



Stakeholders of (De-) Radicalisation in Germany

D3.1 Country Report

April 2021

Julia Glathe – Freie Universität Berlin



© Osteuropa-Institut, Freie Universität Berlin

Reference: D.RAD [D3.1.]

This research was conducted under the Horizon 2020 project 'De-Radicalisation in Europe and Beyond: Detect, Resolve, Re-integrate' (959198).

The sole responsibility of this publication lies with the author. The European Union is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein

Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at: julia.glathe@fu-berlin.de

This document is available for download at <https://dradproject.com/>

Table of contents

List of abbreviations	4
About the Project	5
Executive summary/Abstract	6
1. Introduction	8
2. Contextual background	9
3. Structure of radicalisation	10
3.1. Statistical evidence of radicalisation	10
3.2. Perception of radicalisation by the political elite.....	12
3.3. Public perception.....	14
4. Stakeholders and channels of radicalisation	14
4.1. Right-Wing terrorist networks	14
National Socialist Underground	15
Group Freital	15
Network Hannibal	16
4.2. State-driven radicalisation	16
5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation	17
6. Conclusion	20
Appendices	21
Appendix 1: Main (de)-radicalisation events in Germany since 2001.....	21
Appendix 2. Political discourse about radicalisation in Germany	24
Appendix 3. Networks of connection of the main agents of radicalisation in Germany.....	28
Appendix 4. Main de-radicalisation programmes in Germany.....	30
References and sources	33

List of abbreviations

AfD	Alternative for Germany
BfV	Domestic intelligence agency
BKA	Federal Criminal Police Office
BMI	Federal Ministry of the Interior
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
NSU	National Socialist Underground
SPD	Social Democratic Party
VBGR	Association of Counseling Centres for Victims of Right-wing, Racist and Anti-Semitic Violence in Germany (VBGR)

About the Project

D.Rad is a comparative study of radicalisation and polarisation in Europe and beyond. It aims to identify the actors, networks, and wider social contexts driving radicalisation, particularly among young people in urban and peri-urban areas. D.Rad conceptualises this through the I-GAP spectrum (injustice-grievance-alienation-polarisation) with the goal of moving towards measurable evaluations of de-radicalisation programmes. Our intention is to identify the building blocks of radicalisation, which include a sense of being victimised; a sense of being thwarted or lacking agency in established legal and political structures; and coming under the influence of “us vs them” identity formulations.

D.Rad benefits from an exceptional breadth of backgrounds. The project spans national contexts including the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, Georgia, Austria, and several minority nationalisms. It bridges academic disciplines ranging from political science and cultural studies to social psychology and artificial intelligence. Dissemination methods include D.Rad labs, D.Rad hubs, policy papers, academic workshops, visual outputs and digital galleries. As such, D.Rad establishes a rigorous foundation to test practical interventions geared to prevention, inclusion and de-radicalisation.

With the possibility of capturing the trajectories of seventeen nations and several minority nations, the project will provide a unique evidence base for the comparative analysis of law and policy as nation states adapt to new security challenges. The process of mapping these varieties and their link to national contexts will be crucial in uncovering strengths and weaknesses in existing interventions. Furthermore, D.Rad accounts for the problem that processes of radicalisation often occur in circumstances that escape the control and scrutiny of traditional national frameworks of justice. The participation of AI professionals in modelling, analysing and devising solutions to online radicalisation will be central to the project’s aims.

Executive summary/Abstract

Building on existing research and analyses by scholars, journalists and NGOs as well as on primary data, this report provides an overview of the context, structures, and agents of radicalised political violence in Germany and sheds light on the stakeholders and measures of de-radicalisation. A particular emphasis is laid on far-right terrorism, given its relevance to the current terrorist threat and its salience in terms of the quantity of violent assaults it's been linked to, as well as its organisational capacity. The history of right-wing terrorism after reunification is most prominently linked to the so-called National Socialist Underground that is responsible for the racially motivated murders of at least 9 people. In 2015, a new wave of right-wing terrorism emerged with daily violent attacks on refugees, leading to disturbing records of political violence. In the context of anti-migration movements, terrorist cells such as the "Freital Group" formed and committed serious attacks on refugees and left-wing politicians, while other cells such as "Oldschool Society" and "Revolution Chemnitz" managed to be stopped by the police right before they could carry out their murderous plans, ideologically rooted on white supremacy, anti-muslim racism, antisemitism and misogyny. Most recently, in a period of few months in 2019 and 2020, three right-wing terrorist attacks took place, killing 13 people.

Against this background, the first part of the report studies the socioeconomic and political context in which processes of radicalisation unfolded in Germany since the fall of Berlin wall in 1989. It shows that, as a result of major domestic and global transformations, social insecurity and a significant loss of trust in democratic institutions among the population have created a social environment in which radicalisation accentuates rapidly as new crises emerge. Events ranging from the global financial crisis to the increasing influx of refugees to the Covid 19 pandemic have all contributed to a dynamic in which segments of the population become increasingly alienated from the democratic system and eager to join radical movements that openly challenge democratic institutions and seek to destabilize and polarise the population. The new right, especially the far-right party Alternative for Germany, has played a particular important role in this process.

The second part of the report analyses the statistical evidence of radicalisation and compares it with the perception of violence by political elites and the population. Based on different sources from state authorities and civil society, it describes the major threat posed by far-right terrorism. In comparison, evidence of jihadist terrorism appears relatively low. Apart from the deadly attack on a Christmas market in 2016, jihadism rather remains a potential threat, exemplified by the terrifying attacks in other European and non-European countries. The report has also shown that there is no indication for ethno-separatist or left-wing terrorism in Germany. Nevertheless, in political discourse, references to left-wing violence are sometimes used as a political tool by nationalist and conservative parties, especially by the AfD, but also by the CDU and individual politicians of other parties. The trend of overestimating left-wing violence is also visible in public discourse, bearing witness of a mutual interdependence of public and political discourse.

The third part of the report investigates the main collective agents involved in radicalisation since 2001 in their socio-political surrounding. The focus is laid on three networks that have been responsible for most incidents of violent attacks in Germany: I) the “National Socialist Underground” (NSU), which radicalised since the early 1990s and shows ideological and organisational continuities until today; II) the “Freital Group”, which represents recent trends of “turbo radicalisation” that have been taking place against the backdrop of the public discourse of a “refugee crisis” and the massive social mobilization against the government’s migration policy and III) the “Hannibal Network”, which is an outstanding example of the entanglements of far-right networks with parts of the state apparatus.

Finally, the report provides an overview and critical assessments of the development of state programmes to prevent and fight political radicalisation. It criticizes the treatment given by the German state to very different phenomena, such as racism, right-wing terrorism, homophobia, jihadism and left-wing violence, under a single approach of combatting all “extremism”, attempting to link the different fields of action strategically. This does not only blur the substantial differences between left-wing and right-wing positions and equates their level of violence, but it also contrasts both phenomena with an allegedly democratic centre. However, studies have shown that ideologies of inequality and authoritarian attitudes are widespread in all parts of society, which demands an integral perspective that reveals the connections between its different sectors.

Following the three far-right terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020, the report identifies a gradual discursive shift that has taken place in relation to the perception of “right-wing extremism” in 2020 when it was recognized as the greatest threat to democracy by the federal government. This discursive shift materialized in the Cabinet Committee for the fight against racism and right-wing extremism, which was established in May 2020 under the leadership of Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel and adopted a catalogue of 89 specific measures to fight right-wing extremism and institutional racism.

1. Introduction

This report provides an overview of the context, structures, and agents of radicalised political violence in Germany and sheds light on the stakeholders and measures of de-radicalisation (see Appendix 1). Radicalisation is broadly defined as a process involving the increasing rejection of established law, order, and politics and the active pursuit of alternatives, in the form of politically-driven violence or justification of violence. As we can observe in Germany, such processes can take place with rapid pace, facilitated by digital communication and social networks in a globalized world where ideas travel across borders. De-radicalisation is understood as processes countering such rejection at individual (micro), organisational (meso), or societal (macro) levels resulting in a shift from violent to nonviolent strategies and tactics; de-radicalisation might or might not be an outcome of de-radicalisation programmes.

Cases of radicalisation researched in the project include ethnonationalist and separatist, jihadist, left-wing and right-wing terrorism. The latter is of particular importance in the German context, where a massive surge in far-right violence has taken place in recent years. In 2015 and 2016, on a daily level violent attacks on refugees took place, leading to disturbing records of political violence. Terrorist cells such as the “Freital Group” formed and committed serious attacks on refugees and left-wing politicians, while other cells such as “Oldschool Society” and “Revolution Chemnitz” could just be stopped by the police before they could carry out their murderous plans, based on an ideology of white supremacy, anti-muslim racism, antisemitism and misogyny. Most recently, in a period of few months in 2019 and 2020 three right-wing terrorist attacks took place, killing 13 people.

Yet, radicalised political violence against people marked as migrants and political opponents is not a new phenomenon in Germany that emerged with the increased influx of refugees following the war in Syria. It has its roots in the early 1990s, with the rise of nationalism after reunification. What is new, however, is the growing political and public recognition of the threat posed to the democratic system by right-wing extremism and institutionalized racism, which has led to increased attempts to develop measures of de-radicalisation.

Building on existing research and analyses by scholars, journalists and NGOs, as well as on primary data, this report shows the extent of political violence in Germany and the networks in which radicalisation takes place, and presents existing programmes of de-radicalisation. First, it provides an overview of the major socioeconomic and political developments since reunification in 1989, thus providing the broader societal context for processes of radicalisation. Subsequently, available data on political violence is described and discussed before being compared with the political and public perception. After that, radicalised agents and their networks and the relationship to the police, military and intelligence services are discussed. In the last part, the main stakeholders and current strategies of de-radicalisation are presented. The report concludes with a brief summary of the findings and a reflection on possible future trends.

2. Contextual background

The following section describes the socioeconomic and political context in which processes of radicalisation unfolded in Germany since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The German reunification, which officially took place on October 3, 1990, marked the beginning of a challenging process of transforming the East German planned economy into a capitalist market economy. As a result, more than 12,000 East German companies were partly or fully privatized or municipalized until 1994 (BpB, 2020a). More than 3,700 companies were shut down, resulting in a sharp rise in unemployment. At the same time, the transformation of the East German economy was accompanied by a rapid economic catch-up and adjustment process. Housing, cities and infrastructure were modernized, and new, competitive business locations developed. However, this process was unable to resolve all the old inequalities and simultaneously produced new ones. For example, unemployment, which was significantly higher than in West Germany, overshadowed the positive aspects of the transformation process (Schroeder, 2010). Moreover, experiences of deprivation were reinforced by a massive transfer of elites and a one-sided transfer of institutions (Mau/Offe, 2020, pp. 361-362).

Another dramatic change at the socioeconomic level occurred at the beginning of the 2000s under the social democratic chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder. Starting in 2003, the government implemented radical neoliberal reforms in social, retirement and health care policies with the so-called “Agenda 2010”, which stabilized the labour market but at the same time further increased social inequality and fears of unemployment and social degradation. This also marked the beginning of the gradual decline of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) through a loss of popularity within its former core electorate – workers and less privileged segments of the population, which would later facilitate the rise of the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) (Lynen von Berg 2019). Two years later, the coalition of SPD and Green Party was replaced by the government of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the SPD. Angela Merkel took up the chancellorship and retained it for the next four terms for a total of 16 years.

The next social crisis unfolded in the context of the global financial crisis, which began in the USA, where it peaked in 2008 before developing into a worldwide economic crisis. The events also exacerbated the problems and conflicts in the European Union and, starting in 2010, led to a so-called euro crisis, in the course of which some states were threatened with insolvency or national bankruptcy. In Germany, this also led to a crisis of confidence in the political elite and democratic institutions. Against the backdrop of the Euro crisis, the initially primarily Euro-critical party Alternative for Germany was founded in 2013, which was to become an important driver of right-wing radicalisation in the following years.

In 2014, primarily as result of the ongoing Syrian war, the number of asylum seekers in the European Union rose sharply. By the summer of 2016, a total of 1,4 million refugees had arrived in Germany. This situation was instrumentalized by far-right actors, which successfully mobilized for anti-immigrant rallies. In Germany, the anti-Muslim protest movement “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident” (PEGIDA) was founded. The movement expanded throughout Germany and formed an important social space, in which radicalisation processes took place. Likewise, the euro-critical party AfD further radicalised and became the most important player of the “new right” in Germany, with a clearly anti-migration agenda and

featuring regional leaders that openly propagate racist ideas and use neo-Nazi language (Chase & Goldenberg, 2019). Further events contributing to the spread and radicalisation of the anti-migrant movement in Germany were the New Year's Eve incidents of 2015/2016 in Cologne, where numerous sexualized assaults against women took place and were instrumentalized by right-wing actors that pointed to the cultural backgrounds of the perpetrators, as well as the jihadist terrorist attack on a Christmas market in Berlin in 2016. One year later, in 2017, the AfD succeeded in entering the Bundestag as the largest opposition party, with 12.6 percent, marking the first time since reunification that a far-right party has been represented in the German parliament (Quent, 2020, p. 144).

Most recently, the Covid-19 pandemic constitutes a crisis event that reignites radicalisation processes. Anti-Semitic conspiracy myths in particular have gained in importance, such as the conspiracy of a "Great Reset", according to which a global financial elite is planning a reset of the current economic world order using the Covid-19 pandemic as a justification (Balzer 2020). In Germany, the movement "Querdenken" was founded to protest the restrictions introduced by the government to control the spread of the virus. The movement represents a wide range of political affiliations but is open to far-right actors and conspiracy ideologues. A variety of incidents have been documented in which participants of the protests have violated legal regulations, attacked police officers, journalists, and others, and spread hate speech against politicians and experts (Sundermann, 2020).

In summary, as a result of major domestic and global transformations, an atmosphere of social insecurity has led to multiple social frictions and a significant loss of trust in democratic institutions among the population. This has created a social environment in which rapid radicalisation takes place as soon as the next crisis occurs. From the global financial crisis to the increasing influx of refugees, to the Covid 19 pandemic, all of these events have contributed to a dynamic in which segments of the population become increasingly alienated from the democratic system and eager to join radical movements that openly challenge democratic institutions and seek to destabilize and polarise the population. The new right, led by the far-right AfD, played a particular important role in this process

3. Structure of radicalisation

3.1. Statistical evidence of radicalisation

Radicalised political violence is documented by the state through the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). The domestic intelligence agency (BfV) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) base their decisions on the BKA's statistics. According to these statistics, the most significant form of radicalised political violence is linked to "right-wing extremism". In 2015 and 2016, there was a peak of "right-wing extremist" violence with up to 1,600 violent crimes per year, often directed against refugees (Staud, 2018). The most recent report on political violence in 2019 revealed 925 violent crimes "with a right-wing extremist background", of which the vast majority of 781 were categorized as "bodily injury" (BMI, 2020, p. 25). In addition, 121 violent crimes were attributed to so-called "Reichsbürger" and "Selbstverwalter", both groups that share the racist and antisemitic ideology of "right-wing extremists" (ibid.: 30). "Reichsbürger" and "Selbstverwalter" are groups and individuals who, for various motives and

with various justifications, including references to the historical German Reich and conspiracy ideologies, reject the existence or legitimacy of the Federal Republic of Germany and its legal order. According to the BfV, only a small part of this movement is linked to right-wing extremism.

The Association of Counseling Centres for Victims of Right-wing, Racist and Anti-Semitic Violence in Germany (VBGR) points to significantly higher numbers of right-wing violence. In 2019, the organisation counted 1,347 cases in only eight out of sixteen federal states (VBGR, 2020). This difference is mainly explained by the fact that the data collected by the authorities only reflects the police assessment, which often differs from the victims' perspective recorded by the counseling centres (Kleffner, 2019, p. 36). The new project "Tatort Rechts" is an open-source project that collects data on right-wing crimes and makes it accessible to the public with the help of an interactive map (Först, 2021). The data comes from twelve victim protection associations, societies and non-profit organisations distributed throughout Germany. So far, around 16,000 right-wing crimes from the past twenty years have been registered on the platform. However, even this data underestimates the full extent of right-wing violence, as not all regional victims' associations publish their chronicles and, in some cases, some areas have no accessible victims' associations at all. Overall, right-wing violence has killed at least 213 people since 1990 (Brausam, 2021).

Most recently, in February 2020, a far-right terrorist shot nine people to death for racist reasons and then executed his mother and himself in Hanau. Before the attack, he had spread racist messages and conspiracy ideologies on the Internet. Just a few months before, on October 9th, 2019, Stephan Balliet killed a female passer-by and a man at a kebab shop in Halle after failing to break into the main synagogue to kill all 68 people that were celebrating Yom Kippur. During his trial, he espoused a racist, misogynist discourse and denied the Holocaust (Nejezchleba & Schönian, 2020). And just four months before, the neo-Nazi Stephan Ernst assassinated the politician Walter Lübcke (CDU), president of the Kassel governmental district, marking the first murder of a politician in Germany in over half a century (Rivera, 2020). Lübcke had become a target of far-right propaganda after openly supporting the government's refugee policy. The perpetrator was linked to the militant neo-Nazi scene in Kassel, where the terrorist cell "National Socialist Underground" (NSU) had murdered ten people in the 2000s.

A major problem is that many right-wing extremists are armed. In 2020, security authorities registered around 1,200 right-wing extremists legally in possession of weapons, which is an increase of almost 35 percent compared to 2019 (tagesschau, 2021). In particular, the authorities have found considerable supplies of weapons among the so-called "Reichsbürger" and "Selbstverwalter". Moreover, many right-wing extremists possess weapons illegally. The assassination of the politician Lübcke, the terrorist attack at Munich's Olympia Shopping Centre in 2016, and the murders of the NSU were each committed with unregistered weapons (Ayyadi, 2020). In addition, multiple police officers and elite soldiers have been identified as members of right-wing extremist networks, stealing and hoarding weapons to perpetrate terrorist attacks. A particularly disturbing case is that of the terrorist network "Hannibal", made up of former and current members of special units of the police and the military, which the public learned about through research by the daily newspaper taz in 2018 (Kaul et al., 2018). Connected to this network is the cell "Nordkreuz", which hoarded weapons, explosives, body bags and slack lime of the kind used for mass graves, and compiled lists of enemies,

comprised of politicians and citizens that were to be executed on a “day x” (Ramelsberger 2019).

In comparison, violence motivated by jihadist ideology, as documented by the domestic intelligence agency, appears relatively low (BMI 2020: 173). In 2019, the BfV counted 41 violent crimes, including 32 bodily injuries, in the category “religious ideology”, most of which were attributed to “islamism” (ibid., p. 39). Since 2011 the authorities have documented 17 people killed by jihadist terrorism. The most serious incidence was the attack on the Christmas market in Berlin in December 2016, which killed 12 people and injured more than 70. Despite the relatively low reported numbers of jihadist violence, the security authorities are concerned about the potential threat posed by the more than 1,050 people who have left Germany to join the terrorist organisation “Islamic State” (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, some of whom have returned or are expected to return to Germany (ibid., p. 176).

In contrast to the terrorist threat posed by right-wing and jihadist ideology, radical left-wing ideas no longer constitute a terrorist threat in reunified Germany. The peak of left-wing terrorism dates back to the 1970s, known as German Autumn, and is associated with the activities of the RAF. Today, left-wing movements are not driven by an ideology of hate and inequality and represent a very heterogenous scene in which only small parts see violence as legitimate political means in confrontations with the police or right-wing extremists (Polizei Beratung). Nevertheless, left-wing violence is documented and tracked by the security authorities. In 2019, the BfV counted 921 violent crimes, including 355 “bodily injuries”, and two attempted homicides against right-wing extremists (ibid.: 32). Although the number of all violent crimes is almost as high as the number of far-right actors, the number of bodily injuries indicates a clear difference between the structure of right-wing and left-wing violence. While left-wing violence is mainly directed against buildings, infrastructure or other objects, right-wing violence targets humans. Moreover, there is substantial difference in terms of who the violence is directed at and in which contexts it emerges. While far-right groups attack and kill groups of people who they consider inferior, most of the left-wing violent acts take place in confrontation with the police, for example in the context of protests against gentrification or far-right marches. Without denying the existence of left-wing violence, it must be understood as part of a dynamic between heavily armed and in part aggressive police forces and comparatively vulnerable, albeit hooded, groups of people. Against this background, it can also be assumed that left-wing violence is more thoroughly documented by the police than right-wing violence. One of the most prominent recent cases of left-wing violence were the G20-protest in Hamburg in 2017, where massive conflicts between the police and so-called “autonomous groups” took place (von Lucke, 2017). In addition, left-wing violence sometimes challenges the state’s monopoly on the use of force, for instance when they attack known members of violent right-wing extremist groups in order to make public space safer.

3.2. Perception of radicalisation by the political elite

Despite the relatively low statistical evidence of jihadist violence in Germany, the threat of jihadism is acknowledged by all political parties represented in the parliament (see Appendix 2). Politicians point to this potential threat when terrorist attacks occur in other European countries. Against the background of the most recent terrorist attack in Vienna on November 2, 2020, the Minister of the Interior claimed that jihadism poses an “immense threat” and is one of the most serious “challenges of our time” (DIPBT, 2020). In the same context, the far-

right AfD tried to rhetorically link the threat of jihadism to immigration, representing all refugees from Arabic countries as potential threat to democracy: “When the great migration wave flowed into Germany via the Balkans in the summer of 2015, we, the AfD, warned that many violent Islamists could swim along in the stream of migrants, and we were right [...] These people, ladies and gentlemen, are not willing to integrate into our society. They do not want to abide by our laws. They put their religious fanaticism above freedom, the rule of law and democracy” (ibid.).

In contrast, despite the long history of right-wing terrorism, the political elite has long underestimated this threat and externalized it as a phenomenon of radicalised youth, individual deviant persons or as a problem of East Germany, the former GDR. This has been changing in recent years. Especially the assassination of the politician Lübcke in 2019, the first time a political representative of the state was killed by a right-wing terrorist, has contributed to this discursive shift (Götschenberg, 2021). After the murder, the Minister of the Interior, Horst Seehofer, stated that “a right-wing extremist attack on a leading representative of the state is an alarm signal and is directed against us all” (tagesschau, 2019). A year later, after two further right-wing terrorist attacks, Seehofer and the new head of the domestic security agency for the first time assessed right-wing extremism, anti-semitism and racism as “the most significant threat to security in Germany” (Phoenix, 2020). All parties represented in the parliament, with the exception of the far-right AfD, expressed similar statements in relation to the right-wing terrorist attacks taking place in 2019 and 2020. The AfD does not directly condemn right-wing extremism and relativizes its threat. In response to the murder of Lübcke by the neo-Nazi Stephan Ernst, the leaders of the party, Alexander Gauland and Jörg Meuthen, declared: “As a party committed to the rule of law, the AfD and its parliamentary groups strongly condemn extremist violence in any form. It makes no difference whether this is right-wing or left-wing extremist or Islamist terror” (AfD, 2019). This can be read as an attempt to deny any responsibility for the assassination, which according to many politicians followed years of hate speech and threats against Lübcke fueled by the AfD (Wehner, 2019).

In contradiction to the existing statistical evidence, the AfD views jihadism as the largest threat in Germany. Stephan Brandner, deputy federal chairman of the AfD, sharply criticized the federal government's new package of measures against right-wing extremism, which was developed in response to the far-right terrorist wave in 2019/2020, saying “islamism” was much more dangerous: “Hundreds of dangerous persons must be under surveillance around-the-clock, thousands of investigations, criminal offences and open arrest warrants: many times more than right-wing and left-wing extremists together” (AfD, 2020).

Despite the rhetorical shift by almost all parties concerning the threat of right-wing extremism, conservative politicians still warn of a rising threat of “left-wing extremism”. For instance, after heavy violent escalations during New Year's Eve in Leipzig in 2019, Saxony State Premier, Michael Kretschmer (CDU), condemned the violent incidents, in which one policeman was injured, as “left-wing terrorism” (Kretschmer, 2020). From such statements follow the construction of “left-wing extremism” as (almost) equally significant threat for national security as right-wing extremism.

3.3. Public perception

Despite major qualitative and quantitative differences between right-wing and left-wing violence, both phenomena are considered serious threats by the general public. The representative survey “Leipziger Autoritarismus Studie” measured that in 2020, 88 percent of the population considered right-wing extremism a threat and only 15 percent less, 73 percent, perceived left-wing extremism as a threat (Decker & Brähler 2020, p. 107). Although we do not know whether respondents equate the threat, the results tend to reflect a political discourse that has long equated right-wing and left-wing violence despite the non-existence of left-wing terrorism in reunified Germany and decades of right-wing terrorism. Public perception of right-wing extremism as a threat to democracy also depends on political affiliation. Another survey from 2020 showed that while the majority of the population (77 to 90 percent) perceives right-wing extremism as a threat to democracy, only a minority (33 percent) of the electorate of the AfD considers its threat to be very high (Statista, 2020). Furthermore, the example of jihadist terrorism shows how much the perception of threats depends on the current public discourse. The representative longitudinal survey by “R+V Versicherung”, which annually surveys fears among the population, showed that (jihadist) terrorism was perceived as the most significant threat in Germany in 2016 (73%) and 2017 (71%), while in 2020 it ranked only at place 15th (35%) – at a time when this was hardly discussed in the media (RUV 2020).

In summary, the perception of violence in public and by political elites is distorted to the statistical evidence of radicalisation. Far-right terrorism has killed more than two hundred people and represents a major threat to public security due to their armed character and infiltration of state institutions. In comparison, jihadism represents mostly a potential threat, happening in other countries. In contrast to both, left-wing terrorism has disappeared since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, conservative and far-right politicians occasionally warn of a rising threat of “left-wing extremism” and occasionally equate right-wing and left-wing violence. The trend of overestimating left-wing violence is also visible in public discourse, bearing witness of a mutual interdependence of public and political discourse.

4. Stakeholders and channels of radicalisation

4.1. Right-Wing terrorist networks

The following section describes the main collective agents involved in radicalisation since 2001 in their socio-political surrounding (see Appendix 3). The focus lays on three networks that have been responsible for most incidents of violent attacks in Germany: I) the “National Socialist Underground” (NSU), which radicalised since the early 1990s and shows ideological and organisational continuities until today; II) the “Freital Group”, which represents recent trends of “turbo radicalisation” that have been taking place against the backdrop of the public discourse of a “refugee crisis” and the massive social mobilization against the government’s migration policy and III) the “Hannibal Network”, which is an outstanding example for the entanglements of far-right networks with parts of the state apparatus.

National Socialist Underground

Between 2000 and 2007 the so-called National Socialist Underground (NSU) perpetrated a terrorist campaign, in which they committed nine racially-motivated murders and also killed one police officer. The network also committed numerous attempted murders, three explosive attacks and 15 robberies. It was not until 2011 that the terrorist network was (accidentally) uncovered. For years, the police were not able to identify 'racism' as pattern between the single murders even though nine of the ten victims were murdered with the same pistol. Instead, the authorities have focused on the personal environment of the victims and investigated under the suspicion of "organised crime". The German media have also played an important role in the context of the NSU, following the police in their interpretation of the murder series as a case of international organised crime instead of identifying 'racism' as motive for murder (Graef, 2020). In addition, patterns of 'othering' were reproduced by headlines, such as "the Döner killer series" (Pau & Renner, 2015, p. 3). On the other hand, the migrant civil society that in 2006 organised a demonstration under the title "No tenth victim" in Kassel and Dortmund, pointing to the racist pattern of the series of murders, remained unheard (NSU Watch, 2020, p. 39).

Uwe Böhnhardt, Uwe Mundlos and Beate Zschäpe, all born in the East German city Jena, formed the core of the terrorist network (see Figure 3.1). The roots of their radicalisation lie in the early 1990s, where they were active in a militant neo-Nazi organisation called "Kameradschaft Jena" (Quent, 2016). However, not only the trio is responsible for the NSU's crimes. Numerous details have become known that show how the NSU trio was embedded in militant neo-Nazi structures, which provided them with money, false identities, information and weapons (NSU Watch, 2020, p. 62). Furthermore, political and ideological support from civil society are essential to the functioning of the NSU (ibid., p. 74-75). Part of the nationwide support network were the regional structures of the neo-Nazi scene, including the "Thüringer Heimatschutz" (Thuringia Home Protection, THS) and the Saxon structures of "Blood and Honour" and the "Hammerskin Nation" (Koehler, 2017, p. 171-172). Furthermore, the NSU had personal networks in the regions where they carried out attacks and robberies. In April 2013, the anti-fascist Press Archive and Education Centre Berlin (apabiz) assumed a total of up to 200 supporters (ND, 2013).

Group Freital

Against the background of an increased influx of refugees in 2014, right-wing mobilization and radicalisation gained new momentum. In the context of nationwide mobilizations, Saxony became a hotspot of racist violence (Rechtes Sachsen). The weekly racist mobilizations against a refugee shelter in Freital that escalated to a siege of the shelter lasting several days (DNN 2015) constitute a particularly disturbing example. The right-wing terrorist "Freital Group" (also known as "Bürgerwehr Freital" and "Bürgerwehr FTL/360") was formed in this context (see Figure 3.2). They networked and radicalised rapidly through chat groups and quickly got prepared to carry out explosive attacks, even though the members of the group were not previously known as criminals (Wüllenweber, 2017). The website Bell Tower provides an extensive dossier about the cell and its broader network, based on numerous media reports (Rafael, 2018). It shows that the Freital Group also cooperated with the "Freie Kameradschaft Dresden" (FKD). Moreover, among the right-wing terrorists' aides was also an NPD member

who had been a member of the Freital city council since 2014. He provided the terrorists with information, spied out targets for them and incited them on political opponents.

On March 12, 2018, eight members of the Freital Group were sentenced to prison terms ranging from four to ten years for the formation of a terrorist group that has committed serious crimes, including attempted murder in four cases, causing explosive detonations, dangerous bodily harm and property damage. In 2021, further members and supporters of the network were sentenced (Zeit online, 2021a). At least one member of the Freital Group was also involved in the violent attack on the left-wing district of Leipzig-Connewitz in 2016, which was carried out by a wide network of organised militant neo-Nazis, including soccer hooligans and martial artists (le1101).

Network Hannibal

The terrorist network “Hannibal” (see Figure 3.3) became public through research by the daily newspaper taz in 2018 and demonstrates the serious threat posed by an entanglement of terrorist networks and parts of the security apparatus (taz, 2018). A good overview about the network is provided by the study “The Hannibal Complex” published by the “Informationsstelle Militarisierung” (Heyer, 2019). According to the report, the network has formed around a member of the special military unit “KSK” and consisted of about 200 former and active soldiers. The network has set up weapons’ depots, drawn up enemy lists, and prepared for the assassination of political opponents on a “day x”. In addition to former and active elite soldiers, the network also included officials from the criminal investigation department, lawyers, intelligence agencies and security firms. So far, only a fraction of the network has been identified and indicted.

The network is composed of different regional cells in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, which are connected by different chat groups, the association UNITER e.V. and its longtime executive André S. (code name: “Hannibal”). The association UNITER e.v. played a central role for the right-wing terrorist network. The purpose of the association is to create a network for follow-up activities after a career in the military. The organisation also offers seminars and advanced training courses, including paramilitary training. Initially, UNITER only accepted former KSK soldiers, but the association gradually opened its doors to other soldiers, members of special police units, secret service agents, and people from the security sector. Members of the Hannibal network also maintained connections to members of the AfD. Officially, UNITER distances itself from extremism on its homepage.

4.2. State-driven radicalisation

One factor that has enabled right-wing radicalisation and terrorist networks to develop can be seen in the restrained approach that state authorities have taken dealing with the far right. In particular, the role of the federal domestic intelligence agency in the context of the NSU has been highly problematic. A wide network of paid informants directly being connected to the NSU has neither contributed to the exposure of the terrorist crimes nor helped in the fight against the neo-Nazi movement at all (Knight, 2015). Moreover, dozens of files on long-time neo-Nazi informants with direct involvement in the Thuringian neo-Nazi scene was shredded on November 11, 2011, shortly after the discovery of the NSU, casting severe doubt on German authorities' actions (NSU Watch, 2020, p. 77-78). According to lawyers and other experts, the NSU trial has also fell short in identifying and sentencing the broad support

network of the NSU and the failings of the domestic intelligence agency (Ramelsberger, 2019). As a consequence, an isolated and radicalised cell appeared to be responsible for a punctual murder, while the underlying structures of right-wing terrorism remained unclear (Fürstenau, 2020). In 2018, the new head of the domestic intelligence agency also attracted negative attention, downplaying far-right violence and formulating scepticism towards media reports of right-wing mobs chasing people of colour during violent anti-migrant demonstrations in Chemnitz (Connolly & Smee, 2018). In recent times, more rigorous attempts to control far-right movements can be observed. The domestic intelligence agency is currently trying to put the AfD under intelligence observation because of its links to right-wing extremism (Zeit online, 2021b). This would have major consequences, allowing the secret service to listen in on members' conversations, read e-mails and use all other means at its disposal for surveillance.

In summary, far-right terrorism cannot be understood without seriously exploring the networks of perpetrators that enable the development and execution of violent attacks. Particularly troubling is the role of state authorities in facilitating the growth of terrorist structures. Against this context, the NSU trial has been heavily criticized for failing to uncover the connections. Moreover, current investigations shows that terrorist networks also exist within state structures such as the military or the police. Therefore, independent monitoring must be established to uncover and prevent such cases as quickly as possible.

5. Stakeholders and channels of de-radicalisation

The German state has been addressing political violence since the early 1990s through various programmes that are aimed at preventing “extremism” and promoting democracy (see Appendix 4). Burschel et al. (2014), Diedrich (2020) as well as Fuhrmann and Hünemann (2017) provide detailed overviews and critical assessments of the development of state programmes against right-wing extremism. The first programme was the “Action programme against aggression and violence” established in 1992, followed by the programme “Youth for tolerance and democracy - against right-wing extremism, xenophobia and antisemitism” launched in the early 2000s under the slogan “Aufstand der Anständigen” by chancellor Schröder (SPD). In 2007, the state programme “Support of counselling networks – mobile intervention against right-wing extremism” and “Diversity feels good. Youth for diversity, tolerance and democracy” followed. The focus on right-wing extremism was expanded in 2010 by the newly elected Conservative coalition government (CDU/FDP) to include “left-wing extremism” and “islamism”, which it had already been pushing for several years. Such a broad perspective is still evident in the state’s approach in regard to de-radicalisation and shapes the most recent state strategy from 2016, which was developed against the context of rapidly rising right-wing violence against refugees, but explicitly addresses also “left-wing extremism” and “islamism” as dangers for democracy (BMFSFJ, 2016).

This means that the German state treats very different phenomena, such as racism, right-wing terrorism, homophobia, jihadism and left-wing violence through a single approach of “extremism”, attempting to link the different fields of action strategically. This has been criticized for a long time by various stakeholders as it suggests a structural similarity of left-wing and right-wing positions and equates their level of violence, while contrasting both phenomena with an allegedly democratic centre (Burschel et al., 2014). In fact, studies have

shown that ideologies of inequality and authoritarian attitudes are widespread in all parts of society, which becomes masked by the paradigm of extremism (Decker & Brähler, 2020). Said extremism paradigm prioritizes, above all, the protection of the state against politically motivated attacks. And thus runs the risk of overlooking hate crimes against certain groups in civil society, such as migrants or people of colour.

Measures of de-radicalisation take place at the federal, regional and local level and are implemented across different state authorities in partnership with the civil society, which plays a major role in preventing “extremism” and promoting democracy. Currently, the federal programme “Demokratie leben” (Live democracy!) provides funding for a broad range of organisations and projects with a volume of 115,5 million Euro. Despite the discursive equation of “right-wing extremism”, “left-wing extremism” and “Islamism”, the actual funding of projects indicates significant differences. The majority of the organisations and projects funded by the government aim at the prevention or de-radicalisation of right-wing extremists. In this context, the Amadeu Antonio Foundation and the organisation cultures interactive e.V. can be mentioned as important stakeholders that bring together and advance expertise on right-wing extremism and related issues and make it available nationwide. In the area of “Islamist extremism” the most important stakeholders are the National Committee on Religiously Motivated Extremism (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft religiös begründeter Extremismus), the Violence Prevention Network e.V. and Ufuq e.V.. In the area of “left-wing extremism”, one Competence centre, namely the Federal Agency for Left-Wing Militancy (Bundesfachstelle Linke Militanz) receives state funding, as well as four pilot projects, such as the project “Left-wing extremism in past and present” at the Berlin-Hohenschönhausen Memorial.

Unlike the repressive approach exerted by security forces, the state funding of civil society organisations seeks to prevent “extremism” by prevention. The applied concept of prevention is based on a threefold classification into primary, secondary and tertiary prevention (Handle et al. 2020: 6f). While primary prevention supports democratic principles and encourages participation on a broad level, for instance through civic or political education, secondary prevention targets persons with first signs of radicalisation. In contrast, tertiary prevention focuses on violent persons that might have committed extremist crimes or have been involved in terrorist activities before. Here, the aim is to separate individuals from radicalised scenes and to prevent renewed criminal acts. In this context, exit programmes are crucial to realize disengagement, de-radicalisation and reintegration. In the theoretical language of the D.Rad project, primary and secondary prevention address the prevention of the development of ‘grievances’ against certain groups and seeks to prevent ‘alienation’ and ‘polarisation’, whereas tertiary prevention seeks to de-radicalise and reintegrate already radicalised individuals.

A strong involvement of civil society characterizes processes of prevention of extremism in Germany. This has been critically assessed by experts, some of whom describe it as co-optation and de-politicization of civil society (Burschel et al., 2014). The criticism refers, among other things, to the fact that funding conditions tie civil society engagement to the definitions of extremism and democracy perpetuated by state agencies, which produces blind spots with regard to institutional racism or other forms of exclusion (Diedrich 2020). Moreover, close cooperation between civil society and security authorities runs the risk of avoiding a critical examination of “extreme” structures within the security authorities (Burczyk, 2017).

In response to the far-right terrorist attacks that occurred in recent years, a Cabinet Committee for the fight against racism and right-wing extremism was established in May 2020 under the leadership of Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel. This committee reflects the gradual discursive shift that has taken place in relation to the risk of “right-wing extremism” that in 2020 has been recognized as the greatest threat to democracy by the federal government. At its third meeting, in November 2020, the Cabinet Committee adopted a catalogue of 89 specific measures, drawn up after consulting representatives of civil society, especially migrant organisations, and academia (tagesschau, 2020). It intends to make more than one billion euro available for these projects between 2021 and 2024, which includes the strengthening of the programme “Live Democracy!” described above.

Compared to the existing strategies for the prevention of extremism and promotion of democracy, the new catalogue takes a broader view of the problem of right-wing violence. Racism and exclusion are recognized as problems of society as a whole and not just of the youth or the former East German regions that made up the former GDR. This is manifested in measures of political education and prevention that are also directed at public institutions and professionally active adults, including the police and journalists. At the same time, exit and disengagement work continues to be supported as an important component of de-radicalisation. Another new aspect is that the catalogue puts an emphasis on the threat of so-called enemy or death lists, for the prosecution of which amendments to the Criminal Code are announced, as well as a tightening of measures against digital hate and violence. With regard to the relationship between the state and civil society, measures show that the cooperation between civil society and the security authorities will be further strengthened in future: in the further development of exit programmes, the development of de-radicalisation formats, and in political education.

Representatives of civil society have welcomed the package, but also voiced criticism, for instance in respect to the vague character of the catalogue in terms of content and time frame (djo, 2020). Moreover, measures to deal with right-wing extremism in the military and police are considered too weak (Amnesty International, 2020). In addition, the catalogue is criticized for containing too little measures for rural areas and structurally weak regions (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, 2020).

The upcoming months will show how consistently right-wing extremism will be actually tackled in the future, as it remains a contentious issue where conflicting interests clash. Disputes within the government over an initial draft of the announced Democracy Act, which was supposed to secure funding for NGOs that contribute to de-radicalisation, only recently delayed its passage (Zeit Online 2021c). One of the reasons is that the conservative CDU wants to prevent “too” left-wing organisations from receiving funding. This claim has characterized the fight against right-wing extremism from the beginning and reflects the problems associated with state funding discussed above. A similar incidence occurred recently in the Saxon city of Plauen where the CDU, with the support of the far-right AfD and the neo-Nazi party III. Weg, stopped the funding of the “Alliance for Democracy, Tolerance and Civil Courage” as result of a local conflict with this alliance (Röhlig, 2021).

6. Conclusion

Ten years after the discovery of the NSU, the threat of far-right movements remains as serious as ever before. The fact that thirteen people were killed by right-wing terrorism in 2019 and 2020 clearly demonstrate the brutality of the far right, which on a daily level manifests in racist violence throughout the whole country. As the report has shown, current right-wing terrorism builds on organisational structures of radicalisation that have developed since the early 1990s. The ideological roots go even further as the self-designation “National Socialist Underground” demonstrates. At the same time, we are observing changes in the nature of far-right terrorism. The Freital group demonstrates a kind of turbo-radicalisation via chat groups. The terrorist act in Halle points to the dangers of online radicalisation. Racist chat groups in the police, a terrorist network in the military and a democratically elected far-right party now under surveillance by the domestic intelligence agency show the complexity of structures that make right-wing terrorism possible. Therefore, these structures require further investigation.

In comparison to right-wing extremism, evidence of jihadist terrorism appears relatively low. Apart from the deadly attack on a Christmas market in 2016, jihadism rather remains a potential threat, exemplified by the terrifying attacks in other European and non-European countries. The report has also shown that there is no indication for ethno-separatist or left-wing terrorism in Germany. Nevertheless, in political discourse references to left-wing violence are sometimes used as a political tool by nationalist and conservative parties, especially by the AfD, but also by the CDU and individual politicians of other parties. This is a dangerous strategy, which relatives and downplays the existing threat Germany is currently facing by right-wing terrorist networks that even expand into the military.

The report has also highlighted that in the past, radicalised political violence has been enabled by the restrained and fallacious attempts of security agencies to control and fight far-right terrorism. Likewise, the rise of the new right and its parliamentary representation of the AfD as largest opposition party seriously challenges the German democratic system. Against this background, severe strategic shifts that confront institutionalized racism and consequently fights right-wing terrorist structures are urgently needed. Given the entanglement of far-right networks with the police and the military, a substantial shift in regard to security authorities is necessary. The Cabinet Committee for the fight against racism and right-wing extremism as well as the announced observation of the entire AfD as a suspected extremist case by the domestic intelligence agency are important steps into the right direction. How the measures will be implemented remains to be seen, especially against the backdrop of the new federal government to be elected in 2021.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Main (de)-radicalisation events in Germany since 2001

Name	Date/Period	Description
Arson attacks on migrant housing	1990 – 1993	In the early 1990s, neo-Nazis, supported by local residents, repeatedly carried out arson attacks on migrants' homes. Among the most striking incidents were the pogroms in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, Mölln and Solingen. Between 1990 and 1993, 58 people were killed by right-wing extremist violence.
The “National Socialist Underground” Murders	2000 - 2007	Between 2000 and 2007, the “National Socialist Underground” killed nine people of Turkish and Greek origin as well as one police officer.
Discovery of the terrorist network “National Socialist Underground”	04.11.2011	After more than a decade, the core trio of the terrorist network “National Socialist Underground” is discovered. This marked the beginning of the criminal and societal reappraisal of the longest and deadliest series of murders by the far right since 1945.
Violent anti-asylum protests in Freital	2015	In the light of an increased influx of refugees from Syria, anti-migrant protests organised by movements such as “Pegida” are taking place in many German cities. These protests have formed spaces of hate, leading to rapid radicalisation. The weekly racist mobilizations against a refugee shelter in Freital constitute a particularly disturbing example. In this context, the terrorist cell “Freital Group” was formed.
Sexual assaults and muggings by men on New Year's Eve in Köln	31.12.2015 - 01.01.2016	On New Year's Eve, numerous sexual assaults and muggings were perpetrated by men in Köln and other German cities. This event was instrumentalized by right-wing politicians and media by referring to a “foreign culture” of the perpetrators.

Jihadist terrorist attack on Christmas market in Berlin	2016	Anis Amri committed the worst Islamist attack in Germany to date when he drove a truck into a Christmas market in Berlin. Eleven people died and sixty people were seriously injured. This event was instrumentalized by right-wing politicians and movements that pointed to the threat posed by Muslim immigrants.
Federal election	2017	After several successes in regional elections, the Alternative for Germany became the largest opposition party in the Bundestag in 2017 with 12.6 percent of the vote. This contributed to a further normalization of far-right political positions in society.
Violent anti-migrant protests in Chemnitz	26.08. – 01.09.2018	Following a deadly confrontation between several people involving migrants in which a young German man was killed, the AfD called for anti-migrant protests in Chemnitz. Various violent far-right groups, including hooligans, joined the protests. During the event, a right-wing mob chased people of colour and attacked a Jewish restaurant. A few days later, another protest took place in which a broad alliance of right-wing actors, including the AfD, Pegida and violent neo-Nazi groups, mobilized against the government's migration policy.
Assassination of the politician Walter Lübcke	02.06.2019	On June 2 2019, Lübcke was shot to death by neo-Nazi Stephan Ernst. This terrorist attack was followed by two further far-right terrorist attacks within a few months.
Terrorist attack on synagogue in Halle	09.10.2019	After unsuccessfully trying to enter the synagogue in Halle during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, the far-right attacker, Stephan Balliet, shot a female passer-by and a man in a near-by kebab shop to death.
Terrorist attack in Hanau	19.02.2020	The far-right extremist Tobias Rathjen targeted two shisha bars in Hanau and shot nine people to death for racist motives. After the attacks, the

		perpetrator returned to his apartment, where he killed his mother and then committed suicide.
Far-right extremists try to storm the Reichstag building during protests against pandemic restrictions	29.08.2020	In the light of the Covid-19 pandemic, the protest movement "Querdenken" formed to protest the government's policy to contain the spread of the virus. These protests quickly became spaces for radicalised messages and people. On August 29, about 38,000 people gathered in Berlin. Among the protesters were several far-right groups and conspiracy ideologues. In the course of the protest, several hundred people broke through police barriers and climbed the steps leading to the entrance of the Reichstag building. Police used pepper spray to prevent them from entering the building.

Appendix 2. Political discourse about radicalisation in Germany

Quotation	Author(s)	Date of quotation	Source	Comments
<p>“The recent attacks in Vienna, Nice and near Paris have once again made us aware of the immense threat that Islamist terror continues to pose to us. In Germany, too, we have already had three Islamist attacks this year: an arson attack in Waldkraiburg, the attack on the Berlin city highway and the attack in Dresden involving a murder. The danger posed by Islamist terrorism therefore remains as ever. We knew and know about this danger, and we emphasized this again and again in the months before the acts mentioned. How often have I pointed out that our country faces the greatest threat from right-wing extremism? I have also emphasized time and again that we should not be blind to any of these threats. Islamist terrorism is one of the challenges of our time.”</p>	Horst Seehofer (CDU)	05.11.2020	https://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19189.pdf#P.23816	After the jihadist terrorist attack in Vienna on November 2, 2020
<p>“When the great migration wave flowed into Germany via the Balkans in the summer of 2015, we in the AfD warned that many violent Islamists could swim along in the stream of migrants, and we were right [...] These people, ladies and gentlemen, are not willing to integrate into our society. They do not want to abide by our laws.</p>	Tino Chrupalla (AfD)	05.11.2020	https://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19189.pdf#P.23816	After the jihadist terrorist attack in Vienna on November 2, 2020

<p>They put their religious fanaticism above freedom, the rule of law and democracy.”</p>				
<p>“The incidents show us that the threat posed by fanatical Islamism has not diminished. It has been somewhat covert in recent times, but it has further developed and is now fighting its way forward again with great brutality and cruelty. However, we can distinguish between fanatical, violent Islamism and Islam, i.e. people who simply want to live peacefully in our midst.”</p>	<p>Stephan Thome (FDP)</p>	<p>05.11.2020</p>	<p>https://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19189.pdf#P.23816</p>	<p>After the jihadist terrorist attack in Vienna on November 2, 2020</p>
<p>“Islamism is an inhuman, dangerous ideology that is brutally directed against all those who do not live and think as the Islamists want. It is directed against freedom of expression, against democracy, against equal rights, against the freedom of education and science - here in Europe, but also around the world.”</p>	<p>Amira Mohamed Ali (Die Linke)</p>	<p>5.11.2020</p>	<p>https://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19189.pdf#P.23816</p>	<p>After the jihadist terrorist attack in Vienna on November 2, 2020</p>
<p>“A right-wing extremist attack on a leading representative of the state is an alarm signal and is directed against us all.”</p>	<p>Horst Seehofer (CDU)</p>	<p>10.10.2019</p>	<p>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bov38LC9E_dk</p>	<p>The press conference took place after the murder of Walter Lübcke by the neo-nazi Stephan Ernst.</p>
<p>“As a party committed to the rule of law, the AfD and its parliamentary groups strongly condemn extremist violence in any</p>	<p>Alexander Gauland and Jörg</p>	<p>18.06.2019</p>	<p>https://www.facebook.com/afdkompakt/posts/85</p>	<p>Stated after the murder of Walter Lübcke by the neo-nazi</p>

form. It makes no difference whether this is right-wing or left-wing extremist or Islamist terror.”	Meuthen (AfD)		0319098681011	Stephan Ernst.
“There is now sad certainty: The murder of CDU politician Walter Lübcke was perpetrated by someone active in neo-Nazi networks. We do not consider his claim that he acted alone and without the support of others to be credible. From the available files in the Hessian NSU investigation committee, we knew that this man had been networked with militant neo-Nazis in northern Hesse for decades and was also classified as particularly dangerous by the Regional Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Hessen.”	Hermann Schaus (Die Linke)	26.06.2019	https://www.facebook.com/DieLinkeHessen/posts/2649246908427722	Stated after a special meeting of the Interior Committee on the Lübcke murder case.
"Right-wing extremism, racism and antisemitism continue to rise, and the frequent statements made recently can only be reaffirmed today: this area is the greatest threat to security in Germany."	Horst Seehofer	09.07.2020	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3qQZ_WsCKMI	Press Conference about the annual report on the protection of the Constitution 2019
“I would like to repeat this in all clarity. As keyword givers with overlapping personnel in proven right-wing extremist groups, the representatives of the New Right are the superspreaders of hate, radicalisation and violence.”	Thomas Haldenwang, Head of the Domestic Intelligence Agency	09.07.2020	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3qQZ_WsCKMI	Press Conference about the annual report on the protection of the Constitution 2019

<p>“And in this matter, we as the AfD, like no other party, stand for the fight against all extremism - no matter where it comes from: Islamist, right-wing and left-wing. The federal government, on the other hand, wants to promote left-wing constituencies and along the way finance everything that opposes the only opposition, the AfD. This has nothing to do with the fight for democracy and the values of our constitution, but only with symbolic politics and the financing of left-wing street thugs, who repeatedly cause riots and destruction, or more than dubious associations, such as the Amadeu Antonio Foundation, with a Stasi spy at the top. We will not support this. By the way, the numbers also speak for an intensified fight against Islamism - hundreds of dangerous persons must be under surveillance around-the-clock, thousands of investigations, criminal offences and open arrest warrants: many times more than right-wing and left-wing extremists together.”</p>	<p>Stephan Brandner (AfD)</p>	<p>25.11.2020</p>	<p>https://www.afd.de/stephan-brandner-eine-weitere-milliarde-euro-nur-fuer-kahane-co-ist-unsinnige-klientelpolitik/</p>	<p>Statement in response to the announced measures by the Cabinet Committee for the fight against racism and right-wing extremism</p>
<p>“The riots in #Leipzig are disgusting. It is shocking how mobs escalate a New Year's celebration into hatred and violence. Our thoughts are with the emergency personnel who were victims of left-wing terror. The perpetrators must feel the full force of the rule of law.</p>	<p>Michael Kretschmer (CDU)</p>	<p>02.01.2020</p>	<p>https://twitter.com/mpkretschmer/status/1212768221767581698?lang=de</p>	<p>Statement on twitter relates to the violent escalations on New Year's Eve in Leipzig</p>

Appendix 3. Networks of connection of the main agents of radicalisation in Germany




Figure 3.1 National Socialist Underground




Figure 3.2 Freital Group





Figure 3.3 Hannibal Network



Appendix 4. Main de-radicalisation programmes in Germany

Name	Dates	Agents	Approach	Scale	Targets
Action Programme against Aggression and Violence (AgAG)	1992	The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth and civil society	Integrative	Nationwide: regional focus on east Germany	Far-right youth
Youth for tolerance and democracy - against right-wing extremism, xenophobia and antisemitism	2001	The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth and civil society	Integrative and preventive	Nationwide; regional focus on east Germany	Right-wing attitudes in the population
Support of counselling networks – mobile intervention against right-wing extremism	2007	The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth and civil society	Integrative and preventive	Nationwide	Right-wing extremism
Diversity feels good. Youth for Diversity, Tolerance and Democracy	2007	The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth and civil society	Integrative and preventive	Nationwide	Right-wing extremism
Promoting Tolerance - Strengthening	2010	The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs,	Integrative and preventive	Nationalwide	Right-wing extremism

Competence (TFKS)		Senior Citizens, Women and Youth and civil society			
Initiative Strengthen Democracy	2010	The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth and civil society	Integrative and preventive	Nationwide	Right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and islamism
Live Democracy!	2014 – until today	The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth and civil society	Integrative and preventive	Nationwide	Right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and islamism
Federal Government Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy	2016	Various players at federal, regional and local authority level and in civil society	Preventive	Nationwide	Right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and islamism
Cabinet Committee for the fight against racism and right-wing extremism	2020 – until today	Chancellor Angela Merkel chairs the Cabinet Committee. Designated Chairperson is Federal Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer, with Federal Finance Minister	Integrative, preventive and punitive	Nationwide	Right-wing extremism

		Olaf Scholz as Deputy. Various players at federal authority level are also members of the Committee			
--	--	---	--	--	--

References and sources

- AfD. (2019) *AfD Kompakt*. <https://www.facebook.com/afdkompakt/posts/850319098681011>
- AfD. (2020). *Stephan Brandner: Eine weitere Milliarde Euro nur für Kahane & Co. ist unsinnige Klientelpolitik*. Available at: <https://www.afd.de/stephan-brandner-eine-weitere-milliarde-euro-nur-fuer-kahane-co-ist-unsinnige-klientelpolitik/>
- Amadeu Antonio Stiftung. (2020) *Amadeu Antonio Stiftung begrüßt umfangreichen Maßnahmenkatalog des Kabinettsausschusses gegen Rechtsextremismus als Meilenstein – viele Ankündigungen bleiben jedoch vage*. Available at: <https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/pressemitteilungen/amadeu-antonio-stiftung-begruesst-umfangreichen-massnahmenkatalog-des-kabinettsausschusses-gegen-rechtsextremismus-als-meilenstein-viele-ankuendigungen-bleiben-jedoch-vage/>
- Amnesty International. (2020) *Maßnahmenpaket gegen Rassismus nicht ausreichend*. Available at: <https://www.amnesty.de/allgemein/pressemitteilung/deutschland-massnahmenpaket-gegen-rassismus-nicht-ausreichend>
- Ayyadi, K. (2020) *Wie kommt die rechtsextreme Szene an Waffen?* Available at: <https://www.belltower.news/illegaler-waffenbesitz-wie-kommt-die-rechtsextreme-szene-an-waffen-95731/>
- Balzer, E. (2020) *“The Great Reset” – Fear of a Digital Health Dictatorship*. Available at: <https://www.belltower.news/new-conspiracy-narrative-the-great-reset-fear-of-a-digital-health-dictatorship-109155/>
- BMFSFJ. (2016) *Strategie der Bundesregierung zur Extremismusprävention und Demokratieförderung*. Available at: <https://www.bmfsfj.de/resource/blob/109002/5278d578ff8c59a19d4bef9fe4c034d8/strategie-der-bundesregierung-zur-extremismuspraevention-und-demokratiefoerderung-data.pdf>
- BpB. (2020a) *Die Geburtsstunde der Treuhand*. Available at: <https://www.bpb.de/politik/hintergrund-aktuell/201919/1990-gruendung-der-treuhand>
- Brausam, A. (2021) *Todesopfer rechter Gewalt seit 1990*. Available at: <https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/rassismus/todesopfer-rechter-gewalt/>
- Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat. (2020) ‚Verfassungsschutzbericht 2019‘
- Burczyk, D. (2017) ‚Wunderwaffe „Deradikalisierung“: Prävention im Dschungel von Polizei und Geheimdiensten.‘ *Cilip* 113. Available at: <https://www.cilip.de/2017/09/06/wunderwaffe-deradikalisierung-praevention-im-dschungel-von-polizei-und-geheimdiensten/>
- Burschel, F./Schubert, U./Wiegel, G. (2014) *Der Sommer ist vorbei...“: Vom „Aufstand der Anständigen“ zur „Extremimusklausel“*. Berlin: Edition Assemblage
- Chase & Goldenberg. (2019) ‘AfD: What you need to know about Germany’s far-right party.’ *DW*. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/afd-what-you-need-to-know-about-germanys-far-right-party/a-37208199>
- Connolly, K. & Smee, J. (2018) ‘German spy chief contradicts Merkel over Chemnitz clashes.’ *The Guardian*. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/07/spy-chief-questions-merkel-claims-over-chemnitz-clashes>

Decker, O. & Brähler, E. (2020) *Autoritäre Dynamiken: Alte Ressentiments - neue Radikalität*. Psychosozial-Verlag

Die Linke.Hessen (2019) Facebook Post.

<https://www.facebook.com/DieLinkeHessen/posts/2649246908427722>

DIPBT. (2020) '189. Sitzung.' Available at:

<https://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19189.pdf#P.23816>

Diedrich, Maria (2020) *Extremismusprävention versus Demokratieförderung*. Siegen: Sozial. 2020/1

Djo. (2020) 'Einschätzung der djo – Deutsche Jugend in Europa zum Maßnahmenkatalog des Kabinettsausschusses zur Bekämpfung von Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus'.

Available at: <https://www.djo.de/de/content/einschaetzung-der-djo-deutsche-jugend-europa-zum-massnahmenkatalog-des-kabinettsausschusses>

DNN. (2015) *Eklat in Freital: Asylgegner belagern in der Nacht Flüchtlingsunterkunft im Leonardo-Hotel*. Available at:

<https://www.dnn.de/Region/Umland/Eklat-in-Freital-Asylgegner-belagern-in-der-Nacht-Fluechtlingsunterkunft-im-Leonardo-Hotel>

Först, V. (2021) *Tatort Rechts. Neues Projekt sammelt rechte Gewalttaten auf interaktiver Deutschlandkarte*. Available at:

<https://netzpolitik.org/2021/tatort-rechts-neues-projekt-sammelt-rechte-gewalttaten-auf-interaktiver-deutschlandkarte/>

Fuhrmann, M./Hünemann, M. (2017) *Fehlschlüsse der Extremismusprävention: Demokratieförderung auf ideologischen Abwegen*. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Available at:

https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Analysen/Analysen38_Fehlschluesse.pdf

Fürstenau, M. (2020) 'Germany: NSU murder verdict facing challenges from all sides.' *DW*. Available at:

<https://www.dw.com/en/germany-nsu-murder-verdict-facing-challenges-from-all-sides/a-53453001>

Götschenberg, M. (2021) 'Der Mordfall Lübcke hat vieles verändert.' *Tagesschau*. Available at:

<https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/luebcke-prozess-143.html>

Graef. (2020) *Telling the Story of the National Socialist Underground (NSU): A Narrative Media Analysis*.

Handle, J./Korn, J./Mücke, T. (2020) 'Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen in der Tertiärprävention.' *Violence Protection Network*. Schriftenreihe 3. Available at:

<https://violence-prevention-network.de/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Violence-Prevention-Network-Schriftenreihe-Heft-3-1.pdf>

Heyer, L. (2018) *Der Hannibal-Komplex. Ein militantes, rechtes Netzwerk in Bundeswehr, Geheimdiensten, Polizei, Justiz und Parlamenten*. Available at:

<https://www.imi-online.de/download/IMI-Studie2019-4%20Hannibal-Web.pdf>

Hille, P. (2020) *Chronologie: Rechte Gewalt in Deutschland*. Available at:

<https://www.dw.com/de/chronologie-rechte-gewalt-in-deutschland/a-49251032>

Kaul, M./Schmidt, C./Schulz, D. (2018) *Hannibals Schattenarmee*. Available at:

<https://taz.de/Rechtes-Netzwerk-in-der-Bundeswehr/!5548926/>

Kleffner, H. (2019) *Die Reform der PMK-Definition und die anhaltenden Erfassungslücken zum Ausmaß rechter Gewalt*. IDZ Jena. Available at: <https://www.idz-jena.de/wsdDET/wsd4-4/>

Knight, B. (2015) 'Bundestag re-examines intel failings on NSU.' *DW*. Available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/bundestag-re-examines-intel-failings-on-nsu/a-18878453>

Koehler, D. (2017) *Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century. The 'National Socialist Underground' and the history of terror from the Far-Right in Germany*. Routledge

Kretschmer, M. (2020) Tweet. Available at: <https://twitter.com/mpkretschmer/status/1212768221767581698?lang=de>

Le1101: 'Die Täter des 11.01.2016.' Available at: <https://le1101.noblogs.org/inhaltsverzeichnis/>

Lynen von Berg, H. (2019) 'Der Niedergang der SPD als Volkspartei und ihr hilfloser Antipopulismus.' In: *Leviathan*, 47. Jg., 1/2019, pp. 7-27

Mau, S./Offe, C. (2020) 'Vom Einheitsrausch zum AfD-Kater?' In: *Leviathan*, 48. Jg., 3/2020, pp. 358-380

ND Journalismus von Links. (2013) 'Berliner Antifa-Archiv schätzt 200 NSU-Unterstützer.' Available at: <https://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/818661.berliner-antifa-archiv-schaetzt-nsu-unterstuetzer.html>

Nejezchleba, M./Schönian, V. (2020) 'Der Gesellschaftsprozess.' *Zeit*. Available at: <https://www.zeit.de/2020/53/urteil-halle-prozess-attentat-stephan-balliet-opfer-anschlag>

NSU-Watch. (2020) *Aufklären und Einmischen. Der NSU-Prozess und der Münchner Prozess*. Verbrecher Verlag

Pau, P./Renner, M. (2015) 'Foreword' In: *Neo-Nazi Terror in Contemporary Germany: The National Socialist Underground (NSU) – Racist Murders, Bomb Attacks, Neo-Nazi Networks and State Collusion*. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Available at: https://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/engl/Neo-Nazi_Terror_in_contemporary_Germany-NSU_12_2015_engl.pdf

Polizei Beratung. *Vielfältige Szene*. Available at: <https://www.polizei-beratung.de/themen-und-tipps/extremismus/linksextremismus/erscheinungsformen/>

Rafael, S. (2018) *Gruppe Freital. Zwischen vier und zehn Jahre Haft für Rechtsterrorismus*. Available at: <https://www.belltower.news/gruppe-freital-zwischen-vier-und-zehn-jahre-haft-fuer-rechtsterrorismus-47216/>

Ramelsberger, A. (2019): 'Nach dem NSU-Prozess: Leerstellen und Lehren', In: *APuZ*, pp. 49-50

Rechtes Sachsen. 'Daten'. Available at: <https://rechtes-sachsen.de/daten.html>

Rivera, E. (2020) *The assassination of Walter Lübcke. A murky tale of Germany's first political murder in over fifty years*. Available at: <https://www.illiberalism.org/the-assassination-of-walter-lubcke/>

R+V Versicherung. (2020) *Die Ängste der Deutschen 2020*. Available at: <https://www.ruv.de/dam/jcr:179fc5f0-f0df-4973-8fc5-de88cf0da249/ruv-aengste-grafiken.pdf>

Röhlig, M. (2021) ‚CDU stimmt mit AfD und Neonazi-Partei gegen Demokratieprojekt.‘ *Spiegel*. Available at: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/plauen-cdu-streicht-geld-fuer-demokratieprojekt-mit-stimmen-von-afd-und-iii-weg-a-1c72fced-a212-4cb6-92f2-6c029c093ad4-amp?_twitter_impression=true

Schroeder, K. (2010) ‚Deutschland nach der Wiedervereinigung.‘ *BPB*. Available at: <https://www.bpb.de/apuz/32608/deutschland-nach-der-wiedervereinigung?p=all>

Statista. (2020) ‚Sind Rechtsextreme eine (sehr) große Gefahr für die Demokratie in Deutschland?‘ Available at: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/910363/umfrage/einschaetzung-zur-gefaehrung-der-demokratie-durch-rechtsextreme-nach-parteien/>

Staud, T. (2018) ‚Straf- und Gewalttaten von rechts: Was sagen die offiziellen Statistiken?‘ *BPB*. Available at: <https://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/rechtsextremismus/264178/pmk-statistiken>

Sundermann, T. (2020) ‚So rechtsextrem war 2020.‘ *Zeit*. Available at: https://blog.zeit.de/stoerungsmelder/2020/12/29/so-rechtsextrem-war-2020_30430

Tagesschau. (2019) ‚Mordfall Lübcke: Pressekonferenz von Innenminister, Verfassungsschutzchef und BKA-Chef.‘ Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bov38LC9Edk>

Tagesschau. (2020) ‚Kabinettsausschuss. 89 Maßnahmen gegen Rechtsextremismus.‘ Available at: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/ausschuss-rechtsextremismus-103.html>

Tagesschau. (2021) ‚Immer mehr Rechtsextremisten haben Waffen.‘ Available at: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/mehr-rechtsextremisten-mit-waffen-101.html>

Taz (2020) ‚„Rassismus ist ein Gift“‘. Available at: <https://taz.de/Merkel-zu-Anschlag-in-Hanau/!5665261/>

VBGR. (2020) *Drei Todesopfer und durchschnittlich fünf Angriffe täglich: Jahresbilanz rechte Gewalt 2019*. Pressemitteilung vom 12.05.2020. Available at: <https://verband-brg.de/rechte-rassistische-und-antisemitische-gewalt-in-deutschland-2019-jahresbilanzen-der-opferberatungsstellen/#pressemittteilung>

Von Lucke, A. (2017) ‚Die neue Linke und die alte Gewaltfrage.‘ *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*. 8, pp. 5-8.

Wehner, M. (2019) *Mord an Walter Lübcke. CDU weist AfD Mitverantwortung zu*. Available at: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/mord-an-luebcke-cdu-weist-afd-mitverantwortung-zu-16244655.html>

Wüllenweber, W. (2017) ‚Prozess gegen „Gruppe Freital“ Timo - ein deutscher Terrorist.‘ *Stern*. Available at: <https://www.stern.de/panorama/stern-crime/prozess-gegen-die--gruppe-freital---timo---ein-deutscher-terrorist-7351720.html>

Quent, M. (2016) *Rassismus, Radikalisierung, Rechtsterrorismus. Wie der NSU entstand und was er über die Gesellschaft verrät*. Beltz Juventa.

Quent, M. (2020) *Deutschland rechts außen*. Bonn: BpB

Phoenix. (2020) ‚Verfassungsschutzbericht: Innenminister Seehofer und BfV-Präsident Haldenwang.‘ Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3qQZ_WsCKMI

Zeit online. (2021a) ‚Weitere Urteile gegen Mitglieder der Gruppe Freital.‘ Available at: <https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2021-02/rechtsextremismus-gruppe-freital-urteil-oberlandesgericht-dresden-mutmassliche-unterstuetzer>

Zeit online. (2021b) ‚Verfassungsschutz erklärt AfD zum Verdachtsfall.‘ Available at: <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2021-03/verfassungsschutz-afd-verdachtsfall-bundesweit>

Zeit online (2021c) ‚Unionsfraktion bremst Demokratiefördergesetz aus.‘ Available at: <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2021-03/rechtsextremismus-antisemitismus-demokratie-cdu-widerstand>

