streets. We will not tolerate that conflicts from abroad between potentially violent extremist groups are being carried out on Austrian soil and that our values are being trampled all over," she stressed: "Anyone who wants to live in Austria must</p> | <p>Susanne Raab, Minister for Integration, ÖVP</p> | <p>25.06.2020</p> | <p>https://www.news.at/a/wien-favoriten-ausschreiten</p> | <p>While the city of Vienna was traditionally governed by Social Democrats, the ÖVP has been in charge of the integration agendas at the federal level since the gradual institutionalisation of integration</p> |

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| <p>abide by our laws and values." For Raab, the incident "once again made it clear how pronounced parallel societies are in Vienna."</p> | | | <p>gen-11537218</p> | <p>policies in 2011. Representatives of the ÖVP follow a problem-centreed approach to immigrant integration, emphasising difference and "Austrian" values.</p> |
| <p>On the right-wing extremist event "Akademikerball" and demonstrations regarding the event</p> | | | | |
| <p>As "mildly astonished" about the outcome of the trial Josef S. appears SPÖ-Justice speaker Hannes Jarolim. "Characteristic for the procedure is that even the present judgement recognised an unconditional imprisonment in the extent of four months as justified, while Josef S. is already held in custody for nearly six months despite fierce indications from the respective expert community. Naturally, we have to wait and see what the appellate court will decide on this not legally binding judgement", says Jarolim on Tuesday vis-à-vis the SPÖ press service. Due to the considerable echo of this procedure also abroad, it will be necessary to discuss the incident in question and its now first-court judgment in the international context according to Jarolim. In particular with regard to the offence breach of the peace. "In this context, it is certainly necessary to take into account the extent to which the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of demonstration - in this case in relation to right-wing extremist developments - may appear undesirable and incomprehensible to representatives of security and the courts," said Jarolim.</p> | <p>Hannes Jarolim, SPÖ Justice Speaker</p> | <p>22.07.2014</p> | <p>https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20140722_OTS0134/jarolim-zu-urteil-josef-s-politische-diskussion-ueber-tatbestand-des-landfriedensbruches-notwendig</p> | <p>The right-wing extremist event Akademikerball (Academic Ball) is an annual event organised by the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). Since 2008, annual demonstrations accompany the event (see also Appendix 1). Protests are directed against the event as such and criticise that the Austrian Republic provides a representative venue for right-wing extremist networking events. The events and the demonstrations against it are exemplary for right-left polarisation in Austria and the strong networks of right-wing groups. Riots during the demonstration in 2014 resulted in a high amount of property damage. The German citizen Josef S. was arrested and sentenced to 12 months of prison.</p> |

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| <p>"The continuing agitation of the left-wing camp over the verdict against Josef S. only shows that the latter is still unable to distance itself from the violence that was displayed in Vienna's city centre in February," FPÖ Secretary General Harald Vilimsky said today. The interpretation of the law by left-wing groups, but also by the SPÖ and the Greens, is more than questionable: "Hundreds of hooded perpetrators of violence marched through the city centre at that time, smashed windows, and wilfully destroyed police equipment and cars. But at the conviction of one person who was verifiably involved in these actions, there is a huge outcry from the left."</p> <p>The cloak of fighting fascism should not be a free pass for destruction and violence, he said. "This verdict shows that Austria is still a functioning constitutional state in which such escapades, including destructive rage, are not tolerated," Vilimsky said. He added that the verdict also showed that the plan to make left-wing extremist ideology acceptable in Austria had failed.</p> | <p>Harald Vilimsky, Secretary General FPÖ</p> | <p>24.07.2014</p> | <p>https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20140724_OTS0160/fpoe-vilimsky-kampf-gegen-faschismus-ist-kein-freischein-fuer-zerstoerungswut</p> | <p>While the SPÖ and the Greens have criticised the long custody prior to the trial on the one hand and the indictment based on the offence breach of the peace as well as the verdict on the other, the FPÖ has hailed the verdict and has used it to delegitimise demonstrations in the following years (see also the following quote).</p> |
| <p>"In recent years, the Akademikerball has been a networking event of the extreme right. FPÖ and German nationalist fraternity members hold a rendezvous with anti-Semites, revisionists and neo-fascists from various countries. Opposition and protests against this meeting are important and necessary," says Albert Steinhauser, deputy chairman of the Green Party.</p> <p>"The premises of the Republic must no longer offer space to right-wing extremist networking activities and</p> | <p>Albert Steinhauser, deputy chairman Green Party; Birgit Hebein, social and security spokes-woman</p> | <p>02.02.2017</p> | <p>https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20170202_OTS0162/steinhauserhebein-akademikerball-endlich</p> | <p>The annual event takes place at the Hofburg in the first District of Vienna. These premises belong to the republic and are highly symbolic. That the republic provides these premises is a core point of criticism by the Green Party and other groups.</p> |

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| <p>events. We must not accept this on the basis of our history alone. Anti-fascist commitment against right-wing extremism and social chauvinism is more necessary than ever," says Hebein, social and security spokeswoman of the Vienna Greens. One thing is certain for both: "As every year, we Greens will accompany the protests and keep a close eye on the observance of fundamental rights and the right of assembly."</p> | <p>of the Vienna Greens</p> | | <p>raus-aus-der-hofburg</p> | |
| <p>"The fact that Sellner, the leader of the Identitarian Movement, will be attending the Akademikerball shows once again that for the FPÖ, demarcation from the right-wing fringe is nothing but smoke and mirrors," explained SPÖ federal manager Christian Deutsch on Sunday. "Dancing with Sellner and at the same time having nothing to do with the Identitarians, that doesn't go together," explains Deutsch, for whom this latest scandal is just another in a chain of evidence that the FPÖ is "not at all serious" about its much-claimed distancing from right-wing extremism."</p> | <p>Christian Deutsch, SPÖ federal manager</p> | <p>19.01.2020</p> | <p>https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20200119_OTS0020/deutsch-fpoe-tanzt-mit-sellner-bei-akademikerball</p> | <p>The FPÖ has regularly been criticised for its links to far-right movements. Lacking demarcation and joint events were strongly condemned by other parties. In the course of its electoral success, the party tried to distance itself publicly from right-wing extremist groups.</p> |
| <p>On developments, following increased political agitations against Muslims</p> | | | | |
| <p>"The Occident in Christian Hands. Yes, that is what we stand for. Many faithful Christians of all Christian churches, Catholics, Protestants, also members of the Serbian Orthodox Church and yes, many believers, and there are also representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church here today, many faithful people. The Christian-European Occident, that's what we are about, that's what we want to preserve. We do not want to see that Europe has to experience an Islamisation, no, we do not want that. Therefore, we also want to clearly and unequivocally commit</p> | <p>Heinz Christian Strache, party chairman, FPÖ</p> | <p>May 2009</p> | <p>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PP_P32tEyJX8</p> | <p>In the course of a demonstration of a citizens' initiative against the expansion of a Muslim centre, Strache gave a speech on a stage shortly before the elections to European Parliament. Strache stood on the stage with a large wooden cross in his hand constructing the Austrian people as Christians belonging to the occident versus the imminent threat of Islamisation.</p> |

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| <p>ourselves to our Christianity, to our community of values of the Christian European Occident, as brothers."</p> | | | | |
| <p>"And I think we will agree in here that neither Islamophobia nor whitewashing problems will get us anywhere on these issues. I think we all agree that there is a strong need to distinguish between Islam as a religion and the phenomenon of political Islamism. Islam as a religion has been recognised in Austria since 1912, but political Islamism definitely has no place in our country."</p> | <p>Sebastian Kurz, Minister for Integration, Europe and Foreign Affairs, ÖVP</p> | <p>27.05.2016</p> | <p>https://www.facebook.com/sebastiankurz.at/videos/die-religion-islam-wurde-1912-in-%C3%B6sterreich-anerkannt-der-politische-islamismus-/1020095841415422/</p> | <p>This quote is an example of the old ÖVP attitude toward integration. Sebastian Kurz is speaking at the opening of a conference on "Islam and Politics. Illusion of an Islamic State" at the University of Vienna. His rise within the party began with his appointment as State Secretary for Integration. In this function, he focused primarily on promoting "integration through performance". The differentiation he makes in the quote between Islam as religion and political Islamism is later blurred and reversed.</p> |
| <p>President of the National Council Wolfgang Sobotka (ÖVP) demands from Austria's Muslims a commitment to the constitution and the rule of law. This does not only refer to those who are organised in the Islamic Religious Community (IGGÖ), as there are more organisations, he said in a press talk. Sobotka also wants to strengthen secular Islam in general, for example through discussions in parliament. "I would wish that all Muslim organisations would make up their minds to make a joint commitment," Sobotka said. The president of the National Council is primarily concerned with the clear separation between state and religion, which "political Islam" apparently does not accept.</p> | <p>Wolfgang Sobotka, President of the National Council, ÖVP</p> | <p>23.07.2020</p> | <p>https://kurier.at/politik/inland/sobotka-fordert-von-muslimen-bekennnis-zur-verfassung/400979438</p> | <p>This more recent quote serves as an example of the current attitude of the ÖVP toward integration. Focusing on the construction of difference, representatives of the ÖVP relate religion to extremism by making references to "political Islam".</p> |

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| <p>"I am not afraid of Corona, Corona is not dangerous. The Quran is more dangerous, my dear friends, than Corona."</p> | <p>Norbert Hofer, party chairman FPÖ</p> | <p>17.06.2020</p> | <p>https://religion.orf.at/v3/stories/3003861/</p> | <p>This very recent quote is an example of how the FPÖ does not shy away from bringing the topic of Islam into discussions which are not at all related to it.</p> |
| <p>Incidents following increased polarisation after the 2015 “refugee crisis”</p> | | | | |
| <p>"Refugees are victims, not perpetrators." Criminalising and ghettoising them plays into the hands of extremists and violent criminals. They could quickly and easily recruit new helpers and supporters among the marginalised. Removing the breeding ground for such human catchers is an important task of politics. "So the community is challenged, in many ways," Faymann said. The response to events such as the series of terrorist attacks in Paris last Friday can therefore "only be to move closer together." Together, the fight must be taken up "to defend democracy and freedom". The question now is how this can be done. How, on the one hand, the security forces can cooperate better across borders and at the same time preserve Europe's freedom and openness. Seclusion cannot be a solution. This is one of the reasons why Germany and Austria agreed with each other at the beginning of September to open the border to Hungary for refugees. Not letting people in at that time "would have triggered a humanitarian catastrophe if we had thought it through to the end," Faymann said.</p> | <p>Werner Faymann, Federal Chancellor, SPÖ</p> | <p>19.11.2015</p> | <p>https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/sz-wirtschaftsgipfel-faymann-fluechtlinge-sind-opfer-nicht-taeter-1.2744650</p> | <p>This quote is an example of the positioning of the Austrian chancellor in the context of the summer of 2015. After a short period of openness, when people welcomed refugees at the borders and train stations, the public opinion and attitudes changed. The SPÖ has had difficulties in positioning themselves vis-à-vis right wing populist parties that mobilised their voters with the topic of immigration on the one hand and liberal wings of the party on the other.</p> |
| <p>Chancellor Werner Faymann (SPÖ) defended his party's stance on the refugee issue during the Vienna SPÖ club meeting on Thursday. "We are not able to take in all the refugees in Austria who are currently looking for a new home," he said. Austria could not</p> | <p>Werner Faymann, Federal</p> | <p>10.03.2016</p> | <p>https://kurier.at/politik/inland/faymann-verteidigt-auf-spoee</p> | <p>In 2016, Werner Faymann had changed the party's course and introduced an annual upper limit of asylum applications in Austria.</p> |

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| <p>take in millions of refugees and "not even two, three, four hundred thousand." "That a country like Austria or the EU should put everything in order that is not in order in other parts of the world, that will not work," he said. "To state that clearly, that's what we were elected for," Faymann said, defending the upper limit: A benchmark of 37,500 had been set "to show that we are willing to take in a large proportion of refugees again this year."</p> | <p>Chancellor, SPÖ</p> | | <p>tagung-seine-fluechtlingspolitik/186.047.390</p> | |
| <p>"I think we all agree that integration is a great challenge, especially when it comes to people who come to us from other cultures as refugees or illegal migrants. This is the greatest challenge when it comes to people who do not come from our neighbourhood, not from Europe, but from other cultural circles. As the Ministry for Integration, Europe and Foreign Affairs, we therefore warned as early as the beginning of 2015 that unrestricted admission to Central Europe cannot work and that waving these people on is absolutely the wrong way to go. I have already emphasised today that I am glad that we have succeeded in stopping the wave-on via the Western Balkans route. There is still a lot to do on the Mediterranean-Italy route. There is also much to do in integrating those who have come to us and will stay here. We therefore proposed an integration law in August. (...) The integration law has the goal of demanding and promoting. The integration year law brings points such as more German courses and value courses, it allows community service, so that people who can not find a job, do not just sit around in the park or at home. And, as I mentioned earlier, there should also be a ban on symbols of the counter-society, such as Quran distribution campaigns by Salafists or, for example,</p> | <p>Sebastian Kurz, Minister for Integration, Europe and Foreign Affairs, ÖVP</p> | <p>28.03.2017</p> | <p>https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00179/fname_672855.pdf</p> | <p>This quote is an example of how Sebastian Kurz and the ÖVP have discursively linked refugee migration to Islam. Emphasising the word challenge and speaking of a "counter-society" as well as "real" refugees and illegal migrants, he constructs difference and problematises migration and integration.</p> |

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| <p>the full-face veil, which in my opinion should have no place in Austria or in Europe. "</p> | | | | |
| <p>"I think it (note: the burqa) is solely about a symbol. The integration minister also said that it was about showing that we don't want that. Of course we don't want it, we all don't want it, because, as Mr. Cap (note: SPÖ) said, the burqa is a symbol of political Islam. There is no question about that. The only question is: By introducing a ban, are we as a liberal constitutional state not counteracting the very liberal values that we should actually all be fighting for? We stand up and say: The only way to react to such an oppressive symbol as the burqa is to de facto abandon the open society, which Mr. Wöginger also mentioned, and to issue a ban as the only response. In doing so, we are driving these women into isolation, and we will certainly not be able to conduct a dialogue with them, which we should be conducting, so that they finally take off the burqa voluntarily."</p> | <p>Nikolaus Scherak, member of Parliament, NEOS</p> | <p>28.03.2017</p> | <p>https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00179/fname_672855.pdf</p> | <p>This quote is drawn from the parliamentary debate on the Integration Law and an example for the position of the liberal party NEOS in Austria.</p> |
| <p>"Today they are still sitting on their plastic bags, or whatever, I don't know, corduroy bags, or on their suitcases somewhere in Afghanistan or Africa, but tomorrow, I guarantee you, they will already be lying on our backs, word has already got around and we can't and won't allow that, because I don't see why an Austrian, a worker, a farmer, who has worked forty-five years and then goes into retirement, that he has the same amount or less than someone who just says the word asylum, yes, who perhaps still lies so that the beams bend when initiating this whole procedure, who then gets status and from that moment on draws the minimum security and other social benefits (...) and this mess, that is the red-black system (note: SPÖ-</p> | <p>Herbert Kickl, General Secretary FPÖ</p> | <p>29.06.2017</p> | <p>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCBPrkNmK0k</p> | <p>This quote stems from a speech delivered by Herbert Kickl at a traditional get-together organised by the FPÖ in Wieselburg, a small town in Lower Austria. It is an example for the aggressive populist rhetoric employed by members of the FPÖ. Using pejorative terms and speaking partially in dialect, Kickl depicts refugee migrants as being lazy and taking advantage of social benefits. Following the logic of populist speeches, he constructs a dichotomy</p> |

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| <p>ÖVP) and nothing else, that's it. Then we talk about integration? They all laugh at us. Yes, because after six years, I don't know if you all know this, because after six years these asylum seekers get de facto citizenship thrown at them (...) Well, that's what we needed. You can still remember what we were promised: the highly qualified who are coming. Qualification has been promised, testosterone has been delivered."</p> | | | | <p>of "us" against "them" and himself as a representative of Austrian citizens.</p> |
| On incidents related to the Terror Militia Islamic State and other jihadist groups | | | | |
| <p>"We stand side by side with the other states to defend our values. For our efforts in the fight against terrorism, specialists are needed whom we must provide with the necessary instruments. We will have a new, intensive discussion about the state protection law. The basis for it has already been determined in the Council of Ministers and it guarantees the balance between freedom and security"</p> | <p>Johanna Mikl Leitner, Minister of Interior, ÖVP</p> | <p>19.11.2015</p> | <p>https://www.orts.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20151119_OTS0116/oevp-stellt-aktuelle-themen-im-bundesrat-zur-diskussion</p> | <p>This quote stems from the time shortly after the Paris attacks. It is an example of how events from abroad have led to legislative changes in Austria.</p> |
| <p>"Austrians and all people who want to live together peacefully in Austria. In the centre of Vienna, in the middle of our republic, a cowardly terrorist attack on the heart of our society has taken place", the head of state said. However, the hatred could never be as strong "as our community." "It was aimed at our free society itself," the president said. "It applied to life in a liberal democracy, which terrorists seem to hate profoundly." But this democracy had been fought for too hard through the centuries "for us to back down now," he said. "Whoever assumes that, knows us</p> | <p>Alexander van der Bellen, Federal President, no party affiliation (formerly green Party)</p> | <p>03.11.2020</p> | <p>https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000121399499/kurz-wir-werden-unsere-werte-verteidigen</p> | <p>This quote was the reaction of the Austria president to the Vienna attack in November. Van der Bellen emphasises the word community and makes references to common values such as democracy, freedom and tolerance.</p> |

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| <p>badly," Van der Bellen said. "But hatred will not fall on fertile ground in society", he added. "We will protect and defend ourselves and our values with everything that is Vienna, with everything that is Austria, with everything we believe in and stand for, we say here and now: hate can never be as strong as our community in freedom, in democracy, in tolerance and in love," the Federal President said, ending with the words, "Long live freedom, long live our Republic of Austria, long live our common peaceful Europe."</p> | | | | |
| <p>"It was a particularly hard, unmediated blow of terrorism on Vienna, a peaceful metropolis that above all emphasises togetherness, one of the safest cities in the world, that out of nowhere a brutal act of terrorism has torn people from their lives, injured many others, some seriously. (...) I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has shown that Vienna is a city that functions well, especially in times of crisis. (...) The pain is now very deep in our city, because we have lost four people, many people are injured, even more traumatised. But that we show as the city of Vienna and people in our city that we will not let this terror, no matter whether it has international connotations or comes directly from Austria, distract us from our democracy, from a democratically run society, from what we live so proudly every day as a togetherness. And that makes me optimistic that in this difficult hour we show that we will not give in to the terrorists' wishes and that we will not depart from the togetherness that we cultivate in our city. And we will do so across party lines and also across religious lines. (...) This cooperation will be important to overcome the deep wound inflicted by international terror."</p> | <p>Michael Ludwig, Mayor of Vienna, SPÖ</p> | <p>03.11.2020</p> | <p>https://www.krone.at/2267428</p> | <p>This quote is drawn from a press conference the day after the terror attack. The mayor of Vienna here draws a picture of togetherness in the city and calls for cooperation across party and religious lines. Analogically to the president, he emphasises democratic values. In his speech, he listed all terror attacks that had occurred in Vienna during the second republic and does not make references to Islam.</p> |

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| <p>"We need a prohibition law against political Islam. This has not failed because of us. If we had one, we could have immobilised these terrorists, it would enable us to secure them before blood is shed. They didn't want it. We have always opposed early release of such individuals. We are in favour of revoking citizenships, even if in the end they are left with statelessness. That is not our problem, that is the problem of these terrorist individuals. (...) We will also have to ask ourselves whether it is really responsible to subject fanatical fundamentalists to a de-radicalisation programme and believe that this will make a difference and turn people who have inhaled a completely different value system than ours into ardent proponents of our way of life with a few value courses. That is naive and irresponsible, and we have to discuss that, because all of that is the breeding ground for the Islamism that you claim you want to fight."</p> | <p>Herbert Kickl, member of Parliament, FPÖ</p> | <p>05.11.2020</p> | <p>https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00060/fname_876492.pdf</p> | <p>This quote is drawn from the parliamentary debate on the terror attack. Herbert Kickl calls for stricter laws and delegitimises de-radicalisation programmes.</p> |
| <p>"In an open society, in a liberal democracy, it must always be clear that precisely this democratic freedom, this openness, and also the basic democratic rights can be exploited to combat precisely this freedom, this open society, this liberal democracy. Therefore, our society, our democratic institutions must always be vigilant and, above all, must always be defensible. The achievements of enlightenment and secularism-and that's what it's all about, those are our fundamental values-must be defended with all means available in this democracy and that we as legislators also make available. Freedom-and that's very important for me to say-is not just a right, but also an obligation, a duty, to defend this freedom again and again. Freedom always comes with responsibility</p> | <p>Beate Meini-Reisinger, Party chair NEOS</p> | <p>05.11.2020</p> | <p>https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00060/fname_876492.pdf</p> | <p>In the same plenary discussion, Beate Meini-Reisinger of the liberal party NEOS makes references to the enlightenment and secularism.</p> |

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| <p>and mindfulness. But mindfulness also means that one must clearly name the enemies of open society. There are many from many different sides, and in Europe at the moment this is especially Islamism. On the ground of a religion, it is in fact about fundamentalism and extremism. A very perverse state of God is placed above the democratic constitutional state, and fundamentalist views are placed above our liberal and open society. This will not be tolerated, ladies and gentlemen! That has no place with us! Ever since the Enlightenment, ever since the historic achievements of a constitution that safeguards fundamental rights and freedom, it must be clear that this has no place in our society. But it is precisely this freedom, this liberal social order, that must not be given up now, otherwise they would have won."</p> | | | | |
| <p>"In the fight against political Islam, we will create a criminal offence 'Political Islam' in order to be able to take action against those who are not terrorists themselves, but create the breeding ground for such. There will be further possibilities for the closure of places of worship, an introduction of an imam register, the symbol and association law will be tightened and furthermore measures will be taken to be able to dry up financial flows for the financing of terrorism."</p> | <p>Sebastian Kurz, federal chancellor, ÖVP</p> | <p>11.11.2020</p> | <p>https://twitter.com/sebastiankurz/status/1326519060922834945</p> | <p>This tweet by Sebastian Kurz shortly after the terror attack in Vienna is an example of the increasing amendment of the concept of terror and radicalisation throughout the years. Legislative changes in the aftermath of the attack target Muslims by creating the offence of religiously motivated extremist groups.</p> |
| <p>On Covid-19 and anti-deportation demonstrations</p> | | | | |
| <p>"It is rather unusual to submit a parliamentary question when you yourself are part of the government", David Stögmüller of the Green Party admits. In the Turquoise-Green government, however, this has now become the norm. There would also be requests to ministers from their own party. "I see</p> | <p>David Stögmüller and Georg Bürstmayr, Members of Parliament,</p> | <p>02.02.2021</p> | <p>https://kurier.at/chronik/wien/corona-demos-gruene-wollen-</p> | <p>During the third lockdown in Austria, there were several controversial demonstrations that led to a debate about the role of the police and the Ministry of Interior. On the one hand, families with children were deported</p> |

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| <p>myself as a control body of the government and as such it is part of my duties to question things," says Stögmüller, who is leading the current parliamentary inquiry to Interior Minister Karl Nehammer (ÖVP). "It has surprised us that the police, after the dissolution of the assembly was announced, for a long time only hesitantly or not at all proceeded against the demonstrators. This seems to us worthy of clarification. After all, those people who have been following the rules to contain the pandemic for a year are justifiably wondering why thousands of people are passing under their windows without masks and keeping their distance." Green security spokesman Georg Bürstmayr also signed the request and commented on the events at the demo: "It is part of the self-image of police officers to serve all people in Austria equally. For this reason, I don't want their superiors to give the impression that police operations and their intensity have anything to do with who is being targeted."</p> | <p>both the Greens</p> | | <p>antworten-von-der-eigenen-regierung/401176009</p> | <p>during the lockdown and protests against the demonstrations were broken up by the police, on the other hand, the police hardly intervened in (partly forbidden) demonstrations against Covid-19 measures. This also led to an increasing polarisation between right-wing and left-wing groups, as radical right-wing groups who participated in Corona demonstrations and disregarded the mask requirement and distance rules were not stopped by the police while left-wing counter-protests were broken up and demonstrators were encircled by the police.</p> |
| <p>"Mr. Interior Minister off duty, this is indeed a very serious and grave situation, but to stand here, to raise the moral finger, to make a big noise here, to lead the fight against Islamism and to accuse me of failure, I think is particularly worth mentioning because precisely the Interior Minister off duty Herbert Kickl in an unprecedented action in the history of the Second Republic - no Interior Minister has done that before! - in an unprecedented action in the history of the Second Republic - no Interior Minister has ever done that before! - he endangered an ongoing operation - in this case against the Muslim Brotherhood and against Hamas - (Belakowitsch/ FPÖ: Please go! - more heckling from the FPÖ) and precisely through this</p> | <p>Karl Nehammer, Minister of Interior, ÖVP</p> | <p>04.02.2021</p> | <p>https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVII/NRSITZ/0081/A_14_23_21_00236303.html</p> | <p>In a special session of the National Council, a motion of no confidence against the incumbent Minister of the Interior, Karl Nehammer, ÖVP, was introduced and supported by all opposition parties. Nehammer had already been criticised before the above-mentioned demonstrations for being responsible for investigative mistakes in connection with the terrorist attack in November. In his speech in parliament, Nehammer attacked in particular his predecessor, Herbert Kickl, FPÖ, who himself was</p> |

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| <p>action he was prepared to actually endanger the security of the Republic for this political agitation, as we have just seen. (Applause from the ÖVP and the Greens. - Mr. Kickl: You won't get rid of the four dead! - More heckling from the FPÖ.) (...) If it were not so serious, one could say that it is a whimsical debate that is being held here right now. (Belakowitsch/ FPÖ: No, it is not whimsical!) - It is not! (Belakowitsch/ FPÖ: That is bitterly serious!) You want to deny that there were right-wing extremists, refuseniks, hooligans, old neo-Nazis (Laughter from the FPÖ - Shouting from the FPÖ: ÖVPler! - heckling by Belakowitsch and Kickl), and then complain that it is mentioned and said that the crimes of the Third Reich were trivialised by wearing Jewish stars. And yes, these offences will all be punished, they will be investigated by the police, because this is not to be tolerated in a free constitutional state, in a democracy. " (Call from the FPÖ: That's your problem!)</p> | | | | <p>involved in a number of scandals surrounding the Interior Ministry and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The heckling by FPÖ deputies and the verbal attacks by Nehammer against Kickl reveal the tensions between the former coalition partners.</p> |
| <p>"Mr. Federal Minister, you are responsible - and this is a very heavy responsibility, I tell you - for the fact that children who were born in Austria, who grew up in Austria, who have their social environment in Austria and who went to school in Austria, were uncompromisingly deported in the early hours of the morning. You are responsible for the fact that students and teachers who wanted to help these children were taken away by the WEGA (Austrian Special Forces) and by dog squads. Young people, children, who have never done anything wrong in their lives, have suddenly been confronted with the police. (...) Yes, my personal view is that demonstrations must be able to take place even in times of a pandemic. It is the task of the authorities - at the end of the Minister of the</p> | <p>Jörg Leichtfried, member of Parliament, SPÖ</p> | <p>04.02.2021</p> | <p>https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXVII/NRSITZ/NRSITZ_00081/A_00014_59_23_00236318.html</p> | <p>In the same session of Parliament, the SPÖ criticises the harsh action against anti-deportation protests and the Interior Ministry's ban on demonstrations in times of the pandemic.</p> |

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| <p>Interior - to set the conditions so that they can take place, and also to be responsible for ensuring that these conditions are respected. We would have been spared the chaos of last Sunday, ladies and gentlemen, if there had been sensible dealings, if sensible official actions had been taken."</p> | | | | |
| <p>"When the ÖVP Minister of the Interior Nehammer, who is the first conservative since Dollfuß to ban political rallies, claims today that the walkers against the restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms last Sunday posed a blanket security threat, then this can only be described as nonsense of the highest order. The security problem lies with the BVT, which is more concerned with porn and gambling than with preventing a terrorist attack. The increasingly authoritarian ÖVP therefore has no moral right to defame peaceful citizens of this state in such a way," said today the National Council member Christian Hafenecker, MA of the FPÖ in his debate contribution. "It was precisely the escalation strategy of the Minister of the Interior that was responsible for the fact that the participants of the walk in Vienna were crowded together in the area of Maria-Theresien-Platz and thus security distances could not be maintained," Hafenecker explained.</p> | <p>Christian Hafenecker, member of Parliament, FPÖ</p> | <p>04.02.2021</p> | <p>https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20210204_OTS0179/fpoe-hafenecker-diffamierung-regierungskritischer-buerger-als-sicherheitsgefahr-durch-oevp-ist-unsinn-der-sonderklasse</p> | <p>Hafenecker makes references to the Austrian Ständestaat and Austrofascism (Engelbert Dollfuß) in his speech in Parliament. The FPÖ, as co-organiser of the demonstrations, sees the ban on the rallies primarily as an attack on freedom of speech. In addition, Hafenecker draws attention to other scandals that were preoccupying domestic politics at the time, concerning investigative mishaps in the terrorist attack on the one hand, and corruption scandals on the other.</p> |

Appendix 3. Exemplary networks of agents of radicalisation in Austria




Figure 3.1. Identitarian Movement network





Figure 3.2. Terror Militia Islamic State network



Appendix 4. Main de-radicalisation programmes in Austria

| Name | Dates | Agents | Approach | Scale | Targets |
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| Primary prevention measures including initiatives focussing on documentation and information | | | | | |
| WNED –Vienna Network Democracy Culture and Prevention (Wiener Netzwerk Demokratiekultur und Prävention) | 2014 – today | City of Vienna including several municipal departments, network of practitioners, group of experts; schools, open youth care, collaboration with BNED | Awareness raising, training | Local | Children and young adults |
| ZARA – Civil Courage and Anti-Racism Work (Zivilcourage und Anti-Rassismus-Arbeit, NGO) | 1999 | Cooperation with several other NGOs in the field | Counselling, prevention and awareness raising | National | Austrian society at large, multipliers, persons affected by racism |
| Dokustelle – Documentation and Counseling Centre Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Racism (Dokumentations- und Beratungsstelle Islamfeindlichkeit und antimuslimischer Rassismus, NGO) | 2015 | No partners mentioned in publications and on website | Documentation and reporting of incidents, awareness raising, counselling, workshops, empowerment | Mostly Vienna, reporting of cases from other federal provinces | Persons subject to islamophobia and anti-muslim racism |
| DÖW – Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance (Dokumentationsarchiv) | 1963 | Republic of Austria, City of Vienna as funding bodies | Research and documentation, educational offers on i.a. Holocaust, Roma and Sinti, right-wing extremism, prevention of | National | Austrian society at large; students and journalists looking for information on resistance, antisemitism |

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| des österreichischen Widerstands) | | | extremism and de-radicalisation | | |
| Secondary prevention measures | | | | | |
| Counselling Centre Extremism (Beratungsstelle Extremismus) run by BOJA (Austrian Network of Open Youth Work) | 2014 – today | Federal Chancellery as funding body; Family Counselling Centres across Austria, initiatives of open youth work across Austria, civil society organisations | Counselling and support for relatives and multipliers, helpline; policy recommendation, workshops | Nation-wide, based in Vienna | Everybody confronted with any form of extremism in their personal setting (relatives, teachers, social workers) |
| Not in God's name (NGO) | 2015 – today | Funding by Federal Chancellery and other public agencies; cooperation with schools | Educational, integrative; sports activities, informal streetwork, social media campaigns, | Mostly Vienna | Migrant children and youth |
| TURN – Association for the Prevention of Violence and Extremism (Verein für Gewalt- und Extremismusprävention) | 2018 – today | Network of youth workers, filmmakers, scholars of Islamic studies, social scientists and young people who have left the jihadist subculture and young Muslims who want to take position against jihadism | Delivering alternative narratives, Community engagement/empowerment | Mostly digital space | Teachers, multipliers, youth workers |
| Mothers' School against Extremism | 2015 in Austria, earlier in other countries | Edith Schläffer (sociologist), funded by Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration, and Foreign Affairs | Training in early detection of signs of radicalisation among children | Different venues across Austria | Mothers |
| Next: No to Extremism | 2019 | Large network of public agencies and NGOs, | Support of institutions dealing with the prevention of extremism, awareness- | Province of Styria, city of Graz | Institutions facing extremism prevention in their work, civil society, |

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| | | | raising, provision of materials on extremism and hate speech, legal support on extremism and hate speech, workshops | | educators and pedagogues, lecturers, politics and administration |
| BNED - Bundesweites Netzwerk Extremismusprävention und Deradikalisierung | 2017 | Federal ministries, civil society organisations, federal provinces, BVT | Networking, dissemination of information among network partners | Multilevel | Extremists in general |
| Tertiary prevention measures | | | | | |
| Social Network Conferences (SONEKO) | 2016 | Neustart | Fostering networks on the individual level, elaboration of a plan and control of compliance | National | Youth detainees (pre-trial and upon release) |
| NEUSTART Probation Services (Bewährungshilfe) | 1957 – today, includes deradicalisation since 2015 | DERAD, RAN; Federal Ministry of Justice as funding body | Integrative, inclusion and prevention, reintegration into society | National | Juvenile detainees on probation or granted parole |
| Exit Programme for Violent Extremists, followed by Exit Europe | 2017 (one year project), followed by Exit Europe | BM.I, BNED; BVT, governmental and non-governmental actors; in the second phase consortium partners in H2020 project | Integrative, awareness raising | Multi-agency approach in an international setting | Religiously motivated extremists, jihadists; local exit practitioners, communities EU wide, exit candidates, policy makers |

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| | (2019-2021) | | | | |
| DERAD – Prevention of Extremism, Dialogue and Democracy (Extremismusprävention, Dialog und Demokratie, NGO) | December 2015 until today | Federal Ministry of Justice as funding body, RAN | De-radicalisation programmes and support for prison detainees, follow-up support for persons convicted of relevant crimes, educational measures for judicial guards, workshops, consulting | International, national, local level | Prison detainees while in prison and after release |

Sources: RAN network online database; Tamas 2020; Mandl and Katona 2018; Websites of the actors.

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