Deradicalisation, Conflict and the Value of Social Inclusion
The Horizon 2020 funded D.Rad: De-radicalisation in Europe and Beyond project is to hold its closing conference in Berlin in March 2024
DATES: 21-23 MARCH 2024
VENUE: Freie Universität Berlin, Garystr. 55, 14195 Berlin
Anyone wishing to join the conference as an external should email Dr Mihai Varga – mvarga@zedat.fu-berlin.de
We expect abstracts of ca. 200 words until the 19th of January 2024!
GENERAL CALL FOR PAPERS:
Our project traces the course of moving from a de-radicalised to a radicalised position for individuals through studying their micro-meso-macro factors that generate feelings of Injustice, Grievance, Alienation and finally Polarisation in societies. We call this I-GAP spectrum. To prevent the evolution of such factors and their progression to radicalisation, we promote a social-inclusion informed de-radicalisation strategy resting on arts and sports, public spaces and processes, and civic education. Originating from the D.Rad approach, this conference calls for papers from other colleagues interested in studying
- Intersection between societal processes and radicalisation stages,
- Interdependence of radicalisation involving groups, individuals and societies,
- Effectiveness of legal frameworks and the role of state as a possible actor of radicalisation,
- Engage citizens in weaving the social fabric of communities tightly through sporting and cultural strategies,
- Spatial dimension and public spaces and processes to understand the social glue of inclusion or precursors of exclusion,
- Participatory-methods-oriented civic education as a preventive measure of exclusion and a way to generate inclusion.
Overall, this conference calls for papers to respond to two general questions:
- How to recognise the micro-meso-macro factors that would make a deradicalised person radicalised?
- How to build socially inclusive societies, spaces, and education systems that would move radicalised individuals to deradicalised positions?
Radicalisation versus Representation – how radical actors seek to boost their support by normalising their community-level presence
Convenors: Mihai Varga and Volodymyr Ishchenko
Affiliation: Freie Universität Berlin
Contact: mihai.varga@fu-berlin.de | volodymyr.ishchenko@fu-berlin.de
In D.rad we approach radicalisation as the increasing rejection of established law, order, and politics and the active pursuit of alternatives, in the form of politically-driven violence or justification of violence, while de-radicalisation means processes countering such rejection at individual (micro), organizational (meso), or societal (macro) levels resulting in a shift from violent to nonviolent strategies and tactics; de-radicalization might or might not be an outcome of de-radicalization programs. Individuals and organisations radicalise by moving along a continuum from alleged Injustices to voicing Grievances, to experiencing Alienation and ultimately Polarisation (IGAP) and acceptance of violence. Various processes operate at each of these stages, making it more or less likely that individuals radicalise; importantly, the crisis of political representation talked about in Europe since the mid-1990s (Jay Hayward, Peter Mair) facilitates radicalisation as it limits how people can voice their grievances through established or traditional political parties. Building on the intersection between societal processes and radicalisation stages, this panel accepts contributions discussing prominent cases of radicalisation in national and transnational European context.
We welcome contributions that study radicalisation and de-radicalisation in relationship to concepts such as crisis of representation (the 21-st century disconnect between citizens and political parties); normalisation of radicalised forces, meaning that these exist not (or hardly) only in the underground but also establish legal, non-violent street presence catering to local community needs; and the NGO-isation of de-radicalisation, meaning that governments transfer important secondary and tertiary de-radicalisation tasks to non-governmental organisations facing severe work limitations (temporary funding, project-based operations causing organisational strain as NGOs need to reapply for funding regularly) etc.
Interdependencies in Processes of Radicalization
Convenors: Steven Sawyer and Roman Zinigrad
Affiliation: American University Paris
Contact: ssawyer@aup.edu, rzinigrad@aup.edu
Determining the processes that lead to radical violence plays a central role in developing deradicalisation strategies. Leading scholars of radicalisation have emphasised the importance of grounding analysis of radicalisation in multiple scales, in order to avoid cruder, linear models of causality that fail to capture the complexity of paths of radicalisation (Kundnani, 2012; Schmid, 2013; Crenshaw, 1981). While micro perspectives on radicalisation focus on what causes one individual rather than another to commit acts of terrorism, such as alienation, marginalisation, discrimination, humiliation, stigmatisation, etc, researchers have argued that a focus solely on individual grievances without examining their wider social context is reductive because it suggests the existence of “rebels without a cause” (Sedgwick, 2010). Similarly, analyses of meso factors have demonstrated the importance of situating radicalisation processes in their social surroundings (Conti, 2019). Such socialisation can include networks, groups and community contexts, both off and online. Finally, macro questions focus on how the state and other large-scale institutions relate to various other actors including social and political minorities; geopolitical relationships with other states; and social movement actors (Hecker, 2022).
Challenges in Countering Radicalization: Detecting Trends, Resolving Drivers and Reintegrating. Does the law matter?
Convenors: Maria Moulin-Stozek and Veronica Federico
Affiliation: Veronica Federico – University of Florence; Maria Moulin-Stozek – Jan Dlugosza University
Contact: m.moulin-stozek@ujd.edu.pl | veronica.federico@unifi.it
Preventing radicalization plays a vital role in ensuring an open and tolerant society, and legal systems may have a role to play. Presentations in this panel will discuss the role of the law in countering radicalization through both preventing and repressing measures, embodying the idea that radicalisation is grounded in perceived injustice which leads to grievance, alienation and polarisation. While radicalization does not always have to take the form of perpetration of extreme violent acts, it usually involves rejection of established laws and government. The alienation and lack of agency in legal and political structures contributes creating an ‘us v. them’ identity pattern that can be addressed via rule of law and fundamental freedoms such as freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association and non-discrimination. Yet, if these freedoms are being limited, radicalization acts might no longer be perpetrated just by an individual or a group against a State, but the State itself may lead individuals and groups to perpetrate.
We invite legal, comparative, theoretical, or case-study contributions from law and related disciplines discussing the following or similar questions: What is the role of fundamental freedoms and rule of law in countering radicalization? How critical aspects of radicalization are addressed by the States’ legal frameworks? How effective are existing legal frameworks as well as State practices and policies on macro-, meso-, and micro-levels?
Mainstreaming of radicalisation and counter-narratives to radicalisation on media platforms
Convenor: Ozge Ozduzen
Affiliation: University of Sheffield
Contact: o.ozduzen@sheffield.ac.uk
In the DRad project, we study contemporary radicalised media cultures concentrating on the mainstreaming of radicalisation through social media platforms. This includes the roles that new media outlets (and legacy media) play in – at times indirectly – depicting and triggering injustice claims, alienation, polarisation, and various grievances (what we call the I-GAP spectrum). We examine the online agents of extremism and the ways in which citizens and members of civil society tackle and resist social and political problems related to radicalisation. By looking at the patterns of visual and textual political communication and everyday talk on social media platforms, we therefore aim to understand how racialisation as well as counter-radicalisation are expressed and narrated online and what these expressions and narratives imply on both an individual and community level.
First, we welcome contributions from studies concentrating on the online performances of actors of radicalisation as well as the textual and visual affordances pertinent to social media platforms that (directly or indirectly) may radicalise its audiences and onlookers, help reproduce existing power structures and social inequalities in wider society, and reinforce legacy media norms. Second, we welcome contributions from studies focusing on how de-radicalisation agents (e.g., charities, unions etc.) and ordinary citizens (e.g., activists, influencers etc.) engage in social media platforms to tackle and/or counter different types of radicalisation.
Building on an interdisciplinary terrain consisting of cultural studies, media studies, political and cultural sociology and politics, we thus welcome contributions to the following research questions:
How do actors of radicalisation exploit online platforms to enhance their appeal to publics?
How do new media platforms, tools, and apps instrumentalise radicalisation?
How do actors of de-radicalisation engage in the same online platforms to counter radicalised groups, ideas, narratives and identities?
Understanding radicalisation and extremism as processes from relational and group perspectives
Convenors: Nelli Ferenczi and Mihai Varga
Affiliation: Brunel University London & Freie Universität Berlin
Contact: Nelli.Ferenczi@brunel.ac.uk
As part of the DRad project, we draw on research showing that terrorism and radicalisation are not necessarily a result of psychopathology (e.g., Ruby, 2002; Silke, 1998;), but that they are rather a more dynamic pathway of multiple social and psychological processes leading to radicalisation and endorsement of extremist ideologies. In this vein, Moghaddam (2005) compares the radicalisation process towards violent extremism to a narrowing staircase with a ground floor and five higher floors, where individuals can either remain on a particular floor or climb further up, depending not only on the actual shape of the building but on their individual perception of it. We invite contributions from studies and perspectives which adopt a relational approach which takes into account subjective experiences of marginalisation, alienation, injustice, and grievance in understanding radicalisation and extremism. We also invite conceptual contributions which explore the underlying structural similarities in extremist ideologies. Importantly, this panel also seeks to understand mundane experiences of radicalisation and extremism, particularly in digital spaces, thus, we invite contributions which investigate the ways that radical and extremist content is experienced online from a relational and group perspective, and its impact on individuals’ social well-being. Finally, we invite contributions which investigate the importance of social identities and group processes in radicalisation and extremism, as well as the ways the mechanisms of inter- and intra-group processes are exploited (e.g., salience of group boundaries, provision of belonging and meaning by group membership, etc.) and how they can aid in deradicalisation pathways.
Some of the suggested research questions which this panel seeks to explore are:
How to relational perspectives contribute to our understanding of radicalisation and extremism?
What is the role of social identities and groups in radicalisation processes?
How does extremism manifest in mundane experiences of digital spaces? How do individuals make sense of their interactions with everyday extremist content in digital spaces?
How are radicalisation and radical ideologies understood across cultures in youth?
What are patterns in collective narratives of radicalisation processes?
How do narratives of injustice and grievance emerge from perceived rejection and marginalisation?
How do practitioners understand radicalisation (as well as related concepts such as extremism), its main causes, sources, changing dynamics, the most important radical threats in their own country and in Europe (globally)? Do they understand radicalisation more as an individual or a relational process?
Challenging otherness through arts & sports
Conveners: Maggie Laidlaw, Doga Atalay
Affiliation: Glasgow Caledonian University
Contact: maggie.laidlaw@gcu.ac.uk | doga.atalay@gcu.ac.uk
Arts and sports participation often focus on engaging citizens in weaving the social fabric of communities more tightly through sporting and cultural strategies. In recent years, sport has become increasingly popular as an intervention to reduce crime, increase rehabilitation among offenders, and reduce radicalisation of young adults (Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, 2019). Engaging young people in activities such as sport has been embraced by many community practitioners and government agencies as a central means of developing locally based programs that contribute to community resilience, enhance civic participation of socially marginalised youth, weaken the likelihood of young people becoming involved in groups engaged in violent extremism (Johns, Grossman, and McDonald 2014), or reoffending in criminal activity (Meeks, 2018).
In a similar sense, arts and culture take the role of universal language and of a “free space” where practices of self-expression, dialogue, and conflict management (at individual and collective level) unfold – and where individuals, embarking on creative activities together, can connect and learn about one another.
Both arts and sports have a well-documented history of enhancing life skills such as interpersonal communication, resilience, and conflict management skills. The central tenants here are inter-subjectivity, being-together, and collective understanding – where we can recognise our differences and commonalities, and endeavour to mobilise these in ways that can demystify ‘othering’ narratives and lead us to deeper understandings of our complex communities.
We welcome contributions to the following research questions:
- How can creative arts and sports contribute to dialogue, collaboration, and everyday practices that create a framework around reconciling the grievances that lead to radicalisation?
- What is the impact of arts /sports in developing resilience (to anti-social behaviours/violence/extremism?
- What are the ways in which arts and sports reintegrate divided communities, including the temporal frames within the process of social exclusion/alienation?
The spatial aspects of inclusion, exclusion and (de)radicalisation
Convenors: Ursula Reeger, Emilia Palonen, Miriam Haselbacher and Kanerva Kuokkanen
Affiliation: Austrian Academy of Sciences, University of Helsinki
Contact: ursula.reeger@oeaw.ac.at | emilia.palonen@helsinki.fi | miriam.haselbacher@oeaw.ac.at | kanerva.kuokkanen@helsinki.fi
The spatial dimension of the public sphere is central in understanding the ‘social glue’ of cohesive societies. It is in public spaces where people of different backgrounds meet with varying interests that must be mediated. Public spaces are not neutral spaces as they are characterised by different power dynamics and influenced by the actors occupying them. Encounters between people in public space may foster social cohesion and people’s sense of belonging to a community but they can also contribute to reinforcing boundaries. Several current developments, such as spatial segregation, gentrification, political polarisation, multiple crises and the rise of commercial and private spaces have impacted the distribution of and the access to public spaces. The design and the accessibility of public space thereby has an impact on how different user groups do or do not interact and can thus contribute to the inclusion/exclusion of groups of people. This is also connected to (de)radicalisation processes as exclusionary processes in public spaces may reinforce a pattern where people mainly interact within their reference group. Such processes can foster feelings of injustice, grievance, alienation and polarisation, thus amplifying radicalisation processes. Nevertheless, public spaces may also have inclusionary effects, strengthening a sense of belonging and creating spaces for marginalized people. These processes are often influenced by a variety of actors, initiatives and projects that work on or in public spaces. Cities across Europe and beyond have tackled these issues quite differently: While some seem to neglect public spaces, which is also connected to the question of funding, others have a highly differentiated governmental and administrative apparatus that steers interventions. Hence, the local level is also an arena where various actors interact and where socio-political negotiation processes and political projects of belonging come to the fore.
The panel aims to critically assess the relationship between public space and processes of inclusion, exclusion and (de)radicalisation, as well as the actors and measures tackling these questions.
We are interested in contributions that either empirically and/or theoretically look at these issues, whereby we welcome both single case studies as well as comparative papers from various contexts.
Civic Education as a Preventive Measure against Radicalisation
Convenors: Roberta Medda, Mattia Zeba
Affiliation: EURAC Research Institute
Contact: Roberta.Medda@eurac.edu | Mattia.Zeba@eurac.edu
We invite abstract submissions for a panel discussion on “Civic Education as a Preventive Measure and Inclusionary Practice.” This panel explores the significance of civic education programs as tools to shape beliefs, commitments, capabilities, and actions of individuals as members of communities (Crittenden & Levine 2018) to prevent, contrast and potentially revert radicalisation processes.
Research has shown that civic education programs can positively impact personal efficacy, political participation, tolerance, and even resistance to extremist ideologies (Mouritsen & Jaeger 2018). Educational tools can potentially broaden individuals’ political values, ideals, and concepts, introducing alternative perspectives and worldviews (Koehler 2017). Civic education programs seek to transform injustice frames, alienating dynamics, and polarising narratives into initiatives that improve community life. These programs involve various stakeholders, including the youth sector, social workers, civil society organisations, and the educational/pedagogical sector. The goal is to promote democratic literacy, critical thinking, pro-social resilience to radical ideologies, active citizenship, and a shared sense of belonging in a constructive and non-conflictual manner.
While civic education programs can take different forms such as classroom-based learning, informal training, experiential learning, and mass media campaigns (Rietbergen-McCracken 2018), we particularly encourage submissions that focus on participatory approaches. Participatory methods emphasise the involvement of marginalised voices and beneficiaries, empowering them and encouraging critical thinking, civic engagement, problem-solving capabilities, and cooperation networking (Chiodini 2020). Role-plays, theatrical activities, and other participatory techniques promote civic engagement and democratic values without falling into counter-indoctrination dynamics.
The main objective of this panel is to highlight the challenges, diverse approaches, and effective practices in civic education as a preventive measure against radicalisation processes. We seek insights into programs, methods, and practices in civic education as a deradicalization tool to respond, among others, to the following questions: How can civic education programs effectively prevent youth radicalisation and contribute to the development of pro-social resilience to radical ideologies? What innovative pedagogical methods and interactive, participatory tools can be employed in civic education to enhance its impact in countering radicalisation? How can civic education foster social cohesion, democratic literacy, active citizenship, and a shared sense of belonging to address grievances, reduce alienation, and mitigate polarisation? What are the key challenges and best practices in implementing civic education as a preventive measure against radicalisation, and how can these initiatives be adapted to different cultural and social contexts?
We welcome abstracts that provide theoretical and empirical contributions, encouraging submissions from diverse academic fields, such as education, law, sociology, psychology, political science, etc. Abstracts should clearly overview the proposed topic, research questions, methodology, and potential findings or outcomes.
We look forward to receiving your abstracts and engaging in a thought-provoking discussion on civic education as a preventive measure against radicalisation.
Istanbul Hub for Islamist Radicalisation: Varieties of Islamist Radicalisation
Convenor: Hasret Dikici Bilgin
Panelists: Pablo Onate; Hasret Dikici Bilgin; Nouha Khelfa & Sayed Mustafa Zamani; Rosita di Peri
Panel Description:
This roundtable focuses on the nature of Islamist radicalisation, which appear to originate a common ideological and religious root, yet, takes diverse forms in accordance with the context the movement operates. In the countries where the Muslim population is a minority, the movement tends to take a more radical critical approach with a focus on the minority issues. Pablo Onate’s work on the Islamist radicalisation analyses this aspect. In the Muslim majority countries, approach of the state institutions towards the issues around the public visibility of religion and religiosity shapes the ways in which Islamist politics manifest itself. Hasret Dikici Bilgin discusses this dimension around Turkish Islamism as well as state-led Islamisation. Nouha Khelfa and Sayed Mustafa Zamani take the discussion to Egypt and Algeria. There are also Muslim majority countries, where minority Muslim sects also radicalize. Rosita di Peri’s focus on Lebanon’s Hezbollah is an attempt to untangle such multilevel cases. These different cases show us how the course of radicalization might vary along with the state-society relations as well as opportunities for dialgoue between the movement and the state officials.
Papers:
Explaining Islamic violent radicalization in Spain
Pablo Onate, University of Valencia
Despite having a small Muslim population when compared to other European countries such as France (or the mean in Europe as a whole), Spain has experienced terrorist attacks linked to Islamic radicalization. News on arrests by the police or judicial prosecution of Islamic violent radicals are quite common in Spanish media. Several factors have been underlined as key variables for the Islamic radicalization of individuals; other factors have been identified as ‘inhibitors’ of the use or support of violence in similar contexts. This paper will analyze these factors and their explanatory potential in the case of Spain, comparing Islamic violent radicalization with violent radicalization of different nature.
Turkish Islamism and State-led Radicalisation
Hasret Dikici Bilgin, Istanbul Bilgi University
Turkish Islamism has been a significant part of the political landscape since 1970s. Transition of Turkey to a multiparty system enabled Islamist movement along with the other currents to electoralize. The inclusive aspect of the political system on the one hand prevented the rise of a strong violent Islamist movement and limited jihadism to small groups. Electoral Islam prevailed over the other groups. The Justice and Development Party’s rise to power in 2002 and its initial moderate issue platform was seen as a success in this regard which seemed to fit into the inclusion-moderation approach. However, as the party consolidated its power by winning consecutive elections to this day, the party’s ideological position became increasingly hardline. Although the constitution remained secular and multiparty elections continue, Islamisation became an important aspect of Turkish politics. This paper aims to untangle debates around inclusion-moderation and state-led radicalisation focusing on the Turkish case.
When Does Islamism Become Terrorism? :The Cases of FIS and FJP
Nouha Khelfa & Sayed Mustafa Zamani, Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia
Significant research has been made on Islamism; however, no research has been made to connect the Twentieth Century’s Algerian Islamist party, Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), and the twenty-first Islamist parties in North Africa that emerged as the most popular electoral choice in the Arab World after the Arab Spring, despite their compatibility and the newly experienced ease of accessing primary data—something that was not possible decades ago. This study will fill this lacuna, aiming to answer two questions: Why didn’t the Egyptian coup on Islamist elections result in armed conflict, unlike in Algeria? Why did the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) react to the military coup differently than the FIS, despite the similar degree of regime repression? These findings suggest that the reaction of the two Islamist groups to the military coups depends on the total duration of political inclusion they experienced: the longer the duration, the less radical the party’s reaction. The regime’s strategy of survival to deal with popular uprisings depends on the Islamist party’s reaction. If the reaction is radical, the regime will use terrorism as a weapon to cripple the uprisings. If the reaction is moderate, the regime will search for new ways. This study will employ a variety of primary data (interviews) and secondary data. Relying on Mill’s method of difference, text analysis, historical analysis, and ‘before-after’ comparative analyses, this study draws its conclusion.
Islamist forces in Lebanon: Hezbollah and the others
Rosita di Peri, University of Turin
In the last decades, and particularly after the end of the civil war (1975-1990) the attention of scholars and media on Lebanon has been mostly focused on the Shia party/movement of Hezbollah. The reason is evident: the “Party of God”, after its decision to be part of the political game in 1992, become the most prominent actor of Lebanese politics. This attention slightly changed after the Arab uprisings and the appearance of other Islamist groups in the country, mainly Sunni, as an effect of the transformation of Sunnism in Lebanon. This also resonate with the surfacing of some other Islamist forces (also as a consequence of the emergence of ISIS) such as Jabhat al Nusra, tried to penetrate into the Lebanese territory. If Hezbollah has been inserted in many lists of terrorist groups for his armed branch, paradoxically, especially after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, it has been one of the subjects, with the Lebanese army, fighting against the extremist Islamic groups to defend the Lebanese territory and integrity. This might seem paradoxically considering that Hezbollah itself is seen as a radical Islamist group by many. This speech aims to unpack this paradox showing that the party’s agenda and nature do not contradict this attitude as well as Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian war beside Bashar al Asad.